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ABSTRACT 
There are two themes contained in this thesis: firstly, the examination 
of the Palestinian attitude, concept and views towards Zionist settlement 
in Palestine during the period 1917-1948, secondly, the analysis of their 
arguments and responses to the different attempts to solve the Palestine 
conflict during this period. 
The Palestinians viewed Zionism as a European political movement which was 
connected with Western colonialism, and sought to transform Palestine into 
an exclusively Jewish state. Therefore, they resisted this alien settlement 
in their country by all possible means, political as well as military. 
The Palestinians, however, failed to persuade the British Government to 
grant them independence or to stop Zionist settlement because they, as a 
traditional society, did not possess the material or military power to 
match the combined forces of the British Empire and the Zionist movement. 
However, during this period the British Government suggested certain 
proposals to solve the conflict, but these proposals were rejected by the 
Palestinians, the Zionists or by both. Therefore, in 1947 the British 
Government transferred the problem to the United Nations. On 29th November 
1947 the U.N., under the influence of the Western powers and the approval 
of the Soviet Union, endorsed a partition scheme, similar to a partition 
plan suggested by the Royal Commission in 1937, which proposed the 
establishment of two independent states, Arab and Jewish. The Palestinians 
rejected the proposal on the grounds that it was not based on the 
principles of justice, equality and the right to self-determination. 
This study suggests that the Palestine conflict was created as result of 
alien settlement in a country which was already inhabited by a people who 
were unwilling to compromise on what they saw as their right to 
independence under a national government which would represent the wishes 
of the majority. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
When I decided to study the basic Palestinian arguments and responses 
to Zionist settlement in Palestine, especially their responses to the 
attempts to solve the conflict, I expected to be asked the following 
questions: What can a historical approach offer to the social scientist 
who is interested primarily in contemporary social conflict or to the 
policy-maker whose focus is on the present and on the future? What 
relevance for example, do historical crises have for the present 
conflict between the Arabs and Israel? Clearly the circumstances are 
different, the people, the leaders, and weapons are different. What can 
we learn that will be useful in facing and solving problems of the 
future? 
Social science approaches to historical situations are based upon the 
fundamental assumption that there are pattern repetitions, and close 
analogies throughout the history of mankind. It is true that the 
circumstances will differ between the 1930s and the 1980s but the 
patterns of human fears and anxieties and perceptions of threat and war 
may not be dissimilar. 1 A fundamental part of the problem lies in 
identifying the levels of abstraction in finding likeness between 
problems or crises that are widely separated in time and also in space. 
There is a further consideration. In fact, history may provide the 
sole key we have to the future. As Horst put it "The only way to judge 
what will happen in the future is by what has happened in the past.,,2 
Wisdom about the present and future is derived from what we have 
experienced or learned about in the past. It is by comparing new 
problems with old experiences, by looking for similarities and 
differences, that we move into the future. "Other things being equal, 
the more frequently things have happened in the past the more sure you 
can be they will happen in the future.,,3 As human beings we have no 
other way of assessing, judging and deciding. 
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Essentially, then, it is by projecting past experiences into the 
future that human beings make decisions, and the leaders of states in 
this respect, are not exceptions. Thus, foreign policy decisions, like 
other human decisions, imply not only an abstraction from history but 
also the making of a prediction, the assessment of probable outcomes. 
These two operations may be undertaken almost unconsciously, but they 
are nonetheless real and inescapable. 4 For example, the "Marshal Plan" 
was based upon a prediction derived from a combination of experiences, 
that systematic aid to European countries would bring about certain 
consequences. Viewed in retrospect this prediction seems to have been 
sound. The basic prediction inherent in the Russian leaders' decision to 
establish long range missiles in Cuba was much less accurate. 5 The 
Palestinian prediction that the Jews would leave Palestine when the 
British did was also wrong and the Zionists' prediction that the Jewish 
problem would be solved once the Palestinians had been uprooted from 
Palestine and a Jewish state had been established there was wrong too. 
Prediction depends always upon knowledge and knowledge is necessarily 
an offspring of the past. This principle is basic, not only to science, 
but perhaps to all knowledge and herein lies the crucial importance of 
understanding the Palestinians' arguments in the first period in order 
to understand and predict their future responses for any lasting 
settlement of the Palestine conflict. It is not sufficient to know what 
happened, we want to know how the people concerned explained and 
understood the problem. As Robert Park put it: "It is not sufficient to 
know what happened we want to know how the transaction looked through 
the eyes of individuals seeing it from opposing points of view."6 In 
other words I would like to highlight the Palestinians' point of view in 
relation to their conflict with the Zionists and how they responded to 
the attempts to solve the conflict. 
Probably Palestinian-Zionist conflict in fact is very complicated. No 
other topic of discussion in recent times has generated such polemic in 
academic and political circles as has commentary on the 
Palestinian-Zionist conflict in Palestine or later between the 
Palestinians, the Arabs and "Israel".7 From the beginning any critical 
assessment of Zionist policies in relation to settlement in Palestine 
would provoke emotional accusations, often loaded with charges of 
anti-semitism, even when the critics were Jews or pro-Zionists. The 
Zionist Movement succeeded in giving the impression that the aim of 
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Zionist settlement in Palestine was to find a refuge for the persecuted 
Jews and the relief of their hardships, and on the other hand that such 
settlement would not benefit the Jews only but the Palestinians as well. 
The Zionists succeeded in building such a noble image of the aim of 
their settlement in Palestine through their advanced methods of 
diplomatic negotiations and propaganda, carried out by and through their 
offices throughout Europe and the United States and their official 
representatives in these countries 
Indeed the Zionists succeeded in shaping World opinion into the belief 
that Palestine was their "promised land", that it was a country without 
a people and the Jews were a people without a country. They argued that 
their endeavours and skill would bring civilisation and prosperity to 
the few "nomad" Arabs living their, without any reference to the 
negative impact on the native population. Such misconceptions about the 
aim of Zionism prevailed in Europe because of the combined efforts of 
Britain and the Zionist Movement. Michael Adams and Christopher Mayhew 
argue that over the past half-century a "deliberate and generally 
successful attempt has been made to cover up the truth about Palestine 
with damaging consequences for the cause of peace and justice in the 
Middle East."8 Adams explains some of the reasons behind the lack of 
information about the Arab point of view, which in addition to the bias 
in the mass media, involved the difficulty of finding a publisher to 
publish books which may express the Arab view: "It was very difficult to 
persuade a publisher to take on a book which stated the Arab case over 
Palestine." He added that: "Even when an author was successful in 
getting a manuscript accepted by a publisher, and when nothing 
intervened to prevent its publication, there remained the problem of 
getting the book distributed and reviewed."9 
Hadawi too, argued that his publisher did not find any bookstore to 
place his book in the United States. IO But Jamil Hamad looks at the 
problem from a different angle and rightly put some responsibility on 
the Arabs themselves. He observes that: "We drank coffee in the desert 
with T.E Lawrence while Chaim Wiezmann and Nahum Sokolo lobbied in 
London for British support of a national homeland for the Jewish 
people."ll 
I would add to these arguments that it is extremely difficult for an 
Arab scholar to express views which might criticize the official views 
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of the Arab States or their way of handling the conflict from the 
beginning without being subject to physical threats or being debarred 
from work in these countries. One of the common features of the Third 
World countries is that scholars are not allowed to express their views 
if these views are different from the official views of the governments. 
The Palestinians, in other words, lacking similar propaganda machinery 
and facilities enjoyed by the Zionists, and for the other mentioned 
reasons were not able to explain or to make their arguments heard 
outside Palestine. Moreover, they were accused by Zionists and 
pro-Zionist circles of being backward, traditional, oriental and even 
not knowing what was good for them and refusing every proposal and 
opportunity for peace. 
The Palestinians basic demands and arguments during the Mandate did 
not, however, change much and included the followings: 12 
1. The ending of the British Mandate and the policy of sponsoring a 
Jewish horne in Palestine 
2. The establishment of a Palestinian democratic state representing 
all the inhabitants of Palestine: Muslims, Christians and Jews, 
according to their numbers. 
3. The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination according 
to international law and the League of Nations or U.N. Charters and the 
rejection of any right for any other government or organization to 
suggest solutions on any bases other than justice, equality and the 
right for self-determination. 
These demands were submitted to the British Government through four 
Palestinian delegations to London between 1917 and 1937 and through all 
the direct or indirect negotiations between the Palestinians and the 
Arabs on one side and the British Government on the other during the 
rest of the British Mandate period. However, the British Government, 
which was committed to the Zionist cause, was adamant in its pro-Zionist 
policy and therefore, rejected all Palestinian demands for 
self-determination. 13 
It is worth noticing here that what was to be accepted in general 
about the nature of the Zionist settlement in Palestine could be said 
about the nature of "Israel"'s policies towards the Palestinians. 
"Israel"'s experiments captured the imagination of some Western social 
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writers to the extent that Peter Worsley recommends it as a good example 
to be followed by developing countries: "Israel provides one set of 
lessons: a country which has had to fight for independence, and which 
has actually made the desert bloom, using "communitarian" methods of 
organization and living together which might well be adapted to African 
and Asian conditions.,,14 
Such a good image of "Israel" made it difficult for any writer to 
criticize "Israel"'s policies towards the Palestinians. Any writer who 
dared to criticize "Israel" would simply be accused of being 
anti-semitic. As James Reston put it: "You can put it down as a general 
rule that any criticism of Israel's policies will be attacked as 
anti-semitism.,,15 
In the light of this it is understandable that any academic should 
think carefully before uttering what might be construed as criticism of 
Zionist settlement in Palestine or later the policies of "Israel." 
Mayhew describes the methods, used by Zionists to discourage the 
expression of views sympathetic to the Arabs, as "damaging in every way: 
politically, professionally, socially.,,16 This situation has created 
unhealthy political, moral and intellecual immunity which has put 
Zionism, and later "Israel", beyond the limits of critical analysis. The 
result has been to produce a nationalistic inwardly-oriented 
interpretation of Zionist settlement in Palestine which reflected 
preoccupation with Zionist achievements, as these achievements were 
defined by the ideologists of Zionism and later of "Israel." 
It is natural, on the other hand, to expect that under such 
circumstances the Palestinians would be assigned a peripheral place in 
Zionist and pro-Zionist writers' investigations. 
The general Western view of Zionist settlement in Palestine, a view 
adhered to by the mass media and policy makers alike, acknowledged the 
pioneering of that settlement and the democratic nature of "Israel" best 
epitomised in the "Kibbutz,,17 and the political institutions of 
"Israel." 
This characterization augmented the basic definition of "Israel" which 
was to provide a refuge and solve the problem of the persecuted Jews of 
the World. These images of "Israel "incorporated counter images of the 
Palestinians, images which depicted the Palestinians as traditional, 
backward and later as "terrorists" determined to destroy "Israel." 
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Such images of the Palestinians were also common features of the 
relations between whites and non whites in South Africa and still remain 
until the present moment. Banton gives an explanation of such negative 
images between Whites and Blacks in South Africa: The two may interpret 
s i mil ar events in qu i te different ways. Th is is because: "As many Wh i tes 
do not respect African culture or seek to understand it, they may fail 
to see that the Africans view of the situation is a reflection of a 
different culture and regard it simply as an indication of childishness 
or stupidity."IB 
Nobody, perhaps, would deny the pioneering nature of the Zionist 
settlement or the advanced methods of development in "Israel" if it took 
place in an empty or uninhabited area. But the fact is that settlement 
and later the establishment of "Israel" took place at the expense of the 
Palestinians. Therefore, we should look at and evaluate this settlement 
not only according to its material achievement but rather in its 
negative impact and result on the Palestinians. In other words, some 
notions such as the pioneering nature of Zionist settlement or its 
revolutionary socialist aim to solve the problems which faced world 
Jewry should not, in any way, distract the researcher from examining 
critically the latent results and consequences of that settlement and 
how it actually materialized. 
In this line of thinking I agree with Peter Berger's notion of "Socio-
logical consciousness."The ability to distinguish between the intended 
and latent functions of social processes is an essential ingredient in 
the "debunking" tendency in sociological thought. Berger perceives that: 
"The sociological frame of reference, with its built in procedure of 
looking for levels of reality other than those given in the official 
interpretations of society, carries with it a logical imperative to 
unmask the pretensions and the propaganda by which men cloak their 
actions with each other.,,19 In other words we must distinguish between 
social appearances and social reality. As Lewis Coser put it: "We must 
concern ourselves with latent as well as with manifest elements within a 
relationship if its full meaning is to be disclosed ana1ytica11y.,,20 
real life example, Zionist settlement in Palestine was 
some writers as a pioneering work which made the desert 
is the social appearance. The social reality;s that the 
and later the establishment of "Israel", in one way or the 
To give a 
described by 
bloom, this 
settlement 
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other, resulted in the displacement of a large number of the 
Palestinians from their native land and caused severe hardships for all 
the Palestinians. It is, at least for the Palestinians, the cause of the 
whole Palestinian problem. 
However, it does not mean that ideas are not important but as Berger 
argues: "It does mean that the outcome of ideas is commonly very 
different from what those who had the ideas in the first place planned 
or hoped.,,21 To illustrate this further Berger gives this example: the 
manifest function of anti-gambling legislation may be to suppress 
gambling but the result or the latent function was the creation of an 
illegal gambling empire.,,22 
Maxime Rodinson advances a similar idea in referring to Zionism as an 
ideology. "As with any ideological movement, one must differentiate 
between ideal principles and variants that crop up in internal 
tendencies and with the passage of the time, the implicit or explicit 
motivation of the masses of followers, the strategies and tactical plans 
of the leaders, the fulfillment of these plans (which are always only 
partial and which always come about in somewhat unforseeable 
circumstances) the consequences of these plans, etc.,,23 
This sociological approach would allow us to examine critically the 
Zionist settlement as it affected the Palestinian and to highlight the 
Palestinian arguments regarding a peaceful solution to their dispute 
with the Zionists and later with "Israel" which may deviate from the 
traditional research by Zionists or the pro-Zionist writers who 
concentrate on the positive side of the settlement and on the negative 
response of the Palestinians and the Arabs in general. 
Between 1917-1948 Palestinian society was transformed from a once 
pre-dominantly traditional Arab society into a plural society with its 
two main segments, the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionist settlers, 
mainly Europeans. During this period the Zionist movement succeeded 
under British legislation, sponsorship and protection, in bringing to 
Palestine about half a million Zionist settlers, forming about one-third 
of the total population, and acquiring about 1.8 million donums or about 
7 percent of the total lands of the country. Yet the U.N. Partition 
Resolution of November 1947 awarded the Zionist settlers over half of 
the country, including almost all citrus and cereal lands and the water 
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resources, and put under their control about half a million Palestinians 
as a permanent minority. 
The U.N., however, as a result of rivalries between the big powers, 
failed to implement the Partition Plan (See Chapter 8) and a local war 
brokeout in Palestine between the Palestinians and the Zionists. During 
the last six months of the Mandate, November 1947 to May 1948, and 
during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the majority of the Palestinian 
people "fled from fear of death" and as a result of Zionist terrorism 
which was designed "to clear the Arabs out,,24 and make possible the 
establishment of an exclusively Jewish state. Palestine was politically 
transformed into a Jewish state, "Israel", a Jordanian West Bank and an 
Egyptian Gaza Strip. The political transformation of Palestine had the 
apparent effect of transforming the original conflict between the 
Palestinians and the Zionist settlers into one between certain Arab 
states and "Israel." The "National" character of the conflict has been 
reinforced in the public mind not only by most writers on the conflict 
since 1948, irrespective of their source, but additionally by the 
periodic eruption of war, the perennial deliberations in the U.N., which 
address themselves to sovereign states, and by the coverage of the 
conflict in the mass media. 
The impact of these writings and deliberations has been towards the 
designation of the conflict as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and projected 
solutions to the conflict hitherto have been decisively affected by that 
designation. On the other hand, the designation of the Palestinians as 
"refugees" had the effect in World public opinion of removing them as an 
original party to the conflict and projecting them as a "refugee 
problem"in search of a solution other than the establishment of their 
own state which was proposed by the Partition Resolution, such as 
resettlement outside Palestine. 
The truth of the matter is that the Palestine conflict must be called 
first and foremost a dispute between the Palestinian people and the 
Israelis before it can be labelled as an Arab -Israeli conflict. No 
matter what language diplomacy uses in defining the rights of the 
Palestinians, the fact remains that the major portion of the territory 
now called "Israel" is legitimately owned by individual Palestinians who 
are entitled to return to it according to the United Nations Resolution 
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194 (111) of 1948 and to establish an Arab state according to the 
Partition Resolution of November 1948 on which "Israel" based its own 
legality. 
The events since 1948 suffice to remind us that the Palestinians are 
determined, more than at any time before, to continue their struggle, no 
matter how long it will take them, until they get their legitimate 
rights and establish their own state. The establishment of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization 
guerrillas and "Israel" 
and the hostilities between the Palestinian 
helped focus the attention of world public 
oplnlon on their deep and long standing grievance and claim and reminded 
all concerned that one of the two original parties to the conflict had 
been denied the exercise of their rights. 
In this sense, the need for research that addresses itself more clearly 
and directly to the original conflict that has set Israel against some 
Arab states is overdue. Time and events have proved that a lasting 
settlement to the conflict cannot be achieved without an understanding 
of the Palestinians' views regarding the nature of conflict and their 
conditions for solving it. Arab views are not understood, are distorted 
or inhibited in the West. According to Adams: "The Arabs found 
themselves virtually cut off from access to Western opinion and felt 
frustrated over the absence of any balanced discussion of the issues at 
stake in the Middle East."25 
In this sense, the objective of this thesis is twofold: On the one 
hand it seeks to make an important contribution to the scholarly 
understanding and knowledge of the Palestinians views on Zionism and 
their responses to the attempts to solve the original conflict, and on 
the other, by clarifying those views and responses it aims at the 
promotion of serious efforts that seek a just and a lasting solution to 
the conflict. 
Accordingly the major thrust of the chapters in this thesis is towards 
the Palestinians' views and responses from their own point of view. This 
is important because as Toynbee rightly put it: "What is peculiar about 
the Palestine conflict is that the World has listened to the party that 
committed the offence and turned a deaf ear to the victims."26 Adams 
too, advances a similar view and argues that: "It was very rare to find 
-9-
in the British press any coherent statement of the Arab point of view 
over the Palestine question or any explanation of the origins of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The same thing was true elsewhere in the West."27 
The underlying rationale for undertaking the study in this particular 
form should be evident. Hitherto, scholarship on the Palestine conflict 
has reflected serious shortcomings. For one thing, most writing is not 
done by Arabs and tends to present the conflict as a conflict between 
two "Nationalist movements" of which one, the Zionist, was always 
pragmatic and ready for peace, and the other, the Arab, was always 
uncompromising and refused any settlement; for another, the findings 
tend to confirm the assumption that the conflict is between certain Arab 
states and "Israel"; and for a third, that the Palestinians refused to 
establish their proposed state; that they voluntarily, left their homes 
and lands in 1948, and finally that there is no need to establish such a 
Palestinian state since the Arabs have many states. 
This thesis seeks to answer some of the following questions: How did 
the Palestinians view Zionism and the conflict? How did they respond to 
Zionist settlement? What were their modes of action and methods of 
resistance? Why did they not succeed in stopping this settlement? Was it 
because they did not understand the Zionist danger or because they could 
not match the combined material and military forces of the British 
Government and Zionism? What was the impact of Zionist settlement on 
Palestinian society? Why did the Palestinians flee? Was it in response 
to Arab calls or for fear of death? What were their arguments and 
responses to the attempts to solve the conflict? Was there any genuine 
opportunity for settlement which was lost? What were the basic 
Palestinian demands and conditions for peace? What was the practical 
implication of the Palestinians responses to Zionism and their tactics 
in handling the problem? 
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The Plural Society Theories in Relation to Colonialism 
Models of Society 
In the recent history of contemporary sociology two theories have 
emerged to explain the puzzling process of society's cohesion: One of 
these, the integration theory of society, assumes that social 
integration is the ultimate goal of society. This can be attained on the 
basis of widespread identification with a representative value system. 
According to this school of thought this sharing of values in society is 
made possible through the creation of institutions whose structures are 
assumed to be functional in terms of maintaining the needs and goals of 
society at large. 28 The other one, the coercion theory of society, 
states that cohesion is imposed by force and constraint. It views social 
structure as a form of organization held together by force and 
constraint. 29 
In fact there are social problems which could be explained by one 
theory or the other while there are problems for which both theories 
appear adequate. As Dahrendorf put it: "A decision to accept one of 
these theories and reject the other is neither necessary nor 
desirable."30 
However, up to the mid 1960s the consensus model, notably that of 
Talcott Parsons, clearly dominated sociological writings, especially in 
North America. What characterized this theory was the assumption of 
stability and integration in every society and that its functional 
co-ordination is based on a voluntary consensus of values among its 
members and the absence of coercion, be it on the level of values or of 
action. Such a "structural functional" model had an equally 
corresponding perspective in political science that is "pluralism."31 
Pluralism conceived in this fashion depicts society as composed of 
different groups, none of which has an overriding influence in shaping 
the decisions emanating from the political sphere. These groups act to 
countervail and even cancel each other out, thus preventing the rise of 
one dominant group which would then have a monopoly over power 
distribution in society.32 Using such an approach, certain writers have 
argued 
on the 
that, the stabil i ty and "success" of democrat i c soc i et i es depend 
sharing of general political and pre-political values. 33 But 
others such as some Marxists attack the value consensus model and for 
them integration on the level of values if it took place in a capitalist 
society is a "False consciousness" and manipulative socialization. 34 
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It is this underestimation of the coercive factor and the assumption 
of integration and voluntary consensus of values in societies which gave 
rise to more critical objections to the pluralist consensus persuasion 
and led some writers to turn to what they saw as more viable outlooks in 
the analysis of society which take into account conflicting group 
interests. 
The integration theory, as Banton noticed: "By its very nature ... , is 
not well suited to the study of circumstances in which two societies 
interact or in which social patterns are maintained by force rather than 
by agreement."35 Dahrendorf too argues that: "The very one sidedness of 
this theory gave rise to critical objections which enable us today to 
put this theory in its proper place."36 He goes on to say that the 
integration model tells us little more than that there are certain 
"strains in the system."37 Because the integration theory, according to 
Dahrendorf, is unable to cope with all social problems, he suggested 
replacing it with another theory. In his words: "We have to replace the 
integration theory of society by a different and, in many ways, 
contradictory model ... what I have called the coercion theory."38 The 
main assumptions of Dahrendorf's theory are: 39 
1. Every society displays at every point dissensus and conflict. 
2. Every society is at every point subject to processes of change 
3. Every element in a society renders a contribution to its 
disintegration and change. 
4. Every society is based on the coercion of some of its members by 
others. 
Dahrendorf accepts the presence of conflict in society but considers 
this conflict to be absorbed and channelled through various 
organizations 
major point 
(legitimate 
such as political parties, trade unions etc. He sees the 
of contention as centring around lines of authority 
power)and not around class interests in the Marxian sense. 
In institutional terms, this means that in every social organization 
some positions are entrusted with a right to exercise control over other 
positions in order to ensure effective coercion or "there is a 
differential distribution of power and authority."40 
According to Dahrendorf, "This differential distribution of authority 
invariably becomes the determining factor of systematic social conflict 
of a type that is germane to class conflict in the traditional (Marxian) 
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sense of this term."41 The structural orlgln of group conflict, 
according to Dahrendorf, must be sought in the arrangement of social 
roles endowed with expectations of domination or subjection. Thus a 
member who is in a position of dominance in one sphere of life is not 
necessarily fit to occupy the same position of dominance in another. In 
a way, while this outlook recognizes the inevitability of conflict at 
the organizational level, it nevertheless sees some form of Pluralism on 
the societal level. 
Michael Mann points out four objections to the integration theory. 
These are the following: 42 
1. Most general values, norms and social beliefs usually mentioned 
as integrating society are extremely vague. 
2. Even if a value is stated precisely, it may lead to conflict, not 
cohesion. Because some values unite people, others necessarily 
divide them. 
3. The standards embodied in values are absolute ones, and it is 
difficult for such absolutes to co-exist without conflict. 
4. Where insulation processes operate, cohesion results precisely 
because there is no common commitment to core values. 
The last point of Mann's findings was that "value consensus does not 
exist to any significant extent."43 
The so called conflict theorists are many and I do not intend to deal 
with all the various strands of their respective theories in this 
thesis. But suffice it to say that the most influential theory of social 
conflict has certainly been that of Karl Marx. The Marxian theory which, 
rather than placing primary emphasis on common as well as integrating 
aspects of society, looks for class differentiation based on the 
relation of the classes to the means of production, which alternately 
give rise to opposing interests. Another theory which deals with social 
conflict is so-called Social Darwinism. 44 The fundamental idea of this 
theory is that society and groups are engaged in a struggle for 
existence in which the fit survive. The Social Darwinists were simply 
trying to prove that "there had been a process analogous to biological 
selection in the struggle for existence among societies."45 For the most 
part they saw the units of struggle to be society and the process wars 
and conquests. 
-13-
The first sociologist to consider conflict as a separate subject, 
without reference to any larger subject like the Marxian theory or 
evolution and survival, was Georg Simmel. 46 He was interested in both 
internal and external conflict, in both causes and results and in both 
personal and group involvement. As Robert Angell put it, "If one can 
summarise so diffuse a piece of work, the central idea in Simmel's essay 
is that conflict is constructive. It is his belief not only that it 
gives rise to social change, as Marx would have it, but also that in 
many ways it is immediately integrative."47 Such a function becomes 
apparent when there is an external danger threatening the society. A 
good example for this is the Israeli society. It consists of individuals 
who immigrated to Palestine from almost every country in Asia, Europe 
and America. They had great differences in race, culture, and language 
but their common fear of the Arabs had the effect of uniting them. In 
S i mme 1 ' swords: "Confl i ct is thus des i gned to resolve divergent 
dualisms. It is a way of achieving some kind of unity .... This is roughly 
parallel to the fact that it is the most violent symptom of a disease 
which represents the efforts of the organism to free itself of 
disturbances and damages caused by them ... Conflict itself resolves the 
tension between contrasts. The fact that it aims at peace is only one, 
an especially obvious expression of its nature: the synthesis of 
elements that work both against and for one another."48 
Simmel asserts that conflict occasioned by clashes of interests or 
clashes of personalities contain an element of limitation in so far as 
the struggle is only a means towards an end, if the desired result can 
be attained as well or better by other means, such other means may be 
employed. In such instances conflict is only one of several functional 
alternatives. In other words, conflict could be a means to reach or 
accomplish an end or a specific result. Therefore, he differentiates 
between two types of conflict: non-realistic conflict, which arises 
exclusively from aggressive impulses which seek expression no matter 
what the subject and has no specific aim. The other type is the 
realistic conflict which arises from frustration of specific demands 
within the relationship which are directed at the presumed frustrating 
object. 49 In this sense the conflict between the Palestinians and the 
Zionists is a realistic conflict. The Palestinians are fighting to gain 
their rights which are frustrated by the Zionists and "Israel". 
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Simmel believes that if the conflict or fight is just a means to reach 
a specific aim or object, it is possible to reach such specific results 
by means other than fighting (perhaps peacefully). "Since the fight is 
centred in a purpose outside itself, it is qualified by the fact that, 
in principle, every end can be attained by more than one means. The 
desire for possession or subjection, even for the annihilation of the 
enemy, can be satisfied through combination and events other than fight. 
Where conflict is merely a means determined by a superior purpose, there 
is no reason not to restrict or even avoid it, provided it can be 
replaced by other measures which have the same promise of success.,,50 
Pluralism 
Of the various models used in the analysis of multi-ethnic and settler 
societies, Pluralism and colonialism stand out as the most relevant. In 
this Chapter I am going to discuss and apply Pluralist theory to the 
situation in Palestine and the conflict between the Palestinians and the 
Zionists. A theory of the "Plural Society" in relation to colonialism 
has been developed from the work of two Dutch social scientists John S. 
Furnivall and Julius H. Boeke. 51 To Furnivall and Boeke, Pluralistic 
Society derived from the disintegration of native cultures under the 
impact of European colonialism. Their principal problem was thus to 
explain how the native cultures of the world, all non-white and living 
in the tropics, contrived to respond to capitalist culture during the 
period of colonization. 
As conceived in the literature of race and ethnic relations, Pluralism 
departs drastically from the "political" model of Pluralism to which I 
alluded previously. Pluralism in this sense denotes differentiation and 
segmentation along cultural, social and racial lines. When Colonialism 
brought the West into contact with the East in an unequal relationship 
of economic exploitation and political dominance, one result of this 
process, Furnivall noticed, was the disintegration of these societies 
into many groups different ethnically, culturally, linguistically and 
economically. He describes the relation between these different groups 
as follows: 
"They mix but not combine, each group holds by its own religion, its 
own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. There is a Plural 
Society. With different sections of the community living side by side, 
but separately, within the same political unit. Even in the economic 
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sphere there is a division of labour along racial lines."52 
Malcolm Cross has argued that the colonial policies which were based 
on the notion of "divide and rule" to protect the colonizer's interests 
were responsible for creating Plural Societies in the colonized 
countries. He argues that: "The Plural Society is the product of 
colonial exploitation while the racial divisions which, most frequently 
characterize it, are exacerbated by the operation of colonial policy."53 
For M.G. Smith, the thing which really mattered in deciding whether a 
society is Plural or not is its institutional system. "Pluralism is a 
condition in which members of a common society are internally 
distinguished by fundamental differences in their institutional 
practices."54 A society is therefore, heterogeneous if it exhibits 
single basic institutions, for Smith the United States, but varies at 
the secondary level, while it is Plural if this institutional diversity 
is also present at the basic level. 55 Thus,"Pluralism simultaneously 
connotes a social structure characterized by fundamental discontinuities 
and cleavages, and a cultural complex based on systematic institutional 
diversity."56 
In a Plural Society, the subjected majority of the population mayor 
may not share a single common system of institutions; often the people 
are internally subdivided by their differing institutional allegiances, 
but in all cases they simultaneously differ in their political status 
and in their institutional practice and organization from the discrete 
minority who rule them. 57 
Boeke identifies the Plural Society as follows: "It is not necessary 
that a society be exclusively dominated by one social system. Where this 
is the case at least, one social style prevails, the society in question 
may be called homogeneous; where on the contrary, simultaneously two or 
more social systems appear, clearly distinct the one from the other, and 
each dominate a part of the society, there we have to do with a dual or 
Plural society."58 The essence of Pluralism, Boeke, observes further "is 
the clashing of an imported social system with an indigenous social 
system of another style."59 
This concept of the Plural Society is useful for my purpose. It was 
the clashes between the indigenous Palestinian social order with the 
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more advanced imported Zionist and British Capitalist systems which led 
to the conflict between the Palestinians on the one hand and the 
Zionists and the British on the other. The Palestinians, as a result of 
this colonial and settlement process, were kept mainly occupied by 
agriculture and lowergrade jobs, divided along family, religious and 
district lines, encouraged sometimes by the British, and left without 
any representative bodies, while the Zionists dominated commerce and 
industry, with the help of the British, and were well represented in 
Palestine and in London through the Jewish Agencey which was approved by 
the Mandate over Palestine. 60 
As in any other colonized society, the British used military force to 
suppress Palestinian resistance to British occupation and Zionist 
settlement. Such repression and military power, according to Smith, is 
an essential pre-condition for the maintenance of the Plural Society's 
structure, which is the only guarantee for continuation of the colonial 
rule over the natives. He observes that: "Given the fundamental 
differences of belief, value and organization that connote Pluralism, 
the monopoly of power by one cultural section is the essential 
pre-condition for the maintenance of the total society in its current 
form. ,,61 
According to Smith it is the relative power positions of the various 
groups in society vis-a'-vis each other which keep a Plural Society in 
its current form. When the balance of power is disturbed, Smith expects 
violence among the different segments of society. He observes that: 
"Since the Plural Society depends for its structural form on the 
regulation of intersectional relations by the Government, changes in the 
social structure pre-suppose political changes, and these usually have a 
violent form.,,62 
The Plural Society which emerged in Palestine as a result of Zionist 
settlement is a good example for Smith's point of view. The Palestinian 
majority were against Zionist settlement in Palestine and in time a 
conflict developed between the Palestinians and the Jews. This conflict 
was there all the time but was suppressed by the British military 
forces. When the British left the country the conflict between the two 
communities developed into violence and war. Smith goes on to say that 
"When the dominant section is also a minority, the structural 
implications of Cultural Pluralism have their most extreme expression, 
-17-
and the dependence on regulation by force is greatest. 1163 In this 
concept Pluralism differs from Robert Park's Race Relations Theory which 
states that liThe Race relations cycle which takes the form, to state it 
abstractly, of contacts, competition, accommodation and eventual 
assimilation." 64 
Pluralism is not without its critics. Some are sympathetic, but others 
such as Oliver Cox,65 question the entire theoretical viability of the 
concept. Essentially because of the multiplicity of its dimensions, 
social, political, racial and so forth, Cox argues that: "Pluralism 
cannot now be accepted as a scientific concept. 1166 And his final 
conclusion states that lithe value of the term Pluralism for the study of 
race relations is quite limited. It has been given no consistent meaning 
or interpretation ... but it is popular and scientifically resonant, hence 
I have no illusions about its future career." 67 
David Lockwood, while admitting that Pluralism may go some way in 
illuminating black-white relations, remarks that: lithe concept of Plural 
Society is less of a novel contribution to social theory, and in several 
respects, it poses less fundamental issues of sociological analysis." 6B 
He goes on to suggest that Pluralism was not the best model for 
examining race relations in a society such as the United States. In 
summarizing the utility of the vari~~s perspectives discussed in this 
chapter so far, Rex makes the fo 11 owi ng relevant remark: II It will be 
noticed that, relatively speaking Pluralist theory seems to accept a 
certain looseness in the relationship of one segment to another while at 
the same time attaching a crucial significance to cultural differences. 
By contrast structural functionalist and Marxist stratification theories 
seems to point to a much closer involvement of one group with another. 
Functionalism emphasizes the ultimate value system, Marxism the activity 
with the social relations of production as the central issue in mens 
lives. Pluralist theory seems to imply that involvement in the policy 
and in production is less important for men, as a central life interest, 
than is the culture which governs their relations outside their working 
lives." 69 
Nevertheless, Rex concludes by stressing the point that: 
of Pluralist theory does draw attention to some central 
colonial social structures, which Marxism, for instance 
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lithe emphasis 
features of 
does not." 70 
These features are best described in the presence of specific 
marketplace relationships not depicted either in classical Marxist class 
relations or in situations which typify Capitalist systems with 
so-called free labour. Rex goes on to make an analytical distinction 
between colonial and metropolitan society. In the case of metropolitan 
society with colonial migrants, the models of contact between colonizer 
and colonized are characterized by:71 
A. Urban systems of stratification of a variety of different kinds in 
which the migrants add to the system at the bottom, forming some kind of 
a new under class element. 
B. Situations in which a particular group of outsiders is called upon 
to perform a role which although essential to the social and economic 
life of a society, is in conflict with its value system. This is the 
type of society which emerged in Palestine as a result of Zionist 
settlement there. 
It must be noticed that in Rex's terms the definition of what 
constitutes a metropolitan society is not identical with what other 
students of race and ethnic relations designate as such. Banton, for 
one, reserves the definition for the traditional centre in the mother 
country which regulates the setting up of a colonial society, London, 
for example, played such a role relative to the overseas colonies. 72 For 
Rex, the concept is not strictly bound up by a geographical 
relationship, but rather by the structural features which determine the 
role played by the immigrants in the colonial economy. Thus, when 
colonial and metropolitan societies exist in one nation state, as is the 
case in the United States and South Africa and we might add, in Israel, 
the geographical distinction between metropolitan and colonial society 
vanishes: "Thus a migration from the deep South to Chicago for a black 
American is akin to a migration from Jamica to London or Birmingham, 
while on the other hand the boardrooms of Johannesburg are much like 
those of London or New York, a metropolitan economy and society having 
been established in this latter case as close as possible to the 
production system. 1173 However, Banton explains that a conflict of 
interest could happen between the mother country and the settler groups: 
liThe tension between its (the settlers') interests and those of the 
metropolitan society may then become as important as the tension between 
the colonialists and the colonized." 74 
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In the light of this notion it will be possible to explain the 
relation between the Zionist settlers in Palestine and the British 
imperialist power between 1940 and 1946. British interests became 
different from those of the Zionists and, therefore, military violence 
broke out between the two allies as will be shown in the coming 
chapters. 
Aware of the various shortcomings and pit falls inherent in Pluralism, 
Van Den Berghe does not restrict his conception to one dimension of 
society at the expense of another. Neither does he conceive of Pluralism 
in a binary fashion, that is to say, either societies are Pluralistic or 
they are not. Although Pluralistic Societies have to manifest 
institutional duplication, such duplication is a matter of degree 
only.75 He observes that: "Clearly, Pluralism is best conceived as a 
matter of degree rather than an all or none phenomenon. A Society is 
Pluralistic to the extent that it is structurally segmented and 
culturally diverse. In more operational terms, Pluralism is 
characterized by relative absence of value consensus the relative 
rigidity and clarity of group definitions, the relative presence of 
conflict, or at least, of lack of integration and complementarity 
between various parts of the social system, the segmentary and specific 
character of relationships, and the relative existence of sheer 
institutional duplication between the various segments of the 
Society.,,76 
Some writers remove the ideological and political economic aspect of 
Zionism from the European colonial imperial context of which it was "an 
integral part and from which it drew much early inspiration.,,77 Some 
Israeli and European writers are particularly sensitive and some times 
deny the colonialist nature of Zionism. 78 As I will show later in this 
chapter what is important for a sociologist, however, is the outcome of 
any sociological process. It is more important for us to study the 
outcome of Zionist settlement, its relation with the colonial power, 
Britain, and its effects, in the end, on Palestinian society and the 
nature of the Plural Society which emerged there. 
South Afr;ca: A Model Of A Plural Soc;ety 
Zionists always denied any association between Zionist settlement and 
colonialism. They argued that the Zionist settlers did not go to 
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Palestine for material profit or to exploit the natives which are the 
main aims of colonialism (other than political and strategic 
considerations). Such popular views among Zionists are expressed clearly 
by Avnery who argues that: "The means employed by the Zionist Movement 
were the antithesis of colonialism ... Zionists did not come to Palestine 
to rule over its inhabitants. They aspired to settle and work the land 
they bought by themselves. Those who embodied the Zionist ideal sought 
to create a new type of society and of a national economy, where Jews 
would engage in all type of labour ... without exploiting anyone."79 
It is true that the Zionist settlement was not a classical 
colonialism, rather, in my view, it is much worse than that, it was 
settler-colonialism with its main aim as the dispossessing and uprooting 
the native population in order to establish there an exclusively Jewish 
state. This Zionist settlement was even worse than the classical white 
settlement elsewhere in the World in the sense that although classical 
white settlers exploited the natives, they nonetheless, allowed them to 
continue to live in their country with the prospect of gaining 
independence in the future. 
In order to make this point absolutely clear, it seems useful to use 
the South African white settlement as a model for the Plural Society, in 
relation to colonialism, and compare the Zionist settlement in Palestine 
with it. 
In the light of previous analysis of the Pluralist model, South Africa 
stands as a typical settler and Plural Society. And because there are 
not many differences among social scientists about the dual nature of 
South African society and the existence of great similarities between 
the situation in Palestine before 1948 and between the Palestinians and 
Jews at the present time and that of South African case I intend to make 
a comparison between the two situations. 
I will be looking for similarities as well as differences in methods, 
policies, attitudes, aims, and more importantly in the impact of both 
settlements on the natives in both Palestine and South Africa. This I 
hope will give us more insight into the nature of the conflict and the 
best ways of solving it. I am, however, not going to give historical 
details about the process of settlement in South Africa, but suffice it 
to say that this settlement took place under the 18th and 19th century 
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imperialist notion which considered any land outside Europe as empty and 
ready for the white man's occupation and settlement. Moreover, under 
such a notion, the Whites could install themselves, by force and the 
protection of a mother country or any imperial power, as the dominant 
element in the territory with the absolute right to confiscate the land 
and to exploit the native people and the mineral resources of the 
territory. 
The similarities between the settlement in South Africa and Palestine 
are the following: 
1. Both settlements took place against the will of the natives and 
under the sponsorship, encouragement and protection of a colonial 
power. In both cases the majority of the settlers were European who used 
military force to suppress the natives' opposition to their settlement. 
2. In both cases the settlers confiscated most of the natives' lands 
and uprooted a great number of the native population from their homes 
and lands to other areas. In South Africa the natives were forcibly 
removed from areas designated by the settlers as whites' areas to the so 
called Black Homelands. In Palestine the majority of the natives were 
expelled by the Zionist settlers or they fled from fear of being killed 
during the Zionist attacks on their areas. They were not allowed to 
return to their homes even after the end of the hostilities between the 
Arabs and "Israel." 
3. In both cases the settlers developed their own capitalist economic 
systems and followed a policy of discrimination and economic social and 
political segregation. However, while the natives in South Africa were 
exploited by the settlers, the Palestinians were denied work and 
employment on the the land bought by Zionists or in the Zionist sector. 
This Zionist policy was designed to force the natives to leave the 
country altogether. Indeed it forced many rural workers to migrate to 
the towns, thus creating a class of landless and unemployed people who 
formed the seeds of the Palestine Revolt of 1936-1939. 
The result of both settlements was the creation of plural societies in 
both countries consisting of two different communities with clearly 
conflicting interests. In both cases the settlers denied the natives the 
right to self-determination and in the end the settlers established 
their exclusive regimes. Consequently, the natives in both cases are 
engaged in a political and military struggle to correct this abnormal 
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situation and gain their independence. 
In the light of this analysis it can be said that the process of 
Zionist settlement in Palestine before 1948, which started at the 
beginning of the 20th century and under the protection of the British 
imperialist power, can be labelled as settler colonialism and it is 
similar in this respect to the White settlement in South Africa. 80 
The main difference between the two settlements is in ideology. While 
the White settlers in South Africa built their argument in settling in 
that area on the imperialist notion, the right of the White man to 
settle anywhere outside Europe, the Zionists based their argument on the 
following: 
1. The religious argument. Zionist ideologists argued that Palestine 
was promised to the Jews by God and therefore, by emigrating to that 
country they fulfill God's promise. 81 
2. The historical connection. This goes back more than two thousand 
years to when a Jewish kingdom was established in part of Palestine. 
After the destruction of their kingdom the Jews dispersed allover the 
Old World and perhaps Europe. The Zionists argued that the present Jews 
were the descendants of the ancient Hebrews and therefore had the right 
to return to Palestine. 82 
3. Humanitarian reasons. The Jews were persecuted and the best 
solution for their problem was to emigrate to Palestine. 
4. Legal reasons. Britain had promised the Zionists to establish in 
Palestine a Jewish home and the League of Nations had accepted their 
claim for a historical connection with Palestine and stated this in the 
provlslon of the Mandate for Palestine. Therefore, the Zionist 
immigration was legal and was accepted by the League of Nations. 83 Such 
arguments, however, are proved to be not relevant to the 20th century 
Zionist settlement in Palestine as we will see in the next chapters. 
5. Realism. Finally "Israel" was established as a result of a U.N. 
resolution84 and the Arabs and the World have to accept and live with 
this reality. 
Native choices and future prospects 
The South African regime of today is built on the old imperialist 
notion of the so called the "White Man's Burden" and therefore it 
ignores completely the rights of the natives. The racist regime still 
practises, until the present day, clear and declared policies of racial, 
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political, and economic discrimination against the Black South 
Africans. 8S For Von den Berghe, South Africa offers a test case. The 
dual political structure was clear cut, cultural and national apartheid 
was highly visible, so was the economic system, "with a high 
productivity money economy (among whites) and a subsistence one (among 
Bl acks) . ,,86 
The social mechanisms which ensure the workings of the South African 
system are varied. While naked coercion is an obvious feature of this 
system, it is only one aspect of it. The basic feature of this system is 
the adoption on the part of the Blacks of compliance procedures which 
imply adherence to instrumental norms connected with occupational role, 
rules of etiquette, styles of dress, and so forth, yet retaining a 
degree of dissension concerning fundamental values. In this manner, Van 
den Berghe points out that the Africans are able to cope with the dual 
Society through shuttling between the native culture of the Blacks and 
the White culture of the metropolis. Thus the Black "migrant workers can 
adjust to town life, so that while in town they appear quite 
Westernized, only to become very traditional at home in rural areas.,,8? 
Notwithstanding the ability to adjust, the Blacks' social structure 
exhibits all the symptoms of social disorganization typical of colonial 
regimes. In spite of a distorted class structure, Van Den Berghe sees a 
revolutionary potential among the oppressed African masses: "In erecting 
a rigid color bar, the dominant Whites succeeded in maintaining a 
monopoly of leading positions in Government, commerce, industry, 
finance, farming, education, and religion. By the same token, they 
prevented the rise of a class of Africans with a stake in the status 
quo; for all practical purposes, there is no African landed peasantry or 
bourgeoisie (in the Marxian S€nse of owners of means of production). 
Conversely, the Whites created an exploited urban proletariat, a "middle 
class" of under paid clerks and other petty white collar workers, and a 
tiny elite of professionals and semi professionals who are strongly 
discriminated against. All these strata share a common interest in 
radical change."SS Van den Berghe then concludes that: "The end of White 
supremacy must come in South Africa, and it will come through revolution 
and violence."Sg 
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Fanon agrees with Van Den Berghe in his optimism about the revolutionary 
potential of the colonized peoples. He argues that the Colonized people 
are no longer alone or isolated from the rest of the World and their 
frontiers remain open to new ideas and echoes from everywhere. He 
believes that the colonized people "discovers that violence is in the 
atmosphere, that it here and there bursts out, and here and there sweeps 
away the colonial regime.,,90 Fanon concludes that for the native this 
violence represents the only line of action. 91 
However, such optimism is not shared by H. Adam. According to Adam, 
who takes South Africa as an example, the demise of South Africa through 
internally inspired revolutions is not likely to come about in the near 
future. 92 He states this for three reasons: 
1. Increasing economic interdependency between the Blacks and the 
Whites will eventually mean that South Africa will lose its Pluralistic 
character through increasing economic integration. According to Adam, 
changes in the class structure will necessitate "deracialization" and 
incorporation of the blacks into the productive and consuming sectors of 
society. While such a process might bring the subordinates (blacks) into 
a relatively improved position, their fragmentary nature and absence of 
organized political parties, or trade unions among the blacks will 
compel the politicized blacks to withdraw and reorgnize under the 
umbrella of African Nationalism. 93 Adam argues that the emerging class 
conflict between the Whites and the Blacks would create a need for 
political accommodation, or as Adam would put it, the need for a 
"pragmatic oligarchy.,,94 
In other words Adam's thesis is that the common interests of the 
Blacks and the Whites will lead eventually to a peaceful accommodation 
between the two communities without the need for complete assimilation. 
The Whites need the Black workers for the development of their economy 
while the blacks need the jobs and the money, which are offered by 
Whites, and are necessary for their survival. This interdependency will 
lead the two communities to come closer and closer to each other and in 
time they will accept the real i ty of 1 i fe and the need for "pragmat i c 
oligarchy" to regulate their relations. Adam's conclusion95 in this 
manner is similar to that of Max Gluckman in his analysis of Nuer 
society in Sudan. 96 Bearing in mind that the circumstances between the 
two situations were different, since there was no foreign settlement 
supported by colonial power in Sudan's case, Gluckman states that the 
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more common interests and close relations, became dominant in the Nuer's 
relations the more likely they were to develop peaceful relations and 
vice versa. In his words: "Feud is waged and vengeance taken when the 
parties live sufficiently far apart, or are too weakly related by 
diverse ties ... But where they are close together, many institutions and 
ties operate to exert pressure on the guerrillas to reach a 
settlement."97 
Furthermore, Gluckman noted that the pressure for peaceful relations, 
"Is exerted by common interest in a modicum of peace over a certain 
area, which is necessary if men are to live in any kind of security ... 
The conflict between the loyalities held by a man thus, in a wider range 
of relations, establish order and lead to recognition and acceptance of 
obligation within law."98 
2. South Africa's economic strength compared to the rest of the 
neighbouring African countries. According to Adam, "for nearly one third 
of all commodities produced for the market in Africa stem from this 
area."99 
3. The disunity and disintegration among the Blacks in South Africa 
and the military weakness of the neighbouring countries. Adam argues 
that there is no revolutionary potential among the Blacks in the near 
future because of these combined reasons: "As long as African 
dream without economic and social reality, the highly 
industrialized state of the South will not be threatened."IOO 
unity is a 
equipped 
Adam uses similar arguments to rule out any possible effective 
assistance from the neighbouring African States to the Black South 
Africans in the near future. That is due to the military superiority of 
South Africa vis-a'-vis the rest of the neighbouring countries. 
Therefore, Adam sees the African choices as follows: "In the face of 
total subordination political behavior becomes redefined as a technique 
of maximum survival. No longer can victory be expected or even sought. 
The choice they (the Africans) have to make is between political suicide 
or accommodation. Realising this alternative many opted for pragmatic 
survival."IOI 
Adam also pointed out another important aspect of the conflict in 
South Africa, that is the outcome of the Africans' violence. Instead of 
bringing about any concessions from the Whites, it strengthened their 
military power to such an extent that it became extremely difficult for 
the Black majority to overcome it. "Operation Mayebuye (come back) which 
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aimed at frightening Whites into making concessions, instead resulted in 
a strengthening of the repressive machinery and a general discouragement 
of African militancy closer to general resignative despair than 
determination to actively resist White domination."102 
I agree with Adam in his point of view that the military and economic 
superiority of South Africa will succeed in suppressing the Black South 
Africans' resistance and preventing any effective 
outside as long as the Black South Africans' social 
disintegrated, without a representative political 
assistance from 
structure stays 
body and the 
neighbouring countries stay disunited and militarily and economically 
weak. On the other hand, I disagree with him in his view that the black 
South Africans will eventually give up their struggle and integrate into 
South African social life or economy. The black South Africans may have 
to accept the situation as long as the Whites manage to suppress them by 
force. But this situation cannot last for ever since according to 
Dahrendorf, with whom I agree, "effective suppression of conflict is in 
the long run impossible."103 
I also agree with Van Den Berghe that there is a conflict between the 
two communities in South Africa at least simmering under the surface and 
in 1985 this conflict became more violent. I would argue, therefore, 
that there is a real revolutionary potential among the Blacks in South 
Africa. 
Nevertheless, Adam distinguishes between "colonies of exploitation" 
and "settler colonies." The former typifies classical colonialism where 
the colonizing group has no plans to settle permanently in large numbers 
in the colony and continues to conduct its affairs in terms of an 
official mother country. In the latter type the settler group remains in 
the country in relatively sizeable numbers cutting off its official ties 
with a sponsoring foreign entity, and assumes responsibility for 
conducting its own affairs. 104 This distinction is useful to my purpose 
since it is this type which most closely relates to the situation in 
Palestine. "The colony of this type is neither exploited in the 
interests of a foreign power, nor degraded to a market for foreign 
surplus commodities but is characterized rather by a domestic 
colonialism which at certain stages might exceed the metropolitan 
colonies in degree of exploitation. But it is questionable whether this 
holds generally true. For as a ruling class the settlers are also forced 
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to maintain a degree of harmony in the system. They have more at stake 
than a foreign colonial power in their own survival."IOS 
Albert Memmi makes a relevant remark about the future relation of the 
colonizer and the colonized: "The refusal of the colonized cannot be 
anything but absolute, that is, not only revolt but a rev~lution."I06 
From the previous analysis of the Plural Society in South Africa two 
different points of view emerge: 
Firstly, the possibility of pragmatic accommodation and peaceful 
relations between the Blacks and the Whites which is Adam's view; 
Secondly, eventual revolution by the Blacks leading to the destruction 
of the apartheid system and the restoration of freedom and equality 
between Blacks and Whites, which is Berghe's view. 
What choices do the Palestinians have compared to the Black South 
Africans? In the light of the previous analysis it seems that the 
Palestinians in principle have two choices: assimilation or revolution. 
In examining the possibility of the Palestinians' assimilation in 
"Israeli" society it seems that it is not likely to happen for three 
reasons: 
1. Policies of "Israel" which discriminate against the Palestinians 
and consider them as second class citizens. I07 
2. Palestinians themselves feel that they have more right to Palestine 
than the Zionists have. 
3. They now have a representative body namely the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (P.L.O.)I08 which is recognized by all the Arab countries 
and some non-Arab states as the sole representative of the Palestinian 
people. The PLO has succeeded in securing an observer seat in the U.N. 
and has many representative and officially recognized offices in many 
countries, including Russia, France and India. The P.L.O also has its 
own guerrilla forces which are engaged in military struggle against the 
Israeli occupation of their homeland and it is not likely that they will 
stop this struggle before they achieve their rights according to the 
U.N. Resolutions of 1947 which recognise their rights for the 
establishment of their independent state. Briefly, assimilation of the 
Palestinians is not possible either in "Israel" or in the Arab countries 
because it is against the wishes of the majority of the Palestinian 
people, against the policy of most Arab countries and against the policy 
of "Israel", which calls for an exclusively Jewish state and opposition 
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to a Palestinian one. 
The other alternative for the Palestinians is revolution. In my view 
the present "Israeli" policies of non-recognition of the existence of 
the Palestinian people, denial of their right to self-determination and 
policies of annexing East Jerusalem and settlement in the occupied Arab 
territory have left the Palestinians without any other choice but 
revolution. The Palestinians, I believe, have a real revolutionary 
potential for the following reasons: 
Firstly, The Palestinians are part of the Arab Nation and all the Arab 
countries support their struggle to reach their aim of 
self-determination. For example, four wars have taken place between 
certain Arab states 109 and "Israel" to try to correct the injustice 
which was done to the Palestinians and in support for their rights. On 
the other hand, the Arab States are committed not to accept any decision 
concerning the Palestine question without the approval of the 
Palestinians. "The position of the Arab States fully supports the 
Palestinian Arabs' demand for rights to homes and country. Any solution 
agreed to by the Palestine Arabs would be acceptable to the Arab States. 
Conversely, the Arab States cannot conclude a settlement that is 
unacceptable to the Palestine Arabs."110 
Secondly, the Palestinians now comprise four categories. About 650,000 
live in "Israel", 1,300,000 live in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
under "Israeli" occupation,lll about one million are in Jordan and about 
one million more live in Lebanon, Syria, the Gulf Area and in the rest 
of the World. From this distribution it seems apparent that the 
Palestinians not only have revolutionary potential against "Israel" but 
also a destabilising potential in the Arab host countries and in the 
Gulf Area. Evidence for this is the civil war in Jordan in 1970 and the 
civil war in Lebanon between 1975-1985. Through active propaganda, 
during the last 35 years, through the different media, writing, 
education and cinema the Palestinians have gained a great deal of 
sympathy and support among the Arab masses in the Arab World. 
Furthermore, the Palestinians' miserable life in the refugee camps still 
represents living proof of their tragedy. It can be said that the 
Palestinians now have a real influence on the policy makers, especially 
in the neighbouring countries to Palestine and to some extent in the 
Gulf States. 
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In contrast, the Blacks in South Africa neither have large numbers of 
refugees in the neighbouring states, nor are they considered as citizens 
or part of the population of these neighbouring countries. Therefore, 
they do not have as much influence on those countries as the 
Palestinians do on the Arab Countries. For example South Africa has 
signed a non-aggression pact with Mozambique and a ceasefire with 
Angola l12 which aim at stopping the Black guerrillas from operating 
against South Africa from these countries. 
It is true that both South Africa and "Israel" have military 
superiority over their neighbours, but the gap between "Israel" and the 
Arabs seems to be closing as time goes on, especially with support from 
Russia for some Arab countries such as Syria. "Israel", unlike South 
Africa, does not have any economic or diplomatic relations with her 
neighbours and recently she began to experience economic difficulties as 
a result of the continuous state of war with the Arabs and the policy of 
economic boycott imposed by the Arabs against her. 113 
The other similarity between the conditions of the Palestinians and 
the Arab states and that of the Black South Africans and the African 
states is the disunity among the Arab states and disintegration and 
differences among the Palestinians. Any active resistance and guerrilla 
war against "Israel" must come from and be initiated by the Palestinians 
living in the Arab countries and supported by a strong united Arab 
government. This I think is not likely to happen in the very near 
future. 114 The quiet intervals between the Arabs and "Israel" are not a 
result of the Arabs' pragmatic acceptance of the status quo, but rather, 
in my view, a preparatory time for yet another confrontation. Past 
experience has taught us that it is difficult to make accurate 
predictions in the Middle East because the situation could be changed in 
days and in hours rather than years. Therefore, if South Africa has had 
to resort to "Pragmatic Apartheid" to quote Adam, "Israel" would have 
to incorporate a wider range of pragmatic policies and compromises to 
meet the Palestinians' demands and grant them the right to 
self-determination according to the U.N. resolution and international 
law in the area assigned to them by the same Resolution by which 
"Israel" itself was established. 
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One of the pre-requisites for solving or regulating a conflict, 
Dahrendorf argued, was that both parties to a conflict have to recognize 
the necessity and reality of the conflict situation and in this sense, 
the fundamental justice of the cause of the opponent. That is to say 
that both parties have to accept their conflict as it is. II5 Dahrendorf 
argues that wherever the attempt is made "to dispute the case of the 
opponent by calling it unrealistic or denying the opponent the right to 
make a cause at all, effective regulation (of the conflict) is not 
possible."II6 
In applying this principle to the Palestinian-Zionist conflict we find 
the following: 
Firstly, the Palestinian did not recognize the Zionist settlement as 
legal or legitimate because it took place against their will and brought 
alien settlers to their country. On the other hand, the Zionists and the 
British denied the Palestinian majority the right to self-determination. 
As I will show in the next chapters this was one of the major obstacles 
which prevented the two parties from reaching any understanding in 
Palestine before 1948. 
Secondly, at the present time we still have the same situation, that 
is "Israel" refuses to recognize the Palestinian cause and denies them 
the right to self-determination even in the parts of Palestine which 
were assigned to them in the U.N. Resolution of 1947 and also refuses to 
comply with the U.N. resolutions in regard to their rights to return to 
Palestine. II7 Consequently, the Palestinians refuse to recognize the 
right of "Israel" to exist before it recognizes their rights. This 
situation, which I believe is not realistic, consumes a lot of money, 
human lives, and efforts from both sides, which could be better used for 
the development and progress of the area. 
Concluding Remarks 
In the light of the preceding discussion it is possible to draw up a 
list of the main features of settler societies which can be applied to 
the history of Palestinian-Zionist relations in Palestine and later to 
the relations between the Jews and the Palestinians both in "Israel" or 
in the Palestinian areas under "Israeli" occupation (the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip). 
First and foremost to be noted is that the conflict and the Plural 
Society which developed in Palestine were the product of the clashes 
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between the Palestinian traditional social order and the imported 
capitalist Zionist system supported by the British forces. While this 
feature typifies to a large extent the situation in Mandate Palestine, 
its remnants are present up to the present moment, as is evidenced by 
the striking contrast between contemporary Palestinian and Jewish 
sectors in Palestine and "Israel." 
The asymmetrical relationship through contacts between the 
Palestinians and the Zionist settlers was governed and regulated by the 
gradual emergence of the Zionist settlers political and economic 
institutions, by the importation by the Zionist settlers of European 
technology and know-how, and by the influx of Zionist capital and the 
steady increase in the number of settlers. 
An integral part of this process was the acquisition of land by 
Zionists and the eventual distortion of the Palestinian social 
structure, best reflected in the emergence of landlessness, unemployment 
and migrant workers, which continue to be features of the economic life 
of "Israel" and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which "Israel" occupied 
in the 1967 War. The asymmetrical relationship between the Palestinians 
and Zionist sector was augmented by maintaining a complete closure in 
the economic, educational and cultural spheres and later in the 
residential quarters of the settlers vis-'a-vis the indigenous 
Palestinians. 
A second aspect of a settler regime is that it creates a justificatory 
ideology based on the dehumanization of the culture and way of life of 
the indigenous population. Thus, the native Arabs are masked by a 
negative stereotypical image which is utilized to justify his neglect. 
Needless to say, this type of image, augmented with an inferior 
perception of the self is often enough internalized at one stage of 
colonization by the native people. An important corollary of this is 
that the native, even when he assumes an impressive numerical 
superiority, becomes invisible in the eyes of the settlers. 
It seems to me that the final aim of Zionist settlement decided the 
pattern of their relations with the Palestinians. The initial Zionist 
settlement did not rest on physical subjugation or on exploiting the 
natives, as has occurred in other cases of classical settler 
colonialism. The aim of Zionism was to dispossess the Palestinians and 
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eventually converting Palestine into an exclusively Jewish state. As I 
will show in the next chapters, this manifest goal of Zionism produced 
other consequences such as Jewish exclusiveness, a developed Jewish 
sector, an undeveloped Palestinian sector, sporadic Palestinian violent 
reaction and revolt and political separation. It is this system of 
domination and the imposition of foreign settlement and rule that 
created the Palestine conflict. 
Maxime Rodinson rightly defines the conflict as follows: liThe conflict 
therefore appears essentially as the struggle of an indigenous 
population against the occupation of part (now all) of their territory 
by foreigners. Of course there are many other sides to the conflict 
which could be brought out. None of these, however, seems relevant to 
the basic definition." II8 
The other important conclusion to this chapter is that Zionist 
settlement in Palestine is similar to the white settlement in South 
Africa in the following aspects: 
1. Both settlements took place against the will of the natives and 
were not possible without the sponsorship and the protection of a 
colonial power. 
2. In both cases the natives were denied political rights and some of 
them were dispossessed while others were uprooted from their homes and 
lands and transferred to other areas. 
3. In both cases only the settlers established their exclusive states 
while the natives were denied such rights. The main difference between 
the South African regime and Zionism is that while the South African 
Whites denied the Blacks any political rights and followed a complete 
policy of segregation, the Zionists claimed that they developed their 
separate institutions because they did not want to be seen as 
colonialists. From the outset the Zionists made such a claim and tried 
to use the so called historical and the religious association of the 
Jews with Palestine as a justification for their settlement as I will 
show in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Historical Background 
The Zionist claim to Palestine is primarily based on ancient Biblical 
promises of four thousand years ago that God promised Abraham and his 
sons the land of Palestine. 1 And since they claimed that they were the 
descendants of the the Hebrews, who, they claim, were in previous 
occupation of the land, then they were entitled to emigrate to Palestine 
and re-establish a Jewish state there. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the validity of such Zionist 
claims and more importantly to see if these claims are relevant to the 
20th century Zionist colonization of Palestine. 
For the Palestinians, Palestine has been their undisputed homeland 
since the dawn of history. They are not, as is popularly believed all 
exclusively the descendents of the Arab Muslim conquerors of the 7th 
century, they are, in fact, mainly the descendants of the original 
native population, Canaanites, Philistines, and partly the descendants 
of a mixture of all the conquerors, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans and 
Turks. 2 
The name of the country Palestine discloses its non-Jewish character. 
It could be a variant of the Arabic world "Filisteen" which means the 
abode of the Philistines. 3 While some other writers also believe it 
could be derived from Philistenes one of the earliest tribes which lived 
in Palestine in the 12th century B.C. 4 
In the Old Testament the word Palestine was used in different forms: 
PhilistiaS, philistim6, and in the Bible it was also referred to as the 
"Land of Canaan."7 
These forms and uses of the word Palestine support the argument that 
when the Hebrews came to Palestine for the first time, between 1400-1200 
B.C., from Ur in Iraq or later from Egypt, they found the country 
already inhabited by the Canaanites and the Philistines who had already 
established their distinctive culture and civilization, which was 
represented in hundreds of villages and towns. Even the name of the 
country had been related to the natives. 8 The Hebrews were, therefore, 
neither the natives nor in earliest possession of the land as the 
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Zionists claimed. 
Under the leadership of King David (1016-971 B.C.) and his son King 
Solomon (976-936 B.C.) the Hebrews established their kingdom in most of 
Palestine after overcoming the Philistines and the Canaanites. However, 
the Jewish kingdom, after Solomon's death, split into the kingdom of 
Israel in the north and the kingdom of Judah in the south. In 721 
B.C.the Assyrians occupied the kingdom of Israel, which from that date 
became politically extinct, while the kingdom of Judah lasted till 585 
B.C. when Nubuchadnezzar of Babylon occupied it, destroyed Solomon's 
Temple and took most of the Jews into captivity to Babylon. 
After less than half a century (538) the Persians occupied Palestine 
and allowed those Jews who wanted to return to Palestine to do so. Some 
of the Jews returned and rebuilt the Temple while others opted to stay 
in exile. 9 
In 331 B.C. the Greeks occupied Palestine, followed by the Romans (63 
B.C.) who in 70 A.D. occupied Jerusalem and destroyed Solomon's Temple. 
In 132 A.D. Hadrian crushed the last Jewish revolt and this time he 
destroyed the old city of Jerusalem and built another one called Alia 
Capitolima. 
The majority of the Jews, however, had been dispersed throughout the 
different Middle Eastern countries and perhaps elsewhere, and even those 
of th'em who remained in Palestine were prevented from entering the new 
city.l0 
The Arab Muslims occupied the country in 637 A.D. and from that date 
the majority of the natives converted to Islam and became Arabized. 
The interesting thing which has to be noticed in this respect is that 
there was always a distinction between the natives of the country and 
their conquerors. For example, when the Babylonians occupied Palestine 
they picked out the Jews from the natives and sent them to live in 
exile, while when the Babylonians were defeated by the Persians the 
latter allowed the Jews to return. The Romans did as the Babylonians, 
they picked out the Jews and destroyed their Temple and even sent some 
of them to live in exile in other parts of the Roman Empire. 11 
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There is no talk about such action against the native population, the 
Palestinians, who survived all these waves of conquests, preserved their 
own life and culture and never assimilated with any of these conquerors. 
It seems likely that the Palestinians did not assimilate and preserved 
their distinctive identity because there were big differences: racial, 
cultural, religious, linguistic, between them and those occupiers. But 
this was not the case with the Arab Muslims, with whom they must have 
had common racial, cultural, language and social relationships, which 
made it easier for them not only to assimilate and become Arabised but 
also to identify themselves as Arabs. 
It is true that many Arabs settled in Palestine after the Arab 
conquest, but the majority of the Palestinians who became Arabized were 
the very same natives who had lived in the country for centuries before 
the Hebrew conquest. 
Rodinson points out that the Palestinians "were native in all the 
senses of that word.,,12 
Cattan, argues that "The Palestinians of today are the descendants of 
the Philistines, the Canaanites and other early tribes. They are the 
earliest and original inhabitants of the country. They have lived 
continuously and without interruption in their country since the dawn of 
history. Their settlement in Palestine can be traced back at least forty 
centuries. There were infusions of other racial elements into the 
Palestinian stock, mainly from the Greeks, the Romans, the Muslim Arabs 
and the Crusaders. But this Palestine stock which comprises both Muslims 
and Christians, continued to constitute the main element of the 
population until the majority of the original inhabitants were displaced 
by the Israelis in 1948.,,13 
The only real title which any people has to its country comes from 
birth and long continued possession. It is these that give the 
Palestinians their rights to Palestine, 
the British their rights to Britain, and the French their rights to 
France. And in this sense "the historical connection of the early 
Hebrews with Palestine is not one based on birth and long possession but 
. th h' . ,,14 upon occupatlon roug lnvaSlon. 
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The other important and relevant point in this respect is that not all 
the Russian, Polish, American and European Jews are physical descendants 
of the Hebrews of 2,000 years ago. 
Dr Shapiro disagrees with those Zionists who attempted to prove that 
all the Jews of the world belong to one race and form a nation. After 
briefly tracing their history, Shapiro declares "It is odd, in the light 
of their past, that the Jews are often considered and much effort 
expended to prove them to be a distinct race ... these (biological) 
comparisons ... prove that the fundamental requirement for any claim that 
the Jews form a rac{al entity cannot be met, at least by those 
traditional standards of racial classification ... The wide range of 
variation between Jewish populations in their physical characteristics 
and the diversity of the gene frequency of their blood groups, render 
any unified racial classification for them a contradiction in terms."IS 
Koestler, too advanced similar arguments. He argued that the majority 
of world Jewry are not the descendants of the earlier Hebrews but rather 
of Khazar origin. The King of Khazar converted to Judaism in A.D. 640 
with many of his people. 16 
Professor Juan Comas also expresses the view that there is no Jewish 
race "So far as our knowledge goes, we can assert that Jews as a whole 
display as great a degree of morphological disparity among themselves as 
could be found between members of two or more different races."ll 
I would argue therefore that there was a historical and religious 
connection of the Hebrews and their physical descendants l8 with 
Palestine similar to the historical and religious connection of the 
Christians, especially the Romans, with the country. Such a spiritual 
and historical connection, however, entitles the Jews perhaps to visit 
the Jewish religious sites in Palestine, but surely does not entitle 
them to political or sovereignty rights over the country, least of all 
to occupy the country and displace its inhabitants by the use of force. 
The Zionist movement, however, used this "historical connection" of 
the earlier Hebrews with Palestine and God's promise of that country to 
Jews as a pretext to justify their demands for colonizing the country. 
The Zionists knew that the idea of "historical connection" would be 
acceptable to the Christian West which was educated about the connection 
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of the Jews with Palestine through the Christian faith and the Old 
Testament. They, to some extent, succeeded in giving the impression that 
Zionist settlement in Palestine was not a colonization but rather it was 
a fulfilment of God's promise. Such a misconception was spread due to 
the concentrated efforts of the Zionist Movement in Britain and America 
as I will show in the following Section. 
Zionism and Palestine18 
The Zionist movement appeared in late 19th century Europe, influenced 
by the nationalist ferment sweeping the continent. Zionism acquired its 
particular focus from the ancient Jewish longing for the return to Zion 
and received a strong impetus from the increasingly intolerable 
conditions facing the large Jewish communities in Eastern Europe. The 
movement also developed at the time of major European territorial 
acquisition in Asia and Africa and benefited from the European powers' 
competition for influence in the shrinking Ottoman Empire. 19 
One result of this involvement with European expansionism, however, 
was that the leaders of Arab nationalist movements viewed Zionism as an 
adjunct of European colonialism. Moreover, Zionist assertions of the 
contemporary relevance of the Jews' historical ties to Palestine, 
coupled with their land purchases and immigration, alarmed the 
Palestinian Arabs. The ultimate aim of Zionism as expressed by some 
Zionist settlers was "eventually to gain control of Palestine"20 and the 
establishment of an exclusively Jewish state. This goal, they argued, 
would be accomplished both by agricultural and industrial development 
and by military means. These aims were embodied in the political Zionist 
programme crystallized at the first Zionist congress of August 1897. 
This programme included: 21 
1. The promotion of colonization (settlement) of Palestine by Jewish 
workers. 
2. The organization of European Jewry within the law of each country. 
3. The strengthening of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness. 
4. Preparatory steps towards getting governments' consent for the 
attainment of the aim of Zionism. 
The idea of a Jewish state was, in the beginning, a reaction to the 
social and political disabilities which had been imposed on Jews in 
Eastern Europe. There was no mention of any "historical or religious 
connection" with Palestine, which became later the main Zionist 
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argument, in this programme. Other institutional developments followed 
soon after: the creation of the Jewish National Fund in 1901, the 
opening of the Palestine Office in Jaffa in 1907 to assist immigrants 
and purchase land, and the establishment of Tel-Aviv in 1909. 22 
Zionism was and had been from the start the faith of a comparatively 
small minority of Jews. The movement was under persistent attacks from 
two opposite quarters, in Russia by the general Jewish workers 
organization (the Bund) and in the west by the leaders of the 
assimilated Jews who saw in Zionism a weapon which might be used by the 
anti-semites against them. 23 
However, the roots of political Zionism's policy were based on several 
basic concepts which eventually would lead to an exclusively Jewish 
state through: 24 
1. Gradual build-up of an economic and military potential as the basis 
for the achievement of political aims; 
2. Alliance with a great power external to the Middle East which would 
give their settlers the necessary protection; 
3. Acquiring as much land as possible through purchase; 
4. the Zionists civilizing mission which would represent Western 
civilization in an undeveloped country; 
5. Non-recognition of the existence of a Palestinian entity; 
6. Economic, social and cultural segregation as pre requisites for the 
eventual establishment of a Jewish state. 
Against this background Theodor Herzl, the Zionist leader, first 
approached Germany. He defined the Zionists' role in the Middle East as 
follows: "For Europe, we would constitute a bulwark against Asia. Down 
there we would be the advance post of civilization against barbarism. As 
a neutral state, we would remain in constant touch with all of Europe, 
which would guarantee our existence.,,25 
When the Germans rejected27 this Zionist bargain Herzl turned to 
Turkey offering to buy Palestine with Zionist money. "If His Majesty the 
Sultan were to give us Palestine we could undertake to regulate Turkey's 
finances.,,27 The Turkish Authorities, however, rejected the Zionist 
offer perhaps because it was against Islam's traditions to sell lands 
and more importantly to let the Holy Aqsa Mosque come under Zionist 
control. 
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Herzl then turned to Britain which first proposed in 1902 that the 
Zionists could settle in Cyprus, El-Arish or in East Africa. The Zionist 
congress held in August 1903 accepted the last British offer, the Uganda 
area. But this acceptance was short lived and the project was abandoned 
by the seventh Zionist congress held in Basle (Switzerland) in 190528 in 
favour of Palestine. Since Palestine was under Ottoman rule the Zionists 
decided to continue their contacts with Britain and in the meantime they 
called for physical occupation of the land through immigration. 
At the close of the Ottoman era, Zionism was still a small, struggling 
movement. It had an increasing number of adherents in Europe and some 
practical achievements in Palestine, but its growth was inhibited by the 
opposition of the Ottoman Authorities29 and by the absence of a strong 
European patron. 
Nevertheless, the Zionist settlers of the 1900s, provided the nucleus 
for a major political force and worked out political and socio-economic 
programmes that guided the movement for the following decades, when 
political conditions became more auspicious as we will see in the next 
Chapter. 
Britain's Conflicting Promises to both Arabs and Zionists 
Shortly after the outbreak of World War One, the British Government 
concluded a treaty with Sharif Hussein of Mecca that the Arabs should 
revolt against Turkey in return for Arab independence within certain 
boundaries. The two sides reached an understanding and alliance in a 
series of letters exchanged between McMahon, then the British agent in 
Egypt, and Sharif Hussein as representative of the Arabs during 
1915-1916. 30 
According to this pledge Britain agreed to recognize Arab independence 
within the boundaries requested by Hussein in his first letter of July 
14, 1915. The letter defined the boundaries of the Arab state as: 
bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37th latitude, on 
the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra, on the south 
by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to 
remain as it was, on the West by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up 
to Mersina. 31 
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The British agreed to Hussein's proposals but they made some 
reservations in regard to certain portions of Northern Syria, which 
France had some interest in and had to be consulted about their future. 
Here is McMahon: "Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold 
the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the 
frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca ... The portions of Syria lying 
to the West of district of Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo cannot be 
said to be purely Arab."32 
The British perhaps wanted to exclude these portions, which correspond 
to Lebanon, on the grounds that they had Christians who had 
traditionally allied themselves with the French. 
However, Hussein rejected this British demand stressing that: "these 
are purely Arab provinces in which the Muslim is indistinguishable from 
the Christian."33 
The British accepted Hussein's argument in regard to the composition 
of the population in these areas, but insisted that France should be 
consulted over their future: "As for the two vilayets (districts) of 
Aleppo and Beirut the government of Great Britain have fully understood 
your statement in that respect and noted it with greatest care. But as 
the interests of their ally France are involved in those two provinces 
the question calls for careful consideration."34 
Hussein, however, accepted the British argument but reserved the right 
to claim back these areas through negotiations with the Allies after the 
War: "We shall deem it our duty, at the earliest opportunity after the 
conclusion of the war, to claim from you Beirut and its coastal regions 
which we will overlook for the moment on account of France." He 
emphasised that "any concession designed to give France or any other 
power possession of a single square foot of territory in these parts is 
out of the question."35 
The important thing here is that there was no thought in those days 
about a Jewish national home or any deal with Zionism, yet later the 
British government claimed that Palestine was excluded from the 
Hussein-McMahon agreement and therefore Britain had the right to dispose 
of the country as she wished. This matter become so controversial that 
in 1939 a committee was formed, which consisted of Arabs and Britains, 
to study the correspondence. 
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The two sides in the committee admitted that the wording of the 
letters was vague but each side insisted on its position, the Arabs 
claimed that Palestine was included in the Arab state while the British 
claimed that it was excluded. 
However, they agreed that the British government "were not free to 
dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the 
inhabitants of Palestine.,,36 
According 
"undertaking 
from which 
excluded.,,37 
to Marlowe, Hussein agreed to revolt in return for an 
by Great Britain to secure Arab independence over an area 
it can fairly said that Palestine was not specifically 
I would argue that the important issue here is not whether Palestine 
was included in the promised independent Arab State or not, but rather 
if Britain had the right to dispose of the country against the will of 
its inhabitants, a thing which, in my view, she did not have. 
In the light of the previous evidence and in my view Palestine indeed 
was included in the proposed independent Arab state. There was no 
mention of a Jewish state at the time nor even was there any agreement 
between Britain and the Zionists at that time. Britain wanted to reserve 
the Lebanon for France as became clear in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 
the same year. 
The Sykes -P;cot Agreement38 
Immediately after the British had secured the Arabs' alliance they 
started secret negotiations with the French and Russian governments for 
the division among themselves of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire after victory. According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, 
the Arab areas were divided into British sphere of influence areas: 
Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and French areas: Syria and Lebanon. 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement, however, was negotiated and concluded 
without the knowledge of the Arabs. It contained provisions which were 
in direct conflict with the terms of the British pledges to the Arabs. 
This Agreement gives us an indication of the the real value of British 
agreements with countries other than colonialist countries. Such 
agreements indeed intended to secure their interests as they understood 
them and not as the other countries might understand them. In other 
words these agreements were not conducted between two equal states, but 
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rather they were intended to serve the interests of the colonial power 
in the first place. Therefore, Britain entered into the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement which was indeed in violation of their agreement with the 
Arabs. 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement was not the last element in British policy 
towards the Arab countries, since in 1917 the British government entered 
into yet another commitment, this time with the Zionist movement, that 
was the issuing of the Balfour Declaration. 
The Balfour Declaration39 
In the very early days of World War One the British government 
realised the importance of having control over Southern Syria in order 
to protect the Eastern flank of the Suez Canal, which the Turkish army 
very nearly succeeded in crossing in 1915. The British official mind was 
somewhat exercised as to how Britain could establish a claim to this 
region which would satisfy her allies. 40 We have already seen how she 
entered into agreements with Hussein, France and Russia in the 
Hussein-McMahon agreement and the Sykes-Picot Agreement respectively. 
In the context of the British imperialistic design in this area, the 
Jewish national home idea was born in the minds of certain British 
planners and politicians. Some of them even believed that Britain could 
win the United States to their side in the war against Germany through 
Jewish influence, which could be guaranteed by promising them Palestine. 
James McMahon expressed this view to Mark Sykes of the Foreign 
Office: 40 "You can win the sympathy of certain politically minded Jews 
every where, and especially in the United States, in one way only and 
that is by offering to try and secure Palestine for them." 
The Zionist leaders on their side were prepared, in return, for a 
declaration undertaking to establish a Jewish national home in 
Palestine, to do all in their power to "rally Jewish sentiment and 
support through the world to the Allied cause.,,41 
Negotiations between the British government and the Zionist leaders 
especially Dr Weizmann in London, lasted for most of the year 1917 until 
finally on 2nd November 1917 the British Foreign Minister, Arthur 
Balfour, issued the "ill-fated" Declaration which now bears his name. 
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The Balfour Declaration was issued in the form of a letter from Balfour 
to Lord Rothschild: 42 "His Majesty's Government view with favour the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and 
will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this 
object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in any other country". 
The wording of the Declaration is vague and ambiguous because it was 
intended to be vague and ambiguous. It was intended to leave the British 
Government free later to put whatever construction it liked on the 
undertaking given. 
There were different reasons other than colonialistic motives given 
behind Britain's commitment to Zionism, among which are the following: 
1. That the Zionists might used their influence in the United States 
to bring the United States into the war on the side of the Allies. 
2. It was a reward for Dr Weizmann for his participation in the war 
effort. 
3. It was given for human and religious motives. 
George Antonius, with whom I agree, considered the colonialistic 
motives as the dominant ones, and "Whatever part other considerations, 
financial, political, religious or humanitarian may have played, there 
is no doubt that it sufficed by itself to bring about the Balfour 
Declaration.,,43 
John Marlowe presents a similar view: "The Zionist leaders knew, the 
Allied powers knew, that the British government, like Lloyd George did 
not "care a damn about the Jews ", but simply wanted Palestine for 
. d' Z· . t t' t ,,44 strateglc reasons, an was uSlng lonlsm as a means 0 ge 1 • 
The text of the Declaration may be divided into three parts: 
The first part applied to the Jews: "His Majesty's government view with 
favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement 
of this object." This has no definite meaning, "if all Great Britain had 
done in Palestine after the war had been to facilitate the foundation of 
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a Hebrew University and a few orphanages and homes for aged Jews it 
could have been quite plausibly argued that she had carried out what was 
undertaken in the Balfour Declaration."45 
There is no mention of "historical connection" nor Jewish state but 
rather a vague statement which was soon the subject of controversy. This 
was understandable because at that time there were only about 57,000 (9 
percent) Jews in Palestine and nobody was sure that the Zionists would 
succeed 
Palestine 
in persuading a large number of Jewish settlers to emigrate to 
where they faced harsh weather, social and economic 
conditions. 
Lloyd George excluded the idea of converting Palestine into a Jewish 
State. "Whichever, interpretation we adopt, Palestine would appear to be 
incapacitated by physical and other conditions from ever becoming in any 
real sense the national home of the Jewish people."46 
Even Weizmann denied that the Zionists wanted to establish a Jewish 
State in Palestine. This was his answer to a question put to him during 
the Paris Peace Conference about the meaning of the Jewish national 
home: 47 the Zionists did not want an autonomous Jewish Government, but 
merely to establish in Palestine under a mandatory Power an 
administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible 
to send into Palestine 70,000 to 80,000 Jews annually. 
Lloyd George also confirmed that it was not the British Government's 
idea that a Jewish state should be set up in Palestine against the 
wishes of its inhabitants. 48 
On the other hand, some Zionists and other American and British 
political figures did talk about a Jewish commonwealth. For example: 
Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States said: "The Allies, are 
agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish 
commonwealth. "49 
The significance of the Balfour Declaration to the Zionist movement 
lies in the fact that it was legally utilized by both Britain and 
Zionists alike, especially after it was embodied in the Mandate, to 
legitimize their colonization of Palestine and it was the document which 
the Zionists used successfully to frustrate all the Palestinians' 
51-
efforts to gain their independence. 
The second part, concerning the rights and position of the Palestinian 
people, stipulated: "It being clearly understood that nothing shall be 
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine." 
Reading through this part or the safeguarding clause, it will be 
observed that the Palestinian people are mentioned in such a way as to 
give an entirely false picture of their position in the country and 
their indubitable right to it. Although constituting in 1917 about 90 
percent of the population, they were referred to as "the existing 
non-Jewish communities of Palestine." This tended to give the erroneous 
impression that they were an insignificant minority occupying a position 
subordinate to the Jews. 
This British Zionist policy of non-recognition of the Palestinians as 
a people was in my view the basic obstacle which directly or indirectly 
prevented the achievement of a lasting settlement for the Palestine 
conflict during the Mandate as we will see in the next chapter. 
The Arabs, however, were not aware that Britain after promising to 
support their independence had concluded two secret agreements which 
conflicted with Arab aspirations, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the 
Balfour Declaration. The texts of the two Agreements were disclosed by 
the Bolsheviks on coming to power in 1917. 
Since Britain did not consult the Arabs about entering into agreements 
with other parties, the French and the Zionists, on matters which 
concerned directly the Arab people, the Arabs protested strongly to the 
British Government and made it clear that the Arabs would never accept 
or recognize these agreements. 
The British Government, however, gave the Arabs assurances at various 
times after the disclosure of these agreements and convinced the Arab 
leaders to carryon their fight against the Turks. 
Among these assurances were the following: 
1. The Hogarth message of January 1918. 50 An explicit assurance was 
given that Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so 
far as it would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of 
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the Arab population. 
2. The Bassett letter of 8th February 1918: 51 "His Majesty's 
Government and their Allies remain steadfast to the policy of helping 
any movement which aims at setting free those nations which are 
oppressed ... The Government of His Britannic Majesty repeats its 
previous promise in respect of the freedom and the emancipation of the 
Arab peoples." 
3. The British Declaration to the seven of 16th June 1918. 52 
This Declaration assured the Arab people that the British policy 
towards them in regard to the future government would be based upon the 
principle of the consent of the governed. 
4. The Anglo-French Declaration of 9th November 1918. 53 If there had 
been any doubt in the minds of the Arabs, these were dispelled by this 
last Declaration "France and Great Britain agree to further assist in 
setting up indigenous governments and administrations in Syria" (which 
then included Palestine) "and Mesopotamia" (Iraq).54 
However, during the Paris Peace Conference the British Government 
tried to bring her two allies the Arabs and the Zionist together and to 
sign an agreement of understanding. Indeed an agreement was reached 
between Emir Feisal, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, and Dr. Weizmann, 
head of the Jewish Agency. 
Feisal-Weizmann Agreement. 55 
In January 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference Emir Feisal and Dr. 
Weizmann reached an agreement which provided, among other things, for 
"cord i a 1 goodwill and understand i ng" between Arabs and Jews. Accord i ng 
to the agreement the Arabs would allow Jewish immigration into 
Palestine, presumably under Arab control and regulation, to participate 
in developing the country and perhaps the rest of the Arab world, 
through Jewish skills and money, provided that such immigration would 
not affect the political and economic rights of the Palestinian Arabs. 
This Arab concession was given in return for complete Arab 
independence, including Palestine, which could be achieved through 
Zionist influence in the West. 
Feisal certainly did not agree to turn Palestine over to the Zionists, 
or to establish a Jewish state there, as the Zionists tried to suggest, 
but rather it was a deal whereby the Jews could immigrate to Arab 
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territories to participate in their development under Arab control and 
under similar regulations on immigration into the United States, Canada, 
or the Arab World today. 
Feisal, however, put in an important reservation, written in Arabic in 
his own handwriting, at the end of the agreement which made it clear 
that this agreement could be valid only, "Provided the Arabs obtain 
their independence" but if that was not achieved "I shall not then be 
bound by a single word of the present agreement which shall be deemed 
void and of no account or validity and I shall not be answerable in any 
way whatsoever. ,,56 
The significance of that agreement lies in the fact that it was the 
first and last attempt to reach an understanding directly negotiated and 
based on the common interest of both sides. The agreement clearly was 
not executed because neither Britain, France nor the Zionist movement 
was, at that time, prepared to give up its colonial interests in the 
area and agree to complete Arab independence. 
In July 1920 the French occupied Damascus and deposed King Feisal. The 
British continued their occupation of Palestine and in 1922 secured a 
Mandate over the country from the League of Nations. 57 
The Palestine Mandate58 
The granting of the Mandate to Britain, without consulting the 
Palestinians, was seen by the Arabs as a violation of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations itself. According to the Covenant "the wishes of 
these communities (under Mandate) must be a principal consideration in 
the selection of the Mandatory." The victorious British colonial power 
thought, at that time, that the inhabitants of Palestine were not worth 
consulting about their own future which must be decided for them by the 
British government at their convenience. 
A. J. Balfour, then the British Foreign Secretary, expressed this view 
in clear terms: 59 "Whatever deference should be paid to the views of 
those living there, the powers in their selection of a Mandatory do not 
propose, as I understand the matter, to consult them." 
If the Palestinians had been consulted or even considered worthy of 
consultation, they might not have chosen Britain, which was committed to 
Zionism through the Balfour Declaration, and the whole conflict might 
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have been avoided. 
According to the King-Crane Commission,60 which was sent to consult the 
population about their choice of the Mandatory regime, the Palestinians 
were totally opposed to Zionism and put their first choice as 
independence within a unitary state to include the whole of Syria. 
The King-Crane Commission Report makes this point very clear when it 
states that: II I f that pri nc i p 1 e is to rul e, and so the wi shes of 
Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done, then 
it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine, 
nearly nine-tenths of the whole, are emphatically against the entire 
Zionist programme." 61 
The Commission made it clear that the final Zionist aim was the 
dispossessing of the Palestinians through various sort of land purchase. 
liThe fact comes out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with 
Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a 
practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants 
of Palestine by various forms of purchase." 62 
The approval of the Palestine Mandate which included the Balfour 
Declaration and recognized the "historical connection" of the Jews with 
Palestine, without Palestinian approval or consultation made it almost 
impossible for the Palestinians to recognize this document. And since 
British attempts to solve the problem were based on this document, there 
was little chance of their being acceptable to the Palestinians, as we 
will see in the next chapter. 
Concluding Remarks. 
Palestine, in its Mandated borders, was founded in 1919 during the 
Paris Peace Conference as a part of the overall Anglo-French division of 
the Arab countries. Before that the country had no specific frontiers 
but rather it was referred to as Southern Syria. The country though 
small in size (26,000 square kilometers), occupies a strategic location 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
It forms the only land bridge between Asia and Africa and today it is 
located in the heart of the Arab World. This strategic location made it 
a cross-roads and subject to a series of foreign conquests from the East 
as well as from the West. Its original inhabitants were the Canaanites 
and the Philistines. These native populations lived in the country 
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throughout known history and between 1200-1400 B.C. they faced the first 
wave of alien conquerors the Hebrews, who are believed to have come from 
Ur in Southern Iraq or from Egypt. 
The Hebrews were able to establish their control over most of 
Palestine but that occupation came to an end in 585 B.C., when the 
Babylonians occupied the country and took most of the Jews to live in 
captivity in Babylon. The Babylonians were followed by the Persians, the 
Greeks and the Romans. 
Despite the fact that the native population had mixed with their 
conquerors, especially in the towns, they preserved their own culture 
and identity and never assimilated with their conquerors. 
In 637 A.D. the Arab Muslims occupied Palestine and from that date on 
the country became an Arab territory, like Syria and Lebanon, and the 
Palestinians became not only Arabized but identified themselves as Arabs 
too. 
It is true that many Arab tribes settled in the country after it 
became Arabized, but the majority of the Palestinian Arabs are the 
physical descendents of the Canaanites, the Philistines and a mixture of 
some elements who remained in Palestine after the end of each conquest, 
and not, as is the deliberately created misconception, that they 
exclusively came with the Arab Muslims in the 7th century. 
The real title which the Palestinians Arabs have to Palestine 
therefore comes from birth and long continued possession of the country, 
from the dawn of history until the majority of them were forced to leave 
their homes and lands by the Zionist forces during the civil war in 
Palestine between November 1947 and May 1948, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
War, as I will show in the next Chapters. 
On the other hand, the Hebrews were neither the natives nor the owners 
of the land in Palestine and their occupation of the country in Biblical 
times was an episode in the long history of the country like that of the 
Babylonians, the Romans and the Turks. Palestine therefore, may be 
associated with those who today profess the Jewish faith, but this 
association is only spiritual, not political or physical. 
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The Zionist movement appeared at the end of 19th century as a response 
to social and political discrimination in Eastern Europe. The Movement 
quickly associated itself with the leading powers and tried to strike a 
deal with one of these powers, whereby they could get a territory large 
enough to establish a Jewish State in return for Zionist services or 
money. They first approached Germany and Turkey and when they failed to 
achieve a deal, in 1917 they turned to Britain. By now Britain had 
secured an alliance with the Arabs through the Hussein-McMahon Agreement 
and with France and Russia through the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The 
Zionist movement appeared a potential client to fulfil two main 
imperialistic objectives: 
First, to bring the United States into the war through Jewish 
influence and secondly, to give the British Government an acceptable 
pretext to secure their occupation of Palestine for a long time on the 
ground that they were there to protect the Jewish community. 
Within this context of colonial design, Britain, without consulting 
the Palestinians, issued the Balfour Declaration in November 1917 which 
promised to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine 
provided that it would not prejudice the rights and positions of the 
Palestinians. 
Britain 
therefore 
knew that such a Declaration did not carry legal weight and 
she embodied that Declaration in the Palestine Mandate which 
was approved by the League of Nations in 1923 without any Palestinian 
consultation or consent. 
The Mandate, however, recognized the "historical connection" of the 
Jews with Palestine without questioning the validity of the Zionist 
claim and without consulting the Arabs. 
First of all it has been established that not all the Jews of the 
world are the physical descendants of the Hebrews, nor were the Hebrews 
the original natives of Palestine. 
Secondly, the spiritual connection of the Jews does not legitimize 
their 20th century colonization of Palestine against the wishes of its 
inhabitants, the Palestinians, least of all to occupy most of the 
country by the use of force and to force the Palestinians to leave the 
country and to live as refugees under unacceptable conditions. 
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However, despite British assurances to the Arabs63 that it was not 
their intention to create a Jewish state in Palestine the British 
government used the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate as the 
legitimate tools to prevent the establishment of a national government 
in Palestine and at the same time allowed more than half a million 
Zionist settlers to enter the country under the terms of the Mandate, 
but practically imposed them on the country against the will of its 
natives. In this sense it was not different from any other white 
settlement elsewhere. 
Thus, Palestine was transformed from a once predominantly Arab society 
into a Plural Society with a clear continued and widening conflict 
between its main segments, the Palestinian Arabs and the alien Zionist 
settlers. The Palestinians resisted this process of colonization with 
their limited resources, but they did not succeed in stopping it because 
they could not match the combined forces of Great Britain and Zionism. 
However, Britain put forward several proposals to solve the problem but 
they did not succeed either because they did not meet the Palestinians' 
demands for independence, or Zionists' demands for exclusively Jewish 
state, as I will show in the next Chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Transformation of the Palestinian Society under the 
Mandate, A Socio-Historical Profile 
Introduction 
The single most important fact about Palestinian society, during the 
Mandate period, is that it was a predominantly traditional Arab peasant 
society. This is true in the sense that if Palestine had not been a 
traditional backward society by Western standards, it could not have 
been the target of Zionist colonization. Therefore, any interpretation 
of the transformation of the country from a homogeneous Arab society 
into a Plural one has to be developed in the context of settler 
colonialism. 
examine the social The purpose of this chapter, however, is to 
structure of Palestinian society and its 
Palestinian responses to Zionist settlement and 
to solve the conflict. 
implications for the 
the different attempts 
This Chapter will be divided into four sections: 
1. Population 
In this section I will examine the composition of Palestinian society, 
the relationship between its different segments and the implication of 
this composition and relations on the Palestinians' mode of action and 
on their overall responses to Zionist settlement and on attempts to 
solve the conflict. The interesting question here would be: Was the 
Palestinian social structure responsible for the Palestinians' inability 
to stop Zionist and British colonization of their country? Or was it due 
to the military and material superiority of Great Britain and the 
Zionist Movement? 
2. Demographic Transformation 
The purpose of this section is to present a factual account of the 
process whereby Palestine was transformed from a country inhabited by 
settled Palestinian Arabs, to one now inhabited overwhelmingly by 
Zionist settlers and Jews from allover the World. This radical and 
continuing replacement of population, despite the opposition of the 
indigenous Arab inhabitants, created a grievance which present proposed 
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solutions to the Palestine conflict tend to relegate to the background. 
Yet what may appear to outside observers to be a peripheral issue is, to 
the Palestinians, the real and most basic issue from which all others 
follow. To understand this reality one must become more fully aware both 
of the magnitude of the demographic transformation and, more 
importantly, of its startling recency. 
3. Land Alienation 
The purpose of this section is to examine the process of land 
alienation in Palestine during the British Mandate in the hope that it 
will give us an idea of the size of Zionist land acquisition and the 
effect of this acquisition on Palestinian peasant conditions, including 
landlessness, the decline in the size of plots of land and more 
importantly on the relationship between the Palestinians and the Jewish 
settlers. It is equally important to know why the Zionists purchased 
land in Palestine and why did the Palestinians sell their land? How much 
land did the Zionists acquire before the end of the Mandate? Why did the 
Palestinians oppose Zionist land purchase? 
4. Separate Development 
The purpose of this section is to examine the Palestinian and Zionist 
policies of political, economical and social development and their 
effects on the relationship between the two communities and on the 
attempts to solve the conflict. Was separate development a deliberate 
Zionist policy? Or was it implemented to avoid exploiting the Arabs? 
1. Population 
At the close of World War 1 in 1918, Palestine was an Arab country 
similar to other parts of the Arab World. It had a population of about 
700,000 of whom 574,000 were Muslims, 70,000 were Christians and 56,000 
were Jews. The latter were mostly Arabs of the Jewish faith. 1 The 
outstanding characteristics of Palestinian social structure during the 
Mandate appear to have been segmental ism, regionalism and a tendency 
towards autarky (self-sufficiency) within social segments. 2 All three 
characteristics, segmental ism, autarky and regionalism, can be viewed as 
related effects of declining central power during Ottoman rule and the 
lack of adequate roads and other means of communication between towns 
and between towns and villages. 
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The contribution of the Ottoman State3 to security or communication was 
minimal, thus, the population was thrown back upon its own resources for 
survival: a task it managed through well-developed forms of social 
relations, reinforced by specific culture values. As the class most 
vulnerable to exploitation and oppression by other classes, the 
fellaheen (peasants) developed these social relations and cultural 
values with possibly greater tenacity and emphasis than the other 
classes, to whom alternative methods of survival were available. 
To elaborate first upon segmental ism: Palestinian society was divided 
into groups,4 clearly marked by linguistic labels, and specialized as to 
occupation, area of settlement, and way of life. There was, however, no 
ideology of caste, or hierarchy, to separate the classes. 5 On the 
contrary, Islam tends towards egalitarianism, and the idea of "one 
society." But in practice the social classes remained fixed and 
separate. Not only was there little movement of persons between classes, 
but there was also little exchange of any kind, trade, visiting, 
marriage, until the late Mandate period, when it began to become 
fashionable among city people to spend the summer months in the 
countryside. Palestinian society was divided into three distinct groups 
or classes: 
a. Madeniyeen (city dwellers) 
They were predominantly merchants and craftsmen. They formed only a 
small proportion of the population at the beginning of the Mandate 
(between 10 and 20%), but by the end of the Mandate they had grown to 
around 30 percent. 
b. Fellaheen (peasants) 
The single most important fact about Palestinian society during the 
Mandate is that I it was overwhelmingly peasant or fellaheen. The 
Palestinian peasantry formed about 80 percent of the total population at 
the beginning of the Mandate. 6 The heart of rural society was the 
village. "The majority of Palestinians were gathered into somewhat more 
than one thousand villages of varying size and fortune. After the 
extended family, the village was the most important unit in the fellah's 
life. Its functions were not only social and economic but, in the 
broadest sense, political as well."l The size of villages varied greatly 
as did their land area and socio-economic level. Granott,8 gives an 
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average population size of 7 to 8 hundreds and an average land size of 6 
to 7 thousand donums. (Donum =1000 square metres). The link between the 
village and the larger unit of administration was the Mukhtar (head 
man).9 The smallest social unit in Palestinian villages was the 
household. It consisted of a man, his wife, their unmarried children, 
their married sons with their wives and children, and unsupported female 
relatives such as widowed mothers, unmarried sisters of the family head. 
It is worth noting here that there were feuds among the different sects 
(Muslims, Christians, Jews and Druze) or families in the same village 
and between one village and another village or one group of villages 
against another group of villages. 10 This was possible because different 
branches of one tribe happened to live in different villages and in Arab 
culture it is usual that if something happens to one branch all the 
other branches intervene. The causes of feuds and conflict between 
families (tribes) or villages seem to have been mainly water, land and 
grazing. 
However, 
diminish 
drift of 
the distinction between madeniyeen and fellaheen tended to 
at the end of the Mandate for several reasons. One was the 
evicted or indebted peasants to the cities, especially Haifa, 
where there was employment in the port; another was the improvement of 
education, whereby students from villages went to study in towns, and 
finally, the improvements in roads and other communication means which 
facilitated the exchange of the farmers' produce for other goods in the 
cities. However, it is clear from the situated usage of the terms madani 
and fellah, that they indicated social and cultural differences, and not 
simply occupational differences. 11 
c. The 8edu (Nomads) 
The Bedu formed about 5 percent of the total Arab population of 
Palestine and numbered about 66,553 at the beginning of the Mandate, and 
had not greatly increased at its end. The majority of the Bedu lived in 
the Beersheba district and some of them lived in Galilee. 
Relationships between Different Groups 
The Relationship of the Wujaha' (notables) with other Groups12 
As a class the Wujaha' consisted of heads of rich families, merchants 
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and landowners. They lived in the main cities but in many cases had land 
in the countryside which was run by agents. The stance of the 
Palestinian ruling class the a'yan and Wujaha' (notables) towards the 
other groups, peasants and Bedu, was more complex, and requires a more 
detailed historical study than I have space for. Therefore, it suffices 
for the purpose of this chapter to examine the relationship between the 
ruling class and the rest of the population on one hand and on the other 
the relationship between the Fellaheen and the Bedu with particular 
reference to the implication of these relations on the overall 
Palestinian mode of action and responses to Zionist settlement and the 
attempts to solve the conflict before the end of the Mandate. 
The Palestinian leadership was dominated by two large and rich families 
the Husseinis and their rivals the Nashashibis. 13 Both families were 
located in Jerusalem but they had a clan network and connections all 
over the country. 
Zionists other 
Nashashibis were 
The Husseinis were opposed to any concessions to the 
than individual and minority rights, while the 
prepared to accept autonomy for the Zionist settlers 
and unification with Transjordan. There were of course, other rival 
families in Jerusalem itself and in Jaffa, Haifa and Nablus. 14 
The Palestinian leaders were quick to realize the danger of the Zionist 
settlement in Palestine, especially after the Zionists made it clear 
that they were coming into Palestine to establish an exclusively Jewish 
national home and not simply as colonialists like the British or the 
French or occupiers like the Romans, or the Turks. 1S Muslim landowners 
in particular made it conditional, in all their meetings with outside 
parties, especially the British, that the peasants must be left in 
undisturbed tenancy. On the other hand, it is evident that all peasant 
guerrilla action until 1936 was undertaken without leadership, or even 
advice, from the higher levels of the Wujaha', although provincial 
notables may well have played a supportative, though not an active 
role. I6 This was possible because the social distance between 
Palestinian Notables and peasants,17 deriving from the special form of 
Arab and Turkish traditions, had not been broken down during the 
Mandate. 
Palestinian Notables, whatever their orlglns, lived in cities, and 
managed their estates through agents. Although towards the end of the 
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19th century rich city merchants began to buy land for 
these were strictly commercial transactions, with 
socio-political effects. Thus, unlike the ruling classes 
plantations, 
almost no 
of England, 
Russia or Japan, the Palestinian ruling class had weak ties with the 
peasantry. 
Two other characteristics of the Palestinian Wujaha', equally rooted in 
history, may be explanatory factors in the debacle to come. Firstly, it 
is instructive to discover that the Palestinians were not strongly 
represented at the leadership level in the early Arab Nationalist 
organizations such as al-Fatat, al-Ahod, the Decentralization Party, and 
the Beirut Reform Committee, that formed the nucleus of post-Turkish 
Arab leadership. These were based on Damascus, Cairo and Beirut. 
Although not attached to Syria under late Ottoman administrative 
arrangements, Palestine appears to have been regarded by the early Arab 
Nationalists as an outlying part of Syria. The important thing here is 
that the Palestinian leaders, at the beginning of the Mandate, accepted 
this view and did not demand a separate Palestinian state, but rather 
the integration of Palestine within the Arab government established by 
Emir Feisal in Damascus in 1920. 18 
The second characteristic concern was mode of action. The Palestinian 
leaders' mode of action was: "Negotiatory rather than mobilization, or, 
in as far as they attempted mobilization, it was through exhortation of 
the masses to sacrifices rather than commitment.,,19 
In seeking to explain this limitation of political methods, we may note 
the limited power and wealth of the Palestinian Notables. Their status 
derived from lineage rather than the great wealth or estate to be found 
in Syria or Egypt, their role was bureaucratic, judicial, and religious, 
never military, and political only in a limited sense. 
The other major factor in limiting their action during the Mandate was 
the ruthlessness of the Mandatory regime which in 1936-1939 disbanded 
all Palestinian organizations, arrested most of the Palestinian leaders, 
deported others and used severe military measures to suppress the 
Palestinian Revolt. 20 
Integratation into the Ottoman administration confirmed their local 
status, depriving them of national political power, or responsibility. 
Their role was essentially mediatory, protecting their clients and 
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passing on information, advice, 
downwards. lilt was their access to 
local influence, while their local 
and warnings, both upwards and 
high officials that reinforced their 
status made the authorities ready to 
listen to them: a classic form of colonial rule."21 
While nationalist political parties22 were formed under the Mandate and 
led by individual members of the notables, their style and methods were 
carried over from the Ottoman period. They sought to change the Mandate 
government's commitment to Zionism through argument, warning and hints 
of potential violence. But it is typical of this political strategy that 
the threat of mass violence is used, but never actualized, because the 
individual Wajih (notable) will not jeopardize his position. Lacking 
mass support and in rivalry with other leading Wajaha', the individual 
Wajahi's position depended, in the last analysis, on balancing a 
nationalist stance against his usefulness to the authorities as a 
moderating and defusing influence. lilt is a form of political action 
that requires intelligence, judgement, diplomacy, eloquence: qualities 
very far from those of the mass political organizer." 23 
Thus, as peasant landlessness, unemployment and discontent grew with 
the increase of Zionist immigration and land purchasing, the Palestinian 
Wujaha' drew the attention of the British Mandatory government to these 
facts in countless memoranda and meetings. But this was as far as they 
could go until 1936, when a broad form of political action, involving 
peasants and a younger, educated middle class element, forced them to 
the extremity of action. Even then they were reluctant to resort to 
action, and it is instructive to see how the General Strike and the 
Revolt's gains were thrown away for worthless promises, and through the 
intervention of the leaders of the neighbouring Arab States, favouring a 
diplomatic rather than a resistance stance towards British power. 24 liThe 
upper classes could not think in terms of being obligated to the lower 
classes in the context of a total national struggle; they could only 
feel some obligation for the lower classes in so far as this did not 
conflict with their own vital interests." 2S 
It seems to me that it is instructive to understand the precarious 
position of the Palestinian leaders at that time and not simply say that 
they did not do what we see now as the right thing. In the first place 
most of the Palestinian leaders were head of families or land owners 
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and, therefore, in most cases they only represented their own families 
or region and consequently their influence was within that family or 
region. There was in each city or region more than one family and leader 
who were in competition with each other for power, status and government 
posts. The Mandatory government played those leaders off against each 
other, especially through its monopoly over the important jobs such as 
mayors and religious posts, especially Mufti of Jerusalem. It was also 
not difficult for the Mandatory Government to arrest, depose or deport 
any of those leaders at its convenience. 
The Palestinian leaders, however, failed to transfer their regional or 
family leadership into a national leadership capable of exploiting the 
people's readiness to be mobilized into a coherent resistance movement 
during the first two decades of British occupation when the so-called 
"Jewish national home" was at its most vulnerable. 
The Relationship between the Fellaheen and the Bedu 
Relationships between the two poorest social groups, the bedu and 
fellaheen appear to have been harmonious when central authority was 
strong. But a long history of conflict gave rise to a depth of hostility 
and suspicion between the two. The historical and cultural roots of 
their differences go back to the early stages of Islam. The superiority 
of the bedu in terms of status derived partly from their close 
association with Arab conquests and the spread of Islam. It was the 
nomadic tribes, not the peasants, who formed the military basis of 
almost every Arab dynasty and empire. Moreover, bedu leaders formed part 
of the ruling class, linking their tribes to the source of power,26 
while the essence of peasant class helplessness was that they had no 
such links. Finally the decline of central authority, throughout the 
whole region, during Ottoman rule, tipped the power balance in favour of 
the bedu, because unlike peasants, they were both mounted and armed. In 
times of drought or bad harvest, the bedu were likely to raid the 
fellaheen for grain or alternatively, to protect the fellaheen from 
other bedu in return for payment of the Khuwa. 27 
Although, less powerful in Palestine than in Syria, the bedu were 
probably a factor in isolating villages, and in preventing the 
accumulation of a peasant surplus. As late as 1948, the historical 
pattern of bedu-fellaheen relations was still alive. Shoufani 28 tells 
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how, with the breakdown of central authority, bedouin round the Galilean 
village of Mi'ilya began to kidnap draft cattle and hold them for 
ransom. He also notes social distance between the villagers of Mi'illya, 
and the towns-people of nearby Tarsheeha. Both he and Nafidh Nazzal,29 
in their accounts of the 1948 War in the Galilee area, note a lack of 
communication, or co-operation, between individual villages. 
Relations between Towns and Villages 
The social distance between fellaheen and medaniyeen was almost as 
strong as between the former and the bedu, though different in its 
historical origin. Cities were the centres of state and under the 
successive administrations of the Romans, Arabs, and Ottomans, no social 
group interposed itself between the peasants and the officials of the 
state. Even when not the seat of government, cities enjoyed a certain 
autonomy and capacity for self-defence. Because of peasant poverty,30 
there was little economic exchange of agricultural produce against city 
artifacts to link the rural and urban population. 
The present author recalls the conditions and some aspects of the 
relationship between medaniyeen, fellaheen and bedu as he himself 
experienced it in his village during the early 1950s. These conditions 
and relationships could be a typical example for Arab society during the 
1930s, 1940s and 1950s including Palestine. 31 
Kufferrahta is a small village located in the north west of Jordan and 
fifteen miles from the town of Irbed. The social and economic conditions 
in this village were almost similar to those in most of the villages in 
Palestine. My village located about 35 miles from the Palestine borders. 
The fellaheen lived a co-operative community life in almost complete 
isolation from the outside world. There were no roads, cars or any other 
mobile transportation to connect the village with the town or other 
villages. No electricity, water supplies, school, post office, 
telephone, radio, television or any other social services (before 
1950s). 
What they knew about the government was that it had brutal police who 
came to the villages on horses and stayed in the Mukhtar's house for few 
days, at the expense of the village, and collected the taxes. The people 
lived mainly from the produce of the land and animals. They did not deal 
-70-
with cash nor there was any shop in the village. Instead they used to 
exchange the surplus of their production from the land or animals or 
labour among each other. There was no wage labour but rather the 
villagers, 
building, 
men and women, assisted each other during the harvest, 
picking fruit or vegetables. They made their own agricultural 
and building tools mainly from wood and made their own clothes. Even 
wives in some cases were exchanged. One man could exchange his sister 
with another man's sister, thus making two marriages. 32 This practice, 
however, was later abandoned because it proved to cause problems among 
both families. 
The main conflict among fellaheen was about land and animals. The area 
allocated for village building was not registered and there were no 
borders between the houses. If some one wanted to build a fence or a new 
house a dispute could be started and nobody could tell who was right 
because there were no marks or borders. The other source of conflict was 
the animals. They could get loose at night and cause damage to the crops 
or trees. 
These disputes usually finished through the intervention of elderly 
people who were not involved and worked as neutral judges. The only time 
the people went to the town was when they needed to buy their supplies, 
sugar, rice, coffee, some clothes, and metal tools which they could not 
make in the village and when they wanted to buy animals from the town 
animal market. 33 Usually the villagers went to the town in groups of two 
or three people. There was more than one reason for that: some went for 
the first time and they needed help to find the right place to buy 
supplies. Some did not know how and where to sell their grain or 
animals. Others did not know how to count money because they did not 
deal with cash. And most important was that going in a group would 
guarantee that they would not be robbed on the way back home which could 
be during the night. 34 
The villagers did not trust the madeniyeen, especially the merchants 
who in some cases cheated the villagers in weights, prices and in 
counting. The medeniyeen looked down on the villagers and considered 
them inferior to themselves and ignorant. The terms fellah was used as 
an insult among the madeniyeen and if some one wanted to tease another 
he called him fellah. It meant ignorant, poor, and uncivilized. 
Therefore, there were no social visits or marriages between the two 
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groups. 
There was no migration from the villages to the town because the 
villagers were very poor and could not afford to live in the town; they 
did not have skills suitable for town jobs and they would lose the 
family security which they had in the village. 
The main reason for sending village children to Kuttab or Shiekhs was 
to study the Kora'n (Holy Book) and not to learn new skills necessary 
for jobs. The attitude of the villager later became very positive and in 
some cases some villagers sold their land to be able to meet their 
children's education expenses. The reason for this change was that 
education became the only way to get government jobs, money and status. 
The relationship between the villagers and the bedu during the 1920s 
and 1930s was not good, especially during the harvest season, May to 
July, when large numbers of bedu, usually armed, would come to the 
village and trample the crops during the night with their herds and 
sheep. The problem was that the bedu would not say who caused the damage 
and therefore the villagers had to guard their crops during the night. 
This led to some bedu or villagers being killed during clashes between 
the two sides. But this relationship improved largely as a result of the 
improvement of government authority and the decline in the number of 
bedu who used to come to the villages. In the 1960s the relationships 
improved and both sides started to benefit. The bedu started to buy the 
remaining harvest and water from the fellaheen in return for sheep, milk 
and cheese. Relations became more organized when some bedu started to 
come again and again to the same village and even marriages took place 
between the two sides. 
Although in Palestine they were clearly demarcated from one another 
through linguistic labeling and socio-cultural distance, the four major 
groups (wujaha' medaniyeen, fellaheen and bedu) were not united 
internally by a consciousness of common interests, nor by the practice 
of group action. As far as their members perceived each other as 
belonging to the same social category, they tended to act competitively. 
This was true in all spheres of action: social, economic and political. 
For example, the ruling class or notables consisted of heads of large 
families and landowners who were competing against each other for 
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government posts or other religious or traditional positions. The 
villagers or fellaheen were fighting each other and the best thing they 
could do was to form alliances of a few villagers against other villages 
and not fellaheen against madaniyeen. The bedu also consisted of tribes 
and always had conflicts over water, and land suitable for their herds. 
Sometimes some bedu made alliances with fellaheen against other bedu. 35 
As I mentioned earlier they were not groups in the normal sociological 
use of the term, but were internally segmented along sectarian regional 
and kinship lines into smaller units that could not form the basis for 
social or political action. 
Of all Arab countries, Palestine appears to have been historically, one 
of the least affected by sectarianism. This, perhaps, was a result of 
the seriousness of external aggression upon the country. National 
consciousness began early to eclipse sectarian division, especially 
among the more educated sectors of the population. This national 
consciousness increased with the increase of the Zionist danger at the 
end of the Mandate. 36 
However, at the village level, in Palestine during the Mandate, 
sectarianism clearly had a role; villages were designated Muslim, Druze 
or Christian according to their majority sect, and the British 
authorities and the Zionists developed different policies towards each, 
encouraging sectarian hostility. Historically developed stereo-types 
certainly existed around these labels, yet as Zwinner notes,37 in a 
study of Galileen rural people personal friendships frequently crossed 
sectarian lines. 
Regionalism, a consequence of poor communications, insecurity and other 
aspects of Arab traditional society, continued throughout the Mandate 
period to stand in the way of concerted action. Uprisings tended to be 
confined to particular cities, or group of villages, without spreading 
to other areas. Segmental political structures, by reinforcing the power 
of local leaders, made regionalism all the more entrenched. 
The clan38 was by any standard the most effective of social units in 
Palestine. It was a primary source of identification; it could own and 
transmit 
defence 
linked 
property; but more importantly, it was highly mobilizable in 
of the claims or rights of members. Clearly defined obligations 
specified kin to one another, to a specific distance, in all 
possible social contingencies: debt, attack, crime, property disputes, 
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false accusations, marriages. The clan formed a complete social security 
system. The status of the family (clan) was decided on the number of its 
members, especially the males. The larger the size of the family, the 
higher its status and its respect became among other families. The tribe 
which had more men would be more effective not only to defend its 
members but also to win battles against rivals. And because there were 
no modern arms or central government to preserve law and order, the 
number of males became the decisive factor in winning a conflict. For 
the above reasons, clan solidarity was much more highly developed among 
the bedu and the fellaheen, than among the madeniyeen or the ruling 
class. The clan could also supply all its members' basic social needs: 
for defence, loans, for marriage partners, labour and social visiting. 
The other important form of social relation was the patron-client 
relationship. It was a code of sanctuary (dakheel), which could be 
invoked unilaterally by the client, without prior agreement and was 
considered absolutely binding on the patron. The dakheel was a person 
who had committed a crime, rape, murder, theft etc .. and went to another 
family asking their help and protection. The family had to accept him 
and take responsibility for solving his problem whatever the cost. In 
such a traditional society, dakheel can be seen as an individual 
solution to the problem of clan or family powerlessness. The dakheel in 
most cases was a member of a small family who sought protection from a 
stronger family 
I have emphasized, in this section, the segmental ism regionalism and 
other aspects of the Palestinian social structure during the Mandate, 
but it would be incorrect to seek in these social characteristics the 
sole causes of the failure of the 1936-1939 revolt or the 1948 disaster. 
By 1936, two decades of nationalist activities and the double threat of 
British colonialism and Zionist immigration and land purchasing, had 
gone far towards unifying the Palestinian people emotionally. If the 
Palestinian revolt of 1936-1939 failed it was because of deliberate 
collaboration between an experienced colonial power, Britain, with a 
determined Zionist movement against a traditional Palestinian society 
which lacked the material power to defend itself against the combined 
forces of Great Britain and the Zionist. 39 
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Of course, there were mistakes and weaknesses at the level of the 
Palestinian leadership but such mistakes or misjudgements by the 
leadership could not have been and were not the only causes for the 
failure of the Palestinian Revolt or 1948 disaster as Sayigh suggests: 
"If the Great Rebellion failed, it was because of mistakes at the 
leadership."40 
The causes of the failure of the Great Rebellion was the superiority of 
the British forces and the Zionist paramilitary organization and the 
brutal way in which they were used against not only the Palestinian 
guerrillas, but also against the civilian population. These repressive 
measures included blowing up houses and quarters of cities, collective 
fines, and other severe restrictions on the population's freedom and 
movement as I will show in Chapter Five. 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that in spite of the 
spread of nationalist consciousness throughout the Mandate period, and 
• in spite of a high level of combativeness among the fellaheen, social 
segmental ism blocked the rapid mobilization of large groups, and long 
term political organization. Any political action initiated by one 
social segment tended to produce counter action in a rival segment. 
Because of the vertical social structure, rivalries at the leadership 
level would be translated into conflict or suspicion at the rank and 
file level. 
Thus, the readiness of the peasants to take up armed struggle was 
dissipated in sporadic violence, and small regionally based guerrilla 
groups instead of a cohesive national resistance movement. The 1948 
disaster, however, was the result of the combined political influence of 
both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on the U.N. to recommend the partition 
of Palestine, the failure of the U.N. to implement Partition and the 
military superiority of the Zionist forces, as I will show in the coming 
chapters. 
2. Demographic Transformation of Palestine, 1917-1948 
It is not necessary, I think, to trace the demographic composition of 
the country back into the dimness of history, but rather to examine the 
process which through mass Zionist immigration transformed Palestine 
from a homogeneous Arab society into a Plural society, from the 
appearance of the political Zionist movement at the close of the 
Nineteenth Century and more importantly since 1917. 
In 1882, as reported by Zionist sources,41 there were about 24,000 Jews 
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in the general area of Palestine against about half a million Arabs. By 
1914, according to Turkish sources, the total population of Palestine 
was 689,275 of which 85,000 were Jews. This increase in Jewish 
population (from 24,000 in 1889) came chiefly from foreign immigrants. 42 
According to the British census of 1922, and far from substantiating 
Zionist claims that Palestine was virtually unpopulated, there were 
757,182 inhabitants in Palestine, 78 percent were Muslims; 73,024 (9.6 
%) were Christian Arabs; less than 10,000 (1 %) others; and 83,794 (11 
%) were Jewish, of whom, perhaps two thirds were European settlers and 
their offspring. 
Not much change in the geographic distribution of the Jewish minority 
was discernible by this time. Most Jews and Zionist settlers were still 
located in a few urban areas. The sub-district of Jerusalem for 
instance, accounted for 34,431 and 24,000 were in the Jaffa and Tel-Aviv 
districts. Thus, three quarters of the total Jewish population of the 
country was concentrated in these two sub-districts. 
In the large hill region of Samaria and the Southern area (Gaza and 
Beersheba) Jews constituted less than 1 percent of the population, 850 
and 750 Jews respectively.43 The Northern area, however, received 
maximum attention from the Zionists, for it contained the main water 
resources and irrigable land. By 1922 some 20,000 settlers had settled 
in this area where they constituted 12 percent of the population. Even 
in this area, despite the fact that Zionist ideology stressed 
agricultural development, most of the Jews settled in towns. More than 
6,000 lived in Haifa, 4,400 lived in Tiberias and 7000 lived in Safad. 
They formed one quarter in Haifa, two thirds in Tiberias and one third 
in Safad. Thus, about 70 percent of the 20,000 Jewish inhabitants of the 
Northern district were urban. 44 
It is important then, to recapitulate the demographic character of 
Palestine at the end of 1922, less than twenty six years before the 
proclamation of "Israel" in more than half of that country. As recently 
as the 1920s Palestine was still overwhelmingly an Arab country of 
stably settled fellaheen (peasants), madeniyeen (city dwellers) and by a 
small, linguistically and culturally assimilated Jewish community which 
had been joined at the end of the 19th century by a larger group of 
ethnically European Zionist settlers drawn chiefly from Russia and 
Poland. The Jewish communities combined, formed 11 percent of the total 
-76-
population and owned less than 2 percent of the land of Palestine. 45 
The Zionist movement, aware of the demographic composition of 
Palestine, realized that in order to be able to achieve their final 
goal, the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, they had to 
upset the balance of population and land ownership to the advantage of 
the Jewish community. From the start, the movement sought to achieve a 
Jewish majority in the country, and to obtain as much of the land as 
possible. The methods included promoting mass Zionist immigration and 
settlement and acqulrlng tracts of land that would become the 
inalienable property of the Jewish people. 
Zionist ideologists knew that there was no point in Zionist immigration 
to Palestine in small numbers which would lead to yet another minority, 
the very thing which they sought to get rid of by immigrating to 
Palestine. What was important then, "Is first of all, a majority of 
Jewish people in Palestine,,,46 so that the Zionists would be able to 
establish a Jewish state in the whole country. But the Zionist leaders 
knew that a mass immigration and settlement in Palestine would face 
strong opposition and resistance from the Palestinians. Therefore, they 
demanded suitable protection from the British colonial power, through 
legislation and administrative action. "A large colonization cannot be 
conducted independently of a government, that it is the government 
enterprise by nature and can only be completed if the government by 
legislative and administrative action support the colonization." The 
Zionist argued that the Mandatory Government ought "actively to promote 
Jewish colonization with a view of course to establish a Jewish 
majority.,,47 
The doors of Palestine were officially opened to Zionist immigration by 
the British colonial power, in September 1920 and on December 1931, the 
British second and last census48 revealed that the total population was 
1,035,821, the overwhelming majority were still Palestinian Arabs: 
861,110 (Muslim, Christians and Druze) and there were 174,606 Jews or 
double their numbers in 1922, mainly due to foreign immigration, 
constituting 16 percent. It is worthwhile mentioning here that although 
Jews constituted 16 percent of the total population, they accounted for 
about 11 percent of the citizens and only 8 percent of the native born 
population. During this decade (1922-1931) about 82 percent of the 
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Zionist immigrants came from Russia and Eastern Europe. About 9 percent 
came from Asia and Africa, 6 percent came from Germany, Austria and the 
United States and about 3 percent from other countries. 49 
It will be recalled that in 1922 about 70 percent of the Jewish 
population was found in the Jaffa and Jerusalem urban areas, by 1931 
over 68 percent of the Jewish and Zionist settlers in Palestine were 
still concentrated in those two areas. On the other hand, in other parts 
no Jewish settlers were to be found in the subdistrict of Beersheba, 
Ramallah Jenin or Nablus; well under 1 percent of the populations of the 
subdistricts of Gaza (0,4 percent) Hebron (0,2 percent) Bethlehem (0,1 
percent) Tulkarm (0,14 percent) and Acre (0,7 percent) were Jews. 50 
Between the beginning of 1932 and the end of 1936 about 170,000 Zionist 
settlers immigrated to Palestine. This radical change, occurring in the 
brief span of only 5 years, must certainly be recognized as an important 
underlying cause of the Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939. as I will show 
in Chapter Five. Within five years the Jewish population doubled, almost 
exclusively as a direct result of mass immigration. By the end of 1936 
Jews constituted some 28 percent of the total population as compared 
with 11 percent in 1922 and 16 percent in 1931. 
It was therefore, not suprising that the Palestinian Arabs should have 
been become alarmed at the rapid rate at which the demographic 
composition of their country was being altered, without their consent 
and against their will, especially since self-determination was becoming 
an increasingly distant prospect. 
The Palestinians expressed their opposition to Zionist settlement 
through continued political and violent action during the Mandate period 
which included a General Strike and a Revolt which continued for three 
years until it was defeated by the British Forces in 1939. More will be 
said of the Palestinians' opposition in the coming Chapters. 
However, despite Palestinians' continuious opposition, Palestinian 
society was transformed from an overwhelmingly Arab traditional society, 
with a small culturally assimilated Jewish minority, into a plural 
society consisting of two distinctive Arab and Zionist settler 
communities different and separated in everything and in open conflict 
with each others. 
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The Palestinians revolted against this alien invasion of their country 
and from the mid-1930s they directed their attacks on the British as 
well as on the Zionists. As a result of this revolt and other 
considerations, the British government introduced new restrictions on 
Zionist immigration and recognized for the first time in 1939 the right 
of the Palestinian people to independence with guaranteed rights for the 
Jewish minority. The rate of Zionist immigration was lowered to 
4000-5000 per year after 1939, and by the end of 1947 the total 
population of Palestine was estimated at 1,935,000 with the Jews and 
Zionist settlers numbering 608,225, or 31 percent. 51 
The main significance of the question of immigration in relation to 
Palestine was political since it affected the distribution and balance 
of power between the Palestinians and the Zionists. However, its 
economic importance is by no means negligible. The basic objective of 
the Zionist movement was to bring as many immigrants as possible and to 
guarantee for them the exclusive right to work in the Jewish sector. 
This policy of exclusive Jewish labour created unemployment and 
landlessness among the Palestinians and a grievance which was to 
continue to exist until the end of the Mandate and which indeed played a 
major role in poisoning relations between the two sides. 
For the Palestinians, Zionist immigration took place under the rule of 
British colonialism and in violation of Article Six of the Mandate which 
states clearly that "the administration of Palestine, while ensuring 
that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not 
prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration." 
The introduction of mass alien immigrants against the wishes and the 
will of the Palestinians and dening them employment and work in the 
Jewish sector was indeed against the rights of the Palestinians and 
presented a real threat to their existence. Moreover, this mass Zionist 
immigration and the exclusive Zionist policies were allowed to take 
place against the advice of the British Government's own commissions and 
economic experts, who reported that there was no land available for new 
immigrants and that there was a "very great deal of unemployment in the 
Arab section of the population.,,52 
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The only explanation for such a British policy in regard to Jewish 
immigration to Palestine is that it took place in the context of 
colonialism whereby the only consideration, in deciding the size of 
immigration and land acquisition by the settlers, was the wellbeing and 
benefits of the settlers, regardless of its effects on the native Arabs. 
The British must have seen this policy as being in their own colonialist 
interests. 
As for the characteristics of Palestinian Arab society, segmental ism, 
regionalism and poverty were similar to other traditional societies 
outside Europe and their conditions were used by the Zionists to justify 
the colonization of Palestine. The Zionists promised their European 
patrons that they would be the, "bulwark against Asia, down there we 
would be the advance post of civilization against barbarism. As a 
neutral state, we would remain in constant touch with all of Europe 
which would guarantee our existence."53 
3. Land Alienation in Palestine, 1917-1948 
The territory of Palestine covers a total area of 10,435 square miles 
including the water and lake areas. Palestine is largely an agricultural 
country. Generally speaking it may be divided into four distinct soil 
regions. 54 
1. Sahel (coastal plains). This consists of fertile land and has been 
relatively developed and contains large stretches of citrus groves. 
2. Jebel (hill region) predominantly rocky and suitable for planting of 
deciduous trees, especially olives and figs. 
3. Ghor (or Jordan valley) where the soil is good for many kinds of 
cultivation including citrus and tropical fruits. Water from the River 
Jordan is used for irrigation. 
4. The Negeb (the Southern Desert). This region comprises nearly half 
the lands of Palestine (3,144,246 acres) and only some 640,000 acres of 
its Northern portion consist of good soil, suitable for irrigation. 
Most of the Palestinian peasants lived in villages located in the hill 
areas (Jebel) and their exploitation of the Sahel (Plains) fluctuated 
with the state of security. The Palestinians lived in the hill areas, 
not as some Zionists claimed because it was part of their culture, but 
d 1·· 1 . t . 55 rather because of environmental, security an po ltlca neceSSl leSe 
The Palestinian peasants were pushed back to the hill areas when there 
was no power of Government to protect them from foreign invasion to 
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which Palestine, because of its geographical location, was subject or 
from local Bedu (nomads) raids on the plains. The hill villages were 
more easily defended against such invasion. Some diseases like malaria 
also made the plain unhealthy and played a role in pushing the fellaheen 
back to the hills: "The landed property of the villages; both in the 
plains and in hills was so extensive that some of it lay at a great 
distance from the village. For the sake of security, and also to some 
extent for health reasons and to keep away from Malaria spots, swamps or 
stagnant waters -the villages were built as far as possible on the 
s umm its or the s 1 opes of the hill s . ,,56 
But whenever security improved, as it did at the end of Turkish rule 
and under the Mandate, the Fellaheen would re-establish village colonies 
in the plains or (Khireb).57 These dependent villages (Khireb) were used 
as temporary dwellings during two short periods, the planting and 
harvesting seasons. This relationship between the fellaheen and the land 
in the plain continued until the Zionists purchased most of these lands 
and eventually pushed the fellaheen back and for good to their hill 
vill ages. 
This process of pushing the Palestinians back to the less fertile, less 
watered areas, which was already clearly marked towards the end of the 
Mandate, was practically completed by Zionist military attacks and 
occupation of these areas shortly before the end of the Mandate and 
after the unilateral proclamation of "Israel" in these areas in May 
1948. This process of Zionist colonization led in the end to the 
displacement of the majority of the native population and the creation 
of the Palestinian refugee problem which stands, even today, as the 
major obstacle in the way of a lasting settlement as I will show in 
Chapter Nine. 
Before coming to the two main characteristics of the peasants' land 
relationship during the Mandate, the diminishing size of the average 
holding, and growing landlessness, it is, in my view, useful to set them 
in historical perspective 
Land Ownership and Tenant in Palestine 
The Islamic jural view of land is that ultimately it belong to the 
Muslim Amma'h (nation or community). This in effect, meant the state, 
but the collectivism of its ideal form did not prevent the emergence of 
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private, inheritable property. There were various forms of landownership 
and tenure in Palestine, as in other Arab countries under Ottoman rule, 
and most relevant to our subject are: 
1. Mulk: corresponding to private ownership. This type of ownership was 
very limited and small in extent in Palestine under Ottoman rule. This 
was due to two main reasons. The first, was economic, that is to say 
that the fellaheen were very poor and could not afford to buy land or to 
pay estate taxes. The second reason was political. Ottoman law forbade 
converting the Miri lands (see later) into Mulk, perhaps to avoid 
creating independent local powers. But Mulk ownership increased rapidly 
during the Mandate because the British did not follow Ottoman law. 
2. Mesha ownership. Here the property is joint and undivided, whether 
belonging to one family or to a number of families united into a hamula 
(tribe) or to the inhabitants of a whole village. According to 
Granott,58 up to 1860 practically all land in Palestine was held in 
Mesha' ownership. land property held in Masha' remained in many villages 
up to the Mandate time, in spite of the economic and social changes 
which had meanwhile taken place. Although the land belonged officially 
to nobody, each family or village usually look part of that land and in 
time everyone knew his own land and of the others. 
3. Waqf. 59 This property consists first and foremost of lands which 
were donated by the sultans, rulers and wealthy individuals, over the 
years, or bequested lands, for the purpose of establishing and 
maintaining with the income derived from them, holy place and 
educational and charitable institutions. 
4. Miri land or state land60 
Among the four classes of land ownership the Miri was the most 
important from the point of view of extent; up to the end of the Mandate 
it included by far the larger portion of the landed property of 
Palestine, and amongst them some of the most fertile land. Under this 
head came first and foremost the lands in the plains and valleys, which 
at various times were transferred by the government to whole villages, 
and more importantly to individuals, that is to say, they were handed 
over to them to be cultivated in return for payment of the tithe (a form 
of religious taxation). 
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The main idea behind the Miri land in Islam was economic. The first 
Arab Muslim conquerors were few and they could not own all the conquered 
lands and, therefore, the Miri system enabled them to claim that the 
land did not belong to individuals, but rather to the whole Muslim 
community. The peasants who worked the land were considered to be 
temporary users on behalf of the community and were required to pay part 
of the produce of the land to the state in return for their use of the 
land. The rights to use or hold the land had revocable ownership and 
such rights were originally made for the lifetime of the holder only. If 
the land remained uncultivated for five years, the state could 
redistribute it to new heirs. 61 These arrangements were made with the 
intention of preventing the growth of independent power and to make sure 
that most of the land was efficiently cultivated. 
At the peasant level, tenancy, the right to farm land - whether for 
rent, tax or on a negotiated sharecropping basis - passed from fathers 
to sons in undisturbed succession until the mid 19th century. "Neither 
the state, nor individual land holders, had an interest in disturbing 
the peasants tenancy, since it was the taxes or rent that they produced, 
not the land itself, that the government and land holders wanted." 62 
Ottoman legislation of 1856-1858 established the principle of the right 
to private property, and land was to be registered in the names of 
individuals and title deeds issued. This opportunity was not fully 
utilized by most of the peasants for more than one reason. 
Some writers claimed that the fellaheen failed to register their lands 
because they did not understand the significance of the new laws nor the 
meaning of the concept of ownership.63 But it seems that the main 
reasons for that were: 
1. Poverty. The majority of the fellaheen were poor and did not have 
money to pay for the land and in many cases they did not have money to 
pay for the registration fees. On the basis of data collected from 26% 
of all rural families and 12% of all villages, it was calculated that 
there was an average debt burden per family of LP 27 (LP=Palestinian 
Pound)and an average yearly interest on debt of LP 8. The meaning of 
these figures can be grasped by setting them against the average yearly 
income of rural families then estimated at LP 25-30 per annum. The total 
debt burden of the fellaheen at that time was calculated at LP 2 
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million. 64 Indeed many fellaheen were working on the land just to 
survive like slaves and the rest of the produce was given away to the 
state as taxation, to the land holder or owner, to the money lender etc. 
2. The fellaheen were afraid that if they registered the land in their 
names and could not pay the taxes they could lose the land to the state. 
More importantly they feared that they would be easily identified and 
consequently would be conscripted into the Turkish Army. "Conscription 
was the form of oppression must feared and detested by the Palestinian 
peasants. At a time of high infant mortality (perhaps 50%), it took 
their young men, their most valued form of capital, the basis of lineage 
and household survival, and almost never returned them.,,65 
Ruedy summarises these reasons as follows: 66 "Fearing that the tax 
collector and army recruiter would make effective use of the new 
registers, and hardly understanding the enormous importance of the new 
records and deeds to their own future, when the implementing regulation 
of the code began to be applied, they evaded massively and stubbornly." 
Evasion took the form of registering land in the name of dead or 
fictitious persons, or, more dangerously, in the name of any important 
or influential man, who could be the shiekh, notable, city merchant or 
tax farmer. In the same way much of Bedu tribal land was registered in 
the name of individual chiefs. 67 
The relationship of some peasants to land thus legally alienated became 
that of rent-paying or share-cropping tenants who could be evicted at 
will. The tenants were the main victims of Zionist land policy, since 
they were not protected under British regulations. They were evicted 
from the land before or after Zionist purchase. 
Tenancy68 was a 
Arab countries. 
life of the Arab 
prominent feature of the economy of Palestine and the 
It was widespread and played an important part in the 
village. A large number of the fellaheen of Palestine 
tilled the ground not as owners but as tenants or lessees on the land of 
large and absentee owners or the state. The large owners leased their 
land in two forms. Under the one, the land was handed over to a tenant 
contractor, who worked the land through fellaheen or sub-leased it 
further. The other was direct leasing by the land owner to the 
fellaheen. In the first form the hired fellaheen used to work and to 
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live on the land temporarily or permanently. In many cases the estate 
contained several villages and thousands of Fellaheen. 
Most of the owners of the large estates however, used to live in the 
towns of Palestine or even in Beirut and other Arab countries. "Absentee 
landlords" were a characteristic feature of the Arab countries; their 
number was large and their possessions formed a considerable part of the 
landed property but this phenomenon almost disappeared after the 
division of the the Arab countries into independent States. 
Tenancy was a recognized method of exploiting the lands of the absentee 
land lords. As a rule the tenants did not change, but remained on the 
land all their lives. "The right to remain on the land and till it was 
transmitted from father to son until in course of time it became itself 
a highly valued right.,,69 As in the case of the Miri land the fellaheen 
lived and worked on the land and they did not see the landlord, like the 
state tax men, except once a year and during the harvest time. 
Despite the fact that the fellaheen spent most of their lives working 
on the land, they were not protected. "No explicit tenancy contract 
existed in writing or even for the most part orally; there was only a 
custom going back for many years, a custom which had become a tradition. 
And tradition naturally acquires in course of time a power of 
compulsion."lO Unlike leasehold, which has a fixed term, long tenancy 
was not defined in time. This feature increased its similarity to 
ownership, at any rate in the eyes of those who tilled the land. The 
problem which arose from such a traditional tenancy institution was that 
it had no legal standing under British law. As Granott described it: 
"Tenancy is, therefore, a unique institution. It is devoid of any formal 
or legal signs of ownership, those rights which the law recognizes and 
which provide security for one who enjoys them."ll In other words 
tenancy under the British law lacked the fundamental elements of 
ownership: legality and stability. 
This tenancy however, was of great importance in Palestine because it 
determined the relations between the landlord and the fellah and also 
between the fellah and the land. "The lot of tens of thousands of 
Fellaheen was bound up with this institution, which in former days was 
the main pillar of the agrarian regime of the Arab village."l2 Those 
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Palestinian tenants, however, were forced to leave the land once that 
land was acquired by the Zionists. 
Thousands of those fellaheen who had worked and lived on the lands for 
generations, whose rights were guaranteed under the traditional system 
and were transmissible to their descendants, became a landless class who 
migrated to the big towns to form the seeds of the social unrest and 
disturbances, especially in the 1930s. The fellaheen in some cases were 
evicted by force from the villages and lands which were sold over their 
heads and without their consent to the Zionists and became victims of 
the British laws and the discriminatory policies of the Jewish Agency 
which states in Article 3 of its constitution that: 73 
"D. The title to the lands acquired is to be taken in the name of the 
Jewish National Fund, to the end that land shall be held as the 
inalienable property of the Jewish people. 
E. The Agency shall promote agriculture colonization based on Jewish 
labour and in all works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the 
Agency, it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish 
labour be employed". 
The Fellaheen evictions together with such exclusive policies of the 
Zionists created an atmosphere of enmity and hatred between the two 
communities which was reflected in their negative attitudes towards the 
attempts to solve the conflict. Suspicion and distrust have prevailed 
between the two parties up to the present day. 
The significance of Miri land and tenancy appeared in 1948 when Israel 
invoked these categorizations to justify confiscation of Palestine land 
either when the occupant of the land was an absentee, refugee or when he 
had not registered it during the Mandate. 74 The traditional and 
customary rights of land ownership were not recognized as a legal or 
valid basis for land ownership. 
Jewish Land Acquisition in Palestine 
The answer to the question: Why did the Zionists buy land in Palestine? 
is simple if we understand the aim of the Zionist movement and the 
conditions which surrounded its efforts to reach that aim. The aim of 
the Zionist movement was the eventual establishment of a pure 
(exclusive) Jewish state in Palestine. To achieve this aim they needed 
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population and land. 
The British Mandatory Government promised and pledged to facilitate the 
establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine. Under British protection 
the Zionists brought half a million Zionist settlers to Palestine during 
the Mandate period. But in regard to the land the matter was not that 
simple. British rule over Palestine continued after 1922, under the 
terms of the Mandate and therefore, she could not simply confiscate the 
natives' land, as in the case of the classical colonial practices, and 
give it to the Zionist settlers. 
The Mandatory government, in its relations with the Zionist settlers, 
played the role of colonial mother country, but in the beginning stopped 
short of granting them or allowing them to confiscate large tracts of 
land. Instead of confiscating the lands, the British created the 
economic and political conditions which enabled the Zionists to buy as 
much land as they could find and to increase their numbers, train and 
arm themselves until they became able to occupy and confiscate what they 
could not buy during the Mandate, by the use of force in 1948. 
The other reason behind the Zionists' purchasing land in Palestine is 
that the Zionist movement appeared almost at the turning point of the 
classical colonial era. The decolonization process was well under way 
and most of the people in the Middle East were demanding of the colonial 
powers, especially France and Britain, to quit their countries. In 
buying land the Zionists would, as they did, dissociate themselves from 
the hated process of colonialism and claim that they were living on 
their own land like the Palestinians themselves. Indeed the Zionists 
followed exclusive policies in regard to the land and labour and they 
justified their segregation policies on the ground that they were not 
colonialists. 
The size of the land acquired by the Zionists from the beginning of 
their activities in Palestine until the end of the Mandate in May 1948, 
was estimated at 1.75 to 1.85 million donums 75 (1 don urn = one thousand 
square metres) or 7 percent of the total land of Palestine, estimated at 
26 million dunums. 
The Zionists, however, argued that Jewish land acquisition was so small 
that it could not be responsible for the fellaheens' poverty or the 
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problem of landlessness. They claimed that out of the 1,850,000 donums 
acquired by them, 181,000 donums had been obtained through concessions 
from the Mandatory Government, 120,000 donums had been acquired from 
churches and from foreign companies. One million donums was acquired 
from absentee and large landowners and only 500,000 donums had been 
acquired from fellaheen. In other words about 1,3 million or 73 percent 
from absentee and large land owners, government, churches and foreign 
companies and half a million or 27 percent from fellaheen. 76 
The Palestinians, however, opposed land purchases by Zionists for 
political and economical reasons. The Palestinian leaders realised from 
the start the danger of Zionist intentions towards Palestine. Moreover, 
above anything else it was the ultimate political content of Zionist 
land acquisitions that drove the Palestinians to oppose these purchases. 
Ruedy correctly argued that although there were economic and human 
problems caused by Jewish immigration and land purchase by Zionists, the 
main causes of Palestinians opposition to both were political: "While 
immediate economic and human problems played their part in the rising 
resistance movement of the native leadership, the leadership correctly 
saw the keys to Palestinian survival or the seeds of its destruction in 
the twin issues of immigration and land."77 
Violent Palestinian action in 1920, 1921, 1929 and the Revolt of 
1936-1939 were connected with these two issues. Both British and United 
Nations attempts to solve the conflict failed because neither 
Palestinians nor Zionists were prepared to compromise on land and 
immigration. 
The Palestinians did not dispute the Zionist figures about the amount 
and the sources of the land they acquired in Palestine, rather they 
utilized the same figures to show first, that the amount of land 
acquired by the Zionists was so small that it did not justify Zionist 
demands for a separate state, and secondly, the Palestinians argued that 
although the amount was small, it consisted mainly of large tracts of 
fertile land which amounted about 20 to 26 percent of the cultivable 
lands in the whole country.78 They added that the land purchases coupled 
with Zionist segregation policies did cause some economic hardships and 
landlessness among the Palestinian fellaheen. 
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The Palestinians argued that the Zionists acquired the majority of the 
land from a small number of large and absentee landowners or from other 
institutions such as Government, Churches and foreign companies, in a 
small number of transactions. The problem was that although such 
transactions involved a small number of landlords or institutions, it in 
fact, included large tracts of land in each transaction and affected 
thousands of fellaheen tenants who were neither consulted on the sale 
nor protected against the exclusive policies of the Jewish Agency. 
The British official economist Simpson warned the British Government 
about the dangers of the Zionist policy on the relation between the two 
communities. He argued that: liThe principle of the persistent and 
deliberate boycott of Arab labour in the Zionist colonies is not only 
contrary to the provision of that Article (6) of the Mandate, but it is 
in addition a constant and increasing source of danger to the 
count ry. ,,79 
The exact numbers of Fellaheen who become landless or unemployed as a 
result of Jewish land purchase or segregation policies are not known. 
But as to landlessness, already by 1930 Simpson reported that according 
to a Government study of 104 villages there were 23,573 families; of 
these 16,633 cultivated some land while 6,940 or 29.4 percent were 
landless. 80 Sayigh suggests a figure of 35 percent by 1945. 81 
Landlessness was usually the result of single sales of large areas of 
lands including villages. Most of these large sales occurred in the 
first decade of the Mandate for political and economic reasons which I 
will discuss later in this section. The largest was the sale by the 
Beirut family (Sursock) of 240,000 dunums in the area of Esdraelon to 
the Jewish Fund, involving the destruction of 22 villages and the 
eviction of more than 8,730 persons. 
On fellaheen conditions, Simpson stressed that, "There is no question 
but that there is a very great deal of unemployment in the Arab section 
of the popul at ion. 1182 He added that: liThe cond it i on of the Arab fe 11 ah 
is little if at all superior to what it was under the Turkish regime." 83 
The Shaw Commission also reported in 1930 that: "There is no further 
land available which can be occupied by new immigrants without 
displacing the present population."84 
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This class of landless fellaheen, however, migrated to the big cities 
and lived under appalling conditions, especially in Jaffa. "Thousands of 
unskilled workers in Jaffa cannot afford a house to sleep in, they sleep 
in tin huts or in the open. Some 10 to 15 thousand people live in the 
city and its suburbs without a single proper latrine.,,85 
In contrast to these conditions the Zionist settlers were better off 
because they "have had every advantage that capital, science and 
organization can give them.,,86 
The disintegration of village society and the emergence of vast shanty 
towns in the large cities created according to Flapan87 the social base 
for the emergence of the Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939. Barbour 
advances a similar argument about the relationship between the land 
sales and the poisoning of the relationship between the Palestinians and 
the Zionists which led to the Palestinian Revolt. He argues that: "The 
question of land sales has, however, caused a profound sense of 
grievance, and was certainly a principal cause of the revolt of the 
peasantry which was maintained in Palestine for over three years.,,88 
The privatization and expropriation of peasant land in Palestine can 
best be demonstrated in the decline of average land holdings. It 
gradually dropped from 148 donums in 1917 to 42 in 1936. 89 According to 
the Shaw Commission the required viable plot for a family varied from 
100 to 150 donums. 90 This drop in the size of the average plot, however, 
was not only caused by Zionist purchases but also because the population 
of Palestine, as we have seen in section two, had doubled during the 
first two decades of the Mandate. This increase in population 
simultaneously with the decrease of the viable land plots, must have 
played a role in worsening the economic conditions of the fellaheen 
since more fellaheen had to live on less land. 
The last relevant question in regard to the land issue is this: If the 
Palestinians knew the economic and political consequences of selling 
land to the Zionists, why then did they do so? The Zionists succeeded in 
giving the impression that they acquired the land from the Palestinians, 
not only through bargains but also that the Palestinians had benefited 
from the high prices which they received for their lands. 91 Such 
arguments which were generally accepted by the West, however, are 
deceptive unless we put them in the proper perspective and connect them 
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with the circumstances which surrounded the land sales. 
The occupation of Palestine by Britain coupled with Britains's 
• 
commitment to Zionism created political and economic conditions in the 
country which forced some landowners to sell part, or all their lands in 
Palestine rather than lose them in the uncertain future. Politically, 
Palestine was occupied by Britain in 1917 and eventually was separated 
from the rest of the Arab countries. Britain was committed to the 
Zionist movement to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish home in the 
country. These political circumstances forced the large absentee 
landlords to sell their lands to anyone including the Zionists. These 
private owners feared that the British government might in the course of 
time seize their lands, since they were not Palestinian citizens. In 
such a climate of fear and uncertainty together with the high prices 
offered by the Zionists, these owners had little choice other than to 
sell their lands. 
The large owners, churches and foreign companies on the other hand sold 
their land because of the uncertainty which surrounded the future of 
Palestine in general but mainly for economic reasons and profit. Some 
Palestinians, large owners and foreign companies even worked as land 
brokers and profited from the land sales business. Their main concern 
was personal profit. 
The last category, or the 27 percent of land acquired from fellaheen, 
was sold for economic reasons. The fellaheen needed cash to develop 
their lands and since they could not get the required money for such 
development from the Government, they were forced to sell part of their 
lands to the Zionists in order to buy better irrigated land or to 
develop the other part of their lands. This category, however, did not 
have much bearing on the landlessness problem but on the cotrary it 
perhaps had a positive effect by increasing the Palestin.ians' land 
productivity and expanding their share in the citrus and other 
plantations, especially in the plains. 
In conclusion to this section I would argue that the Palestinians 
opposed Zionist land purchases mainly for political reasons. However, 
the economic consequences of Jewish land purchases were severe on the 
fellaheen and led to the creation of a landless class who eventually 
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formed the seeds for the revolt of 1936-1939. On the other hand, the 
exclusive policies of the Jewish Agency on land and labour alarmed the 
Palestinian leaders who used them as examples of Zionist political 
ambitions and found no difficulty in convincing the population to take 
action against the whole idea of the "Jewish National Home". Separate 
development and segregation were used by the Zionists to demonsrtate the 
non-exploitive nature of their settlement in Palestine. But they were 
used by the Palestinians to show that the Zionists were indeed aiming to 
take control of the whole country and dispossess them. The relationship 
between the British Mandatory government and the Zionist settlers had 
the characteristics of classical colonialism in the sense that what 
matered for the colonial power was the benefit and welfare of the 
settlers in order to promote imperial interests and the complete neglect 
of the natives' rights. 
4. Separate Development 
According to the Palestinian version, there was a settler colonial 
dispossession of a native people by a European Zionist class bent on 
expansion at their expense. Zionism was seen as a racist92 movement, 
connected first with Western colonialism and later with American 
imperialism, which sought to establish an exclusively Jewish state in 
Palestine, ignoring the fact that Palestine was already inhabited by 
Palestinians who, not only owned the country but, also, had established 
a living culture in that country since time immemorial. This Zionist 
colonialist ideology was manifested in the exclusive policies of 
segregation between the Zionist settlers and the Palestinians in every 
aspect of life. The Zionist settlers' attitude towards the Palestinians 
was not different from the attitude of any white settlers towards the 
natives, it is the sense of superiority and contempt towards the natives 
and the refusal to deal with them as equals. It was this attitude which 
prevented any serious negotiations taking place between the Zionist 
settlers and the Palestinians during the Mandate period: "Sevin felt 
that the fundamental difficulty over Palestine was that the Jews refused 
to admit that the Arabs were their equals. If the Jews could be brought 
to see that the principle of one man one vote applied in Palestine to 
Arabs and Jews alike as much as everywhere else the difficulty would be 
solved."93 
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This view of equating Zionism with racism was confirmed by the U.N. 
General Assembly in their Resolution 3379 (xxx) of November 10, 1975 
which condemns Zionism as a form of "racism and racial discrimination." 
This sense of superiority among settler colonialist societies is still, 
even today, the major obstacle to solving the conflict in South Africa 
and between the Arabs and "Israel." In South Africa the white racist 
government refuses to accept the principle of one man one vote as a 
basis for solving the racial conflict because this would mean black 
majority rule. "Israel " too, refuses to recognize or negotiate with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization or accept the fundamental principle of 
the right of the Palestinian people to self determination, even in those 
areas occupied by its forces in 1967, because she knows that it was 
established on territories mainly owned by Palestinians and once a 
Palestinian state was established it would continue to work for the 
liberation of those territories. 
This Palestinian argument equating Zionism with racism and colonialism 
has been widely accepted by some on the European left,94 and many Third 
World countries. 
The Zionist view in this matter was, however, that Jewish immigration 
to Palestine had nothing to do with colonialism but rather was a 
necessity to rescue the European Jews from the persecution and social 
discrimination of the Gentiles. The Zionists argued that they were not 
alien settlers but rather returning to their forefathers' homeland and 
under the approval of the League of Nations. This Zionist argument 
prevailed in Europe during the Mandate period and most Western writers 
on the subject "have tended to represent the Mandatory period in terms 
of the political confrontation of two national communities in which each 
excluded the other"95 rather than a conflict between a native population 
and alien Zionist settlers. 
The Zionists attempted to develop their own political institutions from 
the outset and in April 1920 a Constituent Assembly was established. It 
proclaimed itself to be the supreme organ in conducting the national and 
communal affairs of the Jews in Palestine and its sole representative 
internally and externally. It elected a National Council (Vaad Leumi) of 
36 members which was directed to prepare a draft constitution for the 
inner self-government of the Jewish community.96 The Zionists indeed 
established a shadow government which was recognized by the British 
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government as responsible for the internal affairs of the Jewish 
community 
officially 
Mandate. 
in Palestine, in addition to the Jewish Agency which was 
recognized by the Mandatory under Article Four of the 
The Jewish Agency had two offices, one in Jerusalem to deal 
with the Mandatory Government and the other in London which gave them 
direct access to the British government and British public opinion and 
media. 
In contrast, the British Government recognized no Palestinian national 
organization, such as the Arab Executive97 or the Supreme Muslim 
Counci1 98 as representative of the Palestinians, nor did they promote 
any local autonomy or self government for them, despite the Mandatory 
Government's obligation under Article Two of the Mandate which states 
that: "The Mandatory shall be responsible for the development of 
self-government institutions" and Article Three which states that: "The 
Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local 
autonomy." 
However, the British government offered the Palestinians the 
establishment of an Arab Agency to carryout similar functions to the 
Jewish Agency. The Palestinians refused such an Agency on the grounds 
that it would equate them and the Zionist alien settlers at a time when 
the Arabs formed the overwhelming majority. What they wanted was 
self-government in the whole country representing all the inhabitants 
including the Jewish minority and with executive power over immigration 
and land sales, as I will show in the next Chapters. 
The Zionists would not accept participation in such a government 
because it would prevent the development of the Jewish home in the 
country. And since Britain was committed to Zionism to establish the 
Jewish home, it was against their commitment to Zionism to agree to the 
Palestinian demands for independence. This British discrimination 
against the Palestinians by not applying the democratic rule of one man 
one vote in their efforts to solve the conflict was responsible, among 
other things, for the failure of the British Government to solve the 
conflict. More will be said about this subject when I discuss the 
British attempt to solve the conflict in the next chapters. 
However, once the British Mandatory Government gave the go-ahead for 
separate political development she practically gave the Zionists a free 
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hand in developing separate economic, social, educational and health 
sectors. 
The policy of separate development while it benefited the Zionist 
sector, damaged the Palestinian sector. The Zionists had the advantage 
of capital and technology while the Palestinian traditional sector, 
lacking material resources and human infrastructure, could not compete 
with such a relatively advanced Zionist capitalist and industrial 
sector. This situation led some writers to argue that the Zionist sector 
developed at the expense of the Palestinian sector. "Jewish capital 
which flows into the country secures the development of the country 
through industrialization; it fulfills the first part of the plan: it 
destroys in a significant way the small Arab industry, and transfers 
industries to new Jewish centres, without employing whatsoever, or they 
employ in an insignificant manner, Arab workers. 1199 
Zionist industries were also built in part at the expense of the 
Palestinian consumers, but they did not return to them any benefits in 
terms of absorbing Palestinian labour, or absorbing, in the Jewish 
sector, any Palestinian products. It is certain that without the 
internal Palestinian market, as well as those of the surrounding Arab 
countries, Jewish industries could not have become viable. The Palestine 
market was controlled by the Mandatory Government's taxation system 
which allowed the Zionists to import the raw materials necessary for 
their industries tax free and imposed high taxation on other important 
materials to protect Zionist industries and products from foreign 
competition, see table 1. 
Table:l 100 shows the imbalance between the Palestinian and Jewish 
sectors in Palestine industry in 1942. 
Table:l 
Sectors 
Jewish 
Arabs 
Others 
Distribution 
of firms % 
55 
44 
1 
Distribution 
of workers % 
75 
17 
8 
Wages CaQital Total 
% % % 
83 60 79 
17 10 15 
30 6 
The Jewish population at that time represented less than one third of 
the population and such domination of Palestine industry by the Jewish 
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minority was possible for two reasons: 
1. The Mandatory Government granted the Zionists big industrial 
projects and other economic concessions such as the electricity project 
for all of Palestine, the potash project on the Dead Sea as well as 
granting them certain lands. 101 
2. The flows of capital and technology from outside Palestine into the 
Jewish sector and the boycott of Palestinian labour and produce. 
The Mandatory Government also discriminated against the Palestinians in 
jobs and wages in the Government and other public services and projects. 
The difference in wages between Palestinians and Zionists in government 
jobs reached 30 to 37 percent. The Government justified this on the 
grounds that the standard of living among the Palestinians was less than 
among the Zionist settlers. 102 
Of course such an explanation does not make sense since the duty of the 
government was to narrow the gap between the two standards of living if 
she was interested in avoiding a social conflict between the two 
communities. Indeed the British Government tended to favour 
capital-intensive agriculture and industries, both of which 
characterised the Jewish sector more than the Palestinian one. 103 
The Mandatory Government's discrimination against the Palestinians in 
its contracts can be noticed from the number of Government contracts 
awarded to both sides. Out of 2509 contracts the Zionists were given 
1470 or 58 percent while the Arabs were awarded 1039 contracts or 42 
percent. 104 This indicates how the Mandatory Government preferred the 
Zionist settler minority by granting them more contracts than the 
Palestinian majority. 
The effect of the Mandatory's discriminatory policies and the Zionists' 
exclusive policies in development and boycotting the Palestinian workers 
became acute in the middle of the 1930s and led to the Palestinian 
General Strike in 1936 and the Revolt which lasted until 1939. During 
the Revolt (1936-1939) the Mandatory Government needed more police and 
military forces and consequently she switched the money from social 
services to the military and security services. In 1933 for example, the 
share of the social services amounted to 12 percent but this share 
dropped in 1936 to 7.8 percent. By contrast the share of defence which 
was 28.4 percent in 1933, had increased to 36.6 percent in 1936. 105 
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The Zionist policy with regard to Palestinian labour was that Jewish 
workers only could and should have jobs in Jewish firms and on Jewish 
land. This policy contributed more than any other factor to the 
crystallisation of the concept of territorial, economic and social 
separation between the two communities. 106 
It is worth mentioning that such separation policies were not new 
phenomena in Zionist ideology but rather were as old as the Zionist 
movement itself. Arther Ruppin, a Zionist economist, stated at the 
eleventh Zionist congress that "the objective we have in view is the 
creation of a closed Jewish economy in which producers, consumers, and 
mi ddl e men will be Jewi sh. ,,107 
By the 1930s the segregation policies and the boycott of Arab labour 
become political issues. Such policies were responsible for widening the 
gap and increasing hostilities between the two communities until it 
reached a state of war in 1936-1939 and 1947-1948 as we will see in the 
coming chapters. 
Education 
Like other aspects of Palestinian-Jewish development, Palestinian 
educational infrastructures and services will also show signs of 
weakness when compared to Jewish ones. In 1944, for example there were 
97,000 Palestinian students in the elementary stage between the ages of 
five to fourteen years, comprising 32 percent of the total number of 
children of school age. In the same year among Jewish children it was 97 
percent. 108 
The figures for 1946 indicated that 85 percent of Palestinian boys and 
63 percent of girls of elementary school age attended schools in the 
cities while the figures, for the Palestinian villages, were 63 percent 
and 7.5 percent for boys and girls respectively.109 There were also 
differences in the level of education between the two communities. The 
Jewish education level was higher than that in the Arab sector. 110 
The Zionists referred the low level of education among Palestinian 
student to their traditional value system. The evidence presented here 
shows a different picture. 
First, elementary school enrolment was dictated mostly by availability 
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of places, a factor which the Mandate Government controlled. For 
example, in 1945-1946, only 69 percent of Palestine children who applied 
to study could secure a place. III There were not enough schools or 
teachers. This shortage was especially acute in villages because the 
government aimed at coping with increasing city demands. 
Table:2 Shows the Number of pupils who applied to enter elementary 
schools in contrast to those who entered 1933-1939. 112 
Table:2 
Year No. of AQQlicants Secured a Qlace Percent 
1933 14,383 8,638 60 
1938 23,031 11,552 50 
1939 25,488 13,222 52 
Secondly, the Palestinian themselves were anxious for education for 
their children and by the late 1940s the total Palestinian contribution 
to education funds exceeded that provided by the British Mandatory 
Government. 113 The Palestinian attitude towards education was positive 
but what could they do if the government could not provide adequate 
schools and teachers? 
Thirdly, total government spending on Palestinian education per student 
was much lower than that in the Jewish sector. With a population of over 
a million there were, in 1944-1945, 71,662 Palestinian students in the 
public school system staffed by 1,871 teachers, housed in 478 schools. 
Total government spending for Palestinian education was LP 409.000. On 
the opposite side, the Jewish population, around half million, had 
77,968 pupils in its schools, 3,783 teachers 573 schools and a budget of 
LP 1.489.563, with ten percent of its budget contributed by the British 
Mandatory Government. 114 This contrast led Tibawi to comment that "one 
third of the population had more children at school than the other two 
thirds" and "the money spent on education of the children of one third 
of the population was three times the amount spent by the Government on 
the education of the other two thirds.,,115 The number of schools 
increased, between 1925/6 and 1944/5, from 587 to 749 while the number 
of pupils had increased in the same period from 38,327 to 105,386. 116 
In spite of this increase in the number of Palestinian schools between 
1925 and 1944, the majority of these were primary schools. By 1944, 
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there were only 959 secondary school students, with no secondary schools 
in rural areas. II7 The only university in Palestine was the Hebrew 
University, which was established in 1925, to serve the Jewish community 
exclusively. The Palestinian students who wanted to continue their 
higher education had to go to other Arab countries such as Egypt or 
Lebanon. 
The Zionist policy of separate education had negative implications in 
the relations between the two communities. Although both Palestinian and 
Zionist settlers shared the same country, they talked and learned 
different languages and studied different subjects. There was not much 
intellectual communication between the two communities and the contents 
of their school curricula were in most cases hostile to each other. lIB 
The Zionists taught their children that: Palestine was theirs and they 
should not share it with the Arabs. And the Palestinians taught their 
children that the Zionists were invaders and they had to fight them. So 
the education systems were utilized by both sides to serve their ends. 
The Mandatory Government should have allowed only one educational 
system and it should have directed its content to serve co-operation, 
understanding and reconciliation. The British did not do that because it 
perhaps was considered against their interests. They, perhaps, wanted 
the conflict to widen and continue, giving them a pretext to stay in the 
country. 
In conclusion to this Section, I would argue that the segregation 
policies were deliberately employed and utilized by the Zionists to 
achieve their ultimate aim namely an exclusively Jewish state. 
Concluding Remarks 
It would be incorrect to conclude, in the light of the evidence 
presented here, that the Palestinian sector was dependent on Zionist 
colonizing efforts in its pattern of development. Palestinian peasants 
were not exploited by Zionist settlers in the classical sense of 
colonialism. The situation more resembled a dual-society structure with 
one part deriving benefit from the sponsoring colonial power at the 
expense of the other. 
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Palestinian society showed all the characteristics of traditional 
society and suffered mainly from segmental ism, regionalism, poverty and 
lacked an able and organized leadership. By 1936, the external and 
double threat of British occupation and Zionist colonization, had gone 
far towards unifying the Palestinians. For a full period of three years 
they revolted against this external threat. Nevertheless, it seems right 
to conclude that, in spite of the spread of nationalist consciousness 
throughout the Mandate period, social segmentation blocked the rapid 
mobilization of large group, and long term political and military 
organizations. The readiness of the peasants to take up armed struggle 
was not fully exploited by the traditional leadership, which lacked the 
organizational powers necessary for conducting mass armed struggle. 
But I think it would be incorrect to seek in these societal 
characteristics the causes of the Palestinian Resistance Movement's 
failure or the disaster of 1948. Indeed, the presence of serious 
internal cleavages withni Palestinian society based on clan-ethincity 
made the task of unifying opposition to British and Zionist colonization 
extremely difficult, but it was the combined material and military 
superiority of the British and Zionist forces which defeated the 
Palestinian resistance and made possible the proclamation of a Jewish 
state in two thirds of Palestine after uprooting the majority of its 
Arab inhabitants. 
However, the Zionists realized quite early on that the land held by the 
Palestinians would have to be alienated so that settlement on the land 
and its development by Zionist settlers could eventually establish the 
necessary basis for statehood. A slow process of land alienation from 
Palestinians to Zionist settlers characterized the brief history of 
Palestine during the Mandate period. Though small and really minor, when 
the Jewish state was proclaimed, no more than 7 percent of the land of 
Palestine had been acquired by Zionists, the political and strategic 
implications of the process were clear to Arabs and Europeans alike. 
The process of land alienation coupled with Zionist exclusive policies 
on employment on Jewish land had a serious impact on the relationship 
between the two communities and the economic conditions of the 
Palestinian peasants. 
The average size of the peasant holdings decreased at a time when there 
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was an increase in population and the peasants evicted from land 
acquired by Zionists formed a new landless class. This class of landless 
peasants migrated to the big towns and formed the seeds of the social 
unrest and revolt of 1936-1939. 
Though the process of land alienation was slow and continued to be a 
major problem for the Zionists, the process of immigration was 
relatively easier and in the end proved more significant in effecting 
the destiny of Palestine. What the Zionists had failed to buy, they 
eventually expropriated when they proclaimed the establishment of 
"Israel" in 1948. 
The influx of Zionist immigrants, without taking into account the 
economic absorptive capacity of the country and the wishes of the 
Palestinian Arabs led to the Palestinians' revolt against this alien 
invasion of their country. The Zionist policy of separate development 
was, in fact, within their ideology to establish eventually an 
exclusively Jewish state in the country and not, as they claimed, a 
policy of non-exploitation. 
This exclusive economic, social and political development, in addition 
to its negative effects on the relations between the two communities, 
was seen as a challenge to the Arabs and increased their suspicion of 
the Zionists' final goal. These segregative policies created a 
communications gap between the two sides and indeed formed a major 
obstacle on the way to any understanding between them. 
The process of land alienation, Zionist immigration and the separate 
development of political, social, economic and educational institutions 
transformed Palestine from a traditional, pre-dominantly Arab society 
into a plural society with a direct conflict between its two segments, 
the Palestinians and the Zionist settlers. 
In conclusion I would argue that the Palestine conflict was a conflict 
between a traditional Arab society and a periodic alliance between 
British colonialism and alien Zionist settlers. As in any other 
situation the material and military superiority of the colonialists led 
to the creation of new conditions desirable to the colonialists but 
hated by the natives, and since the new conditions were reached as a 
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result of military victory, which could be reversed, it is expected that 
the conflict will continue until the two sides reach an agreement based 
on rights, justice and the right to self-determination. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Palestinian Reaction to Zionist Settlement and their Responses 
to British Attempts to Solve the Conflict, 1920-1935 
Introduction 
There were no serious problems between the Palestinians and the 
Oriental Jewish community in Palestine before 1917. According to Muslim 
doctrine, Christians and Jews are "people of the book", believers in 
God, revelation and the day of judgment. As such, they are not to be 
persecuted or forced to convert to Islam. They were left free to 
regulate their own communal and personal life in accordance with their 
own religous laws. 
Although, the Jewish community preserved much of their exclusiveness, 
they became Arabized in their language and culture. In the history of 
Jewish culture the Arab period is among the happiest. In Spain, in Egypt 
and elsewhere, the Arabized Jews not only carried on their own life of 
devotion and learning but contributed to the general Arab civilization. 1 
With the fall of Arab rule in Spain the Arab countries became places of 
refuge and a haven for the persecuted Jews of Spain and Europe, where 
they could pursue their daily lives in freedom and equality. This view 
was expressed by both Arabs and Jews to the Shaw Commission: 
"Representatives of all parties told us that before the First World War, 
the Jews and Arabs lived side by side if not in amity, at least with 
tolerance, a quality which today is almost unknown in Palestine.,,2 
This harmony between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, however, was 
disrupted after the appearance of the Zionist movement in 1897 and 
developed into an open conflict after 1917, when Britain issued the 
Balfour Declaration in support to Zionist claims. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine first of all the underlying 
causes of this disruption of the good relations between Arabs and Jews 
between 1917-1935 and to highlight the Palestinians' responses to the 
attempts to solve the conflict during this period. It is interesting to 
know what were their basic arguments and mode of action in opposing 
Zionist settlement? What were their demands and condition for solving 
the conflict at that time? Were there any opportunities for peace which 
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missed? What were the British proposals to solve the conflict and why 
were they not accepted as a basis for a lasting settlement? What were 
the Palestinians responses to the British proposals to solve the 
conflict? 
Basic Palestinian Arguments 
Zionist settlement in Palestine from the end of the 19th Century 
brought to the country a new type of alien people, mainly European, who 
differed from the natives in social habits, language and way of life and 
who looked contemptuously on the natives as inferior to themselves. 
The new settlement created considerable problems for the Palestinians 
both villagers and former tenants. Such problems resulted in the 
beginning from the total ignorance and disrespect of the settlers for 
the traditional Arab way of life. But this did not prevent the settlers 
from exploiting the cheap native labour in their farms and settlements. 
It was the type of classical relationship between white settlers and 
natives in Asia and Africa with its main features as suspicion, dislike 
and local disputes. 4 
After Britain officially committed herself to Zionism in 1917, 
through the Balfour Declaration, the Zionist method of colonization 
changed to what might be called land colonization. That is to say 
acquiring adequate land, clearing it of its inhabitants or tenants, 
bringing new settlers to work the land and establish a separate 
community with its exclusive economic, political, social, educational 
and language features, and create the infrastructure necessary for the 
eventual exclusive Jewish state. 
According to the Palestinian point of view this Zionist ideology and 
policy had created serious political, economic and social problems such 
as lack of independence, land shortages, unemployment, landlessness and 
the destruction of Palestinian society. Such fears were aired to both 
the Mandatory and the British Governments and were presented to the Shaw 
Commission in 1929. The Palestinians complained that: "In the early days 
the Jew who came to work on his land had employed Arab labour. Since 
immigration commenced in large numbers these Jewish employers have 
employed Jews in their place thereby throwing out of work a large number 
of Arabs ... All Arabs understand that the Zionist policy is to dispose 
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of the Arabs in every possible way and to replace them with Jews.,,4 
The British Government considered the Balfour Declaration and the 
Mandate as the only basis and framework for all their proposals, 
especially during the first two decades, to solve the problem. Here lies 
one of the fundamental differences between the Palestians on the one 
hand and the British and the Zionists on the other in their 
interpretation of the causes of the conflict and the right approach to 
so 1 ve it. 
The Palestinian argument was simple. They as the overwhelming majority5 
and the natives of the country had the right, according to all 
democratic rules, to establish a national government which would 
represent their aspirations and the aspiration of the Jewish minority. 
As we saw in Chapter Two the Palestinians refused to recognize the 
Balfour Declaration and the Mandate because these documents carried 
promises, to the Zionists, which were against their interests and 
because these promises were given by Britain without their consultation 
or consent. The Declaration was seen as: "repugnant to the aspirations 
which they entertain, as an outcome of the war, and prejudicial to their 
national, political and economic interests.,,6 
The Palestinians therefore did not at any time recognize the 
Declaration as a binding agreement and considered it null and void. The 
same rule applied to the Mandate because it was a British document which 
was approved by the League of Nations without Palestinian consent or 
consultation. 
On the other hand the British and the Zionists regarded these 
documents as legal and considered that the Palestinians had to accept 
them as the only basis for any solution or understanding. The British 
Government was determined to carry out its policy in Palestine despite 
opposition from the Palestinians and against their wishes, because it 
was seen by Britain as the right policy to serve British interests. It 
must be remembered that colonial interest was always considered as more 
important than the natives' wishes. Here is Balfour: "In Palestine we 
don't propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of 
the present inhabitants of the country.,,7 
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This British attitude and action in Palestine was not, however, 
unusual but fitted perfectly into the great European-American movement 
of expansion in the 19th and 20th centuries whose aim was to plant white 
settlers in other countries in order to dominate them economically and 
politically.8 
The British sponsored Zionist settlement in Palestine in order to 
secure, for Britain, long lasting strategical and economic interests in 
an area whose inhabitants were already demanding the end of British and 
French colonialism especially in Eygpt and Syria. It was often declared 
that a Jewish community in Palestine, dependent for its survival on 
British protection would always provide a moral pretext for continuous 
British occupation of Palestine. 
-The basic problem then which faced the Palestinians was: How could 
they a small traditionally organized people gain their independence 
against the combined weight of the British government and the Zionist 
movement? 
During the first decade the Palestinian leaders thought that they 
could persuade the British Government to abrogate the Balfour 
Declaration, end the Mandate and establish a national government, by 
political means. The methods of persuasion, included sending petitions 
to both the British and the Mandatory Governments and to the permanent 
Mandate Commission of the League of Nations. They sent four delegation 
to London9, Geneva and Lausanne to explain the Palestinian views and 
case. Palestinian action included demonstrations, one day strike and 
riots but did not develop into a full revolt before 1936. 
From the outset the Palestinians, poor and divided as they were, 
realised that they could not face the combined forces of the British 
army and Zionism alone and therefore, they looked to the neighbouring 
Arab countries for help. When Amir Faysal (Son of King Hussein of 
Hijjaz) established an Arab government in Damascus in October 1918 the 
Palestinian aspiration focused on him and many Palestinians served in 
his government and Army. 
The Palestinian leaders expressed their official views in regard to 
the Balfour Declaration and their desire to be united with Syria in an 
all-Palestine conference held in Jerusalem in January 1919. 10 But the 
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establishment of the Civil Administration in Palestine in July 1920, the 
occupation of Damascus by the French forces and the confirmation of the 
British Mandate over Palestine at the San-Remo Conference in April 1920, 
obliged the Palestinians to reformulate their political position. They 
now formed a definite Palestine policy distinct from the former Syrian 
policy.l1 
The new policy was confirmed by the Palestine Arab congress held at 
Haifa December 192012 which demanded the establishment of a national 
government which would be responsible to a representative council and be 
elected by the inhabitants of the country who were living in Palestine 
at the beginning of World War One. 
During this conference the Palestinian leaders formed the Arab 
Executive. It consisted of 24 members who claimed to represent all the 
classes and creeds of the Palestinian people. According to Wain 13 the 
Arab Executive was able to command the support of all segments and 
factions of the population. The executive programme may be summarized in 
four points: 
1. Repudiation of the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish home policy. 
2. Establishment of a Palestinian national government to be elected by 
the inhabitants of the country in their pre-War proportions. 
3. Stoppage of Jewish immigration and 
4. Free association of Palestine with other Arab countries. 
The Arab Executive presented these demands to Winston Churchill, then 
Colonial Secretary, when he visited Palestine in 1921. 14 In his reply 
Churchill, however, made it clear that there was no ground for hoping 
that the British Government would agree to the Palestinian demands for 
the establishment of a national government. He defended his government's 
pro-Zionist policy and the the policy of the Balfour Declaration but, at 
the same time, he assured the Palestinians that there was no intention 
on the part of the British Government to create a Jewish state that 
would dominate them. 1S 
After the establishment of the civil government in Palestine in 1920 
headed by a former British Jewish M.P. Samuel, who was committed to 
Zionism, the Zionists resumed their land purchases and immigration, this 
time under British official sponsorship and protection. The appointment 
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of a Jew, Samuel as High Commissioner, from 1920 to 1925, and the 
resumption of land sales to Zionists coupled with Zionist immigration 
increased Zionist morale and disappointed the Palestinians. 
Thus, the atmosphere became tense in Palestine and in May 1921 the first 
serious outbreak of violence broke out in Jaffa. The disturbances and 
riots spread to some other areas in the country especially to Nablus and 
Tulkarom. During the disturbances 48 Palestinians and 47 Jews were 
killed, 73 Palestinians and 148 Jews were wounded. 16 
The British government appointed the Haycraft Commission to inquire 
into the causes of these riots and to recommend solutions which would 
prevent their recurrence. According to the Haycraft Report: "The 
fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and the subsequent acts of violence 
was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the 
Jews, due to political and economical causes, and connected with Jewish 
immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from 
its Jewish exponents.,,17 
I would argue, therefore, that the essence of the conflict from the 
beginning lies in the Palestinians' rejection of domination, 
dispossession and subordination by alien European Jewish settlers who 
came with the open intention of taking over their country. It is similar 
to the conflict with white settlers in Algeria, South Africa and 
elsewhere in the World. The other causes of the conflict such as 
economic, social or educational causes are secondary and are merely 
symptomatic of the process of settler-colonialism. 
At the beginning of 1922 the Palestinian leaders sent yet another 
delegation to London in an attempt to influence the British Government 
and modify the draft Mandate before its approval by the League of 
Nations. Their main contention was that the Mandate as proposed did not 
conform to Article 22 of the League of Nations which stressed that: 
"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire 
(Palestinian included) have reached a stage of development where their 
existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject 
to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory 
unt il such time as they were able to stand alone." 
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The Palestinians wanted the draft Mandate to be amended to include a 
provision 
existing 
putting 
for self-government with powers which would enable the 
Palestinian majority to prevent the Mandatory power from 
into effect the policy of the Jewish national home. They wanted 
their own government which would be in charge of all Palestine's affairs 
assisted by a Mandatory power in administrative, technical and 
economical matters only. 
The Colonial Office had not only rejected all Palestinian demands but 
rather accused them of being a hopeless delegation which the Colonial 
Office could not do business with: "Experience has shown that they are a 
hopeless body to deal with ... It is submitted that the time has come to 
leave off arguing and announce plainly and authoritatively what we 
propose to do. Being Orientals they will understand an order, and if 
once they realized that we mean business may be expected to 
acquiesce.,,18 
It is not correct, therefore, as it is generally believed, that the 
Palestinians refused British political efforts to solve the problem. On 
the contrary it was Britain which refused to recognize the Palestinians 
as a people and denied them the right to self-determination. 
The Palestinians, like any other people in their situation, refused to 
give up their natural political rights to the British occupiers and 
Zionist colonizers. But their act was reversed by British and Zionist 
propaganda to be understood, and widely accepted, as a Palestinian 
refusal of peaceful solutions as I will show in the next Chapters. 
Some writers have argued that if the Palestinians and the Jews had 
been left alone in Palestine they might have reached an understanding. 
As Cohen explains: "The history of Arab-Jewish relations before the 
British Mandate and in its early stages warrants the assumption that if 
the Jews and Arabs had been left to themselves, they would have been 
able to reach mutual understanding.,,19 Indeed if the number of Jews had 
not been increased by alien settlers supported by a colonial power they 
would have seriously negotiated a settlement with the Arabs. Even today 
it seems to me that if the Arabs and "Israel" were left alone they 
perhaps would reach a settlement. 
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However, the British government, after its failure to reach an 
agreement between the Palestinians and the Zionists in London, drew up a 
statement of policy referred to as the Churchill White Paper of 1922. 20 
The contents of this policy were communicated to both Palestinians and 
Zionists and made public in June 1922. The main principles of the new 
statement of policy, in accordance with the government's official 
summary were as fOllows: 21 
1. His Majesty's Government reaffirm the Declaration of November, 1917 
which is not susceptible of change. 
2. A Jewish National Home will be found in Palestine and that the Jews 
will be in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. But His 
Majesty's Government has no such aim in view as that Palestine should 
become as Jewish as England is English. 
3. Nor do His Majesty's Government contemplate the disappearance or 
subordination of Arab population, language or culture. 
4. Status of all citizens of Palestine will be Palestinians. No 
section of population will have any other status in the eyes of the law. 
5. His Majesty's Government intend to foster the establishment of a 
full measure of self-government in Palestine, and as the next step a 
legislative council with a majority of elected members will be set up 
immediately. 
6. Special position of Zionist Executive does not entitle it to share 
in any degree in the government of the country. 
7. Immigration will not exceed the economic capacity of the country at 
the time to absorb new arrivals. 
8. Committee of elected members of legislative council will confer 
with Administration upon matters relating to regulation of immigration. 
9. Any religious community or considerable section of population 
claiming that the terms of Mandate are not being fulfilled will have 
right of appeal to the League of Nations. 
Both the Palestinians and the Zionists were invited to offer their 
assent to the new statement of policy. The Zionist leadership accepted 
the new policy because it was a continuation of the British friendly 
policy towards the Jewish National Home. For the Jewish community the 
White Paper stressed that the Jews were in Palestine "as of right and 
not on sufferance. ,,22 For Jewish immigration the statement stressed 
that: "It is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be 
its b b" t' ,,23 able to increase num ers y lmmlgra lon. 
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On the other hand the Palestinian Delegation was not satisfied by the 
White Paper. They explained that it was not acceptable because it 
treated the Palestinians, as natives, and the alien Zionists as two 
groups with equal political rights. That the policy reaffirmed the 
Balfour Declaration and the Jewish home policy which the delegation 
refused to accept for reasons mentioned earlier in their 
correspondence24 and mainly "because the immigrants dumped upon the 
country from different parts of the world are ignorant of the language, 
customs and character of the Arabs, and enter Palestine by the might of 
England against the will of the people, who are convinced that these 
have come to strangle them. Nature does not allow the creation of a 
spirit of co -operation between two people so different and it is not to 
be expected that the Arabs would bow to such a great injustice.,,25 
The publication of the White Paper was followed in quick succession by 
the passing of the Mandate for Palestine26 at the League of Nations 
Council meeting in London on 24th July 1922 and then the promulgation of 
the Palestine constitution as an Order-in-Council on lOth August 1922. 27 
The story of the granting of the Mandate over Palestine was similar to 
that of the Balfour Declaration. In both cases the wishes of the 
Palestinians were not taken into consideration. Article (22) paragraph 
(4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations stresses that: "The wishes 
of these communities (under Mandate)must be a principal consideration in 
the selection of the Mandatory." 
No attempt was made to consult the Palestinians before the Mandate 
came into force as to their wishes in the matter of selection of the 
Mandatory. There are two reasons behind this: 
1. The British imperialists, as any other imperial power, did not 
consider at that time, the wishes of any people outside Europe, if they 
saw them at all, as worthy of any consideration. Balfour, then the 
British Foreign Secretary, expressed this attitude plainly as follows: 
"Whatever deference should be paid to the views of those living there, 
the powers in their selection of a Mandatory do not propose, as I 
understand the matter, to consult them.,,28 
2. If the Palestinians had been consulted they would not have chosen 
Britain as Mandatory over Palestine because it was sponsoring Zionist 
activities in the country against their will. According to the 
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King-Crane Commission of Inquiry29 the Palestinians and the Syrians were 
in favour of a united independent Syria and if that was not possible 
then they preferred a single Mandatory for all Syria. 
The Mandate therefore, was granted to Britain not according to the 
wishes of the Palestinians but rather according to Britain's power and 
influence in the League of Nations. 
The Mandate system had been applied to Palestine not merely on account 
of the inability of its present population to stand alone, as A.J. 
Smuts30 had suggested and as was the case with the other mandated 
territories, but also, and perhaps chiefly, on account of the fact that 
the people whose connection with Palestine (the Jews) had been 
recognized were still outside its boundaries. 
The Mandatory power thus appeared not only as a Mandatory, in the 
sense generally given to this term,31 but as a kind of a provisional 
administration in the interest of an absent people. In her capacity the 
Mandatory has assumed an obligation not towards the actual people, the 
Palestinians, but the potential population of Palestine, the absentee 
Zionists. The British Government, instead of responding to the 
Palestinians' demands for independence, proposed the establishment of a 
legislative council. 
The Legislative Council 
This was the first effort by the British Government to develop a joint 
administration for Palestine which would include both Arabs and 
Zionists. The composition of the legislative council which was based on 
the Balfour Declaration, was as follows: ten British government 
officials plus the High Commissioner, and twelve members elected by the 
people, of whom eight were to be Muslims, two Christians and two Jews. 
Two other members should be nominated by the High Commissioner which 
would bring the total to 25 members. 32 
It is clear from the composition of the council that it was designed 
to allow the combined votes of the Government representatives (13) and 
the Zionist representatives (2) to defeat any resolution hostile to the 
main issues such as Jewish immigration, land sales to Jews and the 
Jewish national home policy in general. 
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After studying the legislative council proposals the Palestinian 
delegation sent their reply in writing to the colonial secretary dated 
February 21st 1922. Among the main points made was the following: 
"Whilst the position in Palestine is, as it stands today with the 
British government holding authority by an occupying force, and using 
that authority to impose upon the people against their wishes a great 
immigration of alien Jews ... no constitution which would fall short of 
giving the people of Palestine full control of their own affairs could 
be acceptable. "33 
The proposed constitution was unsatisfactory in their opinion 
because: 34 
a. In the preamble to the Palestine order in council "the Declaration 
of November 2nd 1917 in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a 
national hone for the Jewish people" is made a basis for this order, 
the people of Palestine cannot accept this Declaration as a basis for 
discussion. 
b. In Article 4 to 9 of the order dealing with the manner of 
appointment of a High Commissioner and his powers, Palestine is 
considered as a colony of the lowest order, whereas according to 
paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
Palestine comes under grade A. 
c. The High Commissioner commands 14 out of 25 votes and of the 12 
elected members there will probably be 10 or 11 that would represent the 
Arab majority, who would be unable to carry any measures against the 
officials preponderance of votes. It is interesting here to notice that 
the Palestinians considered the Zionist and the British as one party 
against them. 
The Palestinian argument was that if they agreed to such a 
constitution "the Zionist policy of the government will be carried out 
under a constitutional guise."35 The Balfour Declaration and Jewish 
immi grat ion woul d became 1 ega 1 "Whereas at present it is ill ega 1 , 
against the rights and wishes of the people and maintained by force of 
arms alone."36 
Indeed, any acceptance by the Palestinians of such proposals would 
implicitly legitimise the Jewish national home and the British Mandate 
and thus weaken their power to oppose Zionism and British imperial rule. 
Therefore, the Palestinian Delegation requested that the constitution 
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for Palestine should: 37 
1. Safeguard the civil, political and economic rights of the people. 
2. Provide for the creation of a national independent government in 
accordance with the spirit of paragraph 4 Article 22 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations. 
3. Safeguard the legal rights of foreigners. 
4. Guarantee religious equality to all people. 
5. Guarantee the rights of minorities. 
As an answer to their demands the Palestinian Delegation received a 
written letter from the Colonial Secretary in which he explained the 
British policies regarding the future of Palestine. He ruled out any 
hopes for establishing a Palestinian National government or negotiating 
with them on any basis other that of the Balfour Declaration. the 
Palestinians had been told that: "It is quite clear that the creation at 
this stage of a national government would preclude the fulfillment of 
the pledge made by the British government to the Jewish people."38 In 
regard to Jewish immigration the letter stressed that the: "Questions of 
immigration policy should be reserved from discussion by the legislative 
council and deci ded by the Hi gh Commi ss i oner. "39 As bas is for 
negotiations: "He cannot discuss the future of Palestine upon any other 
basis than that of the Balfour Declaration."40 
This British position provides us with a clear evidence about their 
approach to solving the conflict. The British Government, at that stage, 
was not seriously concerned with solving the problem because that would 
mean their departure from the country and the handing over the 
administrtation to the Arabs. Therefore, it is safe to suggest that 
Britain's main concern was to get both Arabs and Zionists to participate 
in a form of puppet administration without any real executive powers. 
Such participation would facilitate British rule over the country and 
make their position more acceptable in the eyes of the outside world 
especially their rival, France. 
I would argue, therefore, that the British proposals during the first 
ten years were not genuine but rather intended to put the Palestinians 
in an impossible position leaving them without any alternative but to 
reject the British offer. The British Government, however, ignored the 
Palestinians' opposition to participate in the proposed Council and 
announced their intention to make the administrative preparations for 
holding the elections at the end of 1922. In a counter step the 
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Palestinian leaders called upon the people to boycott these elections. 
The Palestinian masses responded positively to their leaders' calls and 
boycotted the elections. The British Government found in the Palestinian 
boycott of the elections a suitable pretext for cancelling the 
elections, accused the Palestinians of non co-operation and consequently 
ruled Palestine directly as any other British colony.41 
Years later the opinion was voiced in various quarters that by 
boycotting the elections and causing the failure of the idea of a 
legislative council the Palestinians forfeited an important instrument 
that might have assisted them in their national struggle. One of the 
arguments used by the British Government was that the Palestinian 
delegation was not an official body and had no right to claim to be the 
authorized representative of the Palestinians. 42 Such an argument could 
hardly have been used against a legislative council acting officially. 
Another argument is that the government would not have ignored the stand 
of the majority of the population's representatives in this body, but 
would have been inclined to hear their demands. 
It seems to me that had the Palestinians taken part in the elections 
and the council been set up, the outcome, at the end, would not have 
been much different. It must not be forgotten that the council would 
have been without the right to debate and decide upon matters apposed to 
the Mandate. 
Moreover, participation in the council could indeed have been described 
as acceptance of the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration. True, the 
council was likely to have influenced, to some degree, the government's 
stand on everyday administrative matters and even on legislation, but in 
reality the pace of development of the Jewish national home was 
determined by factors which were beyond the control of the government of 
Palestine. One of these factors was the British government's strong 
commitment to Zionism. 
On the other hand it seems that the Palestinians' mistake was to believe 
that participation in the legislative council meant acceptance of to the 
Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, while every day co-operation with 
the Government and acceptance of jobs in it were considered 
axiomatically permissible. Therefore the boycott by itself was not 
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effective and Porath rightly argues that: "The boycott of the 
legislative council could perhaps have been effective if it had been the 
high point of a policy of non-co-operation with the government."43 
I may add to Porath's argument that the Palestinians should, in 
addition to the boycott, have resorted to underground active resistance, 
non-payment of taxes and civil disobedience. Such action should have 
been directed not only against the Zionist settlers but against Britain 
too which was acting as protector for the settlers. But as the 
Palestinians were not able to adopt such a course of action, as a result 
of their internal weakness and the superiority of the British, there was 
little point, if any, in boycotting only the legislative council and 
co-operating with the Government in everything else. 
The Palestinian leaders sent yet another another delegation to London 
in an effort to influence the new British Conservative Government which 
replaced the Coalition Government of LLoyd George on 19th October 1922. 
On 11th January 1923 the Delegation met the new Colonial Secretary 
presenting him with their usual demands. That was the setting up of a 
native government elected by all the inhabitants of the country which 
would direct internal affairs, including immigration; the constitution 
of the country would be determined by an elected constituent assembly. 
This native government would negotiate with the British Government over 
the form of advice and aid which the latter would be prepared to render 
to the native government. As on previous occasions, the Delegation 
rejected the Balfour Declaration but, nevertheless, they did not ask for 
complete independence. 44 
The Colonial Secretary informed the Delegation that the new government 
would continue the previous government's policy in regard to the future 
of Palestine. Therefore, the Delegation ended its activities in London 
and returned empty handed to Palestine in March 1923. 45 
The Palestinians, thus, did not succeed in attaining their goal in the 
twenties. The British government had denied them the right to 
self-determination and continued its pro-Zionist policy which was 
approved by successive British Governments. 
The years between 1921 and 1929 witnessed the cessation of violent and 
active resistance against the British and the Zionists. The curbing of 
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violent action on the part of the Palestinians at the end of 1921 and 
their reliance upon political activity alone greatly influenced the 
subsequent development of the anti-Zionist and anti- British struggle of 
the Palestinian people. When at the end of 1923 it became clear that the 
political efforts to effect a change in the British pro-Zionist policy 
had failed, the reaction of the Palestinians was one of disappointment 
and despair. The Palestinians lacked institutions recognized by the 
British46 , lacked efficient leadership and being deeply involved in 
family rivalries and personal disputes, became unable to resort to 
violence again. 47 Thus, they gave the Zionists nine years of peace in 
which they succeeded in doubling the size of the Jewish community and 
enlarging its land possessions. 48 
There were several reasons behind the cessation of violence among 
which were the following: 49 
1. The Mandatory Government reacted forcefully, punishing the 
organizers of the 1921 riots, putting some cities under martial law, 
forbidding the carrying of arms and imposing collective fines upon some 
villages, all of which proved to be very effective in suppressing the 
Palestinians' resistance. 
2. The Palestinian traditional leadership was opposed to violent 
action because they wrongly believed that they could change the British 
pro-Zionist policy by political means and they did not think of any 
alternative action if the political efforts failed, such as underground 
resistance, plans for civil disobedience and the non payment of taxes. 
3. The internal struggle among the Palestinian leadership and family 
rivalries, especially between the al-Husseini and al-Nashashibi 
families, to secure government posts or places on Supreme Muslim Council 
and the Arab Executive. This struggle led them in some cases to put 
their personal interest above the national one and some leaders aligned 
themselves with the government against their opponents. 
4. The weakness of their social structure. As we have seen in Chapter 
Three the majority of the Palestinians were fellaheen living in isolated 
villages and suffering from poverty, neglect, isolation and local 
disputes. It is safe to suggest that under these conditions most of the 
fellaheen, especially those who had no direct contact with the Zionist 
settlers, did not know much about the dangers of Zionist colonization. 
This situation was reversed in the middle of the 1930s after the 
improvement in communications, the substantial increase in size of 
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Jewish settlements and after the fellaheen themselves had felt the 
Zionist danger through the landlessness and unemployment which they 
suffered as a result of Zionist policies on land and labour. 
5. The economic crises among the Jewish community and the failure of 
the Zionist movement to alter significantly the demographic composition 
of Palestinian society. The Zionists succeeded in bringing thousands 
rather than millions of immigrants and therefore Palestine remained 
pre-dominantly Arab. 
The Disturbances Of 192950 
This peaceful phase, however, was disrupted on August 1929 when 
hundreds of young Zionists organized a demonstration at the Western wall 
of al Aqsa Mosque (Wailing Wall), in the course of which the Zionist 
flag was raised and the Zionist anthem sung. On 23rd August a 
counter-demonstration by Palestinians was organized during which a 
serious outbreak of violence took place in Jerusalem between the 
Palestinians and the Jewish communities. The outbreak spread to other 
areas in Palestine in the course of which 133 Jews and 116 Palestinians 
were killed, and 355 Jews and 232 Palestinians wounded. 51 
There were different causes for these incidents on each side. On the 
Arab side these causes varied from political and economical to religious 
fears. for the previous decade the Palestinians had achieved nothing in 
regard to self-government and their traditional leaders found themselves 
in a precarious position. They could not maintain their silence in the 
face of British and Zionist colonization and at the same time they were 
not able to mobilize the people in an alternative local government to 
represent the whole population. The economic conditions of the fellaheen 
and workers had worsened during the last decade with thousands of them 
being thrown off the land or out of jobs in the Jewish sector. They also 
became alarmed at the strength of the Jewish community and feared that 
the Jews could take over their Holy Mosque al-Aqsa. The Palestinians in 
other words considered Zionism not only the main obstacle to their 
independence but also a movement which strove to change the national and 
the religious status quo of Palestine. Such feelings had been 
acknowledged by the Shaw Commission which noted that: "The presence of 
Jews in Palestine would be regarded by the Palestinians as the obstacle 
to the fulfillment of their aspiration.,,52 
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On the other hand, the growth in number and status of the Jewish 
community was accompanied by efforts to attain recognition of new rights 
of worship near the western wall of al Aqsa Mosque (Wailing Wall). The 
Zionists demanded that the Mandatory Government give them control over 
the area adjacent to the western wall or at least allow them to buy it. 
The demonstration and counter demonstration were in fact the direct 
cause of the outbreak but they were not the true causes of the incident. 
The British Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry53 to 
investigate the causes of the violence and to propose a solution to the 
problem which would prevent its recurrence in the future. According to 
the Commission, the underlying causes of the riots were: Palestinian 
opposition to the Jewish national home policy, their fears of being 
swamped by the Zionists and other political and economic reasons. In the 
Commission's opinion: "The political and economic grievances of the 
Arabs ... must be regarded as having been immediate causes of the 
disturbances."54 
The Commission recommended strict measures against Jewish immigration 
and land sales to Jews because they had a negative effect on the 
economic conditions of the Palestinians and stressed the need for 
self-government in Palestine similar to that in Iraq and Transjordan. 
The Commission agreed with the Palestinians that the Balfour Declaration 
was the main obstacle to their independence. 
The Commission noted that: "Were it not for the obligations cast upon 
His Majesty's Government by the policy of the Balfour Declaration their 
hopes and expectations might to some extent have been realized."55 
Comparing the British treatment of the Palestinians and the Zionists 
the Commission noted that: "The Great majority of the people have no 
recognized channel of approach to the Administration while a small 
minority of a different race has close and official relations with the 
administration."56 The Commission explained clearly why the Mandatory 
Government did not develop self-government in Palestine. It was 
certainly not because of Arab opposition. They noted that: "For twelve 
years the Arab leaders and with them the majority of those who are 
politically active, have not ceased to reiterate the claim that a 
representative government should be established; there is no reason to 
h h " '11 h "57 suppose t at t elr Vlews Wl c ange. 
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The Palestinians had been asking for the development of 
self-government for the last decade, and according to the Commission 
they were prepared to accept: "If not the creation of an independent 
state, at least the establishment of a representative government in 
Palestine.,,58 The reason why the British did no develop self-government 
was because: "Leaders of important sections of Jewish opinion in 
Palestine are now strongly opposed to the development of self-government 
in that country.,,59 The Commission warned of the consequences of the 
Zionist exclusive policies on the economic conditions of the Palestinian 
fellaheen. The Commission concluded that: "Between 1921 and 1929 there 
were large sales of land in consequence of which numbers of Arabs were 
evicted without the provision of other land for their occupation.,,60 The 
Commission added that: "There is no alternative land to which persons 
evicted can remove. In consequence a landless and discontented class is 
being created. ,,61 
It will be recalled that the findings of the Shaw Commission in this 
instance were almost exactly the same as those of the 1921 investigating 
commission: the fundamental opposition of the Palestinians to Zionism in 
any form. 62 
The government was able to remove the problem of the Wailing Wall by 
establishing a definite set of rules. Yet when it came to dealing with 
the underlying causes of the disturbances, the British government 
initially did little more than reaffirm the principles contained in the 
Mandate documents. 63 
The British government, in the light of the Shaw Commission report, 
appointed John Hope Simpson to inquire into the economic situation in 
Palestine In his report he emphasised the following points: 64 
1. There was no more land for settlement in Palestine without 
displacing more Palestinians. 
2. There was a great deal of landlessness and unemployment among the 
Palestinians. 65 
3. The Fellaheens' conditions were not superior to those under Turkish 
rul e. 
4. The Zionist boycott of Arab labour was not only violating Article 
Six of the Mandate but formed a constant source of danger to the peace 
and stability of the country. 
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The British Government in the light of the Shaw and Simpson Reports 
made a statement of policy, the so called "Passfield White Paper".66 The 
main points of the new policy were: the establishment of a legislative 
council, to limit immigration and land sales to Jews, and to take 
practical measures to solve the unemployment and landlessness67 among 
the Palestinians through an economic and social development plan. The 
Zionists saw in the Passfield White Paper the seeds of the destruction 
of the Jewish National Home. Therefore they protested to the British 
Government and accused the British of violating their previous promises 
and the terms of the Mandate itself. Weizmann, the Zionist leader, 
resigned in protest from the presidency of the Jewish Agency and some 
British statesmen joined in demanding a reconsideration of the policy 
indicated by Passfield. 
The British government apPointed a special Cabinet Committee to 
examine the Zionist grievances. After a series of meetings between the 
Cabinet committee and the Zionist leaders, the two sides reached an 
agreement acceptable to the Zionists. Mr MacDonald announced the new 
agreement in a public letter to Dr Weizmann, published in the Times on 
February 14 1931. 68 Because this letter meant the abrogation of the 
White Paper the Arabs called it the "black letter". 
The abrogation of the Passfield White Paper without consulting the 
Palestinians marked a turning point in the Palestinian attitude towards 
Britain and opened the way for more radical action. Many Palestinians 
came to realize that unless they did some thing against British rule 
they might lose their country for ever. Indeed since 1929 some 
Palestinians had started to form secret military organizations to resist 
British rule in Palestine as I will show in the following Section. 
The Rise Of The Radical Organizations 
The atmosphere prevailing in Palestine after the MacDonald letter was 
fertile ground for radical attitudes and extreme views. The period 
between 1930 and 1935 indeed witnessed for the first time the 
seriousness of the disastrous affect of Zionist colonization on the 
Palestinians political, economic, and social life. 
After about two decades of passive opposition and political 
negotiations and demands, the Palestinians' independence was not in 
sight. Most of the surrounding Arab countries had attained some sort of 
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self-government and were expected to get their independence in the near 
future. Moreover, between 1932 and 1935 more than 150,000 Jewish 
immigrants were brought into the country creating greater demand an jobs 
in the Jewish sector. 69 Consequently, the Zionists began strictly to 
enforce their exclusive polices on labour, and more Palestinians were 
forced to leave their jobs or were dismissed. The issue of Zionist 
immigration was not merely a moral or national issue, it had a direct 
implication on the economic status of the Palestinians, affecting 
primarily low income workers and certain sections of the middle class. 
The immigration was not only designed to ensure a concentration of 
European capital in Palestine that was to dominate the process of 
industrialization, but also to provide this effort with Jewish labour. 
The policy that gave rise to the slogan of "Jewish labour only" was to 
have grave consequences, as it led to direct and violent clashes between 
the Zionists and the Arab labourers on the spot and poisoned the 
atmosphere generally between the two communities. 
Another area of conflict between Zionists and Palestinians was the 
competitive struggle between the Jewish farmers and Palestinian 
fellaheen. This conflict also extended to higher classes, in so much as 
the Palestinian small landlords and urban middle classes realized that 
their interests were being threatened by growing Zionist domination in 
industry, commerce and capital. As we have seen in Chapter Three, Jewish 
immigration and the transformation of Palestine's economy from an 
essentially Arab agricultural economy to an industrial economy dominated 
by Zionist capital affected primarily the Palestinian fellaheen and 
workers. 
Thus, in addition to the loss of land or jobs on the land the 
Palestinian rural community was being destroyed by the process of 
Zionist colonization. Thousands of evicted fellaheen who immigrated to 
the towns could not find proper jobs and they could not adopt to the new 
conditions Those classes were among the earliest groups to join the 
1936-1939 revolt, as we will see in Chapter Five. 
Against this background the period between 1930 and 1935 witnessed the 
appearance of several military groups and organization who called upon 
the people to resort to armed struggle to get rid of both British and 
Zionist colonialism and at the same time there sprang up half a dozen 
political parties which tried to organize political resistance and lead 
the military organization towards their final goal of independence. 
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Military groups and organizations 
Various nationalist associations70 began to express the view that the 
Palestinian leaders were acting too moderately. Some Palestinians had 
begun to consider covert underground military struggle against both 
British and Zionist alike. An early example was the "Green Hand Gang", 
which operated in the northern region of Palestine and "Al-Jihad 
al-mugadus" (Holy War) in the Jerusalem area between 1929 and 1931. 71 
During the same period Shikh al-Qassam had formed a secret religious 
mil i tary movement in Haifa. He was pres i dent of the Ha i fa "Young Men's 
Muslim Association." Haifa was an urban centre to which many fellaheen, 
. evi cted by Zion i sts from thei r 1 ands, had i mmi grated. "These uprooted 
people were a fertile ground for the fundamentalist Islamic called Shikh 
Izz al Din al Qassam"72 who used his post and good connections with the 
population to promote the idea of military struggle as the best way to 
achieve independence. 
During the five year period of his movement, al-Qassam through his 
daily contacts and in preaching to the masses in the mosques, inspired a 
revolutionary spirit and succeeded in forming secret groups and 
committees specialized in: the use of arms, collecting money and 
advances, his ideas on military struggle, arms purchases, security and 
information. 
When al-Qassam was killed in a battle with the British forces on 19th 
November 1935 he was considered as a hero or martyr who sacrificed his 
life for the cause of his people and country and set an example to his 
foll owers. "The news of Qassam's heroi c death had a tremendous impact 
throughout Palestine. He soon became the symbol of self sacrifice and 
martyrdom and his funeral at Haifa was a great national demonstration 
against the government and the Jewish national home during which the 
police was stoned."73 
However, by his choice of the form of struggle al-Qassam had made it 
impossible for the traditional leaders to stay indifferent. They 
discovered that if they did not try to mount the great wave that had 
been set in motion by al Qassam, it would engulf them. 
The Qassamists played a significant role not only in raising a wave of 
powerful feeling but also prepared the Palestinians for the eventuality 
of military struggle with the British which they themselves participated 
and led in 1936-1939. 74 
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It is worth mentioning here that these military organizations were 
established in different regions and were never extended to take the 
form of a coherent national military struggle. This could be explained 
by lack of experience in political and military organizations and the 
shortage of arms, money and ammunition. It is important to mention here 
that this failure was partly due to a weak social structure 
characterised by division, local disputes, segmental ism and the 
dominance of regional and family loyalities and the lack of 
revolutionary leadership. 
According to Subhi Yassin75 al-Qassam did send a messenger to Hajj 
Amin the Mufti of Jerusalem asking him to join in the struggle but his 
call was turned down by the muffti on the grounds that the time was not 
ripe for military struggle and that the Muffti preferred political 
solutions. 
The Political Parties 
The period between 1930 and 1935 witnessed also the appearance of 
several Palestinian political parties. They were formed by the younger, 
educated and radical notables. Generally speaking they represented more 
or less the views of their respective families or regions. They did not 
enjoy mass support since they were built on family lines and, therefore, 
did not succeed in mobilising the nation into an effective national 
resistance movement. This meant that: "They had not engaged in a 
struggle for independence and that they were no more than general 
frameworks, without definite principles, controlled by groups of 
notables and dependent on loyalties rooted in and derived from the 
influence they enjoyed as religious or feudal leaders or prominent 
members of society they were not parties with organized bases.,,76 
The first effort in this respect was made to organize Palestinian 
youth. On 4th January the first National Congress of Palestinian youth 
was established in Jaffa. It was headed by Rasim al Khalidi who 
succeeded in the next three years in establishing about twenty local 
branches in various towns and villages. They formed their own 
watchguards to prevent illegal Zionist immigration. The members of the 
Youth Congress played an important role during the 1930s unrest, 
demonstrations and strikes by forcing the shopkeepers to close their 
shops and to participate in these strikes and demonstrations. 
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The Istiqlal Party (Independence)77 
This was a pan-Arab Party consisting of young Palestinian radicals and 
professionals, lawyers, doctors, bank managers and journalists. It was 
headed by Auni Abdel Hadi, a nationalist from Nablus. The Party's main 
objective was independence within a united Arab state to include Syria, 
Trasjordan, Lebanon and others. The Party initiated a full scale 
campaign of political activities, public meetings were organized in the 
main cities and strongly worded manifestoes were issued calling upon the 
people to adopt a policy of non co-operation, non payment of taxes, 
civil disobedience and military struggle against British imperialism and 
Zionism. They attacked the traditional leadership as being unfit for 
leading the nation in a popular confrontation with the British 
Government and, therefore, they did not enjoy the support of the rich 
families. This not only affected their effectiveness but also caused the 
anger of these powerful traditional families who established their own 
parties, transforming the family rivalries into new parties. 
The National Defence Party 
In December 1934 the Nashashibis and their allies established their 
own party, the National Defence Party, which was headed by Rageb 
al-Nashashibi. The Party represented some rich urban notables and Mayors 
and worked as the opposition party to the Husseinis. 
The Party's main objectives were: 78 
1. Full independence of Palestine. 
2. The establishment of a national government representing all the 
inhabitants of the country. 
The main difference of this party from the Istiqlal was its readiness 
to co-operate with the mandatory Government in the matter of 
establishing self-government in the manner which was proposed by the 
British government (legislation council) and revision of the negative 
policy calling for rejection of government proposals which the 
Istiqlalists maintained. The party also called for the improvement of 
the economic, educational and social conditions of the fellaheen and 
workers. In its foreign relations, the Nashashibis allied themselves 
with the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan, and contrary to the Husseinis, 
they were ready to form a united kingdom with Transjordan. 
The Palestine Arab Party79 
In March 1935 the Husseinis announced the establishment of the 
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Palestine Arab Party headed by Jamal al Husseini. It more or less 
embodied the policy of the Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al Husseini. 
The Party's main objectives were: 80 
1. Independence of Palestine and the safeguarding of its Arab 
character. 
2. The end of the Mandate and the policy of the Jewish national home 
with it. venture connected 
3. Connecting 
unity treaty. 
independent Palestine with other Arab countries in a 
4. Improving 
population. 
the economic, social and educational conditions of the 
The Party 
organization. 
local branch 
paid special attention to organising youth 
It opened 17 branches in different towns and 
committees. They established youth troops which 
in guarding the borders against illegal Zionist immigration. 
in special 
established 
took part 
Unlike their Nashashibi rival, the Arab Party, while it was in favour 
of Arab unity in general, opposed unification with Transjordan. They 
engaged in practical efforts to prevent sales of Arab lands to Jews. 
The Islah (Reform) Party81 
This party was established in June 1935 in Jerusalem to serve the 
Khalidis family interests and was headed by the family leader Dr. Husain 
Khalidi, the Mayor of Jerusalem. Its stated objectives were the same as 
those of the other parties. 
The Congress of Youth82 
This party was headed by Yacoub Ghussein who showed greater interest 
in the economic situation of the rural areas than the other parties. 
They established 20 branches in different towns and cities. 83 But its 
main objective was similar to the others. 
The National Bloc84 
This Party was established by the Salah family in Nablus. Its 
objectives were similar to those of the other parties, especially 
resisting Zionist colonization by all possible means. 
Although these military and political organizations failed to 
establish a coherent national military resistance and an alternative 
progressive leadership capable of organizing and mobilizing the 
-133-
population against the British Mandate and the Jewish National home 
policy, they succeeded in influencing both their traditional leaders and 
the British Mandatory Government to take their demands more seriously. 
They in fact set the scene and prepared the ground for the revolt of 
1936-1939. 
The five Palestinian parties submitted joint demands to the Mandatory 
Government in November 1935. These demands were three: 85 
1. Immediate stoppage of Jewish immigration. 
2. Immediate stoppage of land sales to Jews. 
3. The establishment of a democratic government in the country 
representing all its inhabitants. They warned the Government that if 
their demands were not met they would take every necessary action to 
achieve these demands. 
The British Government, however, rejected these demands and proposed 
the establishment of a legislative council on the same lines suggested 
in 1922. It is worth noting here that the Passfield White Paper of 1930 
recommended to the British Government the urgent need for the 
establishment of such a council. But the matter was delayed for a period 
of five years due to Zionist pressure on the British Government. The 
traditional Palestinian leaders were prepared to accept participation in 
such a council, especially after they began to lose some of their 
influence to the younger and more radical leaders between 1930 and 1935. 
The Legislative Council Proposa1 86 
On 21st and 22nd December 1935, the High Commissioner submitted to the 
Palestinian and Jewish leaders successively a definite scheme for the 
constitution of the legislative council. It was to consist of 28 members 
only five of whom would be official; there would be 11 nominated 
unofficial members, and 12 elected members. Of the 23 non-official 
members eleven would be Muslim, seven Jews, three Christians, and two 
representatives of commercial interests. The President would be an 
impartial person unconnected with Palestine. There would be no official 
majority but there were to be three main safeguards: 
1. The validity of the Mandate was not to be questioned. 
2. The High Commissioner would have veto and legislative powers and 
3. He would continue to determine the immigration quota and schedules. 
The Palestinian responses to the proposal were not united. 8? Although 
the Palestinian leaders did not reject the proposal they pointed out 
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that it did not go far enough in the direction of self-government. They 
demanded that all members should be elected, that the seats should be 
allocated exactly according to the numerical strength of the 
communities, and that the council should be granted complete control 
over government policy including immigration. aa 
Although, the legislative council proposal did not go far enough to 
meet the fundamental demands of the Palestinians for independence, or at 
least self-government with control over immigration, most of the 
Palestinian political parties accepted it for three reasons: 
First, they found themselves threatened by the growing unrest among 
the lower strata of the population and really challenged by the younger 
and more radical leaders. Therefore, they hoped to secure an official 
recognition for their position as leaders of the country. 
Secondly, they knew that the proposals were totally rejected by the 
Zionists and their acceptance would encourage the government to 
establish such a council without Jewish participation. 
Thirdly, there was a large body of opinion among the Palestinians in 
favour of the legislative council. The High Commissioner reported that: 
"There is little doubt in my mind that with the exception of Haifa town, 
quite ao percent of the Muslim population desired that the legislative 
council should be brought into being."a9 
Suleman Tookan, leading member of the Nashashibi Defence party, 
demanded the Mandatory Government to establish a legislative council 
regardless of opposition from Arabs or Jews. 90 Government would be 
guilty of a serious breach of faith if, influenced by pressures from 
Jews or insincere Arabs, it postponed or abandoned the scheme. 
The Zionists rejected the legislative council proposals and made it 
clear to the High Commissioner that "even if the council was formed on 
the basis of parity they would boycott it.,,91 This position was taken 
against the background of the dramatic increase of Jewish immigration in 
this period and in the hope that the Jews would form a majority in the 
near future. 
The Zionist Congress rejected the proposals in September 1935 and even 
before it was offi cia 11 y announced: "The congress reaffi rmed its 
opposition to the establishment of a legislative council in the present 
stage of the development of Palestine and reluctantly expressed its 
categorical rejection of the scheme.,,92 
The British government, due to Zionist pressure, was forced to bring 
the legislative council idea before the British Parliament for debate. 
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The issue was debated in the House of Lords on 28th February and in the 
Commons on 25th March 1936. All parties in both Houses demanded that the 
government suspend or abandon the scheme, which it duly did. 93 
This British position on the development of self-government in 
Palestine gives us clear evidence that it was the Zionists and the 
British who were not interesting in such a development and not the 
Palestinians. 
The suspension (in fact abrogation) of the legislative council drove 
the Palestinians into a state of despair and frustration. It is 
therefore understandable why a small incident in April 1936 was 
sufficient to bring the whole country into a state of general strike and 
local war. It is against this background that the Palestinians resorted 
to military struggle to achieve their national independence. This 
military struggle, however, lasted for three years and again was 
defeated by the co-operation of British and Zionist forces as we will 
see in the next chapter. 
Concluding Remarks 
The British Government unilaterally issued the Balfour Declaration in 
1917 pledging to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish home in 
Palestine in the hope that such a home perhaps would be developed into a 
Jewish state which would guarantee to the British Empire a lasting 
foothold in the Middle East and consequently secure its economic and 
strategic interests in the area. Since the Declaration was intended to 
secure British interests in this area in spite of the opposition of the 
population, Britain did not consult the people directly concerned when 
she issued the Declaration. 
Britain was not in full control of Palestine at the time of issuing 
the Declaration and, therefore, the Palestinians did not at any time 
recognize the Declaration and refused in principle to accept any 
solution based on it. Consequently, the Palestinians considered Zionist 
immigration, sponsored by British bayonets, to be illegal and developed 
their argument and responses accordingly. The Palestinians throughout 
the 1920s tried to change the British Jewish home policy by political 
means. Their mode of action included, peaceful negotiations, 
demonstrations and some outbreaks of violence in 1921, 1929 and 1933. 
They refused to deal with the Zionists as a main party in the conflict, 
but rather saw their opponent as Britain. They assumed that if they 
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reached an agreement with Britain Zionist activities in Palestine would 
come to an end. 
The main Palestinian demands were: an end to the Mandate and the 
establishment of a national government to represent all the inhabitants 
of the country with guaranteed rights to the Jewish minority and free 
access to the holy places. 
These demands, however, were rejected by both the Zionist and the 
British alike. Instead the British government offered the Palestinians 
participation in legislative councils. The constitution of such councils 
would not question the validity of the Mandate nor would they give the 
Palestinians any executive powers in relation to the most important 
issues, immigration and land sales. The Palestinians refused the 
proposed legislative council in 1922 but for political and other reasons 
accepted similar proposals in 1935. The Zionists, on the other hand, 
accepted the 1922 proposals but rejected the proposal in 1935. They 
accepted the proposals in 1922 because they wanted to secure recognition 
from the Palestinians when they were weak, while they rejected it in 
1935 when they hoped that they would soon become a majority and rule by 
themselves. 
During the first two decades the Zionists succeeded in altering the 
demographic composition of the country to their advantage; they formed 
29 percent in 1936 against 9-11 percent in 1920. They succeeded in 
acquiring about one third of the cultivatable land in Palestine and 
developing their own political, economic and educational institutions. 
Moreover, they enforced their exclusive policies on land and labour. 
The steady and gradual development of the Jewish National home had 
negative effects on the political, economic and social conditions of the 
Palestinians. Thousands of fellaheen were evicted from their lands and 
thousands of Palestinian workers dismissed from their jobs in the Jewish 
sector. Such conditions were fertile ground for political and military 
activity. With self- government becoming a remote possibility the 
Palestinians started to think of resorting to military struggle as the 
only way to gain independence. The period between 1930 and 1935 
witnessed the appearance of several military organizations which worked 
in different regions and half a dozen political parties. Although these 
organizations did not succeed in forming a cohesive national resistance 
movement they formed the basis and prepared the ground for the 
Palestinian revolt of 1936-1939. 
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In conclusion I would argue that the Palestinians were interested in 
forming a national government in Palestine during the first two decades 
and that it was in their interest to do so. But Britain did not listen 
to the Palestinians' call for independence and prevented them, under 
Zionist pressure, from obtaining it. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Palestinians Resistance to Zionist Settlement and the British 
Mandate between 1936 and 1946 
Introduction 
Despite all Palestinian political efforts, the first two decades 
showed that the "Jewish National Home" was growing steadily and that a 
plural society was emerging in Palestine with direct conflict between 
its two main segments, the Palestinians and the Zionist settlers. But 
the first half of the 1930s witnessed two significant developments: 
1. The development of a formal demand from the Palestinian leaders for 
the establishment of a national democratic government in Palestine 
representing all the inhabitants of the country. This demand was 
presented by the representatives of the six political parties at the end 
of 1935. 
2. The appearance of several military and political organizations 
which worked for the attainment of this demand by all possible means, as 
we have seen in Chapter Four. 
The process of radicalization of the Palestinians' responses to 
Zionist settlement and to the British Mandate gathered momentum with the 
increase in Zionist immigration and land purchase. In other words there 
was a positive relationship between the increase of Jewish immigration 
and land sales to the Jews and Palestinian violent reaction, especially 
between 1936 and 1939. 
The Palestinians considered Jewish immigration as the main danger to 
their very existence. The trend of the previous three years(total Jewish 
immigration was 30,727 in 1933, 42,359 in 1934, and 62,000 in 1935) was 
such that the numerical relation in Palestine could be tranformed within 
a decade. The amount of land purchased by Jews increased from 70,000 
donums in 1931 to 187,000 in 1935. The total amount of land being 
transferred to Jews between 1931 and 1935 reached 667,000 donums. 1 
The Palestinians feared that if this situation continued unchecked 
they might soon become a minority in their own country. According to 
-144-
Porath, discussion of the Jewish immigration threat to the Arab 
character of Palestine was the "Central topic in almost every press 
article, political meeting or social gathering."2 
Two more events in 1935 aggravated the situation. These were the debate 
over the proposed legislative council of 1935 by the British Houses of 
Lords and Commons which led to the postponement of the idea for an 
indefinite time; and the strict implementation of the Jewish Agency's 
old policies of "Hebrew labour". This meant that every job in the Jewish 
sector should be filled by a Jew. As we have seen in Chapter Three, the 
Agency's economic policy resulted in throwing a large number of 
Palestinians out of work by sacking some of them from their jobs or 
denying them jobs in the Jewish sector. This matter was so serious that 
a Palestinian daily newspaper wrote: "The real struggle which now exists 
in the country is between Arab and Jewish labour."3 
It is worth noting here that in Haifa alone there were in 1935 over 
11,000 Palestinian workers living in hovels made out of old petrol tins 
without any decent arrangements. 4 Most of those labourers perhaps, came 
from the rural areas after they had lost their jobs or the hope of 
finding a job as a result of the Jewish Agency's land and labour 
policies. Moreover, the workers feelings were intensified as a result of 
another form of discriminatory policy from the British Authorities 
regarding their wages. Barbour described a worker's situation thus: "He 
had the experience of being driven from work by Jewish pickets and he 
resented the fact that the Government paid the Jewish worker double the 
rate which it paid him for the same work."5 
The British permitted mass Jewish immigration into Palestine and did 
not dispute the Jewish Agency's previous policies (regarding land and 
labour) under the terms of the Palestine mandate, but she ignored the 
safeguard in regard to the Palestinians' rights, embodied in Article 6 
of the Mandate, which states: "The Administration of Palestine while 
ensuring that the right and position of other sections of the population 
are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration."6 
Britain was practically violating the spirit of this Article of equal 
weight: This Article carried two obligations: one concerned the rights 
and the position of the Palestinians and the other the facilitation of 
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Jewish immigration. To deny the Palestinians jobs in their own country 
or to sack them from jobs located in Palestine, regardless whether these 
jobs had been created Jews, Arabs or British, was a clear violation of 
the Palestinians' right to work. More important is the transformation of 
Palestine from a homogeneous society into a plural one. This process was 
prejudicial to their rights and positions. 
It can be said that the Palestinians' fear of being dominated coupled 
with the discriminative policies of both the British Authorities and the 
Jewish Agency and the uncertainty about their future were the immediate 
cause of the Palestinian leaders' calling the general strike which 
lasted for six months. 
However, the true character of the Palestinian resistance to the 
British Mandate and the Zionist settlement has unfortunately been 
obscured by many subsequent writings dealing with the socio-political 
history of that period. The confusion over the nature of the Palestinian 
resistance and behaviour derives, perhaps, from the failure to identify 
precisely the nature of the forces operating within the total power 
profile in Palestine, the dynamics of which produced, according to 
Wa i nes: "What was undoubtedl y, a s i tuat i on un i que in the annal s of 
colonialism and imperialism.,,7 
The source of this confusion may be illustrated by an example drawn 
from each of two different perspectives on the Mandate years. While some 
Zionists8 have denied the presence of a genuine Palestinian nationalist 
movement, more frequent is the implicit denial that it was a popular 
resistance or represented the attitude of the majority of the 
population. This, of course, will depend upon the point of view adopted 
towards the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate and Zionism. Thus one 
scholar has noted that: "During the past seventy-five years an Israeli 
nation has been forged in the fires of struggle no different from that 
of nations allover Afro-Asia.,,9 
The writer did not question the origin of the majority of the Jewish 
European settlers and simply considered the Jewish settlers' efforts to 
take over Palestine similar to the Egyption or Algerian struggle against 
the British and French occupations. The writer is not only silent about 
the existence of a Palestinian national movement or the damage which had 
occurred to the Palestinian people as a result of the process (Jewish 
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struggle) which led to the establishment of the Hebrew state, but he 
also: "Removes the ideological and politico-economic aspect of Zionism 
from the European colonial imperial context of which it was an integral 
part and from which it drew much early inspiration."lO 
Similarily, the nature of the Palestinian resistance to the British 
mandate and military occupation was obscured by the British Government 
policy of a dual obligation, incumbent upon the Mandatory regime, 
whereby the Palestinian and the Jewish community would receive equal and 
impartial treatment which made any Palestinian resistance to appear as 
unlawful. In fact Britain was using the Palestine Mandate and the Jewish 
national home as a legal cover for her own intention to stay in 
Palestine. Sheffers explains Britain's real intention as: "White Hall's 
basic intention, its determination to remain in Palestine because of 
that territory's new strategic value, rendered essential adherence to 
the Zionist ingredient in its policy."ll 
When Palestinians resisted the British policy of establishing a Jewish 
national home and resorted to military resistance to force the British 
to recognise their rights, as a majority, for self-government, it was 
simple for the British authorities to accuse the Palestinians of being 
terrorists and let them appear in the eyes of world opinion as an 
uncivilised population who were violating the mandatory rule sanctioned 
by the League of Nations. By resisting Britain's policy, Palestinian 
resistance appeared unlawful according to British propaganda. 
Therefore, Britain was able without much protest from most of the 
international community, to use military force to suppress the 
Palestinian Revolt in the name of keeping law and order. 
The evidence for Britain's using the pro-Zionist policy as a pretext to 
stay in Palestine could be found in the following passage from a 
memorandum prepared as a reply to the High Commissioner's proposales for 
granting the Palestinians self-government. 12 If the Chancellor's 
recommendations were to be adopted, the Jewish Agency might abandon the 
Jewish home idea even as a "piece of bluff". This might be most damaging 
as: "With the national home policy eliminated our excuse for remaining 
in Palestine would be reduced to little more than that of the importance 
of a territory containing the Holy places."13 
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Britain, however, succeeded in diverting world attention from its 
colonial relationship with the Palestinians into a legally impartial 
power assigned to rule Palestine to serve the interests of both 
communities, Palestinians and Jewish settlers. This has frequently 
resulted in an interpretation of a struggle between two irreconcilable 
nationalisms and not as the history of a captive or powerless population 
fighting a colonial power sponsoring mainly European Zionist settlers in 
their country against their will and wishes. 14 As a result of such an 
interpretation the burden of responsibility for the course of events and 
the ultimate failure of the Mandate was adroitly moved from Britain onto 
the backs of the Palestinian and Jewish communities. 1S 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the nature of the 
Palestinian resistance to Zionist settlement and the British Mandate and 
to examine the effectiveness of their methods of mobilizing the 
Palestinian people against British rule. It is equally important to shed 
some light on the British responses to the Revolt, the outcome of the 
Revolt and finally the significance of the Revolt in the development of 
subsequent events up until the end of the Mandate. 
The General Strike of 1936 
The process of Palestinian radical resistance to Jewish settlement 
and the British Mandate began at the end of the 1920s and became more 
violent in the middle 1930s. There were several reasons behind the 
Palestinians' militant attitude: 
First, the emergence of a genuine national feeling and desire for 
independence. Such national feeling was growing steadily and was felt by 
the High High Commissioner who reported to the Colonial Secretary that: 
"It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that the sole cause of riots 
was Jewish national home immigration. A genuine national feeling is 
growing constantly more powerful in Palestine and more bitter against 
Britain."16 
Secondly, their fear and uncertainty about Britain's real intentions 
in allowing thousands of Jewish immigrants to enter Palestine, 
especially between 1932 and 1936. The forecast was that if the rate of 
Zionist immigration was as large as 60,000 per annum, the Zionist 
settlers would begin to surpass the Palestinians within a decade or 
50. 17 
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Thirdly, the implementation of the old Jewish Agency's land and labour 
policies which forced many Palestinians off land bought by Jews, and out 
of work in the Jewish sector. 
Finally, there were the examples of successful nationalist struggle in 
Syria and Eygpt which inspired the Palestinians to follow the same 
course of action to reach a similar goal. lS 
The Out Break Of Violence 
On 15th April 1936 two Jews were killed by Palestinian guerrillas on 
the road between Nablus and Tulkarom. The following night two 
Palestinians were killed by Jews as an apparent reprisal. These killings 
set off a wave of Jewish demonstrations and Palestinian 
counter-demonstrations. On 17th April a Jewish demonstration occurred in 
Tel Aviv on the occasion of the funeral of the two Jews, and many 
speakers demanded that the government arm the Jewish community and even 
demanded the establishment of a Jewish Army.19 
The police interfered to disperse the demonstration and stop the 
demonstrators from marching to Jaffa, the Palestinian city to the south 
of Tel Aviv. The police were attacked during the demonstration but they 
fought back and four persons were killed. 
The following two days, Jews in Tel Aviv picketed businesses which 
hired Palestinians, and several Palestinians were assaulted in Jaffa and 
Tel Aviv. 20 On 19th April the Palestinians gathered in front of Jaffa 
municipal offices waiting for a demonstration permit from the British 
Authorities. Denied the permit the gathering became a mob. Disorder 
continued until the end of the day by which time nine Jews and two 
Palestinians had been injured. Similar, though less bloody, 
demonstrations took place simultaneously in Tulkarom and Nablus. 21 
During these disturbances an unprecedented phenomenon appeared. In 
addition to the political, social and economic separation of the two 
communities they began to separate spatially. The population was moving 
both ways, the Jews to the mainly Jewish areas and the Palestinians to 
the mainly Arab areas, apparently it was obvious to them that the 
disturbances would not finish immediately.22 
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The London "Times" commented on the situation: "The question arises 
whether a permanent no man's land shall be maintained between the two 
communities.,,23 
On 20th April a National Committee was formed at Nablus and called for 
a general strike throughout Palestine, to last until the demands laid 
before the Mandatory Government by the five Palestinian parties should 
be conceded. Between 19th and 21st April similar National Committees 
were set up in most of the Palestinian towns. The members of these 
strike committees were for the most part "Small business men and 
professionals inexperienced in politics but shocked into action by the 
Tel Aviv riots and assaults.,,24 
While Palestinians perceived this violent action as a protest against 
the British Administration and the way they had handled the Jaffa and 
Tel Aviv demonstrations, their efforts and responses were in no way 
concerted at this stage. Each committee had its own demands which 
stressed every area or town's own grievances and without any 
co-ordination at the national level. 
No doubt the common danger of Zionism had the effect of uniting all 
the Palestinian factions. As Marlowe observes: "The pressure imposed 
unity on the Palestine Arabs, compelling them, with ever-increasing 
insistence, to turn their attention away from domestic feuds and towards 
the common peril.,,25 
Barbour advances a similar view and argues that: "The common danger 
was bringing the various sections of the population closer together. 
Christians and Muslims, effendies and fellahin, were acquiring a new 
sense of solidarity.,,26 
On 25th April the leader of the different political parties held a 
meeting and established what became known as the Higher Arab Committee. 
The committee's job was to translate a direct Palestinian desperation 
into constructive political articulation through the language of 
nationalism. At the local level, most strikes were not politicized, this 
was the first time most strikers had attempted political action, and 
therein lay a weakness of the national movement. 27 
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However, it seems that the new Higher Committee had succeeded in 
establishing some sort of unity between the different groups and 
families, at least regarding the strike and the basic national demands. 
Kalkas notes that: "In the process, the Arab Higher Committee unified 
interest based and regionally based national strike committees into one, 
albeit loosely woven, organizational fabric."28 The Higher Committee was 
able to unify the different sections of the Palestinian community by 
acting as an intermediary to help in the articulation of demands in a 
manner which the British would understand. 
The Mandatory government, however, did not concede to the 
Palestinians' demands and consequently, on May 7th, the High Committee 
called a meeting in Jerusalem, of the representatives of the various 
national strike committees and other nationalists. The meeting of the 
150 representatives produced a memorandum to the High Commissioner in 
which they declared: 29 
1. That the strike would continue unless Britain altered its 
pro-Zionist policy and stopped Jewish immigration as an indication of 
such alteration. 
2. That Palestinians should not pay taxes as from May 15 if the 
British Authorities did not respond positively to their demands. 
On 15th May the High Committee issued a manifesto which called on the 
Palestinians to refrain from paying taxes or co-operating with the 
Government in any form. 
The Palestinian's responses to the High Committee for civil 
disobedience differed from one class of people to another. Throughout 
May, group after group in Palestine voted to support the strike. On 12th 
May members of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce went on strike. The 
next day the Palestinians student organization voted to support the 
strike and endorsed the national demands. On 17th May Palestinian 
national guards issued a proclamation urging universal support for the 
Palestinians and appealed to the Palestinian people to resist British 
rule "even to the point of self extermination." 30 
Palestinian officials increasingly showed support for the strike but 
most of them did not strike. Two substitutes were found for the 
officials strike. 
1. They contributed at least a tenth of their salaries to the strike 
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funds and passed to the strike leaders confidential information on 
British intentions. 
2. A memo was signed by all the Palestinian senior officials on June 
30th and in July by 1,200 second division civil servents, in which they 
expressed their solidarity with the aim of the strike. The Palestinian 
officials indicated that the strike was an example of Arab despair, 
their mistrust of the British Government and that the only way to bring 
peace was to tackle the real issue of the conflict namely Zionist 
immigration and the Arab demands for independence. They stressed that: 
"Force can suppress the people but never bring peace.,,31 
The responses of the Palestinian Municipalities to the strike were not 
uniform. The Mayors of Jaffa, Ludda, Ramle, Jenin, and Tulkarom went on 
strike as of 1st June while Mayors of Jerusalem, Acre, Gaza, Safad and 
Nazareth struck a week later. 32 
It seems that the delay in the Mayors' responses to the strike resulted 
perhaps from their fears of being dismissed or replaced by British, 
Jewish or other Palestinian rivals. 
Some writers argued that the Palestinian leaders were pressured by 
their people to take a tougher action against the Government. Toynbee 
for one charged that some decisions taken by the Palestinian leaders at 
that time came about, "by pressure on the leaders from below." Toynbee 
gives an example of such pressure from below the Arab Higher Committee's 
decision on 7th May to adopt the Palestinian Drivers Association's 
"policy of the non-payment of taxation: "Again the Higher Committee took 
its orders from below." 33 
However, the general strike and the Revolt were received with 
increasing enthusiasm by villagers. From the middle of May the rural 
sector became the centre of gravity of the Revolt. This came about as a 
result of British occupation of most Palestinian towns by military 
forces and the readiness of the fellaheen to co-operate, support and 
participate in the military struggle against British and Zionist rule. 
By mid-June several attacks on Jewish settlements and British troops 
were carried out by Palestinian guerrillas. The emergence and spread of 
the rural guerrillas resulted in the military balance swinging 
temporarily to the Palestinian side. The most effective area was Samaria 
with its centre Nablus. This is a mainly mountainous area with poor 
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roads. The guerrillas had the advantage of knowing the terrain and could 
have food and information from their fellow fellahin while the British 
army had difficulty in reaching them in an area without proper roads. 34 
The regular targets of the guerrillas were roads and railways, bridges 
police stations, telephone and, electricity lines, British troops and 
remote Jewish settlements. 35 
The increase in number and the establishment of full time fighters 
brought about serious questions of finance and supply. The Higher 
Committee and the local national committees carried out the job of 
collecting the money and then expended it to maintain the guerrillas and 
to buy weapons for them. 36 
The effectiveness of the Revolt and its organization was increased 
towards the end of August 1938 when a group of about 200 Arab volunteers 
from Syria, Transjordan and Iraq, headed by a former officer, Fawas 
al-Qawagji, went to Palestine to join the Revolt. al-Qawagji assumed the 
position of leader of the Revolt. His previous experience with the 
Ottoman Army helped him to organize the guerrillas into four companies 
and established an intelligence and information unit whose main task was 
to collect necessary information about the British Army and Zionist 
targets. A special court of the Revolt was established to judge traitors 
and spies and to enforce justice, security and order in the areas under 
the guerrillas' control. 37 
As the strike became effective and the guerrillas' violent action spread 
to the rural areas, British military reinforcements began to arrive in 
Palestine in May, and by September the British garrison reached about 
20,000. 38 This British force came to Palestine with full battle 
equipment and was supported by tanks, armoured cars, machineguns and 
warplanes. 
The British Authorities' 
amendments of the emergency 
powers were extended though successive 
regulations of the 1931 Palestine Order in 
Council. These laws empowered the High Commissioner to impose curfews, 
authorize searches, close newspapers, make seizures without warrant, 
mass arrests, impose collective fines and demolish houses without giving 
any chance of appeal against these laws. 
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In view of this and under these regulations, the British Authorities 
arrested, on the eve of May Day, 1936, all known Communists in Palestine 
which included 15 Palestinians and 66 Jews, on the grounds that they 
were suspected of supporting Palestinian anti-British sentiments. 39 By 
13th May The Authorities had arrested over 600 Palestinian agitators and 
on May 23 they arrested 61 more Palestinians, among whom were 40 heads 
of local national strike committees. By the beginning of June 37 more 
leaders had been arrested, including Awni Abdul Hadi of the Higher 
Committee and Asem Said Jaffa's 70 year old Mayor. By 19 June about 
2,598 Palestinians had been arrested as a result of the strike and the 
Revolt. At one point during the strike more than 400 leaders of the 
strike committees were in prison. 40 
When the Authorities realised that without these leaders the strike 
was continuing they started to use other methods, starting with 
collective fines. The collective fines began in mid May in the northern 
district with the Government confiscation of 193 houses as a punitive 
fine and by mid July fines in cash had been levied on most of the 
Pal est in i an towns. Ka 1 kas notes: "By September 14, fi nes equa 11 i ng 
£90,000 had been levied in 28 towns, yet rural resistance continued 
un-abated.,,41 
The next method which the British used was to demolish houses. Jaffa, 
especially the old city which became a haven for snipers and 
manufacturers of home made bombs, posed special problems to the 
Authorities since its streets were very narrow and did not allow the use 
of armoured cars. 
On 16th June planes flying over the city dropped leaflets urging the 
population to leave the old city immediately and informing them that the 
Government would not be responsible for any loss of property after that 
date. The operation of demolition of the old city of Jaffa left about 
6000 persons without homes. The displaced persons were forced to take up 
shelter in orange groves to the east of Jaffa. The London "Times" 
reported on 22 June 1936 that the Hourani Quarter and much of Jaffa's 
old city had been eliminated. 42 
On 6th July the British troops carried out a "comb-out" operation in 
the rural areas bounded by Jerusalem, Nablus, Talkarm and Ludda. While 
this force, which totalled 4000 troops, was searching houses, 
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questioning and arresting suspect persons, the air force planes dropped 
leaflets urging the population to give up the strike and to co-operate 
with the troops. Even such a large operation was not sufficient to stop 
the Revolt. 
The British Government, however, announced on 29th July that a Royal 
Commission would go to Palestine to investigate the causes of the strike 
and disorders. But it would not proceed to Palestine until order had 
been restored. In the mean time the British Government attempted to 
obtain the assistance of certain Arab rulers to help end the Revolt. 43 
The first effort for mediation between the Palestinians and the 
British came from Nuri Said, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, who visited 
Palestine on 20th August 1936 to mediate between the Palestinians and 
the British Authorities. The Arab Higher Committee accepted Nuri's 
initiative of mediation. But on the 7th September the British Government 
suddenly announced a new policy on Palestine. They made it clear that 
they were determined to stop the strike and crush the Revolt by military 
means. The statement implied that Nuri's mediation efforts had failed, 
because the Higher Committee refused to call off the strike. It declared 
that agreement with Palestinian demands would constitute an abrogation 
of the Mandate, something which Great Britain would not accept. The 
statements continued to explain that the Mandate was a responsibility 
and "trust which they have no choice but to carry out." The statement 
described the general strike and the Revolt as "Wide spread acts of 
murder and outrages by groups of armed terrorists", and because the 
Government's main concern "has been to restore peace between the 
different communities in Palestine", they "decided to take rapid action 
to bring the troubles to an end.,,44 
Such a statement from Britain undoubtedly contributed to the confusion 
about the nature of Palestinian resistance to British colonialism. 
The Higher Committee was surprised by the British statement and found 
themselves in a difficult position. Although the strike had mobilized 
the Palestinians the colonial Authorities refused to make a move towards 
negotiations. Instead they soon declared martial law and forcibly put 
down resistance. 
The Palestinian leaders called a congress on 17th September 1936 to 
consider what to do. As the British Authorities prohibited such a 
-155-
meeting, the matter was left for the local committees to deliberate on 
separately. Each was unwilling to take the initiative of surrendering 
and declared to continue the strike. 45 
The Higher Committee, with the threat of punishment hanging over their 
heads if they publicly advised retreat, and having failed to obtain 
moral support from the local committees for the step that became 
inevitable, turned to the rulers of the neighbouring Arab states. On 
11th October the Higher Committee, after consultation with the 
representatives of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, published the 
text of the letter they had received from the rulers of these states. 
The letter called upon Palestinians to "resolve for peace in order to 
save further shedding of blood." The letter assured the Palestinians 
that "in doing this we rely on the good intentions of our friend Great 
Britain, who has declared that she will do justice." The letter assured 
the Palestinians that "you must be confident that we will continue our 
efforts to assist you.,,46 
This letter gives us an idea of those Palestinian leaders who agreed 
to publish it and to call off the strike when they knew, through their 
political contacts and Arab countries' mediation, that Britain did not 
promise any change in her policy. 
It seems to me that the Arab leaders' letter was just a face-saving 
device used by the Palestinian leaders to call off the strike without 
facing the consequences of a lost battle against the British forces. 
The real reasons for calling off the strike were the following: 
1. If guerrilla warfare continued against an enemy now able to take 
the offensive, that would cost many lives and could only have one end, 
defeat. 
2. The strike, had involved considerable financial sacrifices for 
Palestinian shopkeepers, owners of transport services and 
employees, and dock labourers. The approach of the orange season 
their 
brought 
the larger interests, both of capital and labour, into operation against 
the strike's continuation. 
3. The Palestinians realized that the Zionists had profited by the 
strike. They had strengthened their military relations with the British 
through joint training and co-operation and succeeded in increasing 
their military defence units. 47 
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4. On the economic side the Zionist succeeded in filling all jobs in 
the Zionist sector which, before the strike, were occupied by 
Palestinians. The Zionists also secured many jobs, especially with the 
British Army's security projects. 48 They succeeded in building a port at 
Tel Aviv as an alternative to the Jaffa port which was closed as a 
result of the strike. The development of a rival and exclusive port for 
the Zionist sector was seen by the Arab workers as a threat to their 
interests. Such Arab worries were reported in The London Times: "In the 
Jews' avowed intention to develop independent harbour facilities, the 
Arab port workers see a menace to their livelihood.,,49 
5. The last reason for calling off the strike was the announcement by 
the British Government to send a Royal Commission to inquire into their 
grievances. The proposed Inquiry Commission was used this time, as a 
face-saving device, by both Arabs and British alike. For the Palestinian 
leaders they could tell their people that they had called off the strike 
because Britain was willing to investigate their grievances. For Britain 
it would enable them to carryon their pro-Zionist policy without the 
need to use their forces against the civilian population, which would 
damage their interests in the rest of the Arab countries. 
On November 5th 1936, the Royal Commission arrived in Palestine and on 
the same day Britain announced a new quota of Jewish immigrants. This 
announcement prompted the Arab Higher Committee to declare their boycott 
of the Royal Commission because Britain had not, as they expected, 
suspended Jewish immigration until the Commission had finished its 
investigations. SO 
The Palestinians' boycott of the Royal Commission in effect allowed 
Zionists to use it as a forum to present their demands. The Commission 
had been sent in the first place to investigate the Palestinians' 
grievances, but it actually listened to the Jewish point of view almost 
daily for six weeks. They listened to the Palestinian case for one week, 
the last, when the Palestinians, under pressure from the Arab countries, 
agreed to present the Palestinian case before the Committee. 51 
The Commission's Report was published on 7th July 1937 and recommended 
the establishment of a Jewish state on the coastal area and annexation 
of the rest of Palestine, except the Holy places, to Transjordan in 
order to establish an Arab state, as I will explain in details in the 
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next chapter. 
The lesson which could be derived from this strike is that it is 
difficult in a plural society facing a colonial power, to conduct a 
successful strike if one segment of the society co -operates with the 
colonial power. 
Waines explains that the failure of the Palestinian general strike 
come about as a result of the co-operation between the British and the 
Jews: The strike "could scarcely have the desired consequence when one 
third of the population could act as a buffer in the crisis and even 
derive benefit from it. That this was possible at all was due to the 
favoured position of the Yishuv (Zionist settlers) within the structure 
of the Mandate.,,52 
2. Resumption of the Revolt and its Organization 
The manner of calling off the strike and stopping guerrilla warfare in 
Palestine left the organization of the Higher Committee, the local 
committees and the guerrilla forces intact and in high morale. For the 
Higher Committee it was a temporary truce to be used for recovery from 
the hardships caused by the long period of the strike. It seems that it 
was the moderate wing led by the Nashashibis who lost ground during the 
strike period. They had followed the lead of Amin al-Husseini and the 
youth leaders who became the only powerful leaders. 53 
The relative truce which followed the cessation of violence was 
utilised for a major organizational effort. A fund raising campaign was 
made to collect money to sustain a renewal of the strike and the Revolt 
should the leadership decided to take such a course and a special levy 
of 1% on the Palestinian citrus industry.54 
The temporary substitute for more effective action was an attempt to 
impose a strict economic boycott of the Zionist sector. This action was 
not new. The Palestinians tried the boycott policy in 1922, 1923, 1929 
and in 1933 without success. The only practical effect the boycott 
brought was the acceleration of the process of segregation between the 
two communities. 55 
During the general strike the boycott of Zionists was a corner stone 
of Palestinian policy. The violence which accompanied the strike made 
the boycott far more effective than ever before. 
The Higher Committee's decision to continue the boycott after the end 
of the strike was implemented rather easily and effectively. This of 
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course was due, in the first place, to the awareness of the Palestinian 
population of the Zionist danger and their readiness to take collective 
action to stop it. It was also partly due to the threat of violence 
against those on the Palestinian side who did not observe the boycott. 56 
For the Palestinians, the boycott was mainly a political weapon, used 
in order to restrain the Jewish economy. It did not reflect the economic 
interests of the Palestinians. It spelled economic ruin for citrus 
growers and merchants. It brought unemployment for Palestinian workers 
and caused great losses to the peasants who depended on selling their 
products on the Jewish market The only positive effect at least in the 
short run was that of bringing the majority of the Palestinian people 
under the Authority of their national leaders. 
The effects of this boycott on the Zionists were that it liberated the 
labour market from Arab workers, it gave a boost to Zionist farming and 
created a totally independent economic structure. Flapan concludes that: 
"The call for an economic boycott of Jews played into the hands of the 
Jewish policy to build a closed economic circuit and facilitate the 
implementation of the policy of Hebrew labour and Hebrew goods. liS? 
The Zionist leaders found their opportunity to implement their own 
exclusive economic policies. What was important was not to allow 
Palestinian labour to come back, not to buy Palestinian products and not 
to renew the tenancy of Palestinian houses. But the Zionist leaders who 
were aware of the difficulty of explaining a boycott to international 
public opinion and the damage which a declaration of boycott could cause 
to their cause abroad abstained from declaring their boycott policy, 
leaving the Palestinians to do the job for them and, consequently, bear 
the responsibility. This was possible because of the disadvantaged 
political position of the Palestinian leaders compared to the Zionist 
leaders. For the Palestinians the boycott was part of their legitimate 
struggle and since they did not expect any help from the outside world 
it did not make much difference to them what the outside world might say 
about their actions. In this sense their position was different from 
that of the Zionists who were totally dependent on external support and, 
consequently, in need of World public opinion' sympathy. 
This lack of political experience, however, put the Palestinian leaders 
in an awkward position when they declared a boycott of the Royal 
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Commission without having any other alternative option. They were forced 
to retreat from their hasty decision of boycotting the Commission, but 
not before they had given the Zionists most of the time allocated to the 
Commission to present their case, presenting the Arab case only in the 
last week of the investigation. During the period preceding the arrival 
of the Commission and pending the conclusion of its investigations, 
there were no real efforts made by the Palestinian leaders to establish 
a duly elected body which would represent the Palestinian case before 
the Royal Commission or to work as an alternative government should the 
Commission recommended granting Palestine independence. There were no 
efforts to organise an underground political infrastructure to lead the 
country, should the government decide to arrest the leaders, nor use 
that truce period for organising an underground national military 
movement to continue the military struggle against the British forces or 
to be the national army should independence be granted. The misuse of 
that opportunity to establish military and political infrastructures had 
grave consequences when the British Government decided to adopt the 
Royal Commission's recommendation to divide Palestine and to use the 
military alternative to implement that policy. 
However, when the strike was called off the Palestinian guerrillas 
were not militarily defeated nor disarmed. During the truce period the 
guerrillas were directed and guided to some extent by the traditional 
leaders and communication between the two organisation continued through 
members of the local committees. Guerrilla leaders used the truce period 
to enlist and train new volunteers, purchase weapons and ammunition to 
be used should the Revolt be resumed 58 
The Palestinians were surprised and shocked by the Royal Commission's 
recommendation to partition Palestine. The Report was received with 
indignation by the majority of the Palestinian Arabs who were adamantly 
opposed to the creation of the Jewish state on what they regarded as 
Arab land, as I will show in detail in the next chapter. 
On 8 July 1937 the Higher Committee rejected the Partition scheme and 
appealed to other Arabs and Muslims for solidarity. They demanded the 
replacement of the Mandate with a national government bound by a treaty 
with Britain that would guarantee minority rights to the Jews. 59 
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As the general strike had started as a spontaneous response to the 
events which occurred in the middle of April 1936, the Revolt was 
resumed by individual attacks on British and Zionist targets without 
much guidance or planning from the leadership.60 On 1st October the 
guerrillas killed L.Y. Andrews, District Commissioner of Galilee, and 
his police escort at Nazareth. The British Government was determined at 
this stage to carry out the Partition scheme by military force. 
Therefore, this incident was an opportunity for the British Authorities 
to carry out measures against the Palestinian political leaders and 
military action against the guerrillas themselves. Despite their public 
condemnation of the act which led to the killing of the Galilee 
Commissioner, the Arab Higher Committee and all national committees were 
declared illegal. The Muffti was deprived of his offices as president of 
the Supreme Muslim Council and several members of the Higher Committee 
were deported to the Seychelles. Hundreds of political activists and 
suspected guerrill as were arrested. "The Government brought a 11 its 
resources to bear on the Palestinians in order to crush the rebellion 
once and for all. ,,61 
The reason given for government action against the Palestinian leaders 
was their alleged "moral responsibility" for the various acts of 
violence which had occurred in the country.62 
The Palestinians responded to the British measures by a series of 
attacks on British and Zionist targets. On the night of 14-15 October 
1936, several attacks were made on Jewish buses in the Jerusalem area 
and sporadic attacks were made on Jewish settlements, the Iraqi pipe 
line which carried oil to Haifa, telephone lines, passenger trains and 
troops and damage caused. 
The following night Ludda air port premises were attacked and customs 
and passport offices were burned down A twenty three hour curfew was 
imposed on Ludda for four days, two houses were demolished and a 
collective fine of £5,000 was imposed. 63 
The second phase of the Revolt was already under way. But the 
dissolution, arrest and deportation of most of the Palestinian leaders 
denied the Revolt its previous organisational infrastructure, leadership 
and financial aid. On the military side the departure of the Arab 
guerrillas volunteers, including the leader of the Revolt, Fawzi 
al-Qawgji, inevitably caused the virtual collapse of the hierarchical 
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structure which he had succeeded in forming. Despite these disadvantages 
it did not take long before the guerrillas were called on, reorganized 
and started their operations. It was estimated that the number of 
permanent active guerrillas was between 1500 and 3000. This number was 
supported by 1000 urban guerrillas and 6000 armed villagers who could be 
called upon in time of need within their local areas64 . 
The first category formed the military backbone of the Revolt and 
operated from the mountains against the British troops and engaged in 
sabotage of the oil pipe line, road bridges, military installations and 
railway lines. The second category consisted of the town commandos who 
carried on their ordinary civilian life but performed specific tasks or 
attacks at the request of their leaders. These were important in the 
liquidation of Palestinians suspected of collaborating with the British 
as well as the assassination of British officers accused of committing 
excesses against Palestinians. The third category was the partisans 
which consisted of ordinary peasants and only took up arms to relieve 
the guerrillas in the case of a battle taking place in their area65 
The problems which faced the leaders of the second phase of the Revolt 
were many. The first serious problem facing the leaders in Syria was how 
they could lead, direct, organize and finance the Revolt in exile. 
Therefore they formed al-Lujnah al-Markaziyyah Lil Jihad66 (Central 
Committee for Holy War) to provide leadership for the Revolt. 
Among other tasks the Central Committee was responsible for speaking 
on behalf of the Palestinian people in purchasing arms, collecting money 
and making arrangements for smuggling this money and arms into 
Palestine, together with their guidance and directions. Communication 
between the Central Committee and the district guerrilla leaders was 
carried out by messengers and occasional personal visits of the 
guerrilla leaders to Damascus. 
The guerrilla formations were divided into four fronts headed by a 
district commander, who had armed formations varying between 150 and 200 
Mujahidin (Holy fighters) led by a platoon leader. The most prominent 
leaders of the second phase of the Revolt were Abdul Rahim al-Hiji 
Mohammad, Tulkarm, Aref Abdul Razeg, Nablus, Abdul Qader al-Husseini, 
Jerusalem and later Yusuf Abu Dura, Galilee. 67 
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It can be said that as a result of the Palestinian leaders' failure to 
establish secret military and political alternative leaderships they 
could not establish such leadership when the British arrested the 
traditional and military leaders in October 1937. Therefore, the 
Palestinian guerrillas had to work in separate groups in their districts 
almost independent of each other. There was no co-ordination between 
these different districts and consequently they were not able to conduct 
their resistance to British rule in a manner similar to that of other 
organized resistance movements or revolutions such as in Algeria or 
Vietnam. 
However, in the Summer of 1938, in an effort to establish a national 
resistance movement with a common leadership, the Central Committee 
requested the Palestinian guerrilla leaders to form a Higher Council to 
reorganise and lead the military resistance in Palestine on a national 
level. The major guerrilla leaders' response was positive. They formed 
"Diwan al-Thawrah al-Arabiyyah fi Filastin (Bureau of Arab Revolt in 
Palestine) composed of the regional commanders. 68 
It was agreed that all members of the Bureau would serve as its head 
in rotation. This was one of the first indications that the new Bureau 
was not going to work. This set-up generated competition between the 
members of the Bureau originating from family, regional and political 
reasons. Abdul Qader al-Husseini the commander of Jerusalem district did 
not join the Bureau and he, therefore, had separate means of 
communication with the Central Committee in Damascus. Every Commander 
was authorised to command the guerrillas in his region and thus the 
status quo was maintained. In brief the Bureau did not serve as a real 
military command and at best it served as a limited co-ordinating body. 
It is worth noting here that at the end of 1938 the disagreement 
between the guerrilla leaders reached a point at which A. R. al-Hajj 
Muhammad called himself Commander in Chief of the Arab rebels in 
Palestine and Arif Abd al-Razig called himself Commander-in-chief of the 
Rebels in Southern Syria. This rivalry contributed to weaken the 
military resistance at a moment when unity and co-operation were 
desperately needed. 
In Summer 1938 the Palestinian Revolt reached its peak. 69 The rebels 
constituted the only authority in most of the rural areas and even 
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occupied some major towns such as Hebron, Jericho, Beersheba, and 
Rammallah. They even occupied the old city of Jerusalem for a short 
period. They established their own administrative offices, intelligence 
centres and special courts. Since the guerrillas were not completely 
dependent on the Central Committee's financial assistance they attempted 
to find local financial alternatives. They were able to levy taxes and 
quotas of volunteers on the villages and towns. 
But when the Central Committee became unable to supply the guerrillas 
with their increasing demands for money, the latter used, in some cases, 
violence and intimidation to get what they wanted from the local 
population The guerrillas used Revolt activists in the towns to collect 
monetary contributions while they used the commandos to attack selected 
targets inside their towns. 
The Commandos were also instrumental in intimidating and threatening 
Palestinian collaborators with the British authorities, land brokers, 
and other opponents. Such threats and intimidations led according to 
Kayyali to an exodus of "thousands of rich Palestinian land brokers, and 
pro-government notables.,,70 
3. British Response to the Renewal of the Revolt 
During the general strike the British Authorities attempted to repress 
the Revolt under the provisions of Palestinian civil law and the 1931 
Palestine Order-in-Council. As the Revolt continued the Authorities' 
powers were extended through successive amendments of these emergency 
regulations. Mass arrests, collective fines, and demolitions were 
characteristic of government actions at this time. Cities where 
disturbances occurred were cordoned off and patrolled by occupation 
police. 
After April 25 1936 the police were armed and empowered to use their 
guns in crowd control. By June 2 military reinforcements were empowered 
to work as police in crowd control and preventive control. But as the 
strike continued, the Authorities called in police and military 
reinforcements. By the end of 1936 the police forces had been increased 
by almost 1000 men to include 1,902 Palestinians, 930 British and 484 
1 . 71 ° Jewish. In addition there were 3,000 Jewish supernumerary po lce. n 
1st October the British Authorities outlawed the Higher Committee and 
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all other national committees and arrested most of the Palestinian 
national 
leaders. 
The British Government realised that in order to carry out the 
Partition Scheme they had first to crush Palestinian military resistance 
as quickly as possible and by all possible means. This helps to explain 
for the British military offensive which began in May 1938 with the 
formation of joint British and Zionist special night squads under the 
Command of Captain Orde Wingate. 72 These squads operated at night and 
attacked Palestinian villages and exerted systematic pressure, 
surveillance and harrassment upon the guerrillas. In May also, British 
troops occupied twenty villages in Samaria and Galilee permanently. 
Police and military posts were established or re-established in the main 
vi 11 ages. 
The objectives of this action were fourfold: 73 
1. To prevent the villages from either becoming or continuing as a 
source of food, shelter, and recruitment for the guerrillas. 
2. To re-establish British administrative control where such authority 
had ceased. 
3. To prevent intimidation and threats to the population and regain 
the confidence of the population. 
4. To effect more strategic control of the previously inaccessible 
areas for road making and patrols. 
At the end of October Palestine was under military command and divided 
into four military districts each under a military commander. Some towns 
such as Jaffa, Acre, and Jerusalem were re-occupied during October and 
November. In re-occupying towns and villages the Army used brutal 
measures against the Palestinian civilians. Attacks or firing at the 
troops brought about immediate collective punishment. For example, on 
October 26th 1938 two British Batallions launched a punitive raid 
against the Palestinian village of Mair. They requested the villages to 
surrender some arms and suspected guerrillas. When the villagers failed 
to do so, the British Army started to blow up the village houses with 
dynamite in front of their owners. A New York Times correspondent on the 
spot wrote: "When the troops left there was little else remaining of a 
. 1 d "74 once busy village except a plle of mang e masonry. 
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District officers were empowered to submit a village to a collective 
fine. Then if the villagers would not or could not pay they could 
confiscate the entire village's flocks of sheep and goats as security 
for the fine. They were empowered to impose punitive police posts at the 
villagers' expense, which might involve fifteen police men at six pounds 
a month for three months. Either method could cripple a village 
financially. The district officer had actually unlimited powers. He 
could demolish a house in no way connected with any violent incident but 
as reprisal for any act committed by an unknown person from the same 
village. 75 
The trains and some times military vehicles were safeguarded by 
Palestinian civilians. "The natives (father and brother) of the band 
commander operating in a certain area or the local notables were ordered 
to sit on the inspection trolleys which drove at the head of the 
train."76 
The British Authorities imposed more severe measures upon the 
Palestinian people in order to make it easier to identify and pick up 
Palestinian guerrillas. They issued identity cards and forbade any 
movement by rail, road or car without a pass. Passes of different 
colours were issued giving the bearer greater or lesser privileges of 
travel. Such pass cards and laws are still in operation in "Israel" and 
are used mainly to restrict Arab movements in the country especially 
between the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the area called "Israel" 
proper. It is perhaps interesting to mention here that such pass laws 
and restrictions on the movement of the natives are one of the main 
features of the racist regime of South Africa today. 
Card issuing offices were sited in large towns and traffic-checking 
posts established at the exit of every town and village as well as at 
other random points along the major roads. A permanent night curfew was 
also imposed on all roads outside urban areas. Hence anything that moved 
at night or moved by day without a pass was arrested. 77 
It seems that British tactics of village occupation and restriction of 
movement proved effective. The guerrillas had been forced out of these 
villages into the hills. They were cut off from their base, supplies of 
food and recruitment, they were unable to move from one district to 
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another and more importantly they could not transport arms and 
ammunition from one area to another. They were denied security and rest 
and the British forces were even able to follow them to their hideouts 
and attack them with military fighters. 
The presence of British troops also had a feedback effect on the 
number of Palestinians willing to express anti-guerrilla sentiments, 
especially those who had suffered from mal-treatment by the guerrillas 
before the British re-occupation. The British Authorities even 
encouraged and assisted the Nashashibis faction and other pro-government 
families to establish anti-guerrilla bands called "peace bands."78 
The task of these bands was to force the guerrillas out of their 
areas, to stop them from collecting money and to inform the British 
troops about their hideouts and plans. This internal conflict between 
the two main factions al-Husseinis and Nashsashibis increased after the 
announcement of the Partition scheme in July 1937. The Husseinis were 
against while Nashashibis were in favour. This led the pro-Husseini 
guerrillas to attack and intimidate the pro-Nashashibis between 
1937-1938. When the British reoccupied the villages and drove the 
guerrillas out, the Nashashibis had their revenge on the pro-Huessini 
guerrillas by fighting them or informing the British forces about 
them. 79 
It is worth noting here that this disunity between the different 
Palestinian factions regarding the method of solving the Palestine 
problem still prevails among the different organizations of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization. Such differences, other than the 
fighting which broke out between the pro-Arafat (leader of the P.L.O) 
and the pro-Syrian guerrillas in Lebanon in Summer 1983, became clear 
when the pro-Syrian leaders boycotted the Palestinian National Council 
Conference held in Amman, Jordan, in November 1983. 80 Such differences, 
however, did not result from differences on the final goal but rather on 
the tactics to achieve that goal, self-determination. 
Nevertheless, these severe British measures against the Palestinians 
did not crush the Revolt completely, but they did succeed in damaging 
the good relations between the guerrillas and their fellow-citizens and 
supporters. The guerrillas in this situation had to operate from the 
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hills and get their arms and supplies from the neighbouring Arab 
countries, especially Syria. In an attempt to block that route of 
supplies the British Army erected barbed wire fences across Palestine's 
northern borders. 81 
The British also made arrangements with the Transjordan frontier force 
to guard and control the Eastern border of Palestine completing a full 
blockade around the guerrillas in the hill areas of Palestine. 
The British military offensive and their internal struggle 
substantially contributed to the destruction of the guerrillas' power. 
Many were killed and many others were encouraged to defect to the peace 
bands or simply quit fighting because there was no hope of victory 
against the British Army. 
The guerrillas, short of supplies and denied the necessary popular 
support in Palestine, now faced new measures from the French colonial 
authorities in Damascus. The best indication of this poor situation of 
the Revolt was the fate of the chief guerrilla commanders. After Abd 
al-Rahim Muhammad had been killed by the British Army on 23rd March 
1939, Arif abd al-Raziq was captured by the French forces in Syria on 
April 13th and finally in July Yusuf Abu Durrah was captured by the 
Transjordan frontier force and handed over to the British Army and was 
hanged in 1940. 82 
Moreover Franco-British rapprochement on the eve of the Second World 
War led to the French decision to suppress guerilla movements and later 
to restrict their political leaders' activities against Britain. Kayyali 
remarks on the end of the Revolt. "Weariness with fighting, constant 
military pressure and the hope that some aspects of the White Paper 
would be applied, in addition to the lack of arms and ammunition, all 
played their part in making it difficult to continue the Revolt. 
Moreover, in view of the fact that the world was on the brink of the 
Second World War, France suppressed the Rebels' Head Quarters in 
Damascus. ,,83 
The Palestinians actually paid a high price in economic and human 
losses. It has been estimated that the total losses were 19,792 killed 
and wounded during the revolt period (1936-1939).84 This estimate is 
based on conservative admissions contained in official reports, checked 
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against other documents. 
These calculations established that 1200 Palestinians were killed in 
1936 120 in 1937, 1200 in 1938 and 1200 in 1939. In addition 112 
Palestinians were executed and 1200 killed during various internal 
conflicts among Palestinian factions. Palestinian detainees numbered 
about 2,000 in 1936, 816 in 1937 and 2,463 in 1938 and approximately 
5,679 in 1939. Thus, making a total of 5,032 Palestinians killed, 14,760 
wounded and 10,848 detained. But the real and most serious losses lay in 
the rapid growth of both the military and economic sectors of the Jewish 
settler society. 
The general policy followed by the Zionists during the revolt followed 
two lines: 
1. Alliance with British imperialism including military co-operation 
to defeat and crush the Palestinian Revolt. 
2. The mobilisation of the Zionist settler society which emphasised 
the necessity of laying the foundations of a military society and of its 
military and economic instruments. 
Freed from the competition of cheap Palestinian agricultural produce 
the Zionists proceeded to take action to promote their economic 
existence. During the revolt the Zionists and the British Authorities 
built a network of roads between the principal Jewish colonies and the 
towns which were later to constitute a basic part of the infrastructure 
of the Zionist economy. They succeeded in building a harbour at Tel-Aviv 
which was later to kill the port of Jaffa. In addition the Zionists 
monopolised contracts for supplying the British troops which reached 
20,000 men. 
The Zionists were able to reduce Jewish unemployment by filling all 
the jobs abandoned by Palestinians during the strike and by getting jobs 
in British security projects and by the involvement of thousands of 
Jewish supernumeraries. 85 Fifty Zionist settlements were established 
between 1936 and 1939 and the Jews invested £p 1,268,000 in building 
works in five Jewish towns as against only £p 120,000 invested by 
Palestinians in 16 Palestinian villages in the same period. The value of 
exports of locally manufactured goods rose from £p 478,807 in 1935 to 
nearly double that figure (£p 896,875) in 1937. 86 This can only be 
explained by the greatly increased activity of the Jewish economy. 
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The scope of this mobilisation expanded from the economic field, in 
alliance with the British Authorities, to the military field, in 
collusion with it. To cover up their co operation, the Zionists came up 
with the idea of establishing Jewish defence units later to be known as 
colony police. The British Government believed that the formation of a 
Jewish strike force would solve many problems connected with the defence 
of their long term imperialist interests. They therefore held 
instruction courses on offensive operations against guerrillas which 
provided training for large numbers in Haganah cadres who later became 
cadres of the Israeli Army.87 In 1937 the Jewish police were increased 
with 3000 new members, all of whom played a direct role in repressive 
operations against Palestinian guerrillas. 88 
At the beginning of 1939 the British Army organised ten groups of 
colony police into well armed groups, which were given Hebrew names. 
These groups totalled 14,200 men each being commanded by a British 
officer assisted by Jewish officers. By the Spring of 1939 the Zionists 
also had 62 mechanised units of eight to ten men each. 89 In Spring 1938, 
for example, the British Authorities entrusted to the Zionist defence 
units the defence of railways between Haifa and Ludda and sent 434 
members to do the job. Later this Jewish force was increased to 800 and 
entrusted with the defence of the oil pipe-line in the Bushan plain. 
However, low scale military engagements continued between the British 
forces and Palestinian guerrillas until September 1939, the month in 
which World War Two broke out. In the main period of the Revolt the 
Palestinians suffered irreplaceable losses, the main leaders were killed 
and the newly constituted local commandos fell one after the other in 
the various fields of battle. British oppression had reached its climax 
when they started to train and cooperate with the Jewish Haganah in 
their operations against the guerrillas and the Arab population. 
War weariness, continued military pressure, in addition to a shortage 
of arms and other supplies militated against the continuation of the 
Revolt. Soon after the declaration of the World War, the Revolt started 
to peter out, and the High Commissioner reported that as a whole the 
Arab Community had declared its support for the government in the War 
with Germany.90 Bowden makes a relevant remark on the end of the Revolt: 
"A revolutionary war with a developed politico-military component and 
the cellular structure of mature underground alternative government may 
well have been able to survive such defeats, a peasant War or rebellion 
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could not."91 
The Palestinian leaders were not able to revive' the revolt after 1939. 
Being prohibited from entering their country and living in exile in 
other Arab countries made them dependent more and more on these Arab 
countries to solve the Palestine conflict with Britain by political 
means 
After the Second World War the Palestine conflict was extended not 
only to involve the Arab countries but also international powers such as 
the United States. The development of Palestinian responses to different 
peaceful efforts to solve the problem between 1939 and 1946 will be 
discussed in the following chapter (chapter six). 
4. Some Social Aspects of the Revolt 
From 
Porath, 
and the 
analysing 282 members who held office in the Palestinian Revolt 
concluded that the revolt was carried out mainly by villagers 
lower classes. Out of the 282 members there were 187 (65%) 
villagers, 8 (3%) villagers who had emigrated to towns, 61 (22%) 
townsmen, 22(8%) bedouins and 8 (3%) Arabs from different countries. 92 
The breakdown of the Palestinian population at that time was 62% 
villagers 30% townsmen and 8% Bedouins. 93 It is clear therefore, that 
the urban population was under represented in the sample. 
If we break down the group of 61 townsmen by the role they played in 
the Revolt we find that only 34 (55%) of them were guerrilla group or 
sub guerrilla group commanders, the other 27 (42%) being advisors, arms 
transporters, instructors and 2 (3%) judges in the courts of the Revolt 
whereas almost all the villagers and bedouins were actual guerrilla 
group commanders. 94 
I should add here that many townsmen lent their support to the Revolt 
in other ways, for example, the merchants, journalists, policemen, civil 
servents, who were townsmen and their support was very important, mainly 
in finance, newspaper reports and in the intelligence field. This 
composition of the guerrilla ranks necessarily raises questions about 
the social orientation of the Revolt: Was there any social ideology 
which the guerrillas cherished and which might have influenced their 
action? And what were their concrete relations with the people? 
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The reply to the first question is simple: The guerrillas did not 
articulate any new ideology of their own. In their communiques they 
generally accepted the political positions of the national leaders. They 
did not express, or perhaps they were still not able to express, social 
demands of their own even in an inarticulate way, which their political 
leaders of the upper class did not deem necessary. As Porath put it: 
"Being devoid of any social ideology, the rebels did not attempt, when 
they reached the peak of their power in Summer 1938, to bring about any 
change in the social structure of those large rural parts of the country 
which were then under their control.,,95 
Porath's argument is not far from the truth. But he failed to connect 
the Palestinian's inability to express their own social demands with 
their overall circumstances. With their leaders jailed, or living in 
exile without any permanent and regular financial resources, without any 
full and permanent control of any large area and with the British forces 
occupying their country, the guerrillas perhaps set as their main target 
the liberation of their country. If the guerrillas started to talk about 
social demands and changes without having the means and power to 
implement them it might have created more divisions among the people. 
In answer to the questions of the relation between the guerrillas and 
the people it may be said that: during the general strike relations were 
generally good. The machinery of the Higher Arab Committee and the 
national committees was in operation and most of the guerrillas' needs 
in terms of money and weapons were supplied by them. 
The leaders decided what demands should be made on the population. 
There were not exorbitant and so could be met. But when the Revolt 
resumed in 1937 the circumstances were different. There was no central 
leadership to control, organize and decide how much money should be 
collected from each area and this matter was left to the regional or 
local leaders to decide. Some guerrilla leaders even demanded more money 
than the villagers could afford. 96 
The general strike had impoverished many peasants who could not sell 
their products during the strike. The other important factor which 
played a major role in worsening the relations between the guerrillas 
and the population was British intimidation, collective fines and house 
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demolitions which were imposed upon villages or people who supported the 
guerrillas. The misuse of authority by some leaders, poverty and 
government intimidation, all these factors combined together to damage 
relations between the guerrillas and the villagers. 
The relationship between the guerrillas and the urban population grew 
much worse too. This was not only because of the above factors, but it 
is very probable that the guerrillas were also motivated by class 
animosities. The sums of money demanded by the guerrillas from the urban 
population were very high and perhaps these sums were asked not only out 
of need but also out of malevolence towards the rich population whose 
participation in the Revolt was slight. The climax was reached in 
December 1938 when the guerrillas asked the people of Jaffa to pay P£ 
60,000 (Palestinian pound) Jerusalem P£ 30,000 Ramalah P£ 18,000 Nablus 
P£ 14,000. 97 
The matter reached the Central Committee in Syria which tried to 
convince the guerrillas to reduce these sums, but their efforts were 
unsuccessful. These exorbitant demands and another two orders, which the 
guerrillas issued to the urban population during their occupation of 
Jaffa and other cities between August and November 1938, had some class 
connotations. They decreed that a moratorium on debts would be effective 
from 1st September 1938 indefinitely and that all actions of the courts 
in respect to debts would be stopped. It is clear that these measures 
were intended to benefit the lower classes. A second order made the 
anti-urban connotation very clear. This time the guerrillas requested 
the creditors not to ask the villagers to settle their debts. They 
warned these creditors against any legal action against their debtors. 
Another class action was the guerrillas' declaration that rents were 
cancelled. 98 Here the guerrillas identified themselves with the urban 
lower classes against the rich ones as well as with the poor villagers 
against the rich townsmen. 
The Revolt leaders ordered all the population to wear the Palestinian 
traditional dress which in their opinion represented the true symbol of 
Nationalism and Arabism. The other action against the rich people was 
confiscation of the movable properties of the rich who had fled the 
country. This situation led Sir Harold MacMichael to write commenting on 
the Revolt: "Some thing like a social revolution on a small scale is 
beginning. The influence of the landlord -politician is on the wane. He 
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has done nothing but talk, others have taken the risks, and these others 
(Guerrillas) are disposed to take a line of their own. "99 
Between 1936 and 1939 about 10,000 violent acts were carried out by 
the Palestinian nationalists. This included attacks on British troops, 
police stations, railways, pipelines and Jewish settlements and 
population About 5,000 Palestinian were killed and fifteen thousand 
wounded. 100 Other sources put the numbers at 2,850 killed many thousands 
more wounded, 9,000 people arrested, 200 houses blown up and 30,000 
Palestinian pounds in collective fines levied on Palestinan villages and 
towns. 101 
The British and Zionist casualties were estimated at 1,200 Jews and 
700 British killed or wounded during the Revolt. 102 
Flanon describes the Revolt as follows: "The events of 1936-1939 
showed all the features of a popular struggle characteristic of fully 
mature national movements: a general strike, economic boycott, 
demonstrations, political actions and guerrilla warfare."103 
A Palestinian Revolt was just a beginning which was not given the 
chance to grow further. It was spoiled by British brutality and military 
interference and by internal Palestinian disputes, divided loyalities 
and lack of practical material and military support from the Arab 
countries. 
Conclusions 
The Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939 was an important turning point in 
the history of the Palestinian-Zionist conflict. The Revolt was not 
simply a continuation of Palestinian protest against British and Jewish 
national home policy but rather a national rebellion against British 
colonialism and efforts to plant a Zionist settler society in Palestine 
against the wishes and the will of the Palestinian people. 
The Revolt was mainly directed against British rule and its main 
demand was independence. It was mainly carried out by peasants and up to 
October 1938 they succeeded in holding onto, and even occupying, large 
parts of the rural areas and several towns in Palestine. The guerrillas, 
however, did not represent any specific social outlook nor did they 
develop any class solidarity. In addition to their lack of military 
experience and modern military technique and equipment, they could not 
overcome the gap in regional and personal interests. 
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The British Authorities used more than 20,000 troops and very severe 
measures, not only against the guerrillas but also against Palestinian 
civilians, cooperated with Jewish Haganath and established 
anti-guerrilla bands in order to crush the revolt. But it was not before 
the British Authorities had occupied all the towns and most of the 
villages in Palestine, cut Palestine off from the rest of the Arab 
countries and reached an understanding with the French Authorities in 
Syria to suppress the political and military leadership in Damascus that 
Britain was able to quell the Revolt. 
In conclusion I would argue that the defeat of the Palestinians' 
Revolt was due to the superiority of the combined forces of the British 
Government and the Zionist settlers.Although other factors had 
contributed to this defeat, the superiorty of the British forces was 
enough by itself to end the Revolt. 
As a result of the Revolt (and other factors)Britain abondoned the 
Partition scheme in October 1938. There were also several new features 
which entered the Palestinian-Zionist conflict as a result of this 
revolt. 
1. The intervention of the Arab states, which were invited by Britain 
mainly to pressure the Palestinians to adopt a more "moderate" attitude. 
This intervention became a permanent feature and later developed into 
the general Arab -Israeli conflict. 
2. The appearance of the practical and open alliance between British 
colonialism and their prote'ges', the Zionist settlers, especially in 
the military field. The British Army assisted the Zionist settlers in 
establishing their defence units which received military arms and 
training from the British Army. These Jewish military units were 
increased during World War Two and later became the Jewish Army which 
defeated the Arabs in 1948. 
3. It signalled further geographical as well as ideological 
segregation between Palestinians and Zionists to be crystallized in 
later Partition suggestions and direct negotiations between Palestinians 
and Zionists as I will show in Chapter Six. 
4. It drove the Palestinians after their defeat to rely more and more 
on the Arab states and less and less on themselves. 
5. The Revolt obliged Britain to acknowledge the seriousness of the 
Palestinian opposition to the idea of the Jewish Home and for the first 
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time a Royal Commission proposed the Partition of the country as the 
only hope for a lasting settlement as we will see in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Palestinian Responses to the British Proposals to Solve 
the Palestine conflict 1936-1939 
Introduction 
Britain wrongly assumed that the Palestinians, faced with her military 
strength and with the so called economic benefits which Zionist 
immigration would bring to Palestine as a whole, would accept the 
"Jewish home" idea and, consequently, they would drop their opposition 
to Zionism and be more reconciled to British rule. The Palestinians, 
however, were neither impressed by the so called economic benefits of 
Jewish immigration to Palestine nor were they prepared to surrender to 
British power. They argued that the best safeguard for their rights and 
future was the establishment of self-government in Palestine in the 
administration of which both Arabs and Jews would participate according 
to the size of their respective populations. 
The Palestinians used political as well as military means to convince 
the British Government to accept their demands. But, as we have seen in 
Chapter Four, Britain, instead of responding to the Palestinians' 
demands, tried to bring about an understanding between Palestinians and 
Zionists to share the administration of Palestine with the British 
Government without questioning the validity of the Balfour Declaration 
or the Mandate. The best example of this approach was the legislative 
councils idea which was suggested in 1922 and later in 1935. But as I 
have explained in Chapter Four, these were neither serious nor genuine 
proposals to solve the conflict. Therefore, by the middle of the 1930s, 
Palestinian opposition to the British Mandate and Zionist settlement in 
Palestine developed into a state of general strike and full rebellion. 
It was during that rebellion that the British changed their approach to 
solving the Palestine conflict. 
In this chapter 
proposals to solve 
responses to them. 
Palestinians are a 
I am going to shed some light upon the British 
the Palestine conflict and analyse the Palestinian 
This is perhaps important because firstly, the 
major party to the conflict and their views are 
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important for anyone concerned about a final settlement to the Palestine 
conflict. Secondly, there are some misconceptions and misguided common 
beliefs regarding the Palestinian position and views for a lasting 
settlement to this conflict. These misconceptions were created by both 
British and Zionist propaganda during the Mandate and later by the 
Zionist Movement and "Israel." For example the British Government held 
the Palestinians responsible for the failure of Nuri Said's mediation, 
during the general strike of 1936, at a time when the Palestinians were 
still waiting for the result of his mediation. The British announced: 
"The Palestinian Arabs are themselves entirely to be blame for the 
failure of all those well meant efforts at mediation."l Commenting on 
the outcome of the London Conference Esco (pro-Zionist Foundation) 
explains that "The Arab position left no room for compromise.,,2 
King Hussein of Jordan rightly argues that despite the fact that both 
Zionists and Palestinians rejected the White Paper of 1939 the 
Palestinians appeared in the Western media as solely responsible for the 
fa il ure of the plan: "The Zion i sts 1 i kewi se, fought it tooth and na i 1 , 
but in the eyes of the Western World it was the Palestinian Arabs who 
had thwarted the Plan.,,3 
There is no doubt that the Palestinians were prepared to accept the 
Jewish minority living in Palestine and allow them to be represented in 
its government. The Palestinians expressed such views on several 
occasions and their attitude towards the Jewish community was expressed 
in their written proposals for solving the problem. "The Arabs are 
irrevocably opposed to political Zionism but in no way hostile to the 
Jews as such, nor to their Jewish fellow citizens. Those Jews who have 
already legally entered Palestine will be full citizens of the 
Palestinian state enjoying full civil and political rights and a fair 
share in government and administration.,,4 
It seems that although the Palestinians were in principle prepared to 
accept the presence of a Jewish minority they failed to convince the 
British Government of their real intention. 5 however, this was not the 
main reason which prevented both sides from reaching a lasting 
settlement. Rather British interests, their concern about the security 
of the Jewish community and the uncompromising Zionist demands for an 
open Palestine for unlimited Jewish immigration and land sales were the 
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main reasons behind the failure of the British, the Arabs and the 
settlers to reach an agreement, as I will show in this Chapter. The 
Palestinian divisions and lack of experience in political negotiations, 
however, played into the hands of the Zionists and contributed to the 
misunderstanding of the Palestinians' position. 
It is worth while to mention here that the security of Israel, her 
racist policy on immigration represented in the so called "law of 
return" which gives exclusive right to every Jew in the world to 
immigrate to "Israel", her expansionist policies, such as her insistence 
on annexing Arab territories occupied in the 1948 War or in subsequent 
wars with the Arabs, such as East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and 
her refusal to recognize the right of the Palestinians to 
self-determination still continue as the main obstacles in the way of 
reaching a lasting settlement to the Palestine conflict. 
However, the inability of the Palestinians to develop a clear and 
coherent policy toward a final settlement and their failure to accept 
the U.N. resolutions in regard to the problem as a whole, still play 
into the hands of "Israel" and give her the required excuses to continue 
her occupation of the occupied Arab territories in defiance of the U.N. 
Resolutions in this respect and without much criticism from world public 
opinion. In this sense there is a similarity between the Arab and the 
Zionist position and tactics of the 1930s and the present position and 
tactics of the Palestinians and "Israel." And until the Arabs overcome 
this rigidity in the way of handling this problem, it is not expected 
that they will be able to get the required international support which 
is needed to pressure "Israel" to recognize their rights. 
This Chapter will be divided into three sections: 
1. The Partition Proposals 
The British Government, in the middle of the 1930s, came to the 
conclusion that the differences between Arabs and Zionist were 
irreconcilable and, therefore, they dramatically changed their approach 
to solving the conflict by proposing partition. The new approach was 
based on the argument that if Palestinians and Jews could not agree to 
share the government of Palestine, the best thing to do was to divide 
Palestine between them. 6 
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Faced with a full scale Revolt by the Palestinians and political 
opposition from the Arab states, the British Government found themselves 
in an awkward position. Britain was forced to choose between (a) her 
continuing to support Zionist settlement and risking her vital strategic 
and economic interests in the Arab countries and (b) abandoning the 
"Jewish Horne" venture and facing a world outcry if those settlers faced 
threats and danger from the Arabs. We must remember that one of the 
reasons which was used to justify Britain's decision to sponsor Zionist 
settlement was humane consideration, namely to save them from 
persecution in Europe. If Britain quit Palestine and those settlers 
faced any threat, Britain would be morally responsible before the entire 
world for their safety. 
Against this background Britain attempted to solve the conflict in a 
way which could, as they say, kill two birds with one stone. The new 
idea was partition. The partition proposals therefore were advanced to 
serve the interests of the British and the settlers at the expense of 
the native population. Partition would give the settlers part of 
Palestine to be recognized as a Jewish state which would be guaranteed 
by the international community and not by Britain alone. Britain in this 
case would be relieved from the future responsibility for the security 
of the settlers. On the other hand Britain could claim that in return 
for such a Jewish state the Palestinians would not only be freed from 
the fear of Zionist domination but also they would gain their 
independence in part of their country. Britain too could sell this idea 
to the Arab states by telling them that the Zionists would be confined 
to a small area which would not form any threat to the rest of the Arab 
countries and if they accepted it British interests in these countries 
would be secured. 
It can be argued therefore that the Partition proposals were not 
intended to serve the interests of the native population but rather to 
secure the interests of the colonial power and the security and the 
well-being of the Zionist settlers as we will see in this Chapter. 
The Palestinians opposed partition on political and economical 
grounds. While partition gave the settler minority the right to 
establish their own state it denied the Palestinians a similar right. 
The Palestinians argued that the number of settlers (about 29 %) and the 
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size of the land they acquired (about 5 %) did not justify the partition 
of their country. On the other hand, partition was rejected by the 
Zionists because it did not give them what they wanted. They hoped to 
form a majority very soon and expected to control the whole country. 
Against this background the British Government abandoned partition and 
instead they called upon both sides to hold a conference to discuss the 
conflict and to try to find a solution which would be acceptable to both 
sides. 
2. London Conference7 
As an alternative solution to Partition, Britain called upon Arabs and 
Jews to hold a round table conference in London in February 1939. The 
British Government, on the eve of World War Two, was desperate to find a 
solution to the Palestine conflict and for the first time she appeared 
willing to recognize the legitimate rights of the native majority 
provided that this would guarantee the rights and the security of the 
settlers minority. 
But suspicion and mutual mistrust prevented the Arabs and the British 
from reaching an agreement. The Palestinians insisted, with reason, that 
a fixed date must be set for independence while the British insisted on 
a provisional ten year period after which, in the light of Arab-Zionist 
understanding, independence would be granted or not. When the London 
conference did not succeed in solving the problem, the British 
Government announced its own policy on the future of Palestine in a 
White Paper. 
3. The White Paper of 19398 
The main features of that policy were the establishment of a National 
Government in Palestine after ten years, the acceptance of only 75,000 
new Jewish immigrants in the first five years and no further immigration 
without the agreement of the Palestinians. 
The significance of the White Paper lies in the fact that the British 
Government recognized the right of the Palestinian majority to the 
establishment of a unitary independent state with the Arabs in the 
majority and limiting the settlers to a permanent minority. The 
Palestinians, however, failed to exploit the opportunity to secure a 
written agreement with the British Government, a thing which they 
regretted in 1947 when they realised the significance of such 
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recognition. Despite the fact that the only difference between the Arabs 
and Britain was over a fixed date for independence and that the Arabs 
had accepted most of the principles embodied in the White Paper, 
officially it was announced that they rejected it. Their position was 
not different from that of the Zionists who saw in the White Paper the 
curtailing of the "Jewish Hornell and declared that they would fight it 
with every mean at their disposal. 
The British Government, however, announced that she was going to 
implement the policy regardless of Arab and Zionist reaction. But the 
policy was never completely implemented and thus the conflict continued 
through the 1940s, as we will see in the next chapters. 
First I am going to discuss the partition proposals and the 
Palestinian responses to them. 
1. The Partition Proposals and the Palestinian Responses to them9 
The Peel Commission was sent to Palestine to inquire into the causes 
of the Palestinian General Strike of 1936. Its terms of reference were 
to inquire into the manner in which the Mandate for Palestine was being 
implemented in relation to the obligations of the Mandatory Power 
towards the Palestinians and Jews, and to investigate any legitimate 
grievances from both sides. lO 
The Commission arrived in Palestine on November 11th 1936 and stayed 
about three months. In the light of their study of the causes of events 
in Palestine since World War One and after their examination of the 
evidence, submitted to them by British, Jewish and Palestinian 
representatives and witnesses, they stated that the underlying causes 
for the 1936 Strike were: ll 
a. The desire of the Palestinians for national independence. 
b. Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National 
home. 
The Commissioners made the following comments on these two "underlying 
causes ll : 
1. That these were the underlying causes which brought about the 
disturbances of 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933. 
2. That the two causes were interlinked. 
The Commission pOinted out that the Balfour Declaration and the 
Mandate involved the denial of national independence at the outset for 
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the Palestinians. In their view, the subsequent growth of the Jewish 
National Home created a practical obstacle and the only serious one, to 
the attainment later of National Independence. It was believed that: 
"Its further growth might mean the political as well as economic 
subjection of the Arabs to the Jews so that, if ultimately the Mandate 
should be terminated and Palestine become independent, it would not be 
national independence in the Arab sense, but self-government by a Jewish 
majori ty. 1112 
3. They were the only underlying causes and all the other factors were 
complementary or subsidiary, aggravating the two causes or helping to 
determine the time at which the disturbances broke out. 
The other factors may be summarized as follows: 
a. The effect on Palestinian opinion of the attainment of National 
Independence by other Arabs states such as Iraq, Egypt and Syria. 
b. The high figures of Jewish immigration from 1933 onwards gravely 
accentuated Palestinian fears of Jewish domination over Palestine. 
c. The Palestinians believed that the Zionists had greater influence 
on the London Government, which enabled them to get their way by means 
denied to the Palestinians. This belief was based on the status of the 
Jewish Agency both in London and Jerusalem, and was greatly strengthened 
by Mr. MacDonald's letter to Dr. Weizmann in 1931 and the debates in 
Parliament on the legislative council in 1936 which led to the 
abrogation of that idea. 
d. The growth of Palestinian distrust of the British ability or will 
to carry out their promises to the Arabs dated back to 1915-1916 
(Hussein-MacMahon Agreement, see Chapter Two). 
e. Palestinian alarm at the continued purchase of Palestinian land. 
f. The general uncertainty and ambiguity of certain phrases in the 
Mandate as the ultimate intentions of the Mandatory Government. 
After a detailed study of the operation of the Palestine Mandate from 
its inception to 1936, the Peel Commission recommended that the Mandate 
should be abolished because it carried contradictory obligations to both 
Arabs and Jews. This was a new type of analysis of the Palestine 
conflict. All previous analyses of the conflict had assumed that the two 
undertakings were reconcilable. In the Commission's view: 
"The application of the Mandate system into Palestine implied the 
belief that the obligation thus undertaken towards the Arabs and the 
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Jews respectively would prove in course of time to be mutually 
compatible owing to the conciliatory effect on the Palestinian Arabs of 
the material prosperity which Jewish immigration would bring to 
Palestine as a whole." The Commission concluded: "that belief has not 
been justified and we see no hope of its being justified in the 
future. "13 
The Commission pOinted out that to allow Jewish immigration to 
continue in the hope that it might ultimately lead to a Jewish majority 
and the creation of a Jewish state in all Palestine, "Would clearly 
violate the spirit and intention of the Mandate System."14 The 
Commission explained that such a course of action would mean that 
National self-determination had been withheld when the Palestinians were 
a majority in Palestine and only conceded when the Jews became a 
majority. "It would mean that the Arabs had been denied the opportunity 
of standing by themselves, that they had in fact, after an interval of 
conflict, been bartered about from Turkish sovereignty to Jewish 
sovereignty."IS 
The Commission argued that the recognition of the Jews' right to 
immigrate to Palestine did not give them the right to rule the 
Palestinians against their will in Palestine. "The international 
recognition of the right of the Jews to return to their old home-land 
did not involve the recognition of the right of the Jews to govern the 
Arabs in it against their will."16 
It is perhaps interesting to notice here how the Commission 
deliberately used misleading phrases such as "the right of the Jews to 
return to their old home-land" in their referring to Zionist settlement 
which, as I showed in Chapter One and Two, was not different from other 
white settlement elsewhere in Asia or Africa. Although the British 
Commission knew that the majority of the settlers had no physical 
connection with Palestine they used such misleading phrases to distort 
the facts about the nature of their support for Zionist settlement in 
Palestine. 
The Commission also argued that the obligation to the Palestinians to 
develop in Palestine self-government and the obligation to the Jews to 
develop a Jewish national home were in conflict. The Commission pOinted 
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out that they expected these two obligations would continue to conflict 
in the future. "The trouble is that they have proved irreconcilable and 
as far ahead as we can see, they must continue to conflict. We cannot 
both concede the Arab claim to self-government and secure the 
establishment of the Jewish national home. And this conflict between the 
two obligations is the more unfortunate because each of them, taken 
separately, accords with British sentiment and British interests."Il 
The Commission pointed out that the crown colony type of government 
was not suitable to govern "educated Palestinians and democratic Jews" 
nor was it acceptable to the British people to govern Palestinians 
against their will. "The task of governing without the consent or even 
the acquiescence of the governed is one for which we believe the British 
people have little heart."IB 
The Commission findings, however, were in conformity with the 
Palestinians' point of view. The Palestinians made it clear from the 
outset that the matter was not related to economic or material benefits, 
but rather it was a matter of identity, future, and life or death. "It 
is one of life and death to the Arabs in that it results in the transfer 
of their country to other hands and the loss of their nationality."19 
Under the terms of the Mandate the British Government allowed 
thousands of European Jewish immigrants to enter Palestine and to 
establish their own community. The introduction of European Jewish 
settlers had the effect of transforming Palestine into a plural society 
consisting of two hostile communities - the Palestinian natives and the 
Zionist European settlers. 
According to plural society theories, conflict between the two 
distinctive communities was inevitable. The Commission's Report agrees 
with this fundamental finding of the pluralism theory, as I have 
exp 1 a i ned inCh apter One. The Commi ss i on reported th at: "An 
irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national Communities ... 
About 1,000,000 Arabs are in strife, open or latent, with some 400,000 
Jews. 1120 The report goes on to say that there was no hope for these two 
Communities to live in peace together because they had nothing in 
common. "There is no common ground between them, the Arab Community 
predominantly Asiatic in character, the Jewish Community pre-dominantly 
European. They differ in religion and language. Their cultural and 
social life, their ways of thought and conduct are as incompatible as 
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their national aspirations."21 The Commission, however, did not consider 
the conflict between Zionists and Palestinians as a new phenomenon but 
rather it "was inherent in the situation from the outset. The terms of 
the Mandate tended to confirm it."22 
The British Government actually did not make any serious effort to 
bring the two Communities together. Rather they left the matter to each 
Community to develop its own political, social, educational and 
economical institutions and to speak its own language. This led the 
differences between the two Communities to grow wider, and polarized the 
conflict between Palestinians or Arabs against Zionist settlers or Jews. 
The Commission pointed out that "for internal and external reasons it 
seems possible that the situation as it now is, will grow worse. The 
conflict will go on. The gulf between Arabs and Jews will widen."23 
If the Mandate proved to be unworkable how could the Commission solve 
the conflict? It was faced with two demands: the complete independence 
of the Palestinians and the continuation of the development of the 
Jewish national home under the protection of the Mandate. Who was going 
to govern Palestine? The Commission states the problem as: "Manifestly, 
the problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or the Jews all 
they want. The answer to the question which of them in the end will 
govern Palestine? must surely be neither."24 
The Commission saw only one way out of the dilemma to divide Palestine 
between Jews, British and Transjordan. The Commission however, did not 
work out a detailed scheme of Partition, but in order to make their 
proposals concrete enough to serve as a basis for consideration, they 
presented a plan together with a map indicating suggested boundaries. 
According to the plan Palestine was to be divided into three regions. 25 
1. A Jewish state, including the coastal region of Palestine from a 
point midway between Gaza and Jaffa to Megiddo in the valley of 
Esdraelon including Galilee, the area which was mainly inhabited and 
owned by Arabs. 
2. British enclaves under permanent Mandate which would include 
Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Ludda and Ramleh and a corridor to the sea at 
Jaffa, and one including Nazareth. 
3. The rest of Palestine would be attached to Transjordan to form an 
Arab state. 
According to the Partition scheme, the population in these three areas 
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would be as follows: 
The Arab state would contain 485,000 Arabs and 7,200 Jews, while the 
Jewish state was going to contain 309,900 Jews and almost the same 
number of Arabs, 294,700. The third part, the British enclaves would 
contain 221,400 Arabs against 80,200 Jews mainly living in the new 
Jerusalem. 
In regard to land ownership the Palestinians owned 19,580,000 donums 
in the area allocated to the Arab state, while the Jews owned only 
92,000 donums in that area. 
In the area allocated to the Jewish state the Palestinians owned 3854, 
700 donums (75 percent) against 1,140,000 donums owned by Jews. 
In Jerusalem and Nasareth enclaves (British Mandated area) the 
Palestinians owned 1,504,000 donums against 78,000 dunums owned by Jews. 
The following table is a summary for the above figures. 
Popul at ion 
Land 
population 
land 
Arab State Jewish State 
Arabs Jews 
485,200 7200 
19,580,000 92,000 
Jews 
309,900 
1,140,000 
British Mandated areas (Enclaves) 
Arabs 
221,400 
1,504,600 
Jews 
80,000 
78,000 
Arabs 
294,700 
3,854,700 
In the light of the main facts which emerge from these figures one 
cannot avoid questioning the wisdom of dividing Palestine if Partition 
could not solve the problem of domination either by Arabs over Jews or 
vice versa. 
As the Arab Office explains: 26 "Having stated some of the fundamental 
principles of the problem the Commission failed to draw the logical 
conclusion from them. It ended by recommending the Partition of 
Palestine into Jewish and Arab states: a scheme which whatever its 
merits or demerits had no connection with the analysis contained in the 
report. II 
The first question to arise here is why did the Commission not 
recommend Partition on the lines of land and people segregation? The 
second question is why did they not recommend the establishment of a 
Palestinian state instead of attaching the rest of Palestine to 
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Transjordan? And finally why did they not recommend independence for 
Palestine as a unitary state? 
The answer to the first question is simple. The Commissioners 
interested themselves in two main things, first, the security of the 
Zionist settler community, mainly European like themselves; secondly, 
the prosperity and free development of their economic enterprise, also 
European-style. These two considerations took priority over the rights 
and wishes of the Palestinians, a colonized population, who appeared to 
be the victims of such colonialist attitudes and prejudices. The 
Commission suggested the establishment of the Jewish state not only on 
lands owned by Jews but also on land mainly owned by Palestinians after 
the compulsory transfer of its occupants. Their aim for suggesting a 
compulsory transfer was to secure the establishment of a self-supporting 
and secure Jewish state, doing away with the wishes and rights of the 
colonized population. 
The answer to the second question lies in the fact that Amir Abdullah 
of Transjordan was willing to accept the throne of such a state, while 
the Palestinians were not expected to accept the Partition scheme. The 
British feared, as "Israel" does today, that an independent Palestinian 
state under the leadership of nationalist leadership would be not only 
host il e to Bri ta in (or today to "I srae 1") but also woul d cont i nue to 
create security problems to the newly created Jewish state. On the 
contrary the unification of the rest of Palestine with Transjordan and 
under the rule of a pro-British ruler would make such Palestinian 
hostility ineffective. 
The answer to the third question is obvious. 
The Commission did not recommend independence for Palestine in order 
to avoid putting the Zionist settlers, a Westernized community, under 
the rule of a Palestinian majority. The Commission argued that to put 
the Jewish Community under Arab rule would hinder the free development 
of their modern European economic system and would put their security at 
risk. The Commission explained the very special relationship between the 
Jewish community in Palestine and Britain. They pointed out that Britain 
could not simply quit Palestine, because it had moral obligations and a 
responsibility towards the security and development of the Jewish 
national home. As the Commission put it: "It was not possible to argue 
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that since the home has been established we can honourably cease to 
interest ourselves in its security. There are 400,000 Jews in Palestine. 
They have come there not only with our permission but with our 
encouragement. We are answerable within reason for their welfare. We 
cannot in the present state of affairs abandon them to the good 
intentions of Arab government." 27 
It is worth mentioning here that this statement could furnish a good 
reply to those Zionists who claim that Zionist settlement in Palestine 
was different from other white settlement and colonization in Africa and 
elsewhere, since it did not depend on military occupations nor did it 
depend on any government assistance or protection. For example, 
Wedgwood, a British MP, argued in the House of Commons that "We see in 
the Jewish colonization of Palestine something quite different, 
something of which everyone in the House can approve." 28 
The previous British statement, however, indicates clearly that 
Zionist settlement was dependent on British protection and would not 
have happened without the British military occupation of Palestine and 
Britain's open commitment to the Zionist Movement to develop such a 
"Jewish Hornell in the country. The notion that Zionist settlement in 
Palestine was different from other white settlement elsewhere was 
intended to disassociate Zionist colonization from the hated Western 
colonization in the 19th century. It seems though that the type of 
relationship between the Zionist settlers and Britain was not so 
important as the impact of this Zionist settlement on the Palestinian 
community. In this sense it seems that Zionist settlement had a similar 
impact on Palestinian society to that of the white settlement of South 
Africa as we have seen in Chapter One. 
The important issue here is not whether we call Zionist settlement 
colonialism, settler-colonialism or just settlement, rather the 
important thing here is, in my view, how did the natives perceive it and 
how did it affect their lives. According to Rodinson, with whom I agree, 
the Palestinians rejected foreign settlement and occupation of their 
country, regardl ess of what it was ca 11 ed. liThe Arabs rejected forei gn 
occupation of their territory whether we choose to classify this 
h 1 . l' t .. 29 p enomenon as co onla lsm or no . 
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The Commission's second main concern was the free development of the 
Zionist Westernised economic system. The Commission regarded the Zionist 
economic system as a European model in the middle of Backward Arab 
countries. Such a modern system must be left to prosper and continue its 
links with the rest of the developed World. 
The Commission argued that: "It was not only a question of humanity. We 
have tried to show that the national home is essentially a European 
institution, modern and on its economic side especially, intimately 
linked with the outer world." The Commission goes on to cast doubts 
about the Arabs' ability to handle such advanced economic system. The 
Commission argues that: "The national home with its peculiar and 
delicate economic constitution cannot prosper under a government (Arab) 
which had little experience of modern capitalism and is not fully 
acquainted with financial and commercial problems on a wide scale.,,30 
The commission justified partition on the grounds that it: "Offers 
each (community) what its wants most, namely freedom and security. It 
means that the Arabs must acquiescence in the exclusion from their 
sovereignty of a piece of territory, long occupied and once ruled by 
them. It means that Jews must be content with less than the land of 
Israel they once ruled and hoped to rule again."31 
This is another example of misleading statements which contributed to 
the misunderstanding about the nature of the conflict between the native 
Arabs and the Zionist settlers. 
Although it has been established in Chapter Two, that not every Jew in 
the world is essentially a descendent of the the earlier Hebrews and 
that the majority of the settlers were Polish, Russian or West European, 
the Commission gives the impression that those settlers had ruled 
Palestine before and "hoped to rule it again." The truth of the matter 
is that the majority of the settlers had never been to Palestine nor did 
they have any physical relation with the country. Partition was 
recommended because it would have given the Zionist settlers what they 
wanted. First, they would be free from Arab majority rule and 
consequently they could bring in as many immigrants as they wanted; 
secondly, partition would give them security, since the Palestinian 
territory allocated to the proposed Jewish state would be handed over to 
them after removing its Palestinian owners from it, as suggested by 
partition. 
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In contrast, partition would have given Palestinians neither freedom 
nor security. Partition deprived the Palestinians of their basic freedom 
and right to establish a Palestinian state. Palestine was to be divided 
between British, Jews and Transjordan. Moreover according to the 
Partition proposal about 300,000 Palestinian peasants would be 
compulsorily transfered to uncertain areas with an uncertain future and 
deprived of their basic right to their land and property. According to 
the Partition scheme there would not have been a Palestinian state to 
look after the Palestinians welfare and therefore, Partition did not 
offer any security to the whole of the Palestinian community and in 
particular to those who would be obliged to move out of their only means 
of living, their land and homes. 
The British Government, however, accepted the Royal Commission's 
Partition scheme and published the report together with a statement of 
policy which expressed the view that the British Government "are driven 
to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the 
aspirations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations 
cannot be satisfied under the terms of the Mandate, and that a scheme of 
Partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents 
the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock." 32 
The Partition scheme was rejected by both Palestinians and Zionists 
alike for different reasons on each side. First I will present the 
Palestinian responses. 
Palestinian Responses to Partition 
The Partition scheme was a severe blow to the hopes of many 
Palestinian who expected the Commission to recommend independence for 
Palestine. The Palestinian leaders, surprised by the Partition scheme, 
found themselves unable to give an immediate response. If they accepted 
Partition they would appear traitors and would be accused of betraying 
the national cause. Such action would mean their denunciation and 
condemnation, not only in Palestine but throughout most of the Arab 
countries. Their lives could be in danger and they might have been 
killed. In rejecting the plan on the other hand, and without consulting 
the Arab states, they would be isolated and deprived from some Arab 
states' support. 
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As might be expected in such circumstances the Palestinians appeared 
divided on partition. Some of them, the so called "moderates" announced 
their readiness to enter negotiations with Amir Abdullah of Transjordan 
to establish the proposed Arab state. The other party, the so called 
"extremists" rejected Partition and in the end their view prevailed. 
according to Hussein, the present King of Jordan. "The so-called 
moderate leadership amongst the Palestinian Arabs accepted the plan and 
even initiated talks with king Abdullah for its implementation. The 
extremist elements within the Palestinian leadership rejected it 
outright and since they possessed the gun, their counsel prevailed."33 
The Palestinians, faced with this difficult situation, appealed to the 
Arab and Moslem world for help and advice. They explained the 
Palestinian position as losing their homes, lands, and identity. Their 
appea 1 goes on to say: "The Arab people in Palest i ne beg your Majest i es 
to give them your support and advice in these very difficult critical 
and historical circumstances. They demand of you in the name of this 
Holy Country, the honour of the Arab nation and your religious duties to 
work for the aim of saving this country from the evils of imperialism, 
Judaism and division."34 
The Arab states also appeared divided on the issue. Therefore, they 
sent sympathetic replies to the Palestinian's appeal but rather cautious 
ones. The notable exception, apart from Syria, was Iraq. The Prime 
Minister, Sayyid Sulayman, in a statement to the press, called upon the 
Arab people to defend the rights of the Palestinians and to condemn the 
proposals to create an Arab state smaller than the whole of Palestine. 
He even warned any person who might accept the rule of such a state that 
they might be denounced throughout the Arab and Moslem worlds: "Any 
person venturing to agree to act as head of such a state would be 
regarded as an outcast throughout the Arab world, and would incur the 
wrath of Muslims allover the East. I declare, both as a head of an Arab 
government and as 
individual ready to 
the rulership of the 
a Private citizen that I should always oppose any 
stab the Arab race to the heart in order to secure 
d t t 1135 propose new s a e. 
This threat perhaps was directed to Amir Abdullah of Transjordan who, 
according to Hussein, believed that lithe Zionist thrust and avalanche 
could have been blunted but not entirely thwarted. "36 Abdullah's thesis 
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was that the best safeguard for Arab land from the Zionist design of 
expansion would be an undivided sovereign state with an Arab majority, a 
guaranteed status for the Jews, with autonomous administration in their 
areas and proportional representation in the national government and a 
treaty with Britain. But as a result of rivalry and division among the 
Arabs his plan was rejected on the Arab side. The Zionist rejected it 
too. 37 
It is important to mention here that Hussein, the present king of 
Jordan has faced the same dilemma. The king believed that the best 
safeguards to the Arab interest is in reaching a negotiated settlement 
with "Israel ". According to King Hussein it is possible to exchange the 
Arab occupied territory for peace with Israel. In February 1985 he 
concluded an agreement,38 with some moderate Palestinians from the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) to explore this possibility. 
Just as Arab divisions and rivalries prevented Abdullah from reaching 
agreement with the Zionists in the 1930s, these Arab divisions and 
rivalries still hinder and frustrate king Hussein's effort to find a 
solution to the present Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Nevertheless, Arab nationalism did not stop at the frontiers of 
Palestine. The Arab Higher Committee sent a memorandum to the High 
Commissioner, the Colonial Secretary and the Permanent Mandate 
Commission. 39 Their demands were: 
1. The recognition of the Arab's right to complete independence in 
their own land. 
2. The cessation of the experiment of a Jewish national home. 
3. The cessation of the British Mandate and the substitution for it of 
a treaty with Britain according to which Palestine would be recognized 
as a sovereign state. 
4. The immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and land sales 
pending the negotiation of such a treaty. 
They also stressed that the strategiC interests of Britain and the 
rights of the Jewish minority would be guaranteed. 
On the other hand, Arab opinion had been mobilized throughout the Arab 
world. Partition had evoked a note from the Syrian Government to the 
. f t·t· b French Authorities expressing the unanimous condemnatlon 0 par 1 lon y 
all parties in Syria, mass demonstrations in Baghdad, a one-day strike 
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in the Holy Cities of Hijjaz, a protest from the Muslim Youth of Tunis 
to the British Consul, numerous demonstration in India and a declaration 
against partition by the President of the All-India Muslim League. 40 
Elsewhere the agitation largely took the form of pressure on the 
Egyptian Government to reject Partition. In a speech to the League of 
Nations, the Egyptian Foreign Minister asserted that partition was 
contrary both to previous British promises to Arabs and to the Article 
(22) of the League Covenant upon which the Mandate depended. 41 
Other objections to Partition come from the British House of Lords 
when the issue was brought before them for debate. 42 It was, however, 
agreed that the Government should seek the approval of the League of 
Nations before drafting a scheme for Partition and before submitting it 
to the House of Commons for approval. 
The Permanent Mandate Commission also objected to the partition scheme 
for two reasons: 
1. That the area allocated to the Jewish state was not large enough to 
establish a self-supporting state;43 and 
2. That the Commission did not agree to transfer a substantial number 
of Palestinian peasants from their homes and lands. The Commission 
stressed that "Any solution, to prove acceptable, should therefore 
deprive the Arabs of as small a number as possible of the places to 
which they attach particular value either because they are their present 
homes or for reasons of religion.,,44 
Between 8th and lOth of September 1937 a Pan-Arab conference was held 
at Bludan in Syria. It attracted delegates from the neighbouring Arab 
states. 45 The Conference declared in its resolutions that Palestine was 
an inseparable part of the Arab countries. They demanded the immediate 
cessation of Jewish immigration to Palestine and the establishment of a 
Palestinian national government in treaty relations with Britain. The 
Conference warned Britain against its Partition policy and hinted that 
the Arabs might seek a new alliance to protect their rights. 46 
In October the 
warfare campaign 
administration in 
Government i tse 1 f 
Palestinian rebellion was resumed and a guerrilla 
was started against the British troops and 
Palestine. And by the end of 1937 the British 
began to doubt the viability of Partition, 
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particularly in view of the renewal of the Palestinian Rebellion, the 
Arab states' opposition, Parliament and League of Nations objections, 
Zionist rejection and finally the Munich crisis in Europe. The first 
sign of a British intention to abandon partition appeared in December 
1937 when the British Government announced its rejection to the Royal 
Commission proposal for the compulsory transfer of land and 
population. 47 More significant was the Foreign Secretary's Memorandum 
which explained the dangers of the Partition policy to British interests 
in the area. If a major war should start Britain would need the 
cooperation of the Arab world. 
The document argued that the policy of Partition and the subjection of 
the Palestinian people to "alien and dangerous invaders" faced serious 
opposition from the Arab countries. The document went on to say: 
"It has been suggested to me that there is only one way in which we can 
now make peace with the Arabs and avoid any danger, that is, by giving 
the Arabs some assurances that the Jews will neither become a majority 
in Palestine nor be given any Palestinian territory in full sovereignty. 
We should go a long way towards recovering the confidence and friendship 
of the middle Eastern states and greatly strengthen our moral and 
political position in that vital area by re-establishing peace with the 
Arab world and fulfilling our objection to the Jews by the establishment 
of a fixed numerical proportion between the two races." The Foreign 
Secretary warned that failure to do so "would not only involve the 
British Government in continuing military commitment of a far reaching 
character in Palestine itself but also would bring on Britain the 
permanent hostility of all the Arab and Muslim powers in the middle 
East.,,48 
Zionist Responses to Partition 
The Zionist attitude was revealed in the resolution of the twentieth 
Zionist congress held at Zurich on the 3rd of August 1937. The following 
are among the main resolutions: 49 
1. The Conference expressed the view that the Zionists had understood 
at the time of the Balfour Declaration that the Jewish national home was 
to be established in the whole of historic Palestine including 
Transjordan, and the possibility of the evolution of Palestine into a 
Jewish state. 
2. The Congress rejected the Peel Commission's view that the Mandate 
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was not workable and demanded its fulfilment. The Congress also rejected 
the Commission's conclusion that the national aspirations of the Jews 
and Arabs were irreconcilable. The Congress argued that the British 
Government should take more severe measures against the Arabs in order 
to force them to accept Zionist settlement and the gradual 
transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state. Therefore, "The 
Congress declares that the scheme of Partition put forward by the Royal 
Commission is unacceptable." SO 
It is important to stress here that the Zionist rejection of the 
partition scheme played a significant role in the abandonment of the 
scheme by the British Government. For example Nahum Goldman, a key 
member of the World Zionist Congress, believed that the Zionist 
rejection of Partition was the main factor in the British decision not 
to implement Partition in Palestine. He argues that: "If there has been 
a tragedy in the history of Zionism it is the fact that largely through 
our fault, Partition was not put into effect the first time it was 
suggested in 1937.,,51 Goldman argues that "If the Zionist movement had 
accepted the proposals then, spontaneously and without delay, it is 
quite conceivable that it might have been implemented." S2 
I do agree with Goldman that if the Zionists had accepted partition the 
British Government might have implemented it. This is true because the 
wishes of the Arabs had never been taken into account in regard to the 
British policy in Palestine. We must remember that the whole Mandate 
system was designed to serve British and Zionist interests and was 
carried out against the will of the natives. Clear support for such a 
view came ten years later when a similar scheme was approved by the U.N. 
because it was accepted by the Zionists, despite bitter opposition from 
the Arabs, as I will show in Chapter Eight. 
The important thing here is that, despite the fact that Zionist 
oPposition to Partition was no less than Palestinian opposition, King 
Hussein rightly believes that the Palestinians were held responsible for 
the failure of Partition. liThe Zionist leadership, unhappy that their 
ground design of expansion would be blunted, left it to the Arabs to 
d · th' h d ,,53 bear the onus of rejection. The Arabs almost playe lnto elr an s. 
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Indeed the Zionist anticipation of Arab reactions constituted a basic 
pillar in their calculations and decision-making. As Hussein put it "If 
the Arab leadership was always willing to play the Zionist game, out of 
ignorance, zealotry, over-confidence, complacency or even misguided 
selfishness, why should the Zionist leadership be the party to say 
no?"54 
It seems to me that if the Arabs' rejection of the Partition scheme in 
1937 played into the hands of the Zionists the more recent rejection of 
some Arab states and Palestinian leaders to the Jordanian- Palestinian 
Agreement of February 1985, to exchange land for peace, also plays into 
the hands of the Israelis. "Israel" appears in the eyes of the Western 
World as the peace loving country surrounded by aggressive Arab states. 
This image helps "Israel" to continue her occupation of the Arab 
territories, occupied during her wars with the Arabs since 1948, such as 
Western Galilee, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the 
Golan heights, until the present day, to drain more economic, political 
and military support from the United States and Europe, which is 
necessary to keep up its military superiority over the Arab States. 55 
Nevertheless, as a result of the opposition of the Palestinians, the 
Arabs and the Zionists, the British Government started during the year 
1938 to question the viability of Partition and later to abandon the 
whole idea. 
The Abandonment of Partition 
Despite the fact that both Arabs and Jews had rejected the Partition 
scheme, proposed by the Royal Commission, the British Government 
announced on 23 December, 1937 that a Technical Commission 56 would be 
appointed to draw up a more precise scheme of Partition. The terms of 
reference provided that the Commission should recommend boundaries for 
the proposed Arab and Jewish area which would: 57 
a. afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, with 
adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States; 
b. necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs and Arab 
enterprises in the Jewish State and vice versa. 
The Commission arrived 
until 3rd August 1938. The 
1938 announced that they 
in Palestine on 27th April and stayed there 
report of the Commission published in October 
had not been able to find any practical plan 
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for Partition which fulfilled these terms of reference. The Commission 
announced that: "If we were to adhere strictly to our terms of reference 
we would have no alternative but to report that we are unable to 
recommend boundaries to form self-supporting Arab and Jewish States." 58 
The Commission demonstrated that if the Peel scheme was accepted, the 
Jewish state would have a population of 304,900 Jews and 294,700 Arabs, 
or an Arab minority of 49 percent of the population; and secondly, that 
the Arabs would possess more than three times as much land as the Jews 
in the Jewish state. The Zionist settlers would possess only 1,140,200 
donums of land while the Palestinians would retain 3,854,700 donums. In 
the Arab State there would be only a small number of Jews, about 7,200 
out of a total population of 492,000, holding an even smaller proportion 
of land, 37,000 donums out of a total of 7,064,900 donums. 59 (The Negeb 
region was excluded). 
The Commission examined the possibility of voluntary transfer of 
population which was not ruled out. They concluded that a voluntary 
exchange of land and population between the Arab and Jewish State was 
not possible because, according to the Commission, "it is in any event 
improbable that the Arab cultivators would be prepared to migrate in 
.. 
order to create space for Jews. The Arabs look upon Jews as foreigners 
invading their country."60 
In addition to Arab opposition, the inequality of inhabitants and land 
involved in the suggested transfer from each side, there were the 
following reasons: 61 
1. Even on an optimistic basis it was not likely that many 
Palestinians would be transferred from the proposed Jewish State because 
there was not enough land ready for their resettlement and even if it 
were possible to make land available for them it was unlikely that the 
Palestinians would be willing to leave their homeland and start life 
afresh in a new area. 62 
2. The lands which they would be called upon to leave constituted the 
most fertile and best watered part of Palestine, while the lands on 
which they would be invited to settle were situated in arid tracts with 
scanty and uncertain rainfall. 
3. Galilee should not be included in the Jewish State for three 
reasons: 
a. The inhabitants were almost entirely Palestinians and the land was 
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almost entirely owned by Palestinians. 
b. The Palestinians living there were vehemently opposed to the 
inclusion of Galilee in the proposed Jewish State and would resist such 
inclusion by force. 
c. If Palestinian resistance were effectively crushed, the 
pacification would be only temporary and the area would continue to be 
"a running sore" in the body of the proposed Jewish State. 
The Woodhead Commission, in accordance with the principle of racial 
segregation laid down in its terms of reference, was compelled to reject 
the Peel Commission's plan. The Commission argued that the exchange of 
land and population was a fundamental assumption in the Royal 
Commission's Partition scheme. They argued that "If it should appear 
that no such solution can be found the greater part of the case on which 
their plan rests falls to the ground.,,63 
However, the Woodhead Commission produced three alternative plans A, 
B, and C. 64 Plan C, was considered the "best Partition plan we have been 
able to devise.,,65 In any case plan C, reduced the boundaries of the 
proposed Jewish state to a small area, 400 square miles, consisting of a 
narrow strip of coastal area along the Mediterranean. 66 It was clear 
that the Zionists would not accept such a small area since they had 
refused earlier a larger area allocated to them by the Peel Commission 
and the whole report was a good pretext for the British Government to 
cancel the partition scheme. 
It seems to me that was perhaps the right time for the Palestinians to 
play their political game. If the Palestinians had accepted the 
Partition plan C, in theory they could have achieved one out of two 
things: first, if Britain, as a result of Palestinian acceptance imposed 
the plan on the Zionists, which was highly unlikely, that would have 
confined the Jewish state to a limited area and perhaps relieved the 
Secondl Y, l' f rest of Palestine from the Zionist expansionist design. 
Britain could not impose the plan on the Zionists it was probably going 
to cause some damage to the good relations between Britain and the 
Zionists, something which would work to the advantage of the 
Palestinians. They for example would gain more sympathy from the British 
Government and from British and international public opinion. 
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However, I am not suggesting here that the Zionists were right to 
demand to establish a Jewish state in part of Palestine and the 
Palestinians were wrong when they refused the plan, but rather I mean 
that this was the right tactic which the Palestinians should have 
followed. Perhaps the possibility of the establishment of a potential 
expansionist Jewish state was out of the Palestinians' minds. They were 
honest and straight- forward in their thinking and demands and therefore 
there was no room for such political games or tactics even if such 
action could serve their cause. From the outset the Palestinians 
considered the Zionist settlement as illegal and consequently, they in 
principle rejected it. Their leaders publicly announced their position 
and made clear promises that they would never recognize this settlement 
as legal and committed themselves to fight it to the end by all possible 
means. It was inconceivable that they would reverse this declared 
position without losing their credibility and the confidence of their 
people. This is perhaps still true even up to the present moment. In the 
Arab culture it is extremely difficult to retreat from a declared 
opinion or position even in ordinary life. That is perhaps why the Arabs 
are sometimes accused of being rigid in their thinking during 
negotiations. They do not have much room for manoeuvre in their 
negotiations and that is why perhaps many of the Arab leaders prefer 
secret negotiations and appear very sensitive to public opinion and 
media reports. 
It is worth mentioning here that until the present year -1985- the 
Palestinians, as a result of their declared politics and principles are 
still following the same old tactics which events have proved to be 
ineffective. For example, the United States of America has committed 
itself not to talk directly to the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(P.L.D.), even as part of a joint delegation with Jordan, unless the 
P.L.D. recognizes the security council Resolution 242 of 1967. 67 The 
P.L.D., however, refuses to accept Resolution 242 because while the 
Resolution recognizes "Israel" right to exist it does not recognize the 
Palestinians except as refugees, essentially without a country. 
Although their position is understandable but it seems to me that at 
least tactically, if the P.L.D. recognized Resolution 242 it would gain 
recognition from the Americans and the rest of the Western World. Again 
as in the 193Ds, divisions and rivalry not only among the Palestinians 
but also among the Arab states made it difficult for the Palestinians 
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and the Arab leaders to reverse their previous decisions such as no 
negotiations, no recognition, of "Israel" and that Arab occupied 
territories must be liberated by military means. For example if any Arab 
leader called for reversing these decisions people would confront him 
with the this question: Why then he did not do this from the beginning 
and avoid the huge loss of lives, lands and property? or he would be 
accused of being a traitor, puppet to imperialism or simply he had no 
right to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people. 
Such fears of public reaction, in my view, prevent some Arab leaders 
from making some difficult but perhaps necessary decisions, such as the 
recognition of the U.N. resolutions in regard to the conflict, to gain 
international support for Palestinian rights and to put more pressure on 
"Israel" to accept and comply with these resolutions. Such divisions and 
rivalries still provide obstacles up to the present day. 
The year 1938, however, witnessed a full scale Palestinian revolt and 
thousands of British troops were dispatched to the country to suppress 
the revolt. Arab and Muslim public opinion was mobilized in a "World 
Inter Parliamentary Congress of Arab and Muslim countries for the 
defence of Palestine." It was held in Cairo from 7th to 11th of October 
1938. Delegates were present from most of the Arab and Muslim countries 
including: Egypt, Syria, India, China, and Yougoslavia. The resolutions 
which were adopted declared that the Balfour Declaration was null and 
void, that no further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be 
permitted, that no form of Partition should be accepted and that 
Palestine should be maintained as an Arab country. They included demands 
for the establishment of a national government and the termination of 
the Mandate after reaching a treaty relation with Britain. The 
Conference declared that in the event of the non-acceptance of these 
demands, the Arab and Muslim peoples throughout the World would be 
compelled to regard the British attitude as inimical to them and thereby 
forcing the Arabs and the Muslim to adopt a similar attitude, with its 
natural consequences upon political, economic and social relations. 
Against this background the Colonial Secretary, MacDonald, informed 
the British cabinet that: "If Britain were to insist upon Partition of 
Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state, we should forfeit the 
friendship of the Arab World. ,,68 
During the course of discussions Neville Chamberlain stated quite 
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bluntly that Palestine had become a "pan Arab question ", in that the 
issue had to be viewed within the wider context of the Middle East and 
it was agreed that the Woodhead Report would be published together with 
a Government White Paper rejecting Partition. The statement explained 
that after careful study of the Partition Commission Report the British 
Government "Have reached the conclusion that this further examination 
has shown that the political, administrative and financial difficulties 
involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish states 
inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is 
impracticable. 1169 
The statement stressed the British Government's,concern about reaching 
an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews and therefore they "propose 
immediately to invite representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and of 
neighbouring states on the one hand and of the Jewish Agency on the 
other, to confer with them as soon as possible in London to discuss 
Palestine's future policy."70 The Government made it clear that if such 
a Conference failed to produce agreement between the two parties they 
would take their own decision and announce the policy which they 
proposed to pursue. 
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The London Conference71 
The Conference was officially opened by the British Prime Minister 
Chamberlain on 7th February 1939. The Arab representatives, from the 
outset, refused to sit face to face with the Zionist delegation and 
therefore, the British had to hold separate sessions, one with the Arabs 
and another with the Zionists. The Arabs justified their refusal to 
negotiate with the Zionists on the grounds that they had come to London 
to discuss with the British Government as a colonial power the terms of 
their independence from British rule. The British Government therefore 
worked as a party involved in the conflict and at the some time as a 
mediator between Arabs and Zionists. 
For the Palestinians' part, their demands were as they had always 
been. Jamal al Husseini, acting as spokesman for them, demanded the 
abrogation of the Mandate, the establishment of a Palestinian national 
state, the end of the Jewish national home experiment and the creation 
of a sovereign state with treaty relations with Britain. He stressed 
that the Palestinians were ready to negotiate an agreement which would 
safeguard British interests and the right of the Jewish minority in 
Palestine. 72 
The British delegation submitted on 15th February general suggestions 
on immigration, land sales and constitutional measures. Their plan 
involved the establishment of a single Palestinian state after a 
transitional period, continuation of Jewish immigration for a limited 
period and up to an agreed number, in any case the Jews would remain a 
permanent minority in Palestine, and the safeguarding of British and 
Jewish rights and interests in Palestine. 73 
The Zionist delegation rejected these suggestions on the ground that a 
Jewish minority in a Palestinian state would lead to their expulsion 
from the country. Ben Gurion, a Jewish leader, declared that liThe Jews 
would not consider a minority status in a foreign state. And could not 
recognize a law by which the Muffti would have the right to exclude the 
Jews from Palestine." 74 
The Palestinians were anxious about the length of the transitional 
period and demanded the immediate independence of Palestine after 
. h er the British 
securing a treaty with Britain. By this tlme, owev , 
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Government 
Secretary, 
Cabinet in 
had set out a new policy to follow in Palestine. The Colonial 
MacDonald, circulated the crux of the new policy to the 
a memorandum. He explained that 
"We cannot accept the contention that all Jews as such have a right to 
enter Palestine. We cannot avoid an eventual clash, if we continue to 
carry out the Balfour Declaration, between the forces of persecuted, 
desperate, brilliant, constructive Jewry in Palestine and the wide 
spread Pan-Arab movement which is rallying to the defence of its weakest 
brethren, the Arabs of Palestine. Arab detestation of the Jewish 
invasion into Palestine, being what it is, it would be wholly wrong to 
suggest that this large Arab population should one day in their own 
native land and against their will come under the rule of the newly 
arrived Jews."75 
This statement indicates clearly that the Colonial Secretary 
recognized for the first time that the "Jewish invasion II should not be 
allowed to continue. He recognized also that it was injustice to allow 
such "invaders" to take control of Palestine and rule the Palestinians 
against their will. It was indeed the beginning of a new policy and 
approach to solve the the conflict which the Arabs failed to exploit to 
the full. 
The efforts of the British delegation to bring about a compromise 
between the Palestinians and the Zionists to solve the problem met with 
no appreciable success. After two weeks of negotiations and exchanges of 
views with both sides, the British delegation decided to put forward 
their own proposals which might bridge the gap between the Arab and the 
Zionist standpoints. The British thought that it would be better to 
bring both sides face to face to discuss their proposals. The British 
delegation indeed succeeded in arranging an informal meeting between an 
Arab and a Zionist delegation. The meeting took place on 23rd February 
and the British suggestions were submitted to both delegations. 
The British proposals included general suggestions such as the 
termination of the Mandate and the establishment of a Palestinian state 
in treaty relation with Britain at some future date. The next day, 24th, 
the British submitted to both delegations more precise proposals such as 
a limited provisional period before independence and the admission of 
limited numbers of immigrants within a specific period, after which no 
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further immigration would be allowed without Arab consent. MacDonald 
explained to the delegations that if they agreed to these proposals the 
British Government would call a round table Conference in the Autumn for 
the purpose of deciding upon an agreed constitution. Meanwhile the 
interim legislative institutions would consist of an executive council 
with the participation of three Palestinians and two Jews and an 
advisory council governed by proportional representation. 
According to Rose: liThe Arabs accepted MacDonald's general line of 
argument even pinning down the proposals with details concerning the 
stages leading to full independence. 1I76 But the Zionists rejected it. 
The Arab delegation took exception to certain aspects, notably to the 
length of the proposed period of transition (ten years) and to the 
suggestion that British representatives, should at the round table 
Conference, participate in the drafting of the new constitution for 
Palestine. They therefore, made counter proposals which together with 
the British proposals were referred to an Anglo-Arab Committee77 , but 
without success. 
The Zionist delegation on the other hand, rejected the British 
proposals for reasons explained in a statement dated 27th February, 
1939. In their view these suggestions IIpass over in expressive silence 
the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. They fail to envisage any 
further development of the Jewish national home at all. 1I The statement 
went on to say: II no settlement can be considered which would place the 
Jewish national home under Arab rule, or condemn the Jews to a minority 
life in Palestine. 1I78 After that date the Anglo-Jewish Conference was 
consequently suspended, though informal contact was maintained between 
the two delegations until 15th March. 
The final session of the London Conference was held on 15th March 
1939. MacDonald presented the final proposals for both the Arab and 
Jewish delegations. The scheme provided for the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state, possibly of a federal nature, in treaty 
relations with Britain after a transition period of ten years. The 
constitution would be worked out by a national assembly with British 
participation and would have to include safeguards for the Jewish 
national home and the British interests in the country. 
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On immigration, a total of 75,000 Jewish settlers would be allowed 
within the next five years at the rate of 10,000 per annum and 25,000 
refugees. This would raise the number of the Jewish population to one 
third of the whole population. Further immigration should not be 
permitted without Palestinian consent. The scheme included provisions 
restricting land sales for Jews in some areas and prohibiting such sales 
in others. 
The British proposals were rejected out of hand by the Zionist 
delegation and their main leaders did not even attend the last session. 
According to Rose, lithe Jews asked no questions nor offered any 
discussion." 79 The Jewish delegation explained their position as 
follows: liThe Jewish delegation having carefully considered the 
proposals communicated to them by His Majesty's Government on March 15, 
1939, regret that they are unable to accept them as a basic for 
agreement, and decided accordingly to dissolve." 80 
The main obstacle on the way to reaching agreement between the Arab 
and the British delegations was the uncertainty as to the date at which 
independence would finally be granted. The Palestinians, with their bad 
experience of unstable British policies, demanded that Palestine should 
become independent at the end of the ten year transitional period 
regardless 'of the state of relations between Jews and Arabs and that a 
national government should be established at the beginning of the 
provisional period rather than after five or ten years. 
The Palestinians knew the declared Zionist reaction to the British 
proposals and argued that the Zionists would do everything to delay or 
prevent the establishment of an independent state and therefore the 
conflict would continue. According to liThe Times": liThe objection of the 
Palestinian Arabs to the British proposals are based on their belief 
that an independent Palestine state could not be established without the 
. bl t' 1 1181 cooperation of the Jews, and that this cooperatlon was pro ema lca . 
However, MacDonald made it clear that independence would depend on 
Jewish consent, just as further Jewish immigration was made dependent on 
Palestinian consent. Such a policy was intended to put pressure on both 
Sides to reach an agreement. The British Government knew that the 
aspiration of Arabs and Zionists had proved to be irreconcilable and 
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leaving independence or the development of the "Jewish Home" dependent 
on the agreement of antagonists was, in my view, not realistic. 
Accordi ng to Rose, wi th whom I agree: "To deny each side that whi ch it 
most covets and thereby to put pressure on both sides to reach a 
compromi se was condemend as ill us i onary. ,,82 It seems that the Bri t ish 
Government intended to leave the independence date open so as to make 
things easier for them in case of they had second thoughts about the 
matter. Therefore, they did not alter from this position and on this 
point the Anglo-Arab negotiations broke down. 
The British Government in fact invited both Arabs and Zionists to 
participate in a London Conference in the hope that they could find an 
agreeable settlement to the Palestine conflict. Officially both Arabs 
and Zionists refused the British proposals each for its own reasons. 
"Neither the Arabs nor the Jewish delegations felt able to accept these 
proposals, and the Conferences therefore did not result in an 
agreement. ,,83 
The Palestinians fears and SUsplclons can be appreciated. But it seems 
to me that it would have been better for the Palestinians to accept the 
British proposals for three reasons: 
First, accepting those proposals would have led to the isolation of 
the Zionist delegation and consequently the latter would have borne the 
responsibility for the failure of the Conference in the eyes of the 
Western World; secondly, the Palestinians would have gained a legitimate 
right to press the British Government to implement its own proposals; 
thirdly, it would have been more difficult for the British Government to 
retract its own proposals and this could perhaps have led to their 
genuine implementation of the scheme. 
The British Government, however, announced that both sides had refused 
their proposals and consequently they announced their own policy 
regarding the future of Palestine. They announced the new policy in a 
White Paper which was published in May 1939. The White Paper included 
most of the British proposals discussed during the London Conference. 
The White Paper of May 193984 
In the White Paper the British Government admitted that the ambiguity 
of the provisions and terms of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate 
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had caused friction and conflict between the two communities in 
Palestine. The White Paper pointed out that previous expert Commissions 
"have found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the 
objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between 
Arabs and Jews. ,,85 
One of the main objectives of the White Paper, therefore, was to offer 
a clear definition of policy and objectives regarding the future of 
Palestine. 
The White Paper was published on May 17th 1939 and was outlined under 
three headings: 
1. Constitution 
2. Immi grat ion 
3. Land 
Constitution 
The statement started with a clear definition of the exact meaning of 
the term "Jewish National Home." The White Paper states that: "The 
British Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the 
Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine 
should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab 
population of the country.,,86 
The White Paper acknowledged the fact that previous Government 
statements did not remove doubts about the exact meaning of the term 
"Jewish national hornell and the British Government therefore intended to 
give clear definition to their policy and intentions. The British 
Government now "declare unequivocally that it is not part of their 
policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state." The statement went 
on to state that the British Government "would indeed regard it as 
contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate as well to 
the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, 
that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subject of a 
Jewi sh state aga i nst the i r will. 1187 
The White Paper expressed in a clear manner that the Mandate was never 
intended to continue indefinitely over Palestine. But rather the British 
Government see "It is proper that the people of the country should as 
early as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are 
exercised by the people of neighbouring countries .... They desire to see 
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established ultimately an independent Palestine state ... in which Arabs 
and Jews share authority.n88 
In the light of these considerations the British Government made 
certain proposals. The followings are a summary of these proposals: 89 
1. The objective of the British Government is the establishment within 
ten years of an independent Palestine state in treaty relation with 
Britain. 
2. The independent state should be one in which Arabs and Jews share 
in Government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of 
each community are safeguarded. 
3. The establisment of the independent state will be preceded by a 
transitional period throughout which Britain will retain authority. 
During this transitional period Palestinians will be placed gradually in 
charge of departments. The number of Palestinians in charge of 
departments will be increased until all heads of departments are 
Palestinians. 
At the end of this period the Executive Council will be converted into 
a Council of Ministers. 
4. After restoring peace and order the Government will start 
transferring some of the Government duties to Palestinians. 
5. The British Government make no proposals at this stage regarding 
the establishment of an elective legislature, but if local conditions 
permit and the local opinion would favour it, the Government are 
prepared to establish such machinery. 
6. At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order a 
joint British and Palestinian body will be set up to review the working 
of the constitutional arrangement during the transitional period and to 
consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the 
independent state. 
7. The British Government must be sure that provisions have been made 
for the security of, and the freedom of access to the Holy Places and 
the protection of the interests of religious bodies. 
8. The British Government will do everything in their power to create 
conditions which will enable the independent Palestine state to come 
into being within ten years. If at the end of ten years, it appears to 
the British Government that contrary to their hope, circumstances 
require the postponement of the establishment of the independent state 
they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the 
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council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab states before 
deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the 
conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the 
co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a 
view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date. 
Immigration90 
The White Paper admitted that in accordance with the Mandate and other 
subsequent statements of policy, Jewish immigration was to be 
facilitated in so far as it did not prejudice the economic position of 
the Palestinians. The British Government, nevertheless, did not read 
these various statements lias implying that the Mandate requires them, 
for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of 
Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country's 
economic absorptive capacity.1I91 
The White Paper asserted that in the light of the last three years of 
disturbances and Palestinian Revolt the British Government had arrived 
at the conclusion that the principle of economic absorptive capacity as 
the sole criterion was not one which it was possible for them to 
continue liThe alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either 
1. To seek to expand the Jewish national home indefinitely by 
immigration against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of 
the country or 
2. To permit further expansion of the Jewish national home by 
immigration if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. 1I92 
The former policy, the Government believed, meant IIrul e by force ll 
which was not only IIcontrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations ll but also lito their specific 
obligations to the Palestine Mandate. 1193 Therefore the British 
Government IIhave decided that the time has come to adopt in principle 
the second of the alternatives referred to above namely, that after a 
intermediate period, Jewish immigration was to be permitted only if 
Palestinians acquiesced. 1I94 
I h 1 h f th cons,·derat,·ons the British Government proposed n t e i g t 0 ese 
the following policy:95 
f· will be at a rate of 1. Jewish immigration during the next ,ve years 
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10,000 per year. 
2. In addition 25,000 refugees will be admitted as a contribution 
towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem. This total of 75,000 
immigrants will bring the Jewish population in Palestine up to 
approximately one third of the total population. 
3. After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will 
be permitted unless the Palestinians are prepared to acquiesce in it. 
Finally the British Government declares that when the immigration over 
five years which is now contemplated has taken place "they will not be 
justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to 
facilitate, the further development of the Jewish national home by 
immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population." 
Land96 
The White Paper repeated the findings of the several previous expert 
Commissions regarding the land problem in Palestine. It stressed that: 
"There is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab 
lands, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be 
restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standards 
of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be 
created. "97 
Palestinian Response to the White Paper 
Palestinian response to the White Paper was not uniform. The Arab 
Higher Committee rejected the White Paper for two main reasons: 
Firstly, It envisaged the establishment of the national government at 
the end of the ten year transitional period while the Palestinians 
wanted it at the beginning of that period; and secondly, the White Paper 
did not set a definite date for independence while the Palestinians 
wanted a definite date after which Palestine would become completely 
independent. 98 
In contrast the British Government was concerned about the security 
and the rights of the Jewish community. They wanted to set up an 
independent Palestine state in which both Arabs and Jews would 
participate in administration. They wanted to use the transitional 
period as a trial period to see how both communities would work together 
in a jOint administration. In the light of such a joint administration 
they would be able to develop a suitable constitution for Palestine 
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which would guarantee the The British rights of each community. 
independence conditional Government made Palestinian on such an 
understanding and co-operation between Palestinians and Zionists. 
MacDonald expressed the Government's view in the House of Commons 
debate on this matter as follows: "There is nothing in this White Paper 
suggesting that a Jewish minority is to be handed over to the mercies of 
an Arab majority." He describes the state as a state "in which Arabs and 
Jews share authority and the essential interests of each community are 
secured. "99 
The Colonial Secretary explained the Government's intentions regarding 
the transition period by saying: "We are anxious first to gain 
experience of the first part of the transition period and to see how 
matters work out in actual practice. We shall then have a clearer idea 
for the constitution which may be necessary in Palestine to protect the 
interests of those very different peoples." lOO 
The Palestinians argued that it was much better if the national 
government could be established at the beginning of the transition 
period because this would give such a government the opportunity to gain 
practical experience under British supervision. They argued that such 
experience would be necessary for the government if at the end of the 
ten year period Palestine were to stand alone as an independent state. 
Some Palestinians, however, feared that the British Government would not 
implement the White Paper and they saw no point in accepting it. Yasin 
for example, argues that "some Palestinians believed that Britain was 
not going to implement the White Paper's policy as happened earlier with 
simil ar promi ses. "101 
The Palestinians' other concern was that leaving the transition period 
open as it did would invite the Zionists to use all their strength to 
influence the British Government to delay the time for independence or 
even to abandon the whole idea of independence. They argued that the 
Zionists could block the independence of the country by non co-operation 
with the Palestinians. Therefore they believed that the best policy 
which would guarantee their independence was to set a definite date for 
h d·t· 102 the independence of Palestine regardless of any ot er con 1 10ns. 
It seems that the Palestinians were right in their analysis of the 
situation. The Zionists knew that the British Government had issued the 
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White Paper in a tense international situation and to gain Arab support 
if a major war should start. For many Zionists it was a temporary state 
of affairs which would be reversed once the circumstances changed. Some 
Zionists viewed the White Paper as a temporary aberration of British 
policy brought about by existing circumstances. It was hoped that after 
the immediate dangers of 1939 had been repulsed Zionist and British 
interests would unite for a second time. 103 
There were, however, other important factors which played an important 
role in shaping the final Palestinian response, among which were 
divisions and family rivalry and other kinds of internal conflict which 
I have already explained in Chapter Three. It was easier for some 
leaders to accuse their rivals of betrayal and being collaborators with 
the British. Such accusation are so effective in the Arabic culture that 
they can damage the career and the social position of a person for the 
rest of his life or even lead to his assassination. There is no worse 
crime in Arab culture than being accused of betrayal or singled out as 
traitor. This would lead not only to public denounciation and 
condemnation but also the life of the person could be physically 
threatened. Therefore, many leaders who might have have been aware of 
the right decision dared not take it. It is worth mention here that two 
Arab rulers have been assassinated because of their position on the 
Palestine conflict, King Abdullah of Jordan in 1951 and Sadat, President 
of Egypt in 1981. 
The other factor was that the Muffti, Hajj Amin was living in exile and 
no decision was to be taken without his approval. The British Government 
excluded him from the negotiations and, therefore, it was expected that 
his exclusion would affect his attitude and decision in regard to any 
Palestinian British agreement. The third factor is the division between 
the Arab countries and their effect and influence on the different 
factions of the Palestinian leadership. The Palestinian leaders were, 
and still are up to the present day, divided into pro-Syrian, 
pro-Jordainian and pro-Egyptian groups. The divisions and rivalries 
among these states are reflected in the Palestinian leaders' virtual 
inability to make any coherent agreement among Palestinians. This 
phenomenon, however, is still one of the clear shortcomings of 
Palestinian and Arab politics. 
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The final factor was the cultural differences in understanding politics 
and decision making between Arabs and British. Subhi Yasin,104 explained 
that most of the Palestinians in reality accepted the White Paper. But 
they wanted to hide their feeling from the Zionists. They wanted to give 
the impression that the White Paper was not a Pro-Arab document.- The 
Zionists described the White Paper as a pro -Arab document and it was 
thought that the Arab rejection of the White Paper would weaken the 
Zionist claim. Yasin believed that the Arabs were anxious that the 
British Government might change their minds and wanted in reality to 
implement the White Paper policy. He explained that that Palestinians' 
rejection was perhaps intended to provoke the British Government into 
forcing the White Paper immediately on both Communities. 
Some Palestinians, however, announced that the White Paper was an 
acceptable basis for the furtherance of Palestinian aspirations. Seven 
Palestinian rebel leaders not only accepted the White Paper, but accused 
those among the Palestinian leaders who opposed the White Paper of being 
British agents. IDS "In principle there was not one single Palestinian 
who is honest and mature, who did not agree on the White Paper which 
would prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Those 
among the Palestinians leaders, who rejected the White Paper were 
certainly encouraged by the British Government to do so in order to 
weaken the plan and give the British Government a pretext not to 
implement it."106 
The Governments of the independent Arab states, however, made no 
official statement on the White Paper. This perhaps can be explained as 
a sign of acceptance. But they did not publicly announce their position, 
perhaps to avoid criticism and accusation from some Palestinian 
extremists and other rival Arab states. Only a minority of Arab leaders 
made it known that they thought the Palestinians should accept the White 
Paper. Abdullah, King of Transjordan, advised the Palestinians to accept 
the White Paper and he was criticised by the Palestinians and other 
Arabs for his position. Hussein, the present king of Jordan, argues that 
the fate of Palestine "might have taken a sharply different course if he 
(Abdullah) had been at the helm or at least if his advice had been 
headed by those who were. II Hussein went on to argue that Abdullah's 
pragmatic attitude about the Palestine confl ict "sometimes made him 
misunderstood among sections of the uninformed, who are inclined to hear 
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what pleases them rather that what serves their cause.,,107 
King Hussein believes that the Palestinians leaders failed to take the 
right decision at the right time and indirectly contributed to the 
tragedies of their people. He argues that: "Resistance can take many 
forms, and not the least of them is wise political decision at crucial 
turning points. It is often said that the Palestine question is a 
chronicle of missed opportunities. This is partly true, though not 
entirely for judging in retrospect, it is my considered opinion, as it 
was my grandfather's, that the Zionist thrust and avalanche could have 
been blunted but not entirely thwarted. Morality and power politics do 
not, in most instances, match. The tragic undoing and dismantling of the 
Palestinian people to which their leadership unwittingly contributed, 
was that they adamantly refused to understand or accept this unpleasant 
but elementary fact of 1 i fe. ,,108 
Hussein rightly argues that the Palestinian rejection of the 
Partition plan, and later of the White Paper, cast them in the eyes of 
the Western World as responsible for the failure of these proposals 
despite the fact that the Zionists likewise refused these proposals. 
"The extremist Arab leadership rejected the plan (White Paper) on the 
grounds t~t the plan included a proviso for a five years interim period 
before it went into effect The Zionists like wise, fought it tooth and 
nail, but in the eyes of the Western World it was the Palestinian Arabs 
who had thwarted the Plan.,,109 
Zionist Reaction to the White Paper 
The Zionist leaders rejected the White Paper on the ground that it 
limited the size of the Jewish community to a permanent minority. They 
even set plans to use every available means to prevent the British 
Government from implementing the policy of that Paper. On May 18th, one 
day after it was issued, demonstrations were held throughout Zionist 
settlements in Palestine and public meetings denounced the White Paper 
as a "treacherous document" which would never be accepted by the Jews. 
"The Jewish population proclaims before the World that this treacherous 
policy will not be tolerated. The Jewish population will fight it to the 
d d ft' t ,,110 
uttermost, and will spare no sacrifice to frustrate an e ea 1 • 
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Ben Gurion, as chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, described 
these demonstrations as the beginning of a military resistance to the 
White Paper. "The Jewish demonstrations of yesterday marked the 
beginning of Jewish resistance to the disastrous policy now proposed by 
His Majesty's Government."111 
Concluding Remarks 
During the second half of the 1930s the Palestinians' opposition to 
British and Zionist colonization reached a state of general strike and 
revolt. It was only after this revolt that Britain agreed to send a 
Commission to inquire into the causes of that revolt and other 
Palestinian and Zionist grievances. In the light of their investigations 
the Royal Commission stated that the underlying causes of the strike and 
revolt were the desire of the Palestinians for independence and their 
fear of converting Palestine into a Jewish state. The Commission pointed 
out that these were the very same causes of the previous disturbances 
and revolt of 1920, 1921 and 1929. 
The Commission came to the conclusion that the Mandate involved the 
denial of national independence for the native population and carried 
contradictory promises for both Arabs and Jews. It was not possible in 
their view to promise the Arabs self-government in Palestine and at the 
same time to promise the Jews a national home in the same country. 
Therefore they recommended the abolition of the Mandate. 
The Commission agreed in their analysis with the Palestinians' point of 
view in regard to the consequences of unlimited Jewish immigration. They 
pointed out that it was not right to allow Jewish immigration to 
continue, against Arab wishes, in the hope that it might ultimately lead 
to a Jewish majority and the creation of a Jewish state. This was in 
their view a violation of the British obligation to the Arabs, to the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and to the spirit of the Mandate. 
In the light of their investigation into the origin of the problem and 
the demands of both Arabs and Zionists, the Commission concluded that 
the aspirations of these two Communities were irreconcilable, and that 
the best hope for a lasting settlement for the problem was to partition 
the country between them. 
But it seems that the main reason behind their proposal to partition 
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Palestine was to secure British and Zionist interests. The Commissioners 
realised that the continuation of the British pro-Zionist policy was in 
conflict with Britain's own economic and strategic interests in the Arab 
World. On the other hand, Britain had a moral responsibility towards the 
Zionist settlers who immigrated under British encouragement and 
protection. Britain could not just quit Palestine and abandon them. 
I would argue, therefore, that partition was suggested not because it 
was the right solution or to serve the interests of the native 
population but rather to serve the interests of the British and the 
Zionist settlers. Support for this view can also be found in the 
partition scheme itself. According to partition Palestine was divided 
into: a Jewish state, British enclaves, and the unification of the rest 
of the country with Transjordan - a British ally. The partition plan 
completely ignored the natives' desire for independence which was, 
according to the Commission itself, the underlying cause of the 
Palestinians general strike and revolt. 
The Palestinians rejected the partition plan because firstly, while 
the Zionist settler minority, (29 % of the total who owned about 5 % of 
total land of Palestine), were offered the right to establish their own 
state on the best watered and most fertile land of Palestine, the Arab 
majority were denied similar rights. Secondly, partition implied the 
dispossession of about 300,000 Arabs who owned 75 % of total lands 
allocated to the Jewish state. The partition plan also implied a 
compulsory transfer of those innocent peasants from their homes and land 
to other areas for no other reason than to make the settlers' state more 
viable and secure. They argued that partition practically meant the 
destruction of Palestinian political, economic, and social life. The 
Arab states also joined the Palestinians in their rejection of 
partition. 
On the other hand, the Zionists rejected partition because it did not 
give them all they wanted, especially New Jerusalem and the Negeb. They 
also hoped that they would form a majority in the near future and take 
control of the whole country. 
At the end of 1937, however, the British Government appointed a 
Technical Commission to draw up a more precise plan of partition with 
the possibility of voluntary rather than compulsory exchange of 
population. The Technical Commission visited Palestine at the beginning 
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of 1938 and conducted their work during a full scale Arab Revolt. 
Although they suggested three alternative plans of their own, they 
concluded that they were not able to recommend boundaries for 
self-supporting Arab and Jewish states. The British Government found in 
the Technical Commission's report a pretext to abandon partition and 
instead invited both parties to a London conference to discuss a 
possible solution through negotiations. 
On the eve of World War Two Britain realised that in order to 
guarantee Arab support if a major war started, she had to solve the 
Palestine problem in a manner satisfactory to the Arabs. Therefore, the 
British for the first time, proposed the establishment of a single 
independent Palestine state within a certain period, limiting the size 
of the settlers' community to about one third of the population and 
making Jewish immigration, over a certain number and after a certain 
period, dependent on Arab consent. The only condition for that was a 
treaty relation with Britain and guaranteed rights for the Zionist 
settlers. 
The Palestinians accepted these proposals in principle but objected to 
the length of the provisional period, ten years, and insisted that 
independence must not depend on Zionist consent. The British Government 
rejected the Arab demand for a fixed date for independence and at this 
point the negotiations between the Arab and the British broke down. 
The Zionists, on the other hand, rejected these proposals out of hand 
and even boycotted the official session of the Conference before it was 
officially closed. 
At the end of the Conference the British Government announced that 
both side had rejected their proposals and consequently they announced a 
new policy for Palestine. The new policy was published in a White Paper 
in 1939 and included: 
1. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within ten 
years which both Arabs and Jews participating in its administration. 
2. The admission of 75,000 Jewish immigrants within a five year period 
after which no more immigration would be allowed without Arab consent. 
The Palestinians rejected the White Paper mainly because it made 
independence dependent on Zionist consent. They argued that since the 
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Zionist openly rejected the White Paper it was inconceivable that they 
would co-operate with the Arabs in forming such a government. They 
demanded that independence should be granted at the end of a fixed 
period with or without Zionist consent. 
The Zionists too rejected the White Paper on the ground that it 
limited the Jewish community to a permanent minority under Arab rule. 
The British Government, however, announced that they would implement the 
policy of the White Paper on Palestine regardless of Arab and Zionist 
objections. 
The White Paper was, in my view, the best offer the Palestinians ever 
had and which they failed to exploit to the full. It was indeed the 
first real opportunity for an overall settlement which was spoiled by 
the Zionists' demand for the control of the whole country and the 
Palestinians' lack of experience in political negotiations. In my view 
the Palestinians lost a valuable opportunity when they rejected the 
White Paper, which offered them a written recognition of their right to 
independence and control over Jewish immigration. It must be noticed 
here that the Palestinians considered Zionist settlement illegal and, 
therefore, they rejected in principle any proposal which implied the 
recognition of that settlement. That same principle prevents the present 
Palestinian leaders from recognising "Israel" up to the present day. 
However, at the end of 1939 Britain entered World War Two and the 
Palestine problem was shelved for the time being. Both Arabs and 
Zionists announced their support for Britain for different reasons. The 
Arabs hoped for complete independence while the Zionists hoped for the 
abolition of the White Paper and the continuation of the previous 
British pro-Zionists policy. 
During the 1940s, however, the Zionist shifted most of their political 
activities to the U.S.A and after the War the U.S.A. became deeply 
involved in the Palestine conflict to the extent that they persuaded the 
British Government to appoint a joint Anglo-American Commission to 
inquire into the problem and suggest a solution. The British Government 
emerged from the War economically exhausted and it was difficult for 
them to resist the American pressure towards a settlement favourable to 
the Zionists. The British made a last effort to solve the problem in 
1946 when they proposed, during a London Round Table Conference, the 
establishment of Arab and Jewish Provinces or Cantons. But the Zionists, 
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backed by the U.S.A., had already made their minds up to accept 
partition as the only acceptable solution to the conflict. In the next 
Chapter I will discuss the development of the conflict during the 1940s, 
the new British and American proposals to solve it, and the 
Palestinians' responses to them. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Palestinian Responses to the British Proposals to Solve 
the Palestine Conflict 1945-1947 
Introduction 
In Chapter Six I have discussed the British proposals to solve the 
Palestine conflict during the second part of the 1930s and the 
Palestinian responses to them. As I have shown in that Chapter these 
proposals took the form of partition or a single state with Arab and 
Zionist sharing its administration. In the light of their investigations 
the Royal Commission pointed out that the British undertakings, to Arabs 
and Jews under the terms of the Mandate, were irreconcilable. It was not 
possible to promise the Arabs self-government in Palestine and at the 
same time to promise the Jews a home in the same country. The Commission 
therefore recommended the abolition of the Mandate on the grounds that 
it was unworkable and recommended the partition of the country between 
Arabs and Zionists. 
The Commission pointed out that there was nothing in common between 
the Arabs and the Zionist settlers and that their aspirations were 
irreconcilable and would continue to conflict in the future. The 
Commission concluded that if Arabs and Zionists could not live in peace 
together the best solution would be to partition the country between 
them. According to the partition plan Palestine was divided into three 
areas: a Jewish state in the Coastal Plain and Galilee, British Enclaves 
in Nazareth and Jerusalem and the unification of the rest of the country 
with Transjordan to form an Arab state. The Commission based most of 
their plan on the assumption of transferring about 400,000 Arabs from 
their homes and land to unspicified areas, probably to Transjordan, in 
order to make possible the establishment of a viable and exclusive 
Jewish state. 
The Palestinians rejected partition on political, economic and 
humanitarian grounds. They argued that the number of settlers (29 %) and 
their land holding (5 %) did not justify the partition of their country 
and the establishment of an independent Jewish state in the best watered 
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and irrigated lands of Palestine. They argued that while partition 
offered the settler minority the right to establish their own state, it 
denied the Arab majority similar rights. They also objected to the idea 
of the compulsory transfer of about 400,000 Arabs from their homes and 
lands and considered such action discriminatory against the Arabs and 
completely unjustified. The Arab states also objected to partition and 
demanded its abrogation. On the other hand, the Zionists rejected 
partition because it did not give them what they wanted, especially New 
Jerusalem and the Negeb. They hoped that they would soon form a majority 
and take control over the whole country. 
The British Government, however, appointed a Technical Commission to 
draw up a detailed plan of partition with the possibility of voluntary 
rather than compulsory exchange of population. Although the Technical 
Commission suggested three alternative plans of their own, they 
concluded that they were not able to recommend boundaries to form 
self-supporting Arab and Jewish states. 
Against this background the British Government announced that the 
partition solution had proved to be impracticable and, therefore, they 
called upon both Arabs and Zioninsts to meet at a London Conference in 
Septemper 1939 to try to find a solution to the problem through 
negotiations. During this Conference the British Government proposed the 
establishment within a certain period of an independent Palestine state 
with the Arab in the majority and limiting the size of the settler 
community to a permanent minority. 
These proposals were rejected by both Palestinians and Zionists. The 
British Government then announced a new policy which they would follow 
in the future in Palestine regardless of Arab or Jewish responses. The 
new policy was published in a White'Paper at the end of 1939 and 
included some assurances to the Arabs in regard to the British 
intentions and explained clearly the meaning of the Jewish home which 
was neither to convert Palestine into a Jewish state nor to make the 
Arabs subject to Zionist rule. 
The White Paper proposed the establishment within ten years of an 
independent Palestine state with both Arabs and Zionist participating in 
its administration. It limited the number of Jewish immigrants to 75,000 
spread over a five year period, after which no further immigration would 
be allowed without Arab consent. This practically meant limiting the 
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number of settlers to about one third of the total population. 
It was indeed the first opportunity for a lasting settlement which was 
spoiled by the Zionists' greed for the control of the whole country and 
the Arabs' lack of experience in political negotiation. The White Paper 
not only assured the Arabs that it was not Britain's intention to 
convert Palestine into a Jewish state but also, in my view, it was the 
first and the last fair offer which the Palestinians have ever had. 
The Arab Higher Committee rejected the White Paper of 1939 because: 
1. It did not set a definite date for independence; 
2. It made independence dependent on Zionist consent, which was not 
expected to come. The Palestinians believed that there was no hope for 
Zionist co-operation in a joint government in Palestine unless they knew 
that: "Self Government was going to be established in any event."1 
3. They feared that Britain's policy could be changed under Zionist 
pressure; and finally 
4. They expected to get a better deal in the future. Such expectations 
were based on the assumption of massive Arab and Muslim support and on 
the justice of their case. 
The interesting question here is: Did the Palestinians possess the 
required means, political or militarily, to achieve a better deal than 
that offered by the 1939 White Paper? Certainly they did not. The Arab 
Higher Committee rejected the White Paper at a time when they knew that 
the British were already re-asserting their military superiority against 
the Palestinian guerrillas. British authority was gradually 
re-established in the rural areas and the Palestinian villagers, 
expecting that Britain would carry out the White Paper policy, began to 
quit the Revolt and surrender their arms, and by the end of 1939 the 
revolt was defeated. The Palestinians, however, discovered their mistake 
in 1946 when the British Government rejected their demands to implement 
the policy of the Paper they had rejected in 1939, as I will explain in 
this Chapter. 
The Palestinian Position during the War 
During the 1940s the British Government found themselves not only 
unable to implement partition but also that they were not the only power 
which could decide the future of Palestine. Britain emerged from the War 
economically exhausted and in bad need of American financial aid. The 
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U.S.A. was won over to the Zionist side and immediately after the end of 
the War the Americans persuaded the British Government to appoint a 
joint Anglo-American Commission to investigate the Palestine conflict. 
The Joint Commission recommended the continuation of the Mandate, 
practically cancelling the recommendations of the Royal Commission, the 
immediate admission of 100,000 Zionist immigrants (refugees) and the 
rejection of the idea of establishing of a single state. The British 
Government, however, called upon both Arabs and Zionists for yet another 
London Conference to be held at the end of 1946. The British proposed 
this time less favourable schemes such as cantonization and provincial 
solutions. The Arabs rejected these new schemes and demanded complete 
independence. The Zionists too rejected the new proposals and made it 
clear that they would not accept any solution other than a Jewish state 
in a viable area of Palestine. This Zionist demand was approved and 
backed by the U.S.A. 
Against this background the British Government transferred the 
Palestine conflict to the U.N., asking for assistance to solve the 
problem as I will discuss in the next Chapter. 
However, on the political side and during the first years of the War, 
Britain banned all political activities in Palestine. None of the 
important Palestinian leaders was on Palestine soil after October 1937. 2 
They were forced to flee the country, in fear of British arrest, 
imprisonment or exile. The moderate elements of the Palestinian 
leadership were divided among themselves and the Palestinians were left 
"with no single body to represent their interests via-a-vis the British 
and the Jews."3 However, once the War had started, Britain sought to 
placate the Palestinians by strictly enforcing the immigration and land 
provisions of the 1939 White Paper, and with the final defeat of Rommel 
at the end of 1942 the Mandatory Authority pursued a policy of partial 
amnesty and encouraged some of the exiled Palestinian leaders to return 
to Palestine. The ban on political activity was lifted and the 
Palestinian political parties resumed their activities. 4 
However, during the critical War period, no significant Palestinian 
disturbances took place in Palestine. Moderate Palestinians who backed 
the Allies had come to consider the 1939 White Paper as a British policy 
pledge and they were generally ready to accept it. By 1943, about 8,000 
Palestinians had joined the British military forces in one capacity or 
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another. 5 
After Britain had lifted the ban on political activities the 
Palestinian leaders focused on efforts to revive the Higher Arab 
Committee. A new Higher Arab Committee was established on November 25, 
1945. The new Committee had five Husseinis, five representatives of 
other parties and two neutrals. The Nashashibis, a rich and influential 
family who thought their own representation too small, boycotted it. The 
strong division and rivalries among the Palestinian leaders led in 1946 
to the condemnation of the Arab Higher Committee, by the five other 
parties, as a Husseini creation and set up a rival body, the Supreme 
Arab Front. 6 
From mid 1944 the Palestinian worked in the shade of and later under 
the aegis of the Arab states in recognition both of their weakness and 
of the relative bargaining power possessed by the Arab states. As Khouri 
put it: "Due to constant factional bickering and the absence of 
effective leadership, the initiative in Palestine Arab politics passed 
increasingly in the later War years to the heads of the Arab States.,,7 
This trend, however, was accelerated after the establishment of the Arab 
League in March 1945. Arab Governments, individually and collectively, 
began to apply diplomatic pressure on behalf of the Palestinians. For 
instance, in April 1945 King Ibn-Saud elicited a promise from president 
Roosevelt that he would consider Arab interests and views in any final 
settlement of the Palestine issue. 8 On 12th October, 1945, the 
representatives of Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon, in Washington, in a 
jOint memorandum warned the United States that peace in the Middle East 
would be jeopardised if a Jewish state was established. 
The Arab League opened Arab information offices in London and 
Washington in an effort to counter Zionist propaganda in these 
countries. But Arab measures were, according to Khouri, ineffective. 9 
There were several reasons for this: Firstly, Zionist propaganda over 
the years had already conditioned a large part of public opinion in the 
West and Arab efforts were "too weak and too late." 
Secondly, there was no Arab influence in the West to match that of the 
Zionists, because the number of Arabs in these countries was 
insignificant compared to number of Jews, especially in the United 
States. And finally, the Arabs were unable to match two major advantages 
h a well -publl·cl·zed humanitarian issue and the eld by the Zionists 
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powerful support of numerous Jewish organizations and individuals, 
including many with far greater knowledge and experience than the Arabs 
in Western propaganda techniques and many in key positions in various 
fields within their respective countries. 
The Palestine conflict became after 1944 an Arab issue rather than a 
Palestinian one. The Arab League passed special resolutions concerning 
Palestine which stressed that Palestine constituted an important part of 
the Arab World and the League "declares its support of the cause of the 
Arabs of Palestine and its willingness to work for the achievement of 
their legitimate aims and the safeguarding of their just rights."IO 
During the first part of the 1940s the Palestinians neither succeeded 
in establishing an effective resistance movement nor an alternative 
shadow government. They depended on the promised support of the Arabic 
and Islamic Worlds which was not forthcoming. They realized their 
mistake after they had rejected the British offer of the White Paper of 
1939. The interesting thing here is that the Palestinian leaders were 
divided according to their loyalities to the leaders of the Arab states. 
This phenomenon, however, is still a feature of Palestinian and Arab 
politics. The Palestinian leadership is divided into pro-Syrians, 
pro-Egyptians, pro-Jordanins and pro-Iraqis and because there is no 
agreement between these states on a definite plan for solvining the 
Palesine conflict their differences are reflected in the Palestinians' 
decisions. This state of affairs among the Arabs certainly played into 
the hands of the Zionists in the 1930s-40s and still plays into the 
hands of "Israel"today. 
It seems to me that this division in the Arab camp is a major obstacle 
to a united Palestinian decision. This chaos and inability to reach a 
united decision in the past was one of the factors which contributed to 
the development of the Palestinian tragedy into its present form. The 
major factor was the co-operation of Britain and the Zionist Movement to 
colonize Palestine against the wishes of the Palestinians. 
the Zionist Position and Activities during The War 
Although this Chapter deals mainly with the Palestinian position and 
responses, it seems to me that it is necessary to discuss in brief the 
Zionists' activities during this period which enabled them to declare 
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their own state in 1948. During World War Two Zionist efforts were aimed 
in three directions: 
1. The extention of Zionist settlement to the frontier areas of 
Palestine in order to be able to lay claim to the whole country, or at 
least to a viable area, at the appropriate time. 11 
2. To train as many Zionists as possible in the use of arms and by 
early 1944 about 43,000 Zionists joined the British forces and many 
already belonged to the Haganah. 12 A separate Jewish Brigade was set up 
in the British Army at the end of the War. The establishment of such 
separate Jewish Brigades did not result from military needs, since the 
War was in its closing days, but perhaps because it was intended to 
provide the Zionists with a good opportunity to train as many soldiers 
as they wanted, under British supervision, in preparation for an 
eventual war with the Arabs in Palestine. 13 
3. Thirdly, the smuggling of as many arms and illegal immigrants as 
possible into Palestine. Between 1939 and 1943 close to 20,000 illegal 
immigrants were smuggled into Palestine in addition to the 19,000 
"legal" ones. 14 It is perhaps very interesting to notice here that the 
White Paper, despite Zionist objections, did not damage the good 
relations between the two Allies nor did this alliance change the 
Zionist attitude towards the White Paper. Ben Gurion, a prominent 
Zionist leader, made this point very clear when he declared in 1939 
that: "We shall fight with Great Britain in this War as if there were no 
White Paper. And we shall fight the White Paper as if there were no 
War."IS 
The Zionists, however, did not fight against the Axis Powers for the 
sake of Britain but rather lito serve their own best interests,,16 namely 
the future establishment of a Jewish Army and a Jewish State. 
It is perhaps important to stress here that the process of protection, 
arming, military training and support of the Zionists by the British, 
from the early 1920s up to 1948 and the simultaneous process of 
suppression and disarming of the Palestinians played a decisive role in 
defeating the Palestinians and the Arabs in 1948. "The veterans of the 
Jewish Brigades became the nucleus of the future Israeli Army and the 
decisive factor of the Arab defeat,,17 in 1948-1949. 
Indeed the Zionists entered World War Two with Britain against Germany 
in the hope that the War would bring to them a Jewish State. Such a view 
was expressed frankly by Ben Gurion: liThe World War of 1914-1918 brought 
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us the Balfour Declaration. This time we have to bring about a Jewish 
State."18 The Zionists, however, not only hoped for a Jewish State but 
rather they worked for it. In May 1942 the American Zionists, for the 
first time explicitly defined their goal in what became known later as 
the Biltmore Program. 
"The Conference urges that the gate of Palestine be opened that the 
Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and 
with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country ....... and that 
Palestine be established as a Jewish commonwealth integrated into the 
structure of the new democratic World."19 
By the end of 1944 they were implementing new tactics. On the one hand 
the United States became the focus of their political activities, on the 
other they stepped up their terrorist attacks against the British 
Administration in Palestine. Such attacks were carried out by Zionist 
underground organizations such as Haganah, Irgun, and the Stern Gang. 
The exact numbers belonging to these terrorist organizations were not 
known but some estimates put the members of the Haganah alone at 
60,000. 20 
It is important to stress the fact that the Zionist attacks against 
the British Administration and forces in Palestine should not be 
understood as a national struggle of an indigenous population against an 
occupying enemy but rather sporadic terrorist attacks resulting from the 
conflict of interests between the Zionist settlers and their British 
sponsors. The aim of such attacks was not to cause casualties among the 
British but rather to attain political concessions. "Since early 1944 
Palestine, however, has been the scene of a series of outrages, crimes 
of violence by Jewish terrorists acting with the deliberate intention of 
bringing about by force developments favourable to the realisation of 
their pol itical aims. "21 
The Zionists political aim was the establishment of a Jewish State in 
Palestine. But the establishment of such a Jewish State would cause 
serious damage to Britain's economic and strategic interests in the Arab 
World. Such a conflict of interests between the settlers and their 
protector or mother country (Britain acted as a mother country to the 
Zionist settlers) is in some cases, according to the plural society 
theories, stronger than the conflict between the colonizers and the 
indigenous population. 22 
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It is important to note that despite the complaints and warnings from 
some British Chiefs of staff in Palestine about the moral effects of 
Zionist terrorist attacks on the British troops, the British Government 
was adamant in her position and refused to take any effective military 
measures against the Zionist terrorist organizations. 23 This British 
position was contrary to their position during the Palestinian revolt of 
1936-1939 when they used every possible measure to suppress the 
Palestinian Revolt. 
The British forces had reached 
100,000 troops by 1946 and were sufficient to crush the Zionist 
terrorist organizations if Britain wanted to. Only at the end of June 
1946 did the British seize the Zionist headquarters in Jerusalem and 
arrest 2,700 including most of the leaders of the Jewish Agency, but 
they were released at the end of same year. 24 
It is important to stress the fact that even the convicted Zionist 
terrorists were on some occasions released by the British Government and 
then even used in special missions in the Middle East and Europe. 
Arthur Koestler explains the relationship between the British forces 
and the Zionist terrorists as follows: "It became the practice to 
conclude agreements and formal truces between the Administration, .... on 
one hand and Haganah or Jewish terrorist groups on the other. Men were 
put into jail for life or for ten years, quietly released a year or two 
later, and put into British uniform to carry out some dangerous 
mission.,,25 Moreover the British Authorities knew about the Zionists 
efforts at illegal smuggling of arms and immigrants into Palestine from 
the early days of the Mandate but did nothing to stop it. Koestler 
states "That: the Haganah was buying illegal arms just as they were 
bringing in illegal refugees, was a fact known to the Administration for 
a quarter of a century, tolerated at periods, penalized at others, but 
certainly no news.,,26 
Contrary to the Palestinian position, the Zionists emerged from the 
War with a new national consciousness, a unity of purpose overriding 
party conflicts and internal feuds and with military forces capable of 
defeating not only the Palestinians but even the entire Arab forces. 
When the British commander of the British forces in Palestine was asked, 
by the Anglo-American Committee, what would happen if British troops 
were withdrawn from Palestine his answer was "If you were to withdraw 
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British troops, the Haganah would take over all Palestine tomorrow." 
Then he was asked: "But could the Haganah hold Palestine in such 
circumstances"? He answered, "Certainly they could hold it against the 
entire Arab World.,,27 
During World War Two the Zionists changed their political tactics. 
Instead of concentrating on Britain, they focused on the United States. 
They recognised the role of the United States in a future Middle East 
settlement and therefore they intended to play the Jewish votes to serve 
their cause in Palestine. "They threatened electoral punishment through 
the Zionist vote if the American Administration failed to support a 
Jewish State.,,28 The Zionist propaganda campaign in America was so 
successful that in 1942 and 1943 thirty three state legislatures passed 
pro-Zionist resolutions.,,29 The American Zionist Emergency Council 
established state and regional branches throughout the nation subdivided 
into a myriad local committees. 
Through an endless stream of books, pamphlets, letters to the editor, 
mass meetings and every other conceivable means of communication, the 
Zionists effectively won the support of many ordinary Americans 
disturbed by Jewish suffering and persecution under Nazi rule in Europe. 
One of their very influential organizations was the American Palestine 
Committee It included in its membership, "two thirds of the Senate, 200 
members of the House of Representatives and leaders of both major 
political parties and labour organizations.,,30 
In the presidential campaign of 1944, both political parties and their 
candidates, Roosevelt and Dewey, issued very strong pro-Zionist 
statements. On June 27th 1944 the Republican Party called for free 
Jewish immigration into Palestine. On October 15th, President Roosevelt 
promised, if re-elected to help bring about the establishment of 
Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. 31 
Palestine became at the end of World War Two an area of Anglo-American 
controversy. To Britain it seemed that the United States was prepared to 
sacrifice British strategic and economic interests on the alter of 
American domestic policies. 32 The British Government charged the 
Americans with being hypocritical in their campaign against the British 
immigration policy in Palestine. At a time when they demanded the 
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admission of the Jewish refugees into Palestine, a country for which 
America had no responsibility, they shut their own doors in their faces. 
The British beleived that such a demand "Seemed a way of easing American 
consciences over the refusal to admit significant numbers of Jewish 
refugees to the United States, and a means of diverting the problem to 
an area over which the United States had no responsibility.,,33 
The Arabs were angered by the Americans pro-Zionist statements. "The 
Arabs wanted to know why Americans were forcing open the gates of 
Palestine to Jewish refugees when they were so unwilling to open the 
doors of their own spacious country despite the fact that the United 
States could have absorbed far more refugees more quickly and 
efficiently than any country in the World.,,34 
The victory of the British Labour Party in the July, 1945 elections 
raised Zionist hopes because it had consistently backed the Zionist 
cause. For example, during the annual Party Conference of 1944, the 
Labour Party promised, if elected to office, to let Jews enter Palestine 
"in such numbers as to become a majority" and even contemplated the 
possibility of removing the Arabs to make room for the settlers.,,3S But 
when the Labour Party was demanded to assume full responsibility for its 
election promises, it found that it could not fulfil such promises on 
Palestine without causing serious damage to their national strategic and 
economic interests in the Arab World. 36 "Thus the Labour Party, much to 
its embarrassment, soon discovered that it could not fulfil its pledges 
to the Zionists.,,37 
The British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was convinced that much of 
the Zionist impetus came from British and American anti-Semites, who 
simply wanted the Jews in their midst removed to Palestine. After 
consulting the experts on the Palestine problem Bevin came to the 
conclusion that "Zionist demands were fundamentally unjust as well as 
contrary to Britain's national interests.,,38 Bevin believed that the 
solution to the Jewish refugee problem in Europe "should be resolved by 
reintegrating the Jews into European society rather than encouraging 
mass immigration into Palestine,,39 as the Americans and the Zionists 
wanted. On December 19th, 1944 an article which appeared in the New York 
Post showed a clear desire among the American people that the Jews 
should be encouraged to immigrate to Palestine rather than America. "It 
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would be better for the United States to have Palestine re-opened to the 
Jews than to have millions of them coming over here after the War as 
unassimil ated refugees. 1140 
Clearly there was now no chance of avoiding a British-American rift 
over the Palestine issue. Therefore, in October 1945 the United States 
and Britain agreed to establish a joint Anglo-American Committee to 
study the Palestine conflict and Jewish refugees problem. 
The Anglo- American Committee41 
Since there are several pieces of published and unpublished material 
about the Anglo-American Committee and because its report was never 
implemented, it seems sufficient for the purpose of this section to 
discuss its main recommendations, and more importantly, their practical 
implications and Arab reaction to them. 
In October 1945 an Anglo-American Committee, composed of six Britons 
and six Americans, was set up. The joint Committee was a better tool for 
solving the rift between Britain and the United States rather than for 
solving the Palestine conflict. Unfortunately the Jewish refugee problem 
in Europe was used as a cover up for the real aim behind the forming 
such a Committee. 
On the one hand America had no responsibility over Palestine but they 
used the Jewish refugees as a pretext to serve their domestic politics 
and to increase their influence in the Middle East. 42 Britain too used 
the Jews as a pretext to increase their influence in the area and later 
used them as a bargaining counter in order to receive economic aid from 
America. 43 
Both the United States and Britain indeed put their own interests 
before any humanitarian consideration or human suffering, be it by Jews 
or Arabs. As one member of the joint Committee, Crossman, put it, both 
British and American Governments had talked of humanity "but shut their 
doors to human suffering. 1144 The Palestinians rejected British and 
American claims that their support of Zioninst settlement in Palestine 
was purely on the grounds of humanitarian considerations. If that was 
true, the Arabs argued, then why did not the British and the Americans 
allow the Jews to immigrate to their own countries, larger and richer, 
rather than encouraging them to immigrate to a small country were they 
were neither welcome nor safe? 
liThe Arabs protested that there was no reason why they, the one race 
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sins of with no anti-semitic tradition, should have to bear the 
Christian Europe.,,45 The Arab argued that: "If the United State and 
Britain wished to atone for their failure to save European Jewry, they 
could best do so by accepting the survivors in their own countries, 
rather than in an Arab country like Palestine.,,46 
The first sign of British retreat from the policy of the 1939 White 
Paper, conceding to Zionist and American pressure, came on November 13th 
1945. The British Government sent individual notes to the Arab States 
asking their acquiescence in continued Jewish immigration to Palestine 
after the deadline date specified by the White Paper. 47 The British 
Government argued that an extention of immigration would be for the 
period required for the completion of the joint Committee's inquiries. 
It was, however, the first sign of Britain's using the Committee as a 
pretext to violate the White Paper policy on immigration. 
The Arabs, accustomed to such changes in British policies under Zionist 
pressure, informed the British Government through the Arab League that: 
"The Arabs will never be able to agree to a Jewish immigration emanating 
from Zionist pressure. ,,48 However, despite this Arab opposition, the 
British Government decided on 1st January 1946 that Jewish immigration 
must continue at the rate of 1,500 per month. 49 
Against this background of multi-conflict of interests between, 
British, Arabs, Americans and Zionists, the joint Committee began its 
inquiry in January 1946 in Washington. 50 To the astonishment of the 
Arabs the future of Palestine was now connected with the Jewish refugee 
problem in Europe. Since then the local conflict in Palestine between 
the Zionist settlers and the Palestinians has become an international 
issue. The Committee started their investigations in Washington, London, 
the refugee camps in Europe and Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. 
Extensive testimonies were presented by Arabs and Zionists and the 
Committee published their report in April 1946. 
The Anglo American Committee Report 
The Report was published on 20th April 1946 and included the following 
main points: 
Firstly, the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into 
Palestine. They justified such, recommendation on the grounds that there 
was "no country to which the great majority can go in the immediate 
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future other than Palestine. 51 
This of course was typical colonialist thinking. they knew that there 
were certain laws in their countries which were designed to protect the 
interests of their people against alien immigrants. Therefore, instead 
of recommending changing such rules and opening their countries to 
Jewish refugees, they wanted to solve the problem at the expense of 
other people who, according to their thinking, did not have or deserve 
to have rules to protect their interests against such alien 
immigrants. 52 
It must be remembered that the Jews had suffered under the Nazi and 
Fascist forces in Europe. But after the defeat of the Nazi there was no 
immediate threat to Jews in Western Europe. All displaced persons, 
including the Jews, came under the protection of the Allied forces. The 
British Government favoured the rehabilitation of all refugees and 
displaced persons in their European countries. 53 
But Zionist officials were at work in camps, urging all Jews to 
emigrate to Palestine. They discouraged Jews from the idea of emigration 
to America or integration into other European societies. 
"There had been organized Zionist propaganda in all camps, organized 
by the inmates, organized by the representatives of the American joint 
Distribution Committee and the Jewish Agency who were struggling 
desperately to maintain a declining morale, organized some times by the 
Rabbis attached to the American Army or by members of the (British) 
Jewish Brigade or by sympathetic UNRRA54 officials."55 
In a press conference General Morgan described the exodus of Jews from 
Europe as a "well organized positive plan." He described the young 
Jewish "infilitree" as "well dressed, well fed, rosy cheeked and having 
plenty of money .... They certainly do not look like persecuted people." 56 
The British Government expressed their concern that most of the Jewish 
'l't l't' "57 immigrants "were carefully selected for their ml 1 ary qua 1 les. 
Secondly, they recommended the abolition of the 1940 land regulation 
which sought to protect Palestinian tenants and its replacement by a 
regulation based on a policy of freedom in the sale of land irrespective 
or race or community. 
Thirdly, they recommended the extension of the British Mandate under 
United Nations Trusteeship with the gradual development of 
t ' t' of Jewish immigration self-governing institution, and the con lnua lon 
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according to Article 6 of the Mandate, pending the new trusteeship 
agreement from the United Nations. 
The future government was to be build on the three principles: 
1. That Arabs should not dominate Jews and vice-versa. 
2. That Palestine should be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab one. 
3. That the form of government ultimately to be established should be 
dependent on a constitution with international guarantees of the rights 
of both communities. 
Practically these recommendations put an effective end to the 1939 
White Paper. 
Palestinians, 
believed that 
These recommendations indeed came as a shock to certain 
especially the Nashashibi faction, and the Arabs who 
Britain would stick to their promise and allow the 
establishment of a Palestinian state according to the terms of the White 
Paper. It also strengthened the position of the Palestinian extremists 
who rejected the White Paper on the ground that Britain, anyhow, would 
not fulfil its pledges to the Palestinians and therefore, there was no 
point in accepting them. 
The fluctuation of British policies towards Palestine and the feeling 
which it caused among the Palestinians of being ignored, not listened to 
and discriminated against is perhaps one of the reasons which created a 
common belief among the Palestinians and the Arabs that Britain was 
completely responsible for the creation of the Palestine conflict. 58 
Indeed such a feeling was one of the fundamental causes of the Palestine 
conflict during the Mandate period and perhaps one of the main causes 
which prevented the Arabs and the British from reaching an agreement. As 
an Arab witness put it, for the Palestinians "Zionisim was an imposition 
(by Britain) on the Arabs of an alien way of life which they resented 
and to which they would never submit." 59 
The Arab Reaction to the Report 
The Palestinians reaction to the Report was similar to their reaction 
to the previous British proposals, namely that Palestine was an Arab 
country inhabited by an Arab majority and neither Zionists nor the great 
powers had any rights to impose alien settlement or create a Jewish 
b 1· d th t lithe only State against their wishes. The Palestinians e leve a 
solution lay in a Palestinian State with an Arab majority who would 
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guarantee the equal rights of Jewish citizenship."60 The Palestinians 
argued that it was not possible to establish a Jewish State in Palestine 
without dislodging its inhabitants: liThe logic of facts is inexorable. 
It shows that no room can be made in Palestine for a second nation 
except by dislodging or exterminating the nation in possession." 61 
The problem of the Palestinians was that they did not have any 
alternative means, other than words, to press their demands. Divided as 
they always were without any self-government to represent them and 
deprived of an able leadership capable of mobilising them militarily or 
politically, they condemned themselves to the role of spectators without 
any real influence on the development of the Palestine conflict after 
the War specially between 1940 and 1947. 
It was the position of a powerless native population against 
determined Zionist settlers, supported by two great powers Britain and 
the U.S.A. That position, however, was partly their own creation. The 
Palestinian leaders, despite the defeat of their Revolt by the British 
forces, declined to accept the 1939 White Paper which provided them with 
a legal political status and a valuable opportunity to develop the 
political organizations necessary for leading the people into the post 
War era. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the Palestinians emerged from the War 
practically without any effective political or military organization and 
consequently eliminated themselves from the scene of power-politics in 
Palestine. 
The Report itself was received with anger and frustration among the 
Palestinians and the Arab people. The Arab Governments responded to 
public pressure and held a summit meeting in Inchass, Egypt on May 
27-28, 1946. The heads of the State of Egypt, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia 
and the Yemen published a statement, at the end of their conference, 
warning Britain and America that, although the Arabs wanted their 
friendship, that friendship would depend on whether the two powers would 
or would not transgress upon the rights of the Palestine Arabs. The 
statement stressed that: "Palestine is an inseparable part of the Arab 
Countries and the Arab States consider the implementation of the Report 
as an act of aggression directed to them and that they will use all 
necessary measures to defend Palestine.,,62 
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There is no doubt about the sincerity of the Arab States intentions 
and concern to help and support the Palestinians against the British and 
the Zionists. But did they have the capability to provide the required 
material support for the Palestinians? The evidence suggests that they 
did not. Egypt and Transjordan for instance were at the time still under 
British control and they themselves were not able to get rid of British 
domination. Saudi Arabia and Yemen had hardly, at that time, any army at 
all. 
Therefore such statements, in my view, similar to ones which still 
occur at the present time, damage more than benefit the Palestinian 
cause. It gave the Palestinians false expectations such as, that they 
were part of a large Arab nation which in the end would win the dispute, 
and it gave the Zionists an ideal propaganda ingredient: that they were 
facing a large Arab nation and they therefore, deserved support and 
sympathy from World Jewry and Western democracies. 
It must be noticed here that such statements were typical traditional 
leaders' threats to a colonial power which had never been carried out 
and therefore they were, in most cases, ignored by the British 
Government. Therefore the British government in most cases disregarded 
them. 
However, the Arab League held an extraordinary meeting in Bludan, 
Syria in June 1946 during which they passed resolutions: 63 
1. To set up a special Committee to supervise all activities relating 
to Palestine. 
2. To tighten the Arab boycott of Zionist products. 
3. To send notes to Britain and the United States opposing the 
recommendations of the Anglo-Americans Committee's Report. 
4. To refuse all kinds of Partition and demand that Britain should 
negotiate with the Arab states on the future of Palestine or refer the 
problem to the United Nations. 
The British Government responded to these statement by inviting both 
the Arabs and the Zionists to a Conference to be held in London on lOth 
September 1946. 
Before I move on to discuss the London Conference, it seems necessary 
to highlight the Zionist, British and American responses to the Report. 
Both Zionists and American leaders had only accepted the Committee's 
recommendation regarding the admission of 100,000 settlers into 
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Palestine. They gave no indication that they would accept the rest of 
the recommendations. 64 
The British Government argued that they were prepared to accept the 
figure of 100,000 Zionist settlers but only on certain conditions. In 
the first place it must be clear that immigration must not start until 
disarmament of the Jews had taken place. The British Government 
explained to the Americans that many of the new arrivals in Palestine 
"were not refugees at all. They were young men specially selected by the 
Jewi sh Agency for mil i tary purposes." 65 
On May 1st Attlee, then Prime Minister, confirmed publicly in the 
House of Commons that the disarmament of illegal Zionist armies66 were 
prior conditions to the entry of the refugees. Therefore a major 
disagreement developed between Britain and the United States over 
Palestine. As a way out of this deadlock Britain suggested holding joint 
consultations between British and American experts to study the best 
ways for implementing the Report. 
In the 13th July 1946 an American team led by Henry F. Grady (deputy 
to the Secretary of State) and a British team led by Herbert Morrison 
(leader of the House of Commons) started their first working session. 
The two teams agreed on a plan67 to convert the Mandate into a British 
United Nations Trusteeship. Under the Trusteeship Palestine would be 
divided into four Jewish and Arab provinces and purely British 
Administration areas composed of the districts of Jerusalem and the 
Negab. There would be provisional autonomy with certain powers reserved 
for the central Government, such as, foreign relations, defence, justice 
and taxation. The provinces might evolve into either a unitary, 
bi nat i ona 1 state, or two separate soverei gn states. In pure ly 
inter-community affairs the two provinces would develop representative 
institution that would lead to self-government. Final control over 
immigration would rest with the central government but in the end would 
be left to governments of the Arab and Jewish provinces. On July 25 1946 
the plan was endorsed by the two expert teams, and hoping that President 
Truman would endorse it, Britain invited Arabs and Zionists to attend a 
Conference in September 1946 in London. 
The London 
In a final, 
through direct 
Conference68 
desperate attempt to resolve 
negotiations between the Arabs 
-247-
the Palestine conflict 
and the Zionists, on July 
25th 1946, Britain invited the Arab Governments, the Arab Higher 
Committee for Palestine, and the Jewish Agency to attend a Conference 
beginning in September 1946 in London. While the Arab States accepted 
the invitation, the Arab Higher Committee accepted the invitation on 
condition that Britain would allow their leader Haj Amin to attend the 
Conference, a thing which was rejected by the British Government and 
therefore, they did not participate. The Jewish Agency also refused to 
attend because Britain would not accept its conditions, namely that 
their Partition plan69 would be the sole item on the Conference agenda 
and the release of their jailed leaders. The Conference was opened by 
the British Prime Minister Attlee on September 9, 1946. 
At the first business session the Foreign Secretary, Bevin, asked the 
Arab delegation to view Palestine in its international setting. He 
stressed the fact that Britain could not any more decide the future of 
Palestine without consulting the United States. lilt was impossible to 
isolate the Middle East from the rest of the World and our diplomatic 
relations there formed part of a single network from which they could 
not be detached ... neither we nor the Arabs could afford to disregard 
entirely the wishes of the American people and their government." lO 
It must be borne in mind that the United States had nothing to do with 
Palestine at that time and therefore their interference in Palestine's 
affairs was not acceptable to the Arabs, and is still not today. Why 
should the future of Palestine be decided by a foreign country like the 
United States which had no connection whatsoever with that country? This 
conception namely that the whole problem was imposed upon the 
Palestinians by foreigners against their wishes was and still is one of 
the main causes of the conflict. 
Bevin next introduced the provincial autonomy plan, the Morrison Grady 
Plan,71 or the expert recommendations. The Plan was attacked immediately 
by the Syrian representative Faris el Khouri. l2 In his view, the Plan 
contained unacceptable principles. Firstly, it divided the country into 
four separately administered units, whereas the Palestinians wanted a 
national government for the whole of Palestine; secondly, it contained 
provision for further immigration without Arab consent; thirdly, the 
proposal would clearly lead to the formation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine, something which would not be acceptable to the Arabs. 
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At their next meeting, on September 12, each Arab delegate rejected 
the Morrison Grady Plan in turn and almost all gave the same reasons 
namely that Britain had already more than fulfilled her obligations to 
the Zionists, and that her main obligation now was defined by the 1939 
White Paper, which had promised the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state in the whole of Palestine. 73 
On September 16 Bevin informed the Arab delegations that the White 
Paper of 1939 was no longer available for discussion and therefore they 
had to consider only the new proposals which had not been put forward as 
a bargaining position but nin the belief that they represented a 
reasonable and workable solution. n74 
It is worth mentioning here that time was working to the Zionists' 
advantage and 
previ ous deal 
instance, the 
not to the Palestinian's advantage. In most cases the 
or proposal was much better than the latest one. For 
1937 Partition scheme was better than the 1947 one, the 
White Paper of 1939 was much better than the provincial autonomy plan of 
1946 and the situation before 1967 was much better than the situation 
today. 
It seems that although on each occasion the Arabs lost some parts of 
the previous deal, they refused to compromise on the principles of 
justice, equality and the right to self-determination. The Palestinians 
always gambled on time and on potential Arab unity which would one day 
become a reality and consequently enable them to achieve a settlement 
according to their terms. 75 This, however, does not mean that the 
Palestinians were naive or did not know what the consequences would be, 
rather it seems to me that the Palestinians believe that Palestine is 
their country and according to all democratic measures they have the 
right to live there and establish a form of government which would 
represent them. All loss of land, property and the social and economic 
hardships which had been inflicted upon them, as a result of Zionist 
settlement, were not, in their view, sufficient reasons for surrendering 
their legitimate rights .. 
To outsiders this position might appear unrealistic but it seems to me 
that this Palestinian position is a true reflection of their deep 
feeling toward the justice of their cause. The Palestinians believed 
that if they compromised on this basic principle it would mean that they 
had surrendered their legitimate rights simply because they could not 
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defend their country. They would be indeed the first people in history 
who surrendered their right to their country because they had lost a 
military battle with their enemies. 
This also would set a precedent in the world namely: if a powerful 
country occupied part of another it could annex it - something which is 
not, until now, acceptable in international law and the U.N. Charter. 
However, the Conference was unable to make any real progress and 
therefore the Arabs submitted their own proposals76 providing for the 
creation of an independent unitary state, in accordance with a 
constitution to be laid down by an elected constituent assembly. The 
Jews would enjoy guaranteed minority rights and political rights 
according to their numerical proportion. "The representation of Arabs 
and Jews in the provisional government would be without prejudice to the 
proportions to be determined in the constitution for the representation 
of the Arabs and Jews in the legislative assembly.,,77 
These proposals provided hard evidence of the Arabs' genuine intention 
and desire to share the administration of Palestine with the Palestinian 
Jews. They are contrary to the popular belief in the West that the 
Palestinians wanted to expel all the Jews from Palestine or throw them 
into the sea. 78 The Arab proposals also provided for the protection of 
the Holy Places and for the concluding of a treaty of alliance with 
Britain. The British Government needed time to study the Arab proposals 
and in the hope that the Palestinians and the Zionists would change 
their minds and participate in the Conference they adjourned the 
Conference until January 1947. 
Soon after the British had suspended the London Conference, President 
Truman rejected the Morrison-Grady plan and announced his support for a 
solution on the lines of a Partition Plan proposed by the Zionists. 
On 4th October, 1946, Truman published a policy statement to this 
effect: 
"The Jewish Agency proposed a solution of the Palestine problem by 
means of the creation of a viable Jewish State in control of its own 
immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine 
instead of in the whole of Palestine. It proposed further the immediate 
issuance of certificates for 100,000 Jewish immigrants .... It is my 
belief that a solution along these lines would command the support of 
public opinion in the United States .... To such a solution our Government 
-250-
could give its support.,,79 
The decisive factor prompting Truman's statement had, according to 
Cohen,80 been the Democratic Party's need to mobilize the Jewish vote 
for the approaching mid-term Congressional elections due in November 
1946. Acheson, however, disagrees with Cohen and argues that Truman was 
actually concerned about the fate of the displaced Jews in Europe and 
"never took or refused to take steps in our foreign relations to benefit 
his or his party's fortunes.,,8l 
In any case, the Jewish vote was important in American elections but 
it was certainly not the only factor which decided American policy 
towards Palestine. According to Bethell the British Government had 
looked suspiciously at the American pro-Zionist statement and considered 
it as the "first step in an American bid for Middle East supremacy. It 
seemed a total surrender to the Zionist credo, a gesture that went far 
beyond the President's electoral requirements.,,82 
Bethell argues that the United States used her Jewish citizens to 
build a bridge to the Zionist settlers in Palestine "to establish an 
American base in Palestine that would serve American interests rather 
than British.,,83 
It seems to me that it was a combination of the value of the Jewish 
vote in American elections and America's interests in the area which 
decided the shape of American policy in Palestine before 1948 and it 
seems that these two in combination are still playing the same role in 
influencing United States policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict until 
the present day. 
By October 1946 it seems that the Zionists had made up their minds not 
to accept less than a viable Jewish State in part of Palestine and that 
the American President would not accept any other solution. The London 
Times commented on the new development and the American position in the 
Palestine conflict as follows: "President Truman's latest pronouncement 
on Palestine affords further evidence of his sympathy with the ideas of 
certain Jewish groups exercising great influence upon public opinion in 
the United States at a time when public issues are about to be brought 
to the test of a congressional election. This attitude formerly caused 
him to refuse hi s support to the "Morri son Pl an", in spi te of its 
endorsement by British and American experts when it proved unacceptable 
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to Jewish sentiment ... In the President's view the sole importance of 
the London Conference seems to lie in the possibility it offers of 
reconciling the Morrison Plan with the Jewish project for a viable 
Jewish State. He does not recognize that the Arabs also have a case to 
which the London Conference has rightly devoted attention." The comment 
goes on to say that the President's statement would compel both Arabs 
and British to the reluctant conclusion that "no solution of the 
Palestine Question will satisfy the President unless it goes the whole 
way to meet Jewish claims.,,84 
The other important development which took place in October 1946 was 
in the British position. On 4th October 1946 Creech Jones "a 
self-confessed Zionist" replaced Hall as colonial secretary. "In all 
probabil i ty, the change was des i gned to appease the Zion i sts. "85 As a 
good-will gesture to the Zionists the new colonial Secretary ordered the 
release of 2,700 Zionist terrorists from jail, and the return of illegal 
immigrants to Palestine from Cypriot camps (about 2,800 immigrants). 
British military searching of Jewish settlements had been stopped, 
recruitment for the Jewish police was allowed to continue and the 
British military commander, General Barker, was removed from his post 
because he ordered his troops to stop their "social contacts" with the 
Jews as a punishment for their terrorist attacks on the British forces. 
The British Government hoped that these measures would win over the 
moderates in the Zionist leadership and would encourage them to 
participate in the second phase of the London Conference. But it seems 
to me that this was the first sign of the British giving in to Zionist 
and American pressure and the acceptance of a solution on Zionist terms. 
In December and January of 1946-1947 the British Government became 
divided on the Palestine issue. The Foreign Office, led by Bevin, worked 
towards the creation of a genuine unity or binational state which they 
hoped would preserve British influence in the Middle East through 
Anglo-Arab friendship. The Colonial Office, on the other hand, believed 
that Partition was the best solution because it would eliminate any 
confrontation with the Americans, which might affect American financial 
aid and secondly longterm friendship of the Zionists was more 
" 86 important and guaranteed than that of the Arabs. 
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However, the British Government did not commit themselves to either 
side but rather decided to invite both Arabs and Zionsts to the second 
stage of the London Conference. When the London Conference was resumed 
on 27th January 1947, only the Arab states and the Arab Higher Committee 
attended while the Zionists refused to participate. The Conference 
dragged on until 7th February without significant progress since the 
Arab insisted on their demand for a unitary state and the Zionists 
through their informal talks insisted on their demand - a viable Jewish 
State in part of Palestine. The British therefore, submitted their final 
proposals to both sides and made it clear that if these proposals were 
not accepted the problem would be referred to the United Nations. 
The British proposals or "Bevin Plan,,8? as it became known later was a 
combination of British (provincial autonomy) Arab (unitary state) and 
basic Jewish demands on immigration and land sales. According to the 
Plan there would be a five year trusteeship regime supervised by the 
Trusteeship Council in which Palestine would be prepared for 
independence as a binational State. Instead of provincial autonomy there 
would be cantons determined by Arab or Jewish majorities. The cantons 
were not necessarily contiguous and were more restricted in autonomous 
government than the scheme for provincial autonomy. Within these cantons 
immigration and land sales would be decided by the local authorities and 
therefore, the 100,000 Jewish settlers would be admitted to Palestine 
within two years while the Arab local government would have the right to 
prevent any Jewish immigration to its area. 
The Jewish Agency rejected this Plan and declared that it would not 
accept less than a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of 
Palestine. 88 For the Palestinians the fundamental point was that 
Palestine should no longer be denied the independence which had now been 
attained by every other Arab State, and that, in accordance with the 
acceptable principle of democracy, the Palestinian majority should be 
free to determine the future destiny of the country. They regarded the 
expansion of the Jewish Home as jeopardising the attainment of national 
independence which was desired by all Palestinians and Arab States. 89 
They therefore, demanded that a democratic government should be 
established in Palestine representing all the inhabitants of the country 
and opposed any kind of Partition. 
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After October 1946 the Zionists' point of view, supported by the 
U.S.A., became the decisive factor in determining the future of 
Palestine. The Zionists made it clear that they wanted a Jewish state in 
a viable part of Palestine. The British Government, on the one hand, was 
in need of U.S.A. economic aid and if they did not give the Zionists 
what they wanted such aid would not be possible. On the other hand, if 
Britain conceded to the Zionists' demand she would lose some of her 
interests in the Arab Countries. Therefore Britain sought a solution 
which would guarantee her interests in both the U.S.A. and the Arab 
Countries, namely a U.N. solution which would relieve Britain of her 
direct responsibility for a solution. 
The British Cabinet met on 14th February 1947 to discuss the problem 
and it was decided to reject the schemes proposed by both the Arabs and 
the Zionists. On 18th February the Foreign Secretary, Bevin, told the 
House of Commons: "We have decided that we are unable to accept the 
schemes put forward either by the Arabs or by the Jews or to impose 
ourselves a solution of our own. We have, therefore, reached the 
conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem 
to the judgement of the United Nations ... We do not intend ourselves to 
recommend any particular solution.,,90 
On April 12, 1947 the British Government formally requested the 
Secretary General of the United Nations to discuss the problem of 
Palestine in a special session of the General Assembly as I will show in 
the next Chapter. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The Palestinians entered the 1940s without any effective military or 
political organization to represent them before the British Government 
or to mobilize them in a national resistance movement against the 
colonization of their country. At the end of 1939 the British forces 
succeeded in defeating the Palestine Revolt and the British Government 
banned all their national organizations and political parties. Most of 
their important leaders fled the country, were arrested by the British 
or killed during the three year Revolt. The Palestinian leaders who 
remained in Palestine were divided and weak to the extent that they were 
busy fighting among themselves rather than organizing the people to 
resist British rule. However, between 1943 and 1946 the British 
Government granted partial immunity to most of the leaders and l~f~ed 
the ban on political activities. But despite this the Palestlnlan 
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leaders failed to re-establish an effective political leadership or 
revive their revolt and, therefore, the Palestine issue passed from 
their hands to the hands of the independent Arab states. This situation 
was confirmed in 1945 when the Arab League was established and started 
to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians with the British Government 
and from that date the Palestine issue became an Arab rather than a 
Palestinian one. 
In contrast the Zionists during the same period shifted most of their 
political activities to the U.S.A. and by 1944 they had won over the 
U.S.A. to their side. On the other hand, they strengthend their military 
power through new recruits and participation within the Allied forces or 
by separate Jewish Brigade within the British forces. Despite the fact 
that establishment of the Zionist forces was not possible without 
British assistance they were used, between 1944 and 1947, in an active 
terrorist campaign against the British Administration in Palestine and 
inflicted heavy casualties among the British forces in the country. 
Palestinian military and political power vis-a'-vis the Zionist 
settlers in the 1930s was reversed in the 1940s. In the 1930s the 
British Government viewed the Arab political, economic, military and 
strategic value more important than the Zionist value. Therefore their 
proposals for solving the conflict were more favourable to the Arabs 
than to the Zionists. This situation was reversed in the 1940s when the 
British considered Zionist military and political value more important 
than the Arabs. Consequently they recommended or accepted proposals more 
favourable to the Zionists than to the Arabs. 
Britain emerged from the War economically exhausted and needed 
American economic aid rather than Arab support. And because the 
Americans by this time had been won to the side of the Zionist Britain 
had to accept a settlement on Zionist and American rather than Arab 
terms if she was to get American aid. 
After 1944 the American Government became deeply involved in the 
Palestine affair. And under strong American pressure the British 
Government accepted the establishment of a joint Anglo-American 
Commission to study the conflict. The Anglo-American Commission was in 
fact a tool which was used by both governments firstly, to solve their 
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own differences and secondly, to work out the best way of solving the 
Jewish refugee problem in Europe, rather than solving the real conflict 
between Arabs and Zionists in Palestine. The Anglo-American Commission 
after connecting the Palestine local conflict with the Jewish refugee 
problem in Europe (a Zionist demand) recommended the immediate admission 
of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, the abolition of the 1940 land 
regulations and the extension of the British Mandate under U.N. 
Trusteeship with gradual development of self-governing institutions. 
The Palestinians saw in these recommendations a reverse of the policy 
of the 1939 White Paper and therefore they rejected them. They argued 
that Palestine could not absorb such large numbers of immigrants and if 
the British and the Americans were so sympathetic to the Jewish refugees 
why did they not allow them to emigrate to their own countries? 
The Zionists only accepted the first recommendation and concentrated 
their propaganda pressure on the British Government to open the doors of 
Palestine for them. The Americans too required Britain to allow the 
suggested number to enter the country immediately. However, the British 
demanded that the report should be implemented as a whole and they could 
not, for security reasons, allow the 100,000 immigrants to enter 
Palestine before the complete disarming of the Zionists. 
As a way out of this deadlock a joint team of Anglo-American experts 
met in London to find an acceptable way to implement the Report. They in 
fact agreed on a solution which implied the establishment of four Arab 
and Jewish provinces with the political, economic, taxation and security 
matters resting with a central government. 
The British Government, hoping that this scheme would gain the approval 
of the U.S.A. Government, invited both Arabs and Zionists to a yet 
another London Conference. Only the Arab states attended the Conference 
while both Palestinians and Zionists rejected the invitation. But 
without Palestinian and Zionist participation it was doubtful if 
anything positive would came out of the Conference. Indeed, the British 
Government adjourned the Conference without reaching any agreement with 
the Arabs. 
. kly that President At the end of 1946, things were developing so qU1C 
support for a Zionist Partition scheme and Truman declared publicly his 
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demanded the British Government to consider it as the only basis for 
settlement, doing away with the provincial scheme which was approved by 
his own experts. In a final effort the British Government invited again 
both Arabs and Zionists to resume the adjourned London Conference. Both 
representatives of Arab states and Palestinians attended it while the 
Zionists boycotted it. During the second phase of the Conference the 
British Government proposed the establishment of Arab and Jewish cantons 
according to the majority of their Arab or Jewish inhabitants with the 
possibility of developing these cantons into binational, federal or 
independent states. 
The Arabs rejected this proposal and demanded the implementation of 
the White Paper. Against this background the British Government referred 
the Palestine problem to the U.N. which recommended the partition of the 
country between Arabs and Jews. The U.N. Partition Scheme was seen by 
many as an opportunity for a lasting settlement. What was it and why did 
not the Arab take that opportunity? This will be the subject of the next 
Chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Palestinian Responses to the U.N. Proposals to Solve 
the Palestine Conflict 1947-1948 
Introduction 
The practical result of thirty years of British rule in Palestine 
was the creation of a Plural Society with two different and segregated 
communities, the Palestinians and the Zionist settlers. The conflict 
between the native Arabs and the Zionist settlers started at the 
beginning of this settlement and grew wider and wider over time until it 
became clear, even to the British Government, that there was no hope for 
reconciliation between the two communities. 
As we have seen in the previous Chapters, the British Government tried 
to solve the conflict by partition, single state or cantonization 
solutions. But when her proposals were rejected by both Arabs and 
Zionists, she issued a White Paper implying the establishment of an 
independent Palestine state within a ten year period regardless of Arab 
or Zionist objections. But soon after the end of World War Two Britain 
found herself unable to carry out the White Paper policy without causing 
serious damage to her relations with the U.S.A. The Zioninsts succeeded, 
during the War period, to win the U.S.A.' support for their demand to 
abrogate the White Paper's policy, to connect the Jewish refugee problem 
with the conflict in Palestine, and more importantly to endorse a 
Zionist Partition scheme for the establishment of a Jewish state in a 
viable area in Palestine. 
In 1945 the British Government conceded to American pressure to have a 
say in Palestine affairs, and a joint Anglo-American Commission was 
formed to study the problem. As we have seen in Chapter Seven, the 
Commission recommended the continuation of the Mandate under U.N. 
Trusteeship, the admission of more Jewish immigrants, and the abolition 
of the 1940 restrictions on land sales to the Zionists. This practically 
meant the abolition of the White Paper policy. While the Arabs rejected 
the Report the British and the Americans differed in their 
interpretation of it and the best ways of implementing it. The Americans 
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and the Zionists demanded the imediate immplementation of the first 
recommendation of the Report, the admission of 100,000 immigrants. The 
British insisted on implementing the Report as a whole, instead of 
selected parts, and put as a precondition to the admission of those 
immigrants the disarming of the Zionist terrorist organizations. 
Therefore two Anglo-American teams of experts met in London to try to 
solve these differences. They agreed that the best way to implement the 
Anglo-American Report was by establishing autonomous Arab and Jewish 
provinces with a central government in charge of security and foreign 
affairs. 
Against this background and in the hope that the American Government 
would endorse these proposals, the British Government invited both Arabs 
and Zionists to yet another London Conference in the Summer of 1946. The 
Conference was held in two phases, September to October 1946, and 
January to February 1947. Only the Arabs and the British participated in 
the Conference, the Zionists boycotted it. During the first phase of the 
Conference, the British Government proposed the establishment of Arab 
and Jewish cantons according to whether there was an Arab or a Zionist 
majority with the possibility of developing these cantons into 
bi-national, federal or independent Arab and Jewish states. These 
proposals were rejected by the Arabs who demanded complete independence 
or at least the implementation of the White Paper's policy. The British 
Government adjourned the Conference until January 1947 in the hope that 
both Palestinians and Zionists would participate in its proceedings. But 
on October 1946 President Truman publicly announced his support for a 
Partition Scheme suggested by the Zionists and requested the British 
Government to consider the plan as the only basis for solving the 
problem. Since that date the fate of Palestine was determined by the 
influence of the U.S.A. on Britain and later on the U.N. 
The problem which faced the British Government was this: how could 
she find a solution which would satisfy the Arabs, the Zionists, the 
Americans and at the same time secure her own interests in the area? 
Britain in fact was faced with an uneasy situation and she had to make a 
h 'd f "Jewish decision. Britain actually adopted and supported tel ea 0 a 
"J . h Horne" woul d Horne" in Palestine because she thought that such a eW1S 
provide her with a good pretext to stay in Palestine for a long time and 
th h le Middle East. But she consequently maintain her influence over e W 0 
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soon realised that the "Jewish Home" idea had become the very reason why 
the Arabs demand her departure from their countries and would 
consequently lead to the loss of the vital economic and strategic 
interests which she sought to protect. More over Britain realised that 
she had moral obligations towards those Zionist settlers who came under 
her encouragement and protection and that she could not leave the 
country without ensuring their absolute safety. 
After World War Two both Arabs and Zionists demanded that the British 
Government terminate the Mandate and quit Palestine. On the one hand, 
the Palestinians thought and expected that after the departure of the 
British they would be able to force their will on the Zionist settlers 
in Palestine and impose a settlement which would satisfy their basic 
demands, namely an independent Palestine with an Arab majority and 
guaranteed rights for the Jewish minority. On the other hand, the 
Zionists thought that they had the military power not only to protect 
themselves but also to establish a Jewish state if not in all of 
Palestine at least in a viable area of the country. They made it clear 
politically that they did not need British protection any more and 
followed this by terrorist attacks on the British Administration and 
forces in a designed move to force the British out of Palestine 
especially after they had secured the support of the United States of 
America for their demands. 1 
The British position in Palestine became therefore desperate and they 
wanted to withdraw from the country with the least possible damage to 
their relations with both sides. Therefore, Britain looked to the United 
Nations as the best place to study and recommend a solution to the 
conflict which would guarantee British interests, and the security of 
the Zionist settlers. At the same time Britain would not appear 
responsible for it or for its implementation. Their representative to 
the U.N. made this very clear when he explained that: "We should not 
have the sole responsibility for enforcing a solution which is not 
accepted by both parties and which we cannot reconcile with our 
consc i ence. ,,2 
The British representative knew that there was no solution which would 
satisfy both parties since his own government had not been able to find 
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one or at least claimed so, over a period of 30 years, but he put it 
here clearly as a pretext for rejecting any solution which would not 
guarantee British influence in the country. Hurewitz argues that Britain 
had put such unrealistic conditions in order to be able to stay in 
Palestine especially after a growing desire for expansion in the area by 
the Russians3 
The transfer of the Palestine conflict to the United Nations, however, 
gave no advantages to the Palestinians. They did not have the support of 
a super power or any influential power in the United Nations. It made it 
extremely difficult for them to reject a resolution supported by a 
majority in the organization, and if they did so they would be isolated 
and without any real support from the international community. 
The Zionists, on the contrary, had obvious advantages. They already 
had the support of the United States for the establishment of a Jewish 
State in a viable area in Palestine and British approval for such a 
state, at least in principle, but perhaps in a smaller area. 4 Finally a 
Jewish state suggested by the United Nations would be difficult for the 
British and the Arabs to reject and it would give the Zionists moral 
support from the international community. 
It can be argued that the transfer of the Palestine conflict to the 
United Nations was similar to the transfer of the problem to the League 
of Nations in 1922. Britain used the League of Nations in 1922 as a tool 
to endorse and give some kind of legality to their policy in Palestine 
and in carrying out the policy of the Balfour Declaration. 
The United Nations was used as a similar tool in 1947 to endorse the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine along the lines of a 
Zionist partition scheme suggested in 1946 and publically endorsed by 
the U.S.A. and approved in principle by Britain. S As the League of 
Nations endorsed the British Jewish Home policy in 1922, the U.N. 
endorsed, under American influence, a partition plan favourable to the 
Zionists. 
Since, however, most of the materials concerning the Palestine problem 
before the United Nations could be found in the United Nations records 
it seems to me that it is perhaps sufficient for the purpose of this 
Chapter to discuss the United Nations' major proposals to solve the 
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problem and the Palestinians reaction to them. The U.N. Partition Plan 
was seen as a good but lost opportunity for a lasting settlement. If 
this was true the following questions arise: What was it and what was 
the Arabs' response to it? Did the United Nations' solution reflect the 
wishes of the inhabitants of Palestine? Or was it simply a modified 
draft of previous British proposals? Why did the United Nations not 
implement its recommendation or resolution? Did the Palestinians suggest 
any solution? 
The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)6 
Britain requested the United Nations on 2nd April 1947, to summon a 
special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting 
and instructing a special committee to study the Palestine conflict and 
to prepare recommendations for the future government of Palestine. 7 It 
had not been usual for Britain to request an international body to form 
a committee to study the future government of any other Arab Mandated 
country such as Iraq and Transjordan. Rather Britain transferred the 
Administration in each case to a local government and then recommended 
its acceptance in the League of Nations or in the United Nations. 
It seems therefore that the British objective from setting up an 
investigative body, despite their full knowledge of the root of the 
conflict, was to deprive the Palestinians of their right to independence 
and perhaps to appear as a neutral party in the eyes of both Arabs and 
Zionists. The immediate implication of forming such a commission was the 
deprivation of the Palestinian majority of their basic right to 
self-determination. Therefore it became clear from the outset that, once 
the terms of reference of the Commission were not based on the principle 
of justice and the right to self-determination, the Commission had 
little chance of recommending any solution which would be acceptable to 
the Arabs. 
From the beginning, Britain and the United States rejected an Arab 
suggestion to include on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly a 
supplementary item concerning the termination of the Mandate over 
Palestine and the declaration of its independence. 8 Not only was the 
Arab request voted down, as a result of British and American rejection, 
but the latter succeeded in deciding the composition of the proposed 
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inquiry committee and its terms of reference, which included matters far 
removed from the local conflict between Palestinians and Zionists in 
Palestine, such as the Jewish refugee problem in Europe. 9 It is worth 
noting here that this was clear evidence for the strong American 
influence on the U.N. which was similar to their influence over the 
Anglo-American Commission which I have discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Britain and the United States also rejected the inclusion of any 
member of the Big-Five powers or the Arab states in the membership of 
the projected committee because of their "Special interests", but in 
fact to make their influence over the Commission's members easier. The 
British and Americans demanded the composition of the committee be from 
"neutral countries."IO Despite Arab objections to both the composition 
of the Commi ss i on and its terms of reference: "The Angl o-Ameri can vi ew 
was upheld in the end. "II 
The Arab Higher Committee informed the United Nations that they would 
not be able to cooperate with the Special Committee and stated the 
following reasons for this position.I 2 
1. The Committee had a wide range of terms of reference including the 
Jewish refugee problem in Europe, which should not be included in the 
investigations. 
2. The United Nations refused to insert the termination of the Mandate 
and the declaration of independence in the agenda of the special session 
and the terms of reference of the special committee. 
Fi na 11 y they declared that: " Pal est i ne Arabs ' natural ri ghts are 
self-evident and cannot continue to be subject to investigation but 
deserve to be recognized on the basis of the principles of the United 
Nations",13 namely, the right of every people to self-determination. It 
;s worth noting that the Arab states disagreed with the Arab Higher 
Committee's decision and agreed to co-operate with UNSCOP. 
The UNSCOP Report I4 
The members of the special Committee arrived in Palestine on 14th and 
15th June 1947. By 31st August, they completed their investigations and 
submitted their Report to the General Assembly of the U.N. After 
analysing the problem and summarizing the main solutions previously 
'd' 'nciples 
advanced, 
provided 
the committee unanimously endorsed eleven gU1 1ng pr1 , 
for the termination of the Mandate, independence for Palestine 
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after a transitional period during which administration of the country 
would be the responsibility of the United Nations, and for the 
preservation of the Holy Places. A twelfth principle was approved (with 
two members dissenting and one recording no opinion) providing that "In 
the appraisal of the Palestine question, it be accepted as 
incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as 
a solution of the Jewish problem." 
The Committee's Report was a collection of some of the previous 
British proposals and contained two main suggestions: 
1. A Plan of Partition with economic union supported by seven members 
of the Committee; Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, 
Sweden, and Uruguay.I5 This Plan divided Palestine into an Arab state, a 
Jewish state, and an International Zone of Jerusalem to be administered 
by the United Nations. 
The area allocated to the Arab State was to comprise 4,476 square 
miles or 42,88 percent of the total of Palestine. It would include 
Western Galilee, the hilly central area with the exception of the 
Jerusalem enclave and the Coastal Plain. In regard to population, the 
Arab state would contain 725,000 Arabs and only 10,000 Zionist settlers 
and Jews .16 
The Jewish state was to comprise 5,893 square miles or 56,47 percent 
of the total. It was to consist of Eastern Galilee, the Coastal Plain 
including the Arab city of Jaffa and the Nageb. As regards population, 
the Jewish state was to contain 498,000 Jews and 497,000 Palestinians. 
Jewish land ownership within the proposed Jewish state was less than 10 
percent and less than 7 percent in the whole of Palestine. I7 
Jerusalem International Zone would comprise 68 square miles or 0,65 
percent. It would contain 105,000 Palestinians and 100,000 Jews. 
2. The Second Recommendation was a federal state plan supported by 
three members: India, Iran and Yugoslavia. 18 This Plan provided inter 
alia, that an independent state of Palestine would be established which 
would comprise an Arab state and a Jewish state, Jerusalem would be its 
capital. The federal state would comprise a federal government and 
governments of the Arab and Jewish States respectively. The federal 
government would exercise full powers over such matters as foreign 
affairs, defence, national motorways, transport and communications. The 
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Arab and Jewish states would enjoy full control over local 
self-government in its various aspects. There was to be a single 
Palestinian nationality and citizenship, with guaranteed equal rights 
for all minorities and fundamental human rights and freedoms, as well as 
free access to the Holy Places. 
Both Palestinians and Zionists reacted quickly to the U.N.S.C.O.P. 
Report when it was made public early in September 1947. While the 
Palestinians denounced both the Partition and the federal state plans, 
the Zionists rejected the federal scheme but accepted the Partition 
Pl an. 
The second session of the General Assembly, convening in September 
1947, had before it lithe Question of Palestine" submitted by Britain, 
the UNSCOP Report and an Arab proposal for the termination of the 
Mandate over Palestine and the recognition of its independence. The 
General Assembly set up an Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine to study these 
three items. This Special Committee invited the Palestine Arab Higher 
Committee and the Jewish Agency to send representatives to its 
deliberations. 
On 29 September 1947, the representative of the Arab Higher Committee 
was invited to address the Committee. 19 He began by stating that it was 
the duty of the Palestinians to defend their country against all 
aggression, including the Zionist compaign to secure by force Palestine 
which was not theirs by rights. The duty of the United Nations was, he 
said, to assist self-determination against aggression. He reminded the 
Committee that: The rights and patrimony of the Palestinians had been 
subject of no fewer than eighteen investigations within 25 years, all to 
no purpose. Commissions of Inquiry had either reduced the national and 
legal rights of the Palestinians or had over glossed them. The few 
recommendations, he added, favourable to the Palestinians had been 
ignored by the Mandatory power. 
The Representative of the Arab Higher Committee then pOinted out that 
the struggle of the Palestinian people against Zionism had nothing in 
common with antisemitism. The Arab World, he said, had for centuries ben 
one of the rare havens of refugee for the Jews of the world until the 
atmosphere of neighbourliness had been poisoned by the Balfour 
Declaration and by the aggressive spirit of the Zionist Movement. He 
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disputed the claims of Zionists to Palestine as having legal or moral 
basis. The religious connection of the Jews with Palestine which he 
noted was shared by Muslims and Christians, gave them no secular claim 
to the country. As for the Balfour Declaration, the British Government 
had no right to dispose of Palestine, which it had occupied in the name 
of the Allies as a liberator and not as a conqueror. The Declaration was 
in contradiction to the Covenent of the League of Nations and was an 
immoral, unjust and illegal promise. 
The Palestinian representative then said that the Palestinians would 
be pleased to see the distressed Jews of Europe given permanent relief. 
But he pointed out that Palestine had already absorbed far more Jews 
than its just share, and the Jews could not impose their will on other 
nations by choosing the place and the manner of their relief, 
particularly if that choice was inconsistent with the principles of 
international law and justice, and prejudicial to the interests of the 
nation directly concerned. 
The Palestinian representative noted that the solution of the Palestine 
conflict was simple. It lay in the Charter of the United Nations in 
accordance with which the Palestinians, constituting the majority of the 
population, were entitled to a free and independent state. The United 
Nations, he pointed out, was not legally competent to decide or impose 
Palestine's constitutional organization, and he outlined the following 
principles on which any solution to the problem must rest to be 
acceptable to the Palestinians: 
1. The establishment of a democratic Arab State in the whole of 
Palestine. 
2. That state must respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
equality of all persons before the law. 
3. That state must protect the legitimate rights and interests of all 
minorities. 
4. That freedom of worship and access to the Holy places must be 
guaranteed to all. 
However, on 22 October 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee appointed two 
Sub-Committees to examine and report on the findings of the UNSCOP. 
Sub-Committee 1, composed of nine Pro-Partition states20 (including the 
U.S.A and the Soviet Union) recommended the adoption of the Partition 
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Plan with economic union after slight modification. The main changes 
included increasing the powers of the joint economic board and shifting 
the boundaries slightly to reduce the number of Palestinians left in the 
proposed Jewish State. The proposed Arab State was to comprise 4,500 
square miles and contained 800,00 Arabs and 10,000 Jews while the 
proposed Jewish State was to comprise 5,500 square miles and contain 
about 500,000 Jews and about 400,000 Palestinians. 21 
Sub-Committee 2, comprising nine states (including Egypt, Pakistan, 
Syria, Colombia and Afghanistan) presented three draft resolutions: 22 
1. The General Assembly should request an advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice on certain legal questions concerning the 
competence of the United Nations to recommend or enforce any solution 
contrary to the wishes of the majority of the people of Palestine. 
2. A recommendation for an international settlement for the Jewish 
refugee problem. 
3. The third resolution provided for the creation of a provisional 
government of the people of Palestine to which the authority of the 
Mandatory power would be transferred, as a preparatory step to the 
setting up of an elected constituent Assembly. Sub-Committee three was 
set up to conciliate the two opposing sides. But it hardly functioned at 
all. 
On November 25, 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee passed the amended 
Partition resolution by a vote of twenty five to thirteen with 17 
abstentions. 23 The recommendations of sub-Committee 2 were voted down. 24 
On the 26 November 1947, the General Assembly began to debate the 
Partition resolution passed by its Ad Hoc Committee and on 29 November 
1947, adopted the Partition Plan with economic union by a vote of 33 in 
favour, 13 against, with 10 abstentions. 25 
Arab Response to the UNSCOP Report and 'the U.N. Partition Plan 
Both Palestinian representatives and Arab Governments rejected the 
UNSCOP Report and the U.N. Partition Plan for the following reasons: 26 
1. The Arabs argued that UNSCOP had not based its report on the basic 
principle of the right to self-determination and in doing so they had 
violated the U.N. Charter. 
Arab claims to Palestine, they argued, rested upon their long 
S ion of the country. And occupation and centuries of continuous posses 
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since the removal of the legal basis of the Mandate, after the 
dissolution of the League of Nations, and since they formed a two thirds 
majority in Palestine they were entitled, like any other nation, to the 
establishment of an independent Arab State in the whole of Palestine 
without the intervention either of the United Nations or any other 
party. The Arabs also denied even the legal or moral right of the 
General Assembly to partition Palestine without consulting the 
inhabitants of the country and against the wishes of its native 
majority.27 They argued that the General Assembly could only make 
recommendations which had no legal binding force. 
2. The Arabs argued that while the Arabs' claims rested on long 
possession of Palestine, the Zionists' claim rested on the Balfour 
Declaration and historical association of the Hebrews with Palestine in 
Biblical times. The Arabs repeated their previous claims. Firstly, that 
the Balfour Declaration was illegal because it was given by Britain, who 
had no right to do so, to the Zionists, who had no political or 
sovereignty rights over the country. Secondly, that the Declaration was 
given without the consent of the Arabs and it violated the principles of 
human rights and self-determination. Thirdly, that Palestinian 
independence was promised by the British Government to the Arabs in 
pledges before and after the issuing of the Balfour Declaration such as, 
the Hussein-MacMahon Agreement of 1915-1916 and the 1939 White Paper. 
They argued that Britain never contemplated that a Jewish national home 
meant a Jewish state in Palestine as a whole or in any part of it when 
she had recognized the right of the Arabs to independence in the 1939 
White Paper. 28 
The Arabs, however, accepted the fact that Palestine was a sacred 
place for Muslims, Christians and Jews but rejected the Zionists' claim 
that they were entitled to colonize the country against the will of its 
natives and that every Jew in the World had an exclusive right to 
immigrate and settle in Palestine. The Palestinians in fact repeated 
their previous arguments (see Chapter Two) for rejecting Zionist claims 
to the right to settle and colonize Palestine. They argued that not 
every Jew in the World is physically descended from the earlier Hebrews 
who lived in Palestine two thousand years ago and stressed that most of 
. . 29 
European Jewry were Polish, Russians and Germans of Khazar orlgln. 
They argued that the Jews' religious connection with Palestine did not 
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give them political rights over the country. 
In contrast, the Palestinians were the physical descendants of the 
Canaanites and the Philistines, the original inhabitants of Palestine, 
who had continually lived in and possessed the country since time 
immemorial which give them more valid and legal right to Palestine than 
any Zionist historical or other claims to the country. 
3. The Arabs opposed partition and the establishment of a Jewish state 
for security, political, economic and social reasons. 
a. Security reasons. Palestine is the centre of communication of the 
Arab World and the only land bridge between the Arabs in Asia and those 
in north Africa. It had common frontiers with four Arab states and the 
creation of an alien Jewish state would hamper Arab unity, security, 
peace and stability in the Middle East as a whole. IIThere is no doubt 
that the forcible creation of a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab 
World introduce a new highly disturbing threat to peace and stability in 
the Middle East. n30 
The creation, with the assistance of the West, of such an alien state 
was seen as a confrontation between the West and the Muslim World. IIIn 
the heart of the population of all the countries from the north African 
Atlantic coast to the stepes of central Asia, you sow doubt and mistrust 
of the designs and motives of the Western Powers. You take the greatest 
risk if impairing beyond the possibility of repair, any chance of real 
co-operation between East and West, by thus forcibly driving what in 
effect amounts to a Western wedge into the heart of the Middle East. 1I31 
This is an important analysis of the conflict. The Arabs did not 
look on the Zionists as a persecuted minority who were really seeking 
freedom and refuge. Rather they looked on them as a spear head of the 
Western Powers who would work to secure more influence for those 
imperialist Powers in the Middle East. The Arabs, with sound reason, 
feared that such a Jewish state would, according to the Zionists' 
declared policy, flood the country with foreign immigrants and 
eventually seek expansion at the expense of the Palestinians and the 
neighbouring Arab States. 32 
In contrast the conflict was seen in the West, and perhaps still so, as 
a conflict between Western civilisation, represented by the European 
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Zionist settlers, and backwardness and barbarism represented by the 
Arabs. Such a concept about the conflict was formed under the influence 
of Zionists, British and Amarecans' propaganda in order to justify their 
support for Zionism and the establisment of a Jewish state in Palestine, 
which would represent the Western civilization and would guarantee their 
long term of influence in the area. This concept was expressed clearly 
by a British expert on the Middle East: "Whatever our interests may be 
called, economic, pol itical or strategic, they are all part of one 
interest, the survival of Western civilisation, to which "Israel" 
professes to belong. ,,33 
b. Political reasons: the Arabs rejected partition on political 
grounds especially regarding the unfairness of the distribution of 
population. The population in Palestine as a whole, according to the 
report of the Special Committee on 31 December 1946, was 1,935,000 of 
which 1,327,332 were Arabs and 608,225 Jews. 34 
The Jewish State would contain: 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs, while 
the Arab state would contain: 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. If we add 
the number of unsettled Arabs (nomads) who would be incorporated in the 
Jewish state to the Arab population then the population in the Jewish 
state would be: 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews, so the Arabs would form 
a majority from the outset in the proposed Jewish state. 
It is even more instructive to consider the relative proportion of 
Arabs and Jews in the three regions which would comprise the area of the 
Jewish state. In the southern section, the Beersheba area, there were 
103,820 Arabs as against 1,020 Jews or the Jews represented about 1 per 
cent of the total. Despite this fact this area was allocated to the 
proposed Jewish state. Similarly in the northern section of the proposed 
Jewish state, Eastern Galilee, the Arab population was three times as 
great as the Jewish population, or 86,200 Arabs against 28,750 Jews. 
Only in the central section of the proposed Jewish state had the Jews a 
majority and even there it was not a decisive majority. The 
representative population figures were 469,250 Jews and 306,760 Arabs. 35 
The Palestinians argued that such a partition was neither logical nor 
justified. While it recognized the right of the Jewish minority to 
b ' 't 
self-determination it denied such a right not only to the Ara maJorl Y 
in Palestine as a whole but also to the substantial Palestinian minority 
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in the proposed Jewish state. The Arab Higher Committee, the body which 
represented the Palestinians at that time, protested: "How was it 
possible to recognize the right of half a million of Jews, most of them 
still nationals of foreign nations, to self-determination while at the 
same time refusing it to half a million Arabs ... How could a minority be 
allowed to separate itself from the majority and at the same time to 
take under its domination an equal number from the majority.,,36 
Indeed it seems to me that partition as suggested by the U.N. was 
neither fair nor justified. It could not fully be understood outside the 
context of the colonial powers' domination of the U.N. and their strong 
influence over the Third World members to utilise double standards in 
dealing with matters concerning Western settlers, Western countries and 
Third World countries. The Arab-Zionist conflict was not exceptional. 
This made many countries in the Third World lose their confidence in the 
Organization. Indeed the Palestinians looked at the U.N. as a tool which 
was used by the Western Countries as well as the Eastern Countries to 
pass resolutions in their favour and against the national interest of 
the Palestinians or other national movements in the Third World. 
The double standard followed by the U.N in dealing with the rights of 
Arabs and Zionist settlers in the Palestine conflict was, in fact, a 
revival of the Nineteenth Century concept of the "White man's Burden", 
which had been used as a pretext by the colonial powers to annex the so 
called backward areas. 37 Such a notion was expressed by the Zionists in 
their justification of their demands for a Jewish state and their denial 
of the same right for the Arabs: "In a unitary state a highly democratic 
minority (the Jews) would be forced down to the economic and social 
level of an Arab majority, whereas under Partition the Arab minority 
. J . h . . t ,,38 
would benefit from contact with the progresslve eW1S maJorl y. 
Clearly such concepts should not be acceptable in the U.N. or in any 
other organization whose main aims are supposed to be peace, equality 
and freedom for all. Peace could not be established on bases other than 
justice and equality. 
c. Economic reasons: 
Closely connected with the distribution of population was the 
ownership in the proposed Jewish state. 39 The Arabs argued that 
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1 and 
there 
was not a single sub-district in which the percentage of Jewish land 
ownership exceeded 39 per cent, and that in nine of the sixteen 
sub-districts the percentage of Jewish ownership was less tha 5 40 . . n per 
cent. The Palestlnlans protested that while the Jews represented only 
one-third of the population and owned only less than 7 per cent of the 
total land they were given more than half of Palestine's lands including 
nearly all the citrus land, 80 per cent of the cereal area and 40 per 
cent of Arab industry. The ownership of fertile land was as fOllows: 41 
Category of crops Arab ownership Jewish ownership 
Citrus 135,368 139,728 
Bananas 
Plantations 
Taxable cereals 
categories (9-13) 
Categories (14-15) 
1,843 
1,052,222 
5,653,346 
823,646 
1,079 
94,167 
869,109 
67,839 
The Palestinians argued that: since citriculture was the most 
important industry in Palestine and the main export crop, amounting to 
80 per cent of the total value of exports, and since about 65 per cent 
of the population gained a living directly from agriculture, and since 
50 per cent of Palestine's cereals were being imported, the inclusion of 
most of these producing areas in the Jewish state made it impracticable 
to establish a viable Arab state. 42 
This Palestinian view was supported by the finding of the 
Sub-Committee 2 of the AD HOC Committee which concluded: lilt would thus 
appear that the partition proposal is legally objectionable, politically 
unjust and economically disastrous; in short it is utterly 
unworkable. ,,43 
d. Social and religious reasons: The Arabs also rejected partition 
because they feared that their religion and other social and cultural 
heritage would not be secured or guaranteed under the rule of a 
westernized Jewish state and under Jewish laws. The position of the 
Muslim woman provides us with a good example for such fears. 
The Arabs, however, proposed as a solution to the problem, the 
establishment of a unitary state representing all the inhabitants of the 
country and based on the principle of self-determination. 44 At the last 
moment and during the debate on partition the Arabs, in a tactical move 
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to avoid the partition which was becoming certain, accepted a federal 
state constituted from Arab and Jewish cantons. Their proposals 
included: 45 
1. The establishment of an independent federal state of Palestine not 
later than 1st August 1948. 
2. The government of the independent federal state of Palestine should 
be constituted on a federal basis and should consist of a federal 
government and the governments of Arab and Jewish cantons. The 
relationship between the federal government and the cantonal governments 
would be guided principally by the basic pattern of the constitution of 
the United States. 
3. The delimitation of the cantonal boundaries should be carried out 
in such a way as to leave the smallest possible Arab or Jewish 
minorities in each canton. 
however, this final Arab proposal was rejected by the Zionists, the 
Americans and the Russians. The Russian's representative, Mr. Gromyko, 
argued that: "We referred to the this (the federal state) as one of the 
possibilities at the outset of the debate on this question. The 
delegation of the USSR considers that it would be wrong now to set the 
General Assembly back six months and to begin all over again. "46 It must 
be remembered that the position of the Arabs towards the Russian's 
proposal of a federal state was similar to their position towards the 
British White Paper of 1939. In both cases the Arabs rejected the 
proposals when they were suggested to regret their action at a later 
date. 
The Russian, indeed, made it clear on May 14th 1947 that they would 
support a unitary state in Palestine if both sides accepted it.47 They 
were still anti-Zionist at that time. According to Hurewitz: "In Russian 
f . t' h' . l' "48 eyes Zionism was merely a tool 0 Br1 1S 1mper1a 1sm. 
But from the middle of May 1947, according to Khouri, the Russians 
"hoping to gain some political advantages from increased tension and 
strife in the Middle East and from the early departure of Britain from 
1 t ' Z' 't position.,,49 Palestine, began to alter their traditional Y an 1- lon1s 
It seems to me that the Palestinians 
handling the Palestine problem before the 
knew that the United States and her allies 
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followed wrong tactics in 
U.N. For example, the Arabs 
would support partition and 
Britain would not object to such a solution. Therefore, the only 
rational thing which they could have done, in order to block a partition 
resolution, was to reach an understanding with the Russians and the 
Eastern Bloc. The Russians were, until then, not committed to either 
side and in theory they could go either way to support the Arabs or the 
Zionists. The Russians perhaps, preferred the binational solution and if 
the Arabs had co-ordinated their position with them and accepted their 
proposal when it was suggested, at the beginning of the U.N. debate, or 
if they had suggested their own federal scheme at that time, the outcome 
of the U.N. debate on the Palestine conflict might have been different 
and partition might have been blocked by a Russian veto. 
Of course there were other factors which played an important role in 
preventing the Arabs from coordinating with the Russians. For example, 
three of their independent states (Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan) were 
still under British influence and tied with unequal treaties and Saudi 
Arabia was pro-American and pro-British. The position of the Syrian and 
Lebanese governments would have been vulnerable to French and Western 
influence if they had tried to go to the Russians at that time. It is 
highly likely that if the Arab states had made a deal with the Russians 
they could have been thrown out of power by the British and their 
allies. Their position in fact is one of typical traditional leaders 
facing the danger of losing their posts and privileges in confronting 
the colonial powers. They choose rather to compromise and accept the 
"status quo" than to take the risk of fighting colonialism. 
The other thing which is perhaps worth noting here is the way in 
which the Arab and Zionist position regarding partition was presented to 
Western public opinion. While Zionist acceptance of partition, a scheme 
which met almost all their demands, was presented as a compromise, the 
Arabs' rejection of partition, a scheme prejudicial to their rights, was 
presented as an extreme or uncompromising position. It is perhaps more 
important for us to know the Palestinians' point of view and their 
reasons for rejecting partition than to pass judgement on their action 
in terms of right and wrong. For the Palestinians the U.N. did not 
consult them over a matter concerning their future. If the U.N. did not 
bother to take their views into consideration, why should they accept 
the U.N. recommendation? 
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1 
The lesson which the U.N. must have learned from the Palestine 
conflict and the way which the U.N. handled it must be that th e U.N. 
must take into consideration the wishes of the people directly concerned 
with the conflict and not suggest proposals in accord with the wishes of 
the big powers or other parties. Therefore, it seems to me that peace 
between the Arabs and " I s rae 1 " is not poss i b 1 e wi thout a full 
recognition of the Palestinians' right to self determination in those 
areas allocated to them by the U.N. respective resolutions. Time and 
events had proved that the U.N., "Israel ll and U.S.A. approach to solve 
the conflict through separate agreements with some Arab states as an 
alternative to a negotiated settlement between "Israel ll and the 
Palestinians, is a futile effort and can only delay the time of the next 
confrontation. 
For the Zionists the matter was much better. The U.N. scheme in fact 
gave them more than their actual share of land and population. It was 
the type of solution which they wanted and one which it would not be 
possible to get through the U.N. without the U.S.A.' influence. IIWithout 
U.S. leadership and the pressures which developed during U.N. 
consideration of the question, the necessary two-thirds majority in the 
General Assembly could not have been obtained. 1I50 Therefore, Zionist 
acceptance of partition was not a compromise but rather an approval of a 
pre-prepared and known Zionist scheme which had been suggested and 
accepted by America since 1946. 51 Moreover, a short look at the three 
areas which were to form the Jewish state would prove that these areas 
were not allocated to the Zionists as a compromise but rather these 
areas were intentionally selected to include water resources (Eastern 
Galilee), citrus and other important plantation and cereals (The Coastal 
Plain) and the Negeb with its potential oil and mineral reserves and as 
a strategic location as an exit to the Red Sea. 52 
The division of Palestine, with the allocation of more than half the 
country including the best fertile and irrigable lands to the Zionists, 
was similar to the division of the land of South Africa whereby the best 
land was given to the white settlers while the waste land was allocated 
to the blacks and designated as the home lands for the black majority of 
the country. Such unjust division, be it from a racist regime like South 
Africa or from the U.N., does not make any difference to the natives. So 
long as a solution is not based on the principles of equality, justice 
and self-determination, it will never lead to peaceful settlement but to 
-280-
conflict and it will be resisted by one party or the other. 
Indeed for many countries and people the U.N appeared to be an 
impartial organization and any rejection of its decisions would appear 
extreme and unconstructive. This however, applied to the Arab position 
on partition. Such misconceptions about the nature of the Arab position 
created a gap of communication between the Arabs and the West. It became 
a sort of Arab complex that all the Western countries were natural 
supporters of Zionism and therefore it seemed to many of them as 
hopeless or a waste of time to try to change Western public opinion or 
even make it more understanding towards the Arab position. 
The United Nations, however, failed even to secure for the 
Palestinians those hilly areas which were allocated to them by the 
partition plan recommended by the U.N. itself. Before proceeding to 
discuss the reasons behind the failure of the U.N. to implement 
partition it is necessary to clear up a major misconception about this 
plan. Most scholars who have dealt with the Palestine problem before the 
U.N. have concentrated on the aspect of partition, and both Arab and 
Zionist attitudes to it, as if the U.N's plan included only partition. 
And since the Arabs had rejected partition and the Zionists had accepted 
it, it was understandable why most of them reached similar conclusions 
namely blamed the Palestinians for not taking the opportunity of 
establishing an Arab state according to the partition scheme suggested 
by the U.N. The new line of thinking which I would like to follow here 
is to examine the U.N. Resolution 181(11)53 as a whole and to try to 
offer some answers to questions such as, why did the U.N. fail to 
implement their plan and who was responsible for that failure? 
Resolution 181(11) adopted by the U.N. on 29th November 1947, included 
a plan of partition with economic union. This plan was to be carried out 
in three steps: Termination of the Mandate, partition and independence. 
The British Government had made it clear that it would not take part in 
implementing partition and left the matter to the U.N to decide the best 
way to implement it. 54 Therefore, Resolution 181(11) recommended 
practical steps to be executed before partition itself could be 
implemented. These preparatory steps were: 
1. The establishment of a Palestine Commission to include 
representatives from five states. 55 
2. The commission was supposed to take over the administration of 
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Palestine from the Mandatory power gradually and in conformity with the 
recommendation of the U.N. and under the guidance of the Security 
Council: "The Mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent 
co-ordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to 
take over and administer areas which have been evacuated."S6 
3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission should proceed to carry 
out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and 
Jewish states. 
4. The commission should select and establish in each state as rapidly 
as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The provisional 
government of each state should recruit an armed militia from the 
residents of that state, sufficient in number to maintain internal order 
and to prevent frontier clashes. 
5. If by April 1st 1948 a provisional council of government could not 
be selected for either of the states or, if selected could not carry out 
its functions, the Commission should communicate that fact to the 
Security Council for such action with respect to that state as the 
council might deem proper. 
6. There should be a progressive transfer, from the Mandatory Power to 
the Commission, of the responsibility for all the functions of 
government, including that of maintaining law and order in areas 
evacuated by the British Forces. Moreover, resolution 181(11) requested 
that the Security Council determine as a "threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with article 39 of the 
Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this 
resolution. liS? 
In brief the Palestine Commission was created and charged with the 
task of implementing the measures recommended by the U.N. in its plan of 
partition with economic union, provided that the Commission should act 
under the guidance of the Security Council and should receive from that 
Council such instructions as the Council might consider to issue. S8 The 
question which arises here is: Why was the Commission not able to 
implement the partition plan? The answer to this question can be found 
in the Commission's reports to the Security Council. The following are 
among its main points: 59 
1. Concerning the attitude of the Mandatory Power, they made it clear 
that: 60 The mandate would be terminated on 15 May 1948 and that the 
Commission would not be allowed to enter the country earlier than two 
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weeks before this date. Meanwhile the Mandatary would retain full 
responsibility for the country as a whole and there would be no transfer 
of authority to the Commission before the end of the Mandate. 
2. The Commission was advised that the Mandatory could not facilitate 
the delimitation of the frontiers on the grounds, that it would not 
allow any selected provisional councils of governments to exercise any 
authority, nor would they allow the establishment of armed militias 
before the end of the Mandate and: "There can be no quest i on of the 
outgoing authority handing over to the Commission their former servants 
under any obligation.,,61 The Commission concluded that: "The refusal of 
the Mandatary Power to co-operate in implementing the plan, its 
rejection of any progressive transfer of authority, and the inability of 
the Commission to be in Palestine, constitute a serious jeopardy to the 
discharge of the Commission's responsibility.,,62 
Britain in fact obstructed the execution of the most significant part 
of the Partition plan, namely the practical preparatory work which was 
necessary if partition was to be successfully carried out. The United 
States representative correctly announced before the Security Council on 
19th March 1948 that: "The Plan proposed by the General Assembly is an 
integral plan which cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be 
carried out.,,63 
Indeed to take out the practical part of the U.N. partition plan would 
make the whole scheme no more than an empty recommendation. The 
Commission, however, supplied the Security Council with two monthly 
reports and a special report. 64 These reports included their work, its 
needs and the major obstacles it had encountered in its efforts to 
implement the partition plan. It stressed the fact that without the 
effective assistance of the Security Council it was firmly convinced 
that, it could not discharge the great responsibility entrusted to it by 
the U.N. 
In their second report the Commission made it clear that unless they 
got armed forces they would not be able to implement partition. The 
Commission argued that the Mandatory forces: "must be replaced by an 
adequate non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding elements in 
both the Arab and Jewish communities, organized under the general 
direction of the Commission, in maintaining order and security in 
Palestine, and thereby enabling the Commission to carry out the 
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recommendations of the General Assembly. Otherwise, the period 
immediately following the termination of the Mandate will be a period of 
uncontrolled and widespread bloodshed in Palestine.,,65 
The Security Council, however, according to the Commission: "Did not 
provide armed assistance for the Commission, nor did it give to the 
Commission guidance or instructions, as envisaged in the resolution of 
the Assembly. ,,66 
The refusal of the Security Council to carry out its responsibilities 
in providing necessary armed forces to implement the Partition Plan was 
the second major factor leading to the failure of the Palestine 
Commission to implement Partition,67 the first major factor being the 
attitude of the British Mandatory Government. 
Since both America and Russia supported the Partition Plan it was 
expected that they would work together to implement that solution 
through the Security Council. The question which arises here is why the 
Security Council did not provide the Palestine Commission with the 
necessary forces to implement the U.N. Partition Plan. The problem was 
that both the Americans and the Russians had supported Partition, not 
because such a solution would bring peace and stability or because it 
was a fair and just solution, but rather because each of them thought 
that such a solution would serve their own aims in this strategic 
area. 68 The Russians had apparently become convinced that they had more 
to gain than to lose from the Partitioning of Palestine because 
according to Khouri it would: 69 
1. Drive out British control and influence and increase anti-Western 
feeling generally in the Middle East, thus making it possible for the 
Russians to make some headway there. 
2. Bring about a highly nationalistic anti-British Jewish state 
containing many thousands of Russian immigrants, 
3. Cause a general increase in tension and unrest in the Middle East 
which would hurt the West and enable the Communists to exploit the 
situation. 
4. Compel the Security Council, where Russia had a veto, to deal with 
the Palestine conflict and require the U.N. to dispatch an international 
force, possibly including Russian troops, into Palestine. 
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The Russians, in fact, succeeded in creating the conditions of 
unstability in the Middle East and became one of the major factors which 
have to be taken into account in any efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 70 It is odd enough to discover that the Russians today are 
supporting the same people, the Palestinians, who became the victims of 
the Russians self-interested policy in 1947, when they supported 
Partition without taking any practical and effective measures to stop 
the displacement and the tragedy of the Palestinian people, which was 
only possible because the two super powers, Russia and America, in an 
unprecedented agreement, agreed on Partition without any guarantee for 
its implementation. 
The United States on the other hand supported Partition because they 
believed that it was in the interests of the United States to do so. As 
Clifford, president Truman's consul, presented the Palestine problem to 
Truman. "The Palest i ne problem shoul d not be approached as a Jewi sh 
question, or an Arab question, or a United Nations question. The sole 
question is what is best for the United States of America.,,71 
Clifford advised the President that: "Vigorous American support of the 
U.N.'s Palestine decision is the only policy which is in American 
interests in the Middle East.,,72 Clifford also discounted Arab threats 
of forcing an oil embargo or that the United States interests would be 
damaged if America supported Partition. He argued that "the Arab States 
have no customer for their oil other than the United States ... and that 
they must have oil royalties or go broke.,,73 In a prejudiced remark he 
claimed that if it were not to support Partition "the United States 
appears in the ridiculous role of trembling before threats of a few 
nomadic desert tribes.,,74 Other reasons, however, were given as an 
explanation for the Americans' support for Partition such as Truman's 
religious, humanitarian feeling or because he believed that a Jewish 
State would relieve Jewish suffering and that Partition was a 
practicable solution that could be achieved "without blood shed.,,75 
The United States on the other hand opposed and still opposes any 
Russian involvement or penetration into the Middle East, even within a 
United Nations force. The standing American policy on this subject is 
that such an event constitutes a danger to the United States security. 
"Any solution of the Palestine problem which invites direct Soviet 
participation in administration, policing or military operations in 
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Palestine is a danger to the security of the United States."76 The 
Americans, in fact, wanted to solve the Palestine conflict within their 
own arrangement with their Western Allies and exclude the Russians, whom 
the Americans considered "the only nation that would gain from sending 
troops into Palestine. Since both the U.K. and the U.S. have strong 
strategic reasons for refusing to allow Soviet or Soviet-controlled 
troops to enter Palestine it is highly improbable that an international 
police force will ever be formed.,,77 
It is worth mentioning here that the rivalry between the Americans and 
the Russians, which prevented the establishment of an international 
police force to implement the U.N. Plan, still remains a significant 
negative factor in preventing the convening of a proposed International 
Peace Conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 78 Such a conference would 
include, in addition to Arabs and "Israel", the five permanent members 
of the Securi ty Counc 11. Both Ameri ca and "I s rae 1" oppose such an idea 
because they do not want any Russian or P.L.D. participation and insist 
on direct negotiations between the Arab states and "Israel" to solve the 
conflict. In my view, peace cannot be achieved in the Middle East 
without the full participation of the Palestinians in any future 
conference on the Palestine conflict. 
The United States policy during the first quarter of 1948 was to allow 
the local conflict in Palestine to develop under the eyes of the 100,000 
British troops in Palestine and at the same time to frustrate any 
efforts which might be taken by the Security Council to form armed 
forces to be sent to Palestine. 79 The United States tried during this 
period to give the impression that it was retreating from its support of 
Partition by spreading doubts about the competence of the Security 
Council and the General Assembly to implement Partition by force. In his 
statement before the Security Council the American representative 
stressed that: "The Securi ty Counc 11 shoul d instruct the Pal est i ne 
Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed Partition 
Plan."SO He then suggested the establishment of a temporary trusteeship 
for Palestine. S1 A draft letter from Truman to Attlee gives us a similar 
attitude towards Partition. "We cannot undertake to impose this solution 
(Partition) on the people of Palestine by the use of force, since the 
Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Councilor 
d t' ,,82 the General Assembly to enforce such political recommen a 10ns. 
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The American tactics, however, succeeded in glvlng the Arabs the 
impression that the Americans were finally convinced that Partition was 
not just and should not be imposed upon the Arabs against their wishes. 
The Arabs were pleased by this American position and indeed some Arabs 
considered the American position as a change of heart about partition. 
The American consul in Jerusalem reported the effect of such American 
tact i cs upon the Arabs: II Arabs, wh i 1 e pleased wi th Un i ted States 
abandonment of Partition regard it as only the natural return of the 
U.S. to principles of democracy and justice and are glad Arabs and 
Americans can resume traditional friendship.1I83 
The Arabs also misunderstood the real aim of the British Government 
when it refused to allow the Palestine Commission to do the preparatory 
work which was to precede independence: IIA general disbelief among the 
Palestinian Arabs that Britain had any intention of evacuation. The 
Arabs had not forgotten that the Peel Report had come to nothing, after 
having been all but adopted. 1I84 Not only did the Arabs misunderstand 
both American and British real intentions but some scholars and writers 
did so too. Some writers for example maintained that the British refusal 
to allow the Palestine Commission to carry out their duties before the 
end of the Mandate was a neutral position. 8S Others considered the 
American tactics before the Security Council a retreat from their 
pro-Zionist position and support of Partition. 86 
There is much evidence to suggest that such views were not entirely 
correct. For instance, the British Government knew more than anybody 
else that the Zionists had well-organised, trained and armed forces 
compared to a poorly armed unorganized Palestinian population. 87 In 
preventing the establishment of armed militias and the demarcation of 
the borders between the proposed Arab and Jewish states they served the 
Zionist side. During the local fight which broke out in Palestine before 
the end of the Mandate, the British practically helped the Zionists by 
not only preventing the Arab regular armies from entering Palestine, but 
also by allowing the Zionist forces to occupy large areas allocated to 
the proposed Arab state and uprooting almost all of its Arab 
inhabitants. The British Forces not only watched in silence the 
occupation of Arab areas and the displacement of thousands of 
Palestinians but also helped in transporting them to other areas inside 
and outside Palestine,88 helping the Zionists to achieve their exclusive 
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state as I will show in the next Chapter. 
On the other hand the Americans in fact never intended to abandon 
Partition, but rather it seems that their tactics were designed to 
create a temporary and ready alternative in case the Zionists could not 
win a complete victory over the Palestinians or if they could not secure 
all those parts allocated to them by the United Nations Plan. President 
Truman himself made it clear to his secretary of state that the American 
position was not a retreat from Partition. "I want to make it clear, 
however, that nothing should be presented to Security Council that could 
be interpreted as a recession on our part from the position we took in 
the General Assembly. ,,89 
Trusteeship as the best alternative was also discussed in the British 
Foreign Office as another alternative for which the Zionists would 
mobilize American support if they failed to get what they wanted. "If 
Partition was either defeated, or approved with borders considered 
insufficient by the Zionists, the latter might support, and mobilize 
American support for, trusteeship as the best alternative.,,90 
In a letter to president Truman the Department of State made it clear 
that Trusteeship would be suggested, if Partition was not implemented, 
as a measure to block Palestine independence and not as a retreat from 
Partition. "The Department of State considers that it would then be 
clear that Palestine is not yet ready for self-government and that some 
form of United Nations trusteeship for an additional period of time will 
be necessary.,,91 The Americans' tactics and policy during this period 
puzzled many observers who thought that the Americans had changed their 
pro-Zionist policy or abandoned Partition, especially when the 
Americans, after the Zionists' major success in the local war in 
Palestine, stopped talking about the trusteeship proposal and when they 
recognized the new Jewish state within 11 minutes of the official 
declaration of the establishment of that state by the Zionists leaders 
on 15th May 1948. 
15th May, however, marked the end of the British Mandate, the 
proclamation of "Israel" and not only the replacement of British 
occupation by Zionist occupation for many Arab areas but also the 
th ' 'llages towns and displacement of 200,000 Palestinians from elr Vl , 
cities. Not many Western people knew that the Palestinian refugee 
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problem had been created before the end of the Mandate, and because this 
problem has a direct implication on any future settlement of the 
conflict, I will discuss its origin in the next chapter. 
Concluding Remarks 
After nearly three decades of British sponsorship of Zionist 
settlement in Palestine, Palestinian society was transformed into a 
plural society with open conflict between its main segments, the 
Palestinian Arabs and the Zionist settlers. These two communities were 
not only segregated in their political, social, economic and all other 
aspects of their lives, but also demanded the establishment of their own 
states in the same country. 
The British Government failed to bring about a peaceful settlement 
between them and therefore she transferred the problem to the U.N. 
Britain, however, did not transfer the problem to the U.N. before it 
became clear to her that the conflict, if it was allowed to continue, 
would cause great damage to her interests in the Arab World and to her 
relations with the U.S.A. and the Zionists. Therefore it can be argued 
that Britain transferred the problem to the U.N. in the hope that a U.N. 
solution would guarantee her interests, through the influence of her 
allies, the security of the Zionist settlers, who would become a U.N. 
rather than a British responsibility, and at the same time the Arabs 
could not blame Britain for such a solution. 
It must be remembered that one of the main reasons for Britain's 
failure to solve the conflict was her refusal to apply, as a basis for 
her proposals to solve the problem, the principles of equality, justice 
and self determination. Unfortunately the U.N. did not learn from the 
British experience, or was not allowed to do so as a result of the 
British and American influence, and recommended a partition plan similar 
but worse than the one suggested by the Royal Commission in 1937. 
According to the U.N. Partition Plan the Zionist settler minority, 
(about 30 % and owning about 7 % of the lands of Palestine) were awarded 
more than half the country, including almost all the fertile and citrus 
land, and taking under their rule about half a million Arabs to live as 
a permanent minority. 
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The Palestinians rejected this Plan for the same reason they had 
rejected a similar previous plan, namely: because the Plan was not based 
on the principles of justice, equality and the right to self 
determination. The Arabs, however, demanded the establishment of a 
single state but at the last moment they suggested the establishment of 
a Federal State consisting of Arab and Jewish Cantons but both demands 
were rejected. 
The Zionists, in contrast, accepted partition because it gave them 
almost all what they wanted. 
The U.N. decision to partition Palestine without consulting its 
inhabitants gives us a clear indication of the extent of the big powers' 
influence in the organization. This influence was so great that the U.N. 
recommended a solution which in fact violated its own Charter which 
implies the right of every people to self determination and the 
establishment of the type of government which best represents their 
interests and aspirations. 
By failing to carry out its obligation of preserving peace and order, 
by preventing the Arab regular armies and the Palestine Commission from 
entering Palestine, from establishing the required militias and local 
governments, Britain indeed shared a great responsibility for the 
occupation, by the Zionist forces, of large territories allocated to the 
proposed Arab state and the uprooting of the majority of its Arab 
inhabitants before the end of the Mandate. It stood watching thousands 
of them being killed, terrorized and uprooted from their cities and 
villiages without doing anything to assist them or allowing others to do 
so. 
"Israel", against the general belief, was not established as a result 
of the implementation of the U.N. Partition Plan, but rather she was 
declared unilaterally by the use of force and over areas far larger than 
those allocated for the proposed Jewish state. Although "IsraelI! claimed 
that she had no choice in the way which she was born, the fact still 
that the Arab rejection of the establishment of a Jewish state did not 
give "Israel" the right to occupy those areas allocated to the Arabs nor 
did that the Arab position justify her uprooting of the Arab civilian 
population from their homes and lands and preventing them from returning 
to those areas. This "Israeli" position, however, suggests that the 
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Zionists had accepted partition not as a final solution but rather as a 
first step in achieving a larger state in the whole country. As one 
Zionist leader explained to his son: "A partial Jewish state is not the 
end but the beginning ... We shall organize a modern defence, select 
army, and then I am certain that we will not be prevented from settling 
in other parts of the country, either by mutual agreement with our Arab 
neighbours, or by some other means. Our ability to penetrate the country 
will increase if there is a state. ,,92 
Britain and the U.N. shared a great responsibility for the tragedy of 
the Palestinians because they failed to provide the required protection 
for the innocent Arabs and failed to implement the Partition Plan, which 
after all was imposed by the U.N. upon the Palestinians against their 
will. Having said that it is perhaps constructive to point out that the 
Arabs also committed some mistakes during their handling of the matter 
before the U.N. The fact remains that the Arabs knew that the only way 
to prevent partition was to side with one of the super powers, the 
U.S.A. or U.S.S.R. Once the Americans openly declared their support for 
partition the Arabs should have coordinated their plans and position 
with the Russians who were capable of blocking such solution by the use 
of their veto. The Arabs not only rejected a federal scheme suggested by 
the Russians 93 but also did not suggest their federal scheme until it 
was too late. They refused to offer any significant concession which 
might have won them some of the support of the many United Nations 
members who were not completely satisfied with Partition as the proper 
solution. Most members finally voted for the Partition resolution solely 
because they saw no other acceptable alternative course of action 
available and because they believed that the Zionists had been more 
reasonable and cooperative than the Palestinians. 94 
Khouri explained these Arab mistakes as follows: "Had the Arabs, over 
the years, presented their case more effectively before the world and 
had they been willing to seek or accept compromise solutions in the 
earlier stages of the second and special sessions of the General 
Assembly, as they were in the last few days of each session when their 
situation had become desperate, the result might not have been so 
disastrous for them. By adamantly insisting on all or nothing, they 
d d · '11 th' ,,95 en e up wlth practlca y no lng. 
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One of the serious problems which arose during the United Nations 
handling of the Palestine problem and before the end of the mandate was 
the occupation of large areas allocated to the Arabs and the 
displacement of 200,000 civilian Arabs from their homes and land under 
Zionist threats and terror. Those refugees were uprooted while Britain 
was officially still in charge of law and order in the entire country 
and in some cases the British Forces participated in transferring them 
to other areas inside and outside Palestine. The Palestinian refugee 
tragedy had a serious implication not only for the relationship between 
Arabs and Jews in Palestine itself, but also for any future settlement 
of the Palestine conflict as a whole. Therefore, it seems to me that it 
is perhaps worthwhile examining the origin of the Palestinian refugee 
problem in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
The origin of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 
Introduction 
As we have seen in Chapter Eight the Arabs rejected the U.N. Partition 
Plan not only because they were opposed in principle to the 
establishment of an alien state in their midst, but also because the 
Plan was not based on the principles of equality and self-determination. 
The Palestinians argued that while the Zioninst settlers formed only 
about one third of the population and owned less than 7 % of the lands 
of Palestine the U.N. awarded them more than half the country, including 
almost all the fertile and citrus land and allowed them to take under 
their rule about half a million Arabs to remain as a permanent minority. 
However, despite this Arab opposition the U.N. established the Palestine 
Committee and charged it with the duty of gradual take over of the 
responsibilities of the Mandatory Government and the establishment of 
local governments and militias and to draw up definite borders between 
the proposed Arab and Jewish states. 
The Committee, however, failed to carry out its duties, firstly, because 
the British Government prevented it from entering the country and 
carrying out its duties. Secondly, the failure of the Security Council 
to provide the Committee with the International Police Force needed to 
carry out the responsibility of law and order when the Mandate ended. 
This failure was due to American objections to such an idea, since it 
might haven give the Russians an opportunity to penetrate this strategic 
area. 
Against this background and due to the uncertainty about what would 
happen at the end of the Mandate, both Arabs and Zionists resorted to 
military means to achieve their goals. The Zionist forces, however, got 
the upper hand in the fighting and during the last six months of the 
Mandate they succeeded not only in occupying areas allocated to the 
proposed Arab state but also uprooted the majority of its native 
population. It is important to stress here that this Zionist action had 
not only taken place while the British were still officially responsible 
for law and order in the whole country but also that many of those 
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refugees were transported to other areas inside and outside the country 
by British military vehicles. The British not only did nothing to stop 
this Zionist action and prevent this mass exodus, but also prevented the 
Palestine Committee and the regular Arab armies from entering Palestine 
to do so. The significance of the Palestinian refugee problem lies in 
the fact that it is a unique and fast-growing problem. It is unique 
because there is no precedent in modern history whereby a majority of 
the population of a country has forcibly been displaced by a militant 
minority of alien settlers. Yet this is what happened in Palestine in 
1948. Nearly 700,000 Palestinians then fled or were expelled from their 
homes, towns and villages and became refugees without any means of 
livelihood. 
John Glubb, a British officer and a former commander of the Arab 
Legion of Transjordan, supports this view and states that: "It is quite 
essential vividly to grasp the unique conditions of the struggle in 
Palestine. We have witnessed many wars in this century, in which one 
country seeks to impose its power on others. But in no war I think, for 
many centuries past, has the objective been to remove a nation from its 
country and to introduce another and entirely different race to occupy 
its lands, houses, cities and live there. This peculiarity lends to the 
Palestine struggle a desperate quality which bears no resemblance to any 
other war in modern history.lIl 
The other important aspect of the Palestinian refugee problem is that 
it is a fast growing problem. The number of refugees has increased from 
about 200,000 before the end of the Mandate in 15 May 1948, to reach 
2,706,486 in 1976. 2 
The basic factors which doubled the dimensions of the refugee problem 
were the occupation by the Zionist and later the Israeli forces of 
various areas of Palestine in excess of the territories allocated to the 
Jewish state by the U.N. and the displacement of almost all its Arab 
inhabitants. In terms of population the territories seized by the 
Israeli forces in excess of the Partition plan were: Western Galilee 
123,000 inhabitants, the Jaffa enclave 114,000 and Ludda, Rameleh, Acre, 
Shafa Amer 195,000. 3 
Cattan argued that the majority of the refugees came from those areas 
allocated to the proposed Arab state but occupied by Zionist and Israeli 
forces during the local war in Palestine between 1947 and 1948. 
"Israel's seizure of territories, towns and villages reserved for the 
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proposed Arab state resulted in the expulsion or flight of more than 
600,000 persons. In other words, almost two-thirds of the refugees who 
were displaced in 1948 came from the areas seized by Israel in excess of 
the territorial boundaries fixed by the Partition resolution."4 
The second important factor which has aggravated the refugee problem 
is the refusal of "Israel" to comply with the United Nations resolutions 
and recommendations in regard to the Arab territories and the refugees' 
right to return or compensation. Those Palestinian rights were 
incorporated in the General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 
1948. With respect to the refugees, the Assembly resolved in paragraph 
II that those: "Wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with 
their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property 
of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property 
which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be 
made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." S 
It is not, however, within the scope of this study to discuss the 
Palestinian refugee problem as a whole, but rather to discuss its 
origins, causes and size before the end of the Mandate and mainly to 
highlight the Arab point of view. 
The origin of the Refugee Problems6 
The first interesting question here is: How did the problem start? 
Immediately after the general Assembly passed the Partition resolution 
on November 1947, serious clashes broke out between the Palestinians and 
the Zionist forces in Palestine. On the one hand the Palestinians tried 
to take over the whole country and preserve the Arabic nature of 
Palestine through the establishment of a unitary government representing 
the wishes of the majority and safeguarding the rights of the Jewish 
minority. On the other the Zionists employed their superior military 
forces firstly, to achieve control over those areas proposed for the 
Jewish state and secondly, to extend their control to the rest of the 
country. 
Against this background a local civil war started in Palestine during 
the last six months of the British Mandate, the result of which, 
according to the Palestinians, was determined by the Zionist military 
and the .. and policy of the British Mandatory superiority posltlon 
-300-
Government. 
The Mandatory Government, as we have seen in Chapter Eight, insisted, 
in the one hand, that they would continue to be responsible for law and 
order in Palestine as a whole until 15 May 1948. On the other hand the 
British refused to provide the necessary forces to protect the 
Palestinian unarmed population and at the same time prevented others 
from doing so. This British position was seen by some Arabs as a 
conspiracy with the Zionists. "Britain was a principle party to the vast 
conspiracy whose aim was the establishment of Israel in accordance with 
a carefully prepared pl an. ,,7 
The Palestinians in fact did not have any regular army or 
semi-military organization similar to those possessed by the Zionists 
especially the Haganah (Jewish para-military organization) and the Sturn 
Gang (terrorist organization). The Palestinians "were not in a position 
to put up a sustained defence of their hearths and homes, let alone to 
take the offensive against the Israelis. But at the time few western 
observers fully realised this.,,8 
There are no reliable sources about the number of Palestinian 
irregulars and guerrillas who participated in the local conflict during 
this period. But according to different estimates their numbers varied 
from 2,000 to 5,000 persons. They were supported by similar numbers of 
Arab volunteers from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Transjordan. 9 
The great majority of Palestinian and Arab irregulars were untrained and 
as for their arms "most of them were ancient and of dubious reliability 
and there was an acute shortage of ammunition for numerous varieties of 
fire arms. The majority had only a handful of ammunition, some only half 
a dozen rounds or so, with little prospect of their supplies being 
replenished." IO The other important factor in the Palestinian military 
handicap was British interference in their operations against Zionist 
forces. On several occasions British forces intervened and attacked the 
Palestinian and Arab guerrillas and prevented them from achieving their 
goals. II 
In contrast, the Zionists had between 60,000 and 80,000 troops 
including 300 British trained officers and 4,000 other ranks who had 
formed part of the Jewish Brigade raised by the British Army at the end 
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of World War Two. 12 In addition to this there were between 20,000 and 
30,000 others who served in the ranks of the various Allied Armies.13 
They were supported by 800 armoured cars, 21 aircrfat and small arms 
including 2-inch mortars. Most of the armoured cars, mortars and other 
small arms and ammunition were locally made in Palestine in 
Zionist-owned factories. 14 Moreover, all Zionist settlement were 
provided with self-defence units, ammunition and arms stocks encircled 
with barbed wire, mine-fields and ditches. They were guarded with search 
lights, observation posts, and connected through a radio network with 
the Palmach, the Zionist mobile forces. These settlement fortifications 
proved very effective against guerrilla raids during the local war. 
Against this background the best hope for the Palestinians was to hold 
onto their areas until the end of the Mandate when the Arab armies could 
come to protect them. But the Zionists exploited their military 
advantage and started a series of large offensive operations especially 
from the beginning of April 1948. The Zionists were encouraged to do so 
after they realized that Britain was not going to interfere in their 
offensives and after they received the first large arms shipment from 
abroad .15 
The Causes of the Exodus 
The interesting question here is: Why did the Palestinian leave? There 
are two versions and explanations of this Palestinian exodus. A general 
theme running through Zionist accounts of the events between November 
1947 and May 1949 is that "Arab mass flight from within "Israel" and 
Israeli occupied areas is a direct effect of Arab aggression from 
outside,,16 and therefore the Zionists and later "Israel" disclaim any 
responsibil ity for that problem. In other words" Israel" alleged that 
the refugee problem was created as a result of the Arab invasion of 
d ft the proclamat,'on of "Israel." Palestine after 15 May 1948 an a er 
Palestinians reject this Zionist claim and argue that the origin of 
the refugee problem was already established in the last months of the 
Mandate when between 200,000 and 300,000 Palestinians fled or were 
forced to leave the country as a result of Zionist terror or occupation 
of Arab territories including hundreds of villages and the two largest 
Arab cities of Hiafa and Jaffa. The Arabs argued that this Zionist 
d 's 17 The action had taken place in front of the Man atory s eye. 
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Palestinians argued that the displacement of the Palestinians was in 
accordance with a deliberate Zionist policy of establishing a pure 
Jewish state in Palestine: liThe Zionist racist objective of building up 
an exclusive Jewish state by displacing the eXisting population and 
dispossessing it of its lands and homes was the underlying cause of the 
Palestine refugee problem and is at the root of the Palestine 
Question." 18 The displacement of the Palestinians was not only within 
the overall Zionist policy but also intended to achieve the following 
immediate aims: I9 
1. Lessen the danger of Palestinian espionage in the proposed Jewish 
state. 
2. Provide lands and homes for new Zionist settlers. 
3. Give the Arab countries a vast refugee problem to cope with, which 
they lacked the material or administrative requirements to deal with. 
4. Give the Zionists a strong bargaining position or "trump card", 
which could be used in future negotiations for a final settlement. 
The direct causes of the mass exodus were: Zionist terrorism and 
occupation of Arab territories, expulsion and the breakdown of security. 
First I will discuss Zionist terrorism. 
Zionist Terrorism 
After 29 November 1947 the Zionists turned their terrorist campaign 
against the Palestinian population instead of the Mandatory Government. 
The Zionists used every possible means to frighten the Arabs and force 
them out of their homes and lands. This included: mortar shelling, 
demolishing houses, bombing crowds in public places, raids and 
calculated massacres. However, since the chronology of these events is 
given in other works 20 it seems to me that it is perhaps sufficient for 
the purpose of this Chapter to shed some light upon the most important 
events which had direct effect upon the mass exodus of the Palestinians. 
The local war between the Palestinians and the Zionists started almost 
immediately after the U.N. passed the Partition Resolution in November 
1947. On 30th December a large Haganah force attacked the Arab village 
Balad al-Shikh killing more than 60 villagers including women and 
children.21 On January 4th 1948, 14 Palestinians were killed and 98 
wounded when a bomb planted by the Zionists exploded in the centre of 
Jafa. Another 20 were killed and 12 wounded in a similar incident in 
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1 22 Jerusa em. On 25th January 1948, the Haganah forces demolished 17 Arab 
houses in an Arab village near Rahavot and expelled their inhabitants 
evidently to spread the message to their fellow citizens. 23 On 14th 
February 1948, the Zionists shelled many villages with mortars and in 
the village of Sasa alone 11 civilians were killed and 14 houses were 
demolished or damaged. 24 On 3rd March 14 Arabs were killed and 26 
wounded in the centre of Haifa when the Zionists "detonated an army 
truck filled with explosives in the centre of the city.,,25 In Samaria 
District the Zionists blasted 13 houses onto the heads of their 
residents killing 30 Arabs and wounding 10 others. 26 
This terrorist campaign was accompanied by psychological warfare 
intended to create panic and spread fear among the Palestinian 
civilians, which would achieve the double object of subduing their 
opposition to the creation of a Jewish state and causing their eventual 
flight from the country. The most outstanding incident among the 
outrages committed by the Zionist terrorist organization (Irqun) in 
Palestine against the Palestinian civilian population and which 
accelerated their panic flight, was the massacre of 250 men, women and 
children in the village of Deir Yassin on 9 April 1948. 27 This village 
had shown no special animosity to its Jewish neighbours, yet it was 
attacked by Zionist terrorist, in order to demonstrate their military 
strength and to force the rest of the population in the chain of Arab 
villages on the main road between the coast and Jerusalem to flee the 
area, and make that route safe for Jewish supplies to Jerusalem. Here is 
John Kimche from the "Jewish observer" commenting on the incident: 
"There was no obvious occasion for them to do so. What happened 
afterwards has been subject of conflicting versions, explanations and 
excuses by the terrorists but nothing they have said has explained, or 
can explain away, the murder of some 250 innocent Arabs, among them more 
than a hundred women and ch i1 dren. ,,28 
Although the Haganah and the Jewish Agency denied any knowledge of the 
Irqun's planned operation, Menachim Begin, the Irqun leader at the time, 
argues that the Haganah knew about the operation and warned about 
committing such a massacre. Such warnings and fore-knowledge were 
revealed in the following letter from the Haganah commander to the Irqun 
commander and quoted by Begin: "I learn that you plan an attack on ~ir 
Yassin. I wish to point out that the capture of Dir Yassin and holdlng 
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it is one stage 
carrying out the 
village." 29 
in our general plan. I have no objection to your 
operation provided you are able to hold the the 
Begin argues that the value of the massacre "Was worth half a dozen 
battalions to the forces of Israel .,,30 Indeed the Zionists made no 
excuse for it "as it was all part of their plan for the reconquest of 
thei r "promi sed 1 and" , in whi ch there was no room for 1 arge host il e 
alien groups.,,31 
The Dir Yassin massacre and the publicity which accompanied it from 
Arabs, Zionists and foreign media correspondents, had tremendous effects 
upon the Palestinian civilians. Here is Begin: "Panic overwhelmed the 
Arabs of Evetz Israel (Palestine). Kolondia village, which had 
previously repulsed every attack of the Haganah, was evacuated over 
night and fell without further fighting. Beit -Iksa was also evacuated. 
These two places over looked the main road, and their fall, together 
with the capture of Kastel by the Haganah, made it possible to keep open 
the road to Jerusalem.,,32 
Begin describes the effect of the massacre on the civilian population 
of Haifa as follows: "All the Jewish forces proceeded to advance through 
Haifa like a knife through butter. The Arabs began fleeing in panic, 
shouting Dir Yassin.,,33 The immediate result of Dir Yassin on the 
Palestinians according to Bethell: "Was the headlong flight from the 
allocated Jewish area of two thirds of its Arabs, about 300,000 people, 
who even more than thirty years later are not allowed to return to the 
homes and lands they left behind.,,34 
The other important incident was the attack and occupation of Haifa. 35 
On 21st April, 1948, the British suddenly evacuated the city and after 
two days of continuous Zionist attacks on the city, the majority of its 
Arab population fled the city leaving everything behind. The Zionists 
denied that they planned to displace the Arab population and claimed 
that the Arabs voluntarily chose to leave rather than to surrender. Here 
is Herzog discribing the Arab position and choice: "The Arabs were torn 
by doubts and beset by an atmosphere of panic. Rather than risk what 
they believed might occur. After the collapse of the Arab resistance, 
they decided in most cases to take advantage of the presence of the 
h . . ,,36 British Forces and to be evacuated under t elr aegls. 
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The Arabs claimed that the Zionists had not only put unacceptable 
conditions for Arab surrender, but also that there was no guarantee for 
their safety if they did so, since the Mandatory Government had 
abandoned its responsibilities towards the Arabs. Other Arabs, however, 
argued that the Palestinians in fact had fled the city, losing all their 
material belongings, rather than taking the risk of staying and facing 
possible death. 37 
The state of panic and disorder which prevailed during the 
flight indicates that the refugees indeed felt that their Palestinians 
lives were in great danger. Here is David Kimche, from the "Jewish 
Observer", describing the Arab condition immediately after the city was 
occupied by Zionist forces: "I walked later in the Suk (the Bazar) and 
saw the state of disorder in which they had left their houses often not 
bothering to pick up silver, and valuables which they could easily have 
carried in their hands.,,38 
The logical explanation for such a state of panic and disorder among 
the Palestinians is the clear evidence that: the Palestinians felt that 
there was an immediate danger to their lives and instinctively they 
escaped with their lives and forgot about any other material belongings. 
This state of panic and disorder refutes Zionist claims that it was a 
"voluntary evacuation". 
This Arab flight, however, is not different from the flight of other 
populations under the same circumstances. In almost every war many 
civilians fled the battle area but they were allowed back at the end of 
war. Therefore it seems to me that the real issue here is not whether 
the Palestinians fled by themselves or were expelled by the Zionists, 
rather the real issue is: Did their flight, for what ever reasons, 
invalidate their rights? 
The U.N., which was responsible for the partition of the country, 
resolved that the Palestinians did not lose their rights and recommended 
their repatriation in resolution 194 (III) of 1948. 
On 25th April Jaffa was attacked and occupied by the Zionist forces. 
The story of Haifa 
70,000 Arabs fled 
everything 
"Everything 
behind 
that 
carpets, pictures, 
was repeated yet again in Jaffa. The majority of its 
the city in a state of fear and panic leaving 
them to be looted or destroyed by the Zionists. 
was movable was carried out from Jaffa, furniture, 
crockery, and pottery and jewellery ... What could not 
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be taken away was smashed. Windows, pianos, fittings and lamps went in 
an orgy of destruction.,,39 
Other Palestinian villages were occupied and destroyed by the Zionist 
forces and later by the Israeli forces. Here is the account of 
Bernadatte, the mediator on Palestine, to the United Nations: "After 
intensive investigation by observers, who succeeded in locating more 
than 8,000 of the villagers and in establishing that less than 130 were 
killed or missing, the Central Truce Supervision Board found that the 
villages were attacked by the Jews between 18 and 25 July by air and 
land, and the inhabitants had been forced to evacuated; after the 
evacuation the villages Ein Ghazal and Jaba were destroyed by the 
Israeli forces. The attack could not be excused as a police action ... 
and that the measure taken involving the systematic destruction of two 
villages, were excessive and constituted a violation of both the spirit 
and letter of the terms of the truce.,,40 
The significance of this report lies in the fact that the massacres, 
destruction and shelling of Palestinian people and villages were means 
deliberately employed by the Zionists and Israeli forces to serve a 
policy of establishing a pure Jewish state on Arab lands after the 
displacement of its inhabitants. Here is Dr Stephen Penrose: "There is 
no question but that frightful massacres such as that which took place 
at Dir Yassin in April 1948 were perpetuated for the major purpose of 
frightening the Arab population and causing them to take flight."41 
According to Bernadatte, U.N. mediater on Palestine: "The exodus of 
Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their 
communities, by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or 
expulsion.,,42 John Davis, argued that: The extent to which the refugees 
were savagely driven out by the Israelis as part of a deliberate 
master-plan has been insufficiently recognized. He went on to explain 
how the Zionist concept of an exclusive Jewish state called for the 
ousting of the Arabs from their homes and lands, and the manner in which 
this was achieved by means ranging from "expert psychological warfare to 
ruthless expulsion by force.,,43 
Expulsion 
Another cause of the Palestinian exodus was the actual expulsion of 
people from their villages and towns by the Zionist and Israeli forces. 
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This expulsion was not confined to the areas allocated to the Jewish 
state but also included those areas allocated to the Arab state after 
its occupation by the Zionist forces. Here is Bernadatte: liAs a result 
of the conflict in Palestine, almost the whole of the Arab population 
fled or was expelled from the area under Jewish occupation, this 
included the large Arab population of Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Remleh and 
Ludda. Of a population of somewhat more than 400,000 Arabs prior to the 
outbreak of hostilities the number presently estimated as remaining in 
Jewish controlled territory is approximately 50,000." 44 
George Kirk argued that the Zionists used advanced methods of 
psychological warfare side by side with actual terror and expulsion: 
liThe Jewish combatants made skillful use of psychological warfare to 
break their opponent's moral, and the effect upon the civilians was only 
as to be expected. The Israeli forces did not confine their pressure on 
the Arab civilian population to playing upon their fears. They forcibly 
expelled them: for example the population of Acre (including refugees 
from Haifa), in May, the population of Ludda and Rameleh (including 
refugees from Jaffa) in July, and the population of Beersheba and 
Western Gal il ee in October. 1145 
The Break down of Security and Government Machinery 
After the outbreak of violence following the United Nations Partition 
resolution, the Mandatory Government was neither able to maintain law 
and order in Palestine nor willing to commit its forces to provide 
protection for the Palestinian civilians. From December 1947 the British 
Government started to withdraw its forces from some areas and 
concentrated British personnel in enclosed and guarded zones inside the 
main cities. What happened outside the guarded zones ceased to be of 
concern to the Mandatory Government. In so far as law, order and 
security were concerned, the people were left to fend for themselves. 46 
Although Article 2 of the Mandate had required from the Mandatory 
Government the establishment of self-government in Palestine, no 
administrative machinery of any kind existed or was envisaged for the 
preservation of law and order upon the termination of the Mandate. 
Moreover, the British Government refused to allow the U.N. Palestine 
commission to come to the country to prepare for the peaceful transfer 
of the administration of the local governments of the proposed Arab and 
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Jewish states, through the establishment of militias, local government, 
borders etc. The Palestinians argued that this British position served 
Zionist objective: "This was precisely what the Zionists wanted, for 
dejure authority claimed by Britain over Palestine acted as a shield 
protecting the Zionists from the regular Arab armies. This gave the 
Zionists time to create by 15th of May 1948 a new status quo in the 
country which would be beyond the means of the regular Arab armies to 
reverse. 1147 
However, despite the warnings of the U.N. Palestine Commission about the 
possibility of a collapse of security and a widespread strike and 
bloodshed at the end of the Mandate, there were no successor authorities 
and a security vacuum was immediately created. The complete state of 
chaos into which the country was plunged impelled many Palestinians to 
seek temporary refugee in relatives' or friends' homes or in caves and 
tents. Some of them (the more wealthy) crossed the border to the 
neighbouring Arab States. This refugee movement was further encouraged 
by the absence of any communal organization or leadership for the 
protection of the Palestinian civilians from Zionists attacks or of the 
provision of elementary public services. 
The Palestinians possessed no shadow government, no proper military 
organization, no institutions for the discharge of governmental 
functions or the maintenance of public services. Don Peretz has observed 
that the absence of organized Arab authorities had contributed to the 
confusion of the Arab population and the decline of their morale: "With 
the breakdown of all functions of government necessary to maintain law, 
order and well being - water, electricity, posts, police education, 
health, sanitation and the like - Arab moral callapsed." 48 
In contrast, planning and organization to meet the situation which arose 
during this period were far more developed among the Zionists than the 
Palestinians. For years the Zionists had been organizing politically, 
military, financially and administratively for this situation. Indeed 
during the Mandate period there was always a Zionist shadow government 
which easily converted into a Jewish state immediately at the end of the 
Mandate. 
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One might ask: Why did the Zionists resort to terrorist tactics to 
drive the Palestinians out of their homes? The answer is to be found in 
the underlying Zionist racist objective of creating in Palestine an 
exclusive Jewish state. This objective was in contradiction with the 
demographic facts in Palestine. As we have seen in chapter Eight the 
number of Palestinians within the areas allocated to the Jewish state 
was 497,000 against 498,000 Zionists. More over, the Palestinians owned 
about 75 % of the land in those territories. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the realization of the Zionists' 
objective necessitated the displacement of the Palestinians and 
dispossession of their lands. The other reason behind the Zionist policy 
of displacing the Palestinians was to deprive the Arabs from their 
strong argument, namely the rejection of the idea of establishing a 
Jewish state in part of Palestine on the grounds that there was an equal 
number of Arabs living there and most of the land was owned by Arabs. 
The clearance of those areas of their inhabitants would completely 
devalue such an Arab argument. 
The Jewish character of the state had been a corner stone of Zionist 
policy since the appearance of the movement at the end of the 19th 
century. Professor Maxime Rodinson observed that the Jewish character of 
the state is liThe prime aim and postulate of Zionist ideology.,,49 For 
more than a quarter of a century during the Mandate the Zionists exerted 
all efforts and used all kind of inducements in order to purchase the 
lands of Palestine. They exerted every possible pressure on the British 
government to allow more Zionist settlers to enter Palestine in the hope 
that they would form a majority and could declare Palestine as a Jewish 
state. The policy of segregation, expulsion of fellaheen and tenants 
from their lands after they had been purchased by Zionists and the 
dismissal of Palestinian labour from Zionist firms had already been in 
operation since 1930s. 
But despite all Zionist efforts they could not dramatically alter the 
demographic composition of the country since they formed only one third 
of the population in 1947, and could not acquire more than 7 percent of 
the total land of Palestine at the end of the Mandate, as we have seen 
in Chapter Three. The Zionists therefore "undertook to remove this 
contradiction. Accordingly, the Arab population of the territory of 
Palestine seized by Israel in 1948 was reduced to less than one tenth of 
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its original number." SO 
To sum up here is a list of the major attacks, occupation and 
expulsion which took place while Britain was still officially 
responsible for law and order in the whole country: 
a. In the area allocated to the Arab state. The village of Qazaza was 
attacked and occupied on December 1947, Sal amah village in March 1948, 
Saris, Qastal, Byar Adas and the town of Jaffa in April 1948. The town 
of Acre in May 1948, together with about 200 villages in the whole 
country. 
b. In the area allocated to the Proposed Jewish state. 
The towns of Tiberias and Haifa in April 1948, Safad and Beisan in May 
1948. 
c. In Jerusalem International Zone. 
The village of Dir Yassin and a chain of villages on the main road 
between the coast and Jerusalem and the Arab Quarter of Katamon in 
Jerusalem were occupied in April 1948. 
It can be argued that the displacement of the Arabs was within the 
Zionist overall and longstanding policy to create an exclusive Jewish 
state. lilt was the Jewish policy to encourage the Arabs to quit their 
homes, and they used psychological warfare extensively in urging them to 
do so. Later, as the war worn on, they ejected those Arabs who clung to 
their villages. This policy which had amazing success, had two 
advantages. First it gave the Arabs a refugee problem to cope with and 
secondly, it ensured that the Jews had no fifth column in their 
midst." SI 
The Number of Refugees S2 
During the first three months of 1948 the number of refugees was 
relatively small. The exodus reached great proportions as a result of 
the massacre of Dir Yassin on April 9, 1948 and the occupation, 
expulsion and flight of the Arab inhabitants of Tiberias (April 19), 
Haifa (April 22), Jaffa (April 29), Safad (May 10), Remeleh and Ludda 
(July 12), Beersheba and western Galilee during October 1948. 
Early figures for the number of refugees were in the nature of rough 
estimates made while most of the population were on the move and during 
a continuing flow. Edward Buehring, acknowledges the difficulty of 
d t d th t· liThe number of knowing the exact numbers of refugees an no ea. 
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Palestinian Arabs displaced in 1948 is not known with certainty and will 
always remain a controversial question.,,53 
Since there are no Government or official statistic about the number 
of refugees, during the period under discussion, we are left with the 
only alternative of examining all the available resources. Count 
Bernadotte's estimate as of September 10 1948, was 330,000. 54 A month 
later the acting Mediator's estimate was 500,000. According to the Arab 
estimate, which was submitted to the acting mediator, the number of 
refugees was between 740,000 and 780,000. 55 
When a more precise estimate could be made, it was found that the real 
number was much higher than Bernadotte's estimate. In December 1949, the 
United Nations economic survey mission for the Middle East estimated the 
number of refugees at 726,000. 56 At the time when UNRWA (U.N. Relief And 
Work Agency) was established (May 1, 1950) to assist the Palestine 
refugees, their number was estimated at 960,000. 57 
Prittie (pro-Zionist) argues that the maximum number of Palestinians 
who were living in the areas controlled or incorporated by the Israeli 
forces was 750,000 about 160,000 remained in those territories and only 
590,000 were displaced. 58 Don Peretz59 estimated that out of the 700,000 
to 900,000 Arabs who lived in territories controlled by the Zionist and 
Israeli forces only 170,000 remained the rest had become refugees. 
The number of refugees who were displaced before 15 May 1948 was 
estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000. 60 This means that the number 
of refugees before the end of the Mandate constituted about one third of 
the total refugees up to 1949. The other significant aspect of the 
Palestine refugee problem is that 500,000 or 60 percent of the total 
refugees had come from those areas allocated to the Arab state but 
occupied by the Zionist and Israeli forces in the course of the conflict 
and war between 1947 and 1948. 
"Israel" neither agreed to withdraw from the occupied territories nor 
allowed the refugees to return back to their homes despite the call of 
the mediator on Palestine, Bernadatte, who observed that: "It would be 
an offense against the principles of elementary justice if these 
innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to 
their homes while Jewish immigrants flowed into Palestine, and indeed, 
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at least offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees 
who have been rooted in the land for centuries.,,61 
On the day of British withdrawal a war broke out between the Arabs and 
"Israel". The 1948 War,62 however, is not within the scope of this 
study, which is concerned mainly with the conflict during the Mandate 
period. However, the impact of this war on the prospect of the 
settlement was so great that a few comments perhaps are required. The 
Arab view in regard to this war was expressed in a telegram from the 
Arab League to the General Secretary of the U.N. The Arab states, "were 
compelled to intervene for the sole purpose of restoring peace and 
security and of establishing law and order in Palestine which with the 
British departure had no legal authority," The Arabs justified their 
intervention on the ground that they wanted to "prevent the spread of 
disorder and lawlessness into their countries and to fill the vacuum 
created by the termination of the Mandate.,,63 
The Arabs argued that their intervention was a result of British 
failure to fulfill their duties, to maintain law and order up to the end 
of the Mandate and the failure of the U.N. to establish any alternative 
authority to take over the responsibility of security from the British: 
"Had the U.N. from then on (end of the Mandate) undertaken its 
responsibilities of ensuring peace and security for the the Arab 
inhabitants, Arab states' intervention would have been unnecessary."64 
Others saw Arab intervention as the only way to prevent the Zionist 
forces from occupying the whole country. "Had the Arab states not 
intervened during the crucial period when the British administration 
withdrew, the whole country would have been overrun by the Zionist 
forces. ,,65 
Davi d Gil mour, argued that "the entry of the Arab armi es into 
Palestine on 15 May did, however, bring an end to the first Zionist 
offensive.,,66 
The Zionists on the other hand claimed that the Arab aim in sending 
their regular armies to Palestine was to destroy the newly-born Jewish 
state and not protect their fellow Arabs. Consequently, the Zionists put 
the responsibility of the war and the refugee problem on the Arabs. "If 
the Arab states had not waged open war on Israel on the morrow of its 
re-establishment in May 1948, the Arab refugees issue would never have 
-313-
arisen.,,67 
The interesting thing here, in my view, is that the people in the West 
believed the Zionist version of the story, namely that the exodus of the 
Palestinians was a result of Arab "invasion" and a response to their 
leaders' call to leave the country to pave the way for the advanced Arab 
armies who came to destroy "Israel" and "throw the Jews into the sea.,,68 
The evidence presented in this Chapter, however, support the Arab view 
especially in regard to the origin of the refugee problem. "On the day 
Israel proclaimed its independence there were already 300,000 
Palestinian refugees, and Zionist forces had occupied large chunks of 
territories designated for the proposed Arab state as well as parts of 
Jerusalem International Administration.,,69 
The important thing here is not whether the Palestinians left of their 
own free will, as the Zionists claim, or whether they were expelled as 
the Arabs claim, but rather to take practical steps to solve this human 
tragedy in accordance with human rights and international laws and the 
respective U.N. resolutions. The fact of the matter is that "Israel" had 
refused to allow those refugees to return despite the continuous call of 
the U.N. for their repatriation. It does not serve the cause of peace if 
the Arabs and "Israel" continued to talk about who was responsible for 
the refugee problem instead of doing something to solve it. There is no 
excuse for either side to use political differences as a pretext for not 
solving this human tragedy which must take precedence over any political 
gains or consideration. 
It is my considered opinion that the solving of the refugee problem 
not only must take precedence over any material or political gains, but 
also that it is a prerequisite and pre-condition for any real progress 
towards solving the conflict as a whole. 
Concluding Remarks 
Immediately after the United Nations General Assembly passed the 
Partition Resolution in Nov'ember 1947, serious clashes and civil war 
broke out between the Palestinian people and the Zionist forces. About 
300,000 Palestinian civilians had been uprooted from their homes during 
the last six months of the Mandate, constituting about one third of the 
total Palestinian refugees until the end of 1948. The causes of this 
exodus were three fold: 
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Zionist terrorism, expulsion and the breakdown of security and 
government machinery during the last six months of the Mandate. The 
basic factors which had doubled the dimensions of the refugee problem 
were the occupation by the Zionist and Israeli forces of various areas 
of Palestine in excess of the territories allocated to the proposed 
Jewish State by the Partition resolution and the refusal of "Israel" to 
allow them to return to their homes. In terms of population about 60 
percent of the total refugees had come from areas seized by the Zionist 
forces in excess of the areas allocated for the Jewish State. 
The Zionists resorted to terrorist and intimidation tactics to drive 
the Palestinians out of their homes and villages in order to achieve the 
Zionist long standing racist objective of creating in Palestine an 
exclusive Jewish State. Therefore, it can be argued that the realization 
of the Zionists' objective necessitated the displacement of the 
Palestinians, who formed at the time of Partition, about 49 percent of 
the total population of the proposed Jewish state and about 70 % of the 
total population of Palestine. The Palestinians also owned about 75 % of 
the land allocated to the proposed Jewish state and about 90 % of the 
total land of Palestine, as we have seen in Chapter Three. 
At the end of the war of 1948 the Arab population of the territory of 
Palestine seized by "Israel" was reduced to less than one tenth of its 
original number. The refugee problem, however, was and still is the 
heart of the conflict and it is inconceivable that a lasting settlement 
can be achieved without solving this human tragedy. Bernadatte rightly 
argued that: lilt is, however, undeniable that no settlement can be just 
and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab 
refugee to return to the home from which he was been dislodged by the 
hazards and strategies of the armed conflict between Arabs and Jews in 
Palestine." 70 Despite this warning from Bernadatte and the United Nation 
Resolution 194 (Ill) of 11 December 1948 which recognized the 
Palestinian refugees' right to return or to be compensated, "Israel" has 
refused to allow the refugees to return right up to the present day. 
In conclusion I would argue that: the Zionist objective of 
establishing an exclusively Jewish State by displacing the existing 
population and dispossessing them of their homes and lands was the 
underlying cause of the Palestinian refugee problem and ;s at the root 
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of the Palestine conflict. Unless "Israel" fully recognizes the 
Palestinians' legitimate rights it is not expected, in my view, that a 
lasting settlement to the conflict can be achieved. 
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Summary And Conclusion 
1. The nature of the Palestine conflict in Palestinian eyes. 
Palestinians viewed Zionism as a racist movement connected with 
Western Colonialism which sought the establishment of a Jewish state in 
their country under British sponsorship and protection. Palestinian 
responses to Zionist settlement and to the attempts to solve the 
conflict which resulted from that settlement were therefore a reflection 
of this concept. 
Indeed, 
Palestine 
the Palestine conflict started with the British occupation of 
in 1917 and their declaration to facilitate Jewish settlement 
in the country without consulting its native population and regardless 
of the impact of such settlement on the economic conditions and the 
well-being of the natives. In this sense Zionist settlement in Palestine 
was, in many ways, similar to white settlement elsewhere in Asia and 
Africa and especially in South Africa: 
a. Both settlements took place against the will and the wishes of the 
natives and under the sponsorship and protection of a colonial power. 
b. In both cases the majority of the settlers were European whites who 
had different customs, and social values and developed their separate 
political, social, and economic institutions. 
c. In both cases most of the natives' land was confiscated and the 
majority of the population were displaced, expelled or moved to other 
areas to make room for the settlers, or for security reasons or in 
accordance with the policy of the settlers. 
d. In both cases a Plural society emerged as a result of the 
settlement with direct conflict of interest between the settlers and the 
natives. 
The essence of the conflict lies in the fact that the white settlers 
came, in considerable numbers, to a country which belonged to others and 
imposed themselves upon the population with the help of a colonial 
power. In both cases the native population rejected this foreign 
occupation, and expressed this rejection with all means at their 
disposal 
The main difference between the settlement in Palestine and the 
settlement in South Africa is the ideology of the settlers. While in 
South Africa the aim of the settlement was in the beginning domination 
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and the exploitation of the economic resources and the cheap native 
labour for the benefit of the mother country and later for the benefit 
of the settler regime, the aim of the Zionist settlement was the 
dispossessing and eventual expulsion of the natives in order to 
establish their own exclusive state. 
During about thirty years of British rule over Palestine the Zionist 
movement succeeded, with the help of British legislation, in bringing to 
the country over half a million Zionist settlers, forming about one-
third of the total population, and acquired about 1.85 million donums or 
about 7 percent of the total lands of Palestine. The Palestinian society 
was transformed, against the wishes of its local population, into a 
plural society with its main segments the Palestinian Arabs and the 
Jewish settlers. The great majority of the settlers spoke different 
languages, had different values, different customs and implemented a 
policy of complete segregation between them and the natives in almost 
everything. 
This policy of segregation which resulted in evicting Palestinian 
tenants from the lands which were acquired by Zionists and in dismissing 
Palestinian labourers from their jobs in the Jewish sector, was employed 
to achieve the eventual goal of Zionism namely: the establishment of an 
exclusively Jewish state. This policy in fact had a serious impact on 
the relationship between the two communities. It increased Palestinian 
suspicion that the Zionists were going to dominate them and convert 
their country into a Jewish state. It created landlessness and 
unemployment among the Palestinians. More important, the Zionists 
refusal to recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination or to 
participate in self- government with an Arab majority made the Arabs 
think that the Zionism was the main obstacle in the way to independence. 
All these factors played their parts in creating a national demand among 
all classes of the Palestinian society namely: to oppose and resist 
Zionist settlement with all means and to demand the establishment of a 
national government representing all the inhabitants of the country 
including the Zionist settlers. 
I would argue therefore that the Palestinians viewed the Palestine 
conflict as a struggle of a native population against a foreign 
occupation and settlement in their country which could not be solved on 
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a basis other than the application of the elementary rules of justice, 
equality and self-determination. This in practical terms meant the 
establishment of a national government with Palestinians in the 
majority. Therefore, according to this Palestinian view, the causes of 
the conflict and its continuation without solution for such a long time, 
lie in the refusal of both the British and the Zionists to accept a 
settlement based on the previously mentioned principles and not because 
the Palestinians were not interested in a settlement. 
Indeed during the period of British rule it was the Palestinians who 
demanded a settlement which would guarantee the rights of the Jewish 
minority and at the same time guarantee the rights of the Arab majority. 
But it was Britain, the Zionists and later "Israel" that refused to 
accept the Palestinian demands and insisted on a settlement which would 
guarantee superior rights for the settlers as has been revealed in the 
proceeding chapters. 
Both the British and the Zionists tried to dissociate themselves from 
being colonizers in the case of Palestine. They tried to present this 
settlement as a matter not only of restoring a territory (Palestine) to 
its Jewish "owners", but also that the return of those civilized Jews to 
thei r "promi sed 1 and" was intended to benefi t and bri ng c i v il i zat i on to 
its backward Arab "nomads" who lived there and that they had no 
intention of controlling the Arabs or exploiting them. 
Britain used the Mandate as a tool to give international "legal" cover 
for their role in sponsoring the Zionist settlement and all along she 
claimed that she was carrying a dual obligation and was an impartial 
power which was executing a human and civilising mission on behalf of 
the League of Nations. Both Britain and the Zionists used the earlier 
Hebrew relation with Palestine in Biblical times to justify the 
settlement. 
It has been revealed, however, that although the Hebrews invaded 
Palestine between 1400 and 1200 B.C., and succeeded to control parts of 
it until 132 A.D., they were not the original inhabitants of the country 
and their occupation of Palestine was an episode in the long history of 
the country like that of other conquerors such as, the Babylonians, the 
Persians, the Greeks and the Romans. Moreover, it has been revaled also 
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that not every Jew in the world is a physical descendent of those 
earlier Hebrews. The Zionist settlers of the twentieth century were 
Russians, Polish and Germans who might have some form of spiritual 
connection with Palestine but such connection or association gave them 
neither political rights nor justified their immigration to the country, 
least of all to convert it into a Jewish state after dispossessing and 
uprooting its native inhabitants. 
Despite the fact that the native population of Palestine the 
Canaanites and the Philistines were made subject of consecutive waves of 
conquerors starting in 1400 B.C. they, nevertheless, preserved their 
distinctive, language, culture, religion, identity and never assimilated 
with their conquerors. But in 637 A.D. when the Arab Muslims occupied 
Palestine the natives perhaps because of similarities, in language, race 
and culture, soon adopted the Arab language, the majority converted to 
Islam and from that date the natives not only became Arabized but also 
identified themselves as Arabs. 
The Jews who continued to live in Palestine became known as Arabs of 
the Jewish faith. There were no serious problems between the Arab 
Muslims and the Arabized Jews similar to the problem which faced the 
Jews in Europe. This situation of tolerance continued until the 
appearance of the Zionist movement at the end of the 19th century and 
their demands for the establishment of a Jewish government in Palestine. 
The Zionist movement, after failing to obtain support for their 
aspiration from Germany and Turkey turned to Britain. The British 
government proposed three areas for Zionist settlement Cyprus, el-Arish 
and Uganda. The Zionists accepted the Uganda offer in 1903 to change 
their minds in the next year in favour of settlement in Palestine which 
was part of the Ottoman Empire. 
During World War One Britain reached an accord with the Arabs whereby 
Britain promised to recognize Arab independence within certain areas 
suggested by Sharief Hussein of Mecca in return for Arab revolt against 
Turkey. Immediately after securing that accord Britain entered into 
secret agreement, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, with France to divide the 
Arab countries between themselves. A year later the British government 
declared its support for the Zionist aspiration and issued the Balfour 
Declaration which five years later was incorporated in the provisions of 
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Palestine Mandate and formed the framework of British policy until the 
end of the Mandate in 1948. 
The Palestinians refused to recognize either the Balfour Declaration 
or the British Mandate on the ground that they were not consulted about 
them. Consequently they considered these documents null and void and 
that Britain had no right to promise their country to other people and 
considered Jewish immigration under British protection and sponsorship 
illegal. The Palestinians accordingly did not view the conflict as a 
conflict between two nationalist movements but rather between a native 
population and foreign settlers. 
2. Palestinian responses to Zionist settlement 
The process of transforming Palestine into a Plural 
opposition from all classes of the Palestinian 
society faced 
society. The 
Palestinians' mode of action against Zionist settlement was similar to 
other natives' reactions towards white settlement and corresponded to 
the social structure and material power of that society. Despite the 
fact that the Arabs formed about 90 percent of the total population in 
1917 they in fact failed to prevent the process of transforming 
Palestine into a Plural society for several reasons: 
1. The Palestinian society had all the characteristics of a 
traditional society and suffered mainly from segmental ism, regionalism, 
tribalism and lacked an able and revolutionary leadership. By 1936, 
however, the external and double threat of British occupation and 
Zionist colonization, had gone far towards unifying them. For a full 
period of three years they revolted against this external threat but 
even such level of unity and violent action was not enough to stop the 
process of colonization. 
2. In spite of the spread of nationalist consciousness throughout the 
Mandate period, social segmental ism blocked the rapid mobilization of 
large groups, and long term political and military organizations. 
3. The readiness of the peasants to take up armed struggle was not 
fully exploited by the traditional leadership which lacked the 
organizational powers necessary for conducting mass political 
organization and armed struggle. 
These are some of the important factors within the social structure of 
the Palestinian society which hindered the development of a coherent 
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national resistance movement strong enough to present itself as an 
alternative to the Mandatory regime and to stop the process of 
transforming Palestine into a plural society. But I would argue that it 
would be incorrect to seek in these societal characteristics the causes 
of the Palestinian resistance movements' failure or the disaster of 
1948. Indeed, the presence of serious internal cleavages and conflict 
within the Palestinian society based on regionalism, tribalism and 
segmental ism made the task of a unified opposition to British and 
Zionist colonization extremely difficult but it was the combined 
material and military superiority of the British and Zionist forces 
which defeated the Palestinian resistance and made possible the 
proclamation of a Jewish state in two thirds of Palestine after 
displacing the great majority of its inhabitants. 
Moreover, the process of land alienation, boycott of Palestinian 
labourers and the separate development of political, social and economic 
institutions had a serious impact on the relationship between the two 
communities and particularly on the economic conditions of the 
Palestinian peasants. The average size of the peasants' holdings 
decreased at a time when there was an increase in population. The 
peasants evicted from lands acquired by Zionists and the workers 
dismissed from jobs in the Jewish sector could not find alternative jobs 
and formed a class of landless and unemployed who migrated to the towns 
and formed the seeds of the social unrest and Revolt of 1936-1939. 
The Palestinian responses to Zionist settlement can be divided into 
two types: political and military. 
During the first two decades the Palestinians tried to change the 
British and Jewish national home policy mainly by political means and 
through negotiations. Their mode of action included demonstrations, 
sending petitions and delegations to the British government, one day 
strike and some outbreaks of violence in 1920, 1921, 1929 and in 1933. 
The Palestinian leaders, in fact, although they realized early the 
potential danger of the Zionist settlement, did not make serious efforts 
to organize a popular military resistance to stop it. This was possible 
because, firstly they lacked the required infrastructure to organize and 
lead such a resistance and secondly because the number of Jewish 
immigrants was low and the amount of land purchased by Zionists was 
small. In other words as a result of the relatively slow development of 
the Jewish Home the Palestinian leaders perhaps did not see urgency in 
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mobilizing a national resistance to oppose it and partly because the 
majority of the rural populations did not feel yet its negative economic 
consequences. 
Moreover, the Palestinians wrongly assumed that sooner or later they 
would reached on agreement with the British government, like other 
agreements reached between Britain and other Arab countries, and once 
they reached such agreement Zionist activities in Palestine would come 
to an end and perhaps most of the settlers would leave the country when 
the British did. 
During the first decades it can be said that the Palestinians were 
busy in their internal disputes and rivalries especially between the two 
main powerful families al-Husseinis and al-Nashashibis for the control 
of the Arab Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council, rather than 
working to stop or to resist the British and Zionist colonization. The 
Palestinians also maintained a policy of non- recognition of the 
Zionists as a partner to the conflict and confined their efforts to 
sending four delegations to London to submit their national demands to 
the British government. These demands were based on the elementary 
principle of the right of every people ~o self- determination. Their 
main demand was the end of the Mandate and the establishment of a 
democratic government to represent the wishes of the Arab majority with 
guaranteed rights to the Jewish minority who could prove to be eligible 
for Palestine nationality. At this stage the Palestinians considered all 
Zionist immigration illegal since settlers had entered the country 
against their will and wishes. 
The period between 1930 and 1935 witnessed for the first time the 
seriousness of the effects of Zionist colonization on the Palestinian 
society. Zionist immigration increased dramatically to reach in one year 
-1935- about 62,000 persons. The number of landless and unemployed among 
the Palestinians increased too, without any prospect of alternative 
lands or jobs. Worst of all the Palestinians realized that after more 
than a decade of passive opposition and political negotiations 
t · . ht Most of the Arab countries Palestinian independence was no 1n S1g . 
had attained some sort of self-government and were expected to gain 
their independence in not a very long time. 
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Against this background the Palestinians started to think in terms of 
military struggle, supported by a political organization, as the only 
way to gain independence. This period indeed witnessed the appearance of 
several secret military organizations which worked in different regions 
and half a dozen political parties. Although these organizations did not 
succeed in forming a cohesive national resistance movement they formed 
the bases and prepared the ground for the Palestine Revolt of 1936-1939. 
There were several causes for the Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939 but 
the main causes are two: 
1. Their genuine desire for independence and 
2. Their fear of the potential danger of the Jewish National Home. 
The double threat of British colonialism and Zionism brought them 
together and in May 1936 they declared a general strike which lasted for 
six months, a unique event not only in Palestine but in the history of 
the Arab World. The Revolt was not simply a continuation of Palestinian 
protest against the British Jewish National Home policy. But rather it 
was a national rebellion against British occupation and their 
imperialist policy of planting a Zionist settler community in Palestine 
in the hope of converting the country into a Jewish state. Therefore, 
and for the first time, a large and more organized Palestinian military 
struggle was directed mainly against British rule with its main goal as 
independence. The Revolt was mainly carried out by peasants and workers 
who had been most affected by the economic policy of segregation which 
was strictly implemented by the Zionists at that time. 
Although the Revolt succeeded in controlling most of the rural areas 
and occupying some major towns, they, in fact, lacked military 
experience, modern military techniques and equipment, a communication 
system and finance. They were not able to transform the Revolt into a 
popular revolution because they did not possess the material and human 
infrastructure necessary to lead, organize, finance and carry out the 
revolution. More importantly the British Authorities in 1937 banned all 
their national organizations, arrested and deported their leaders and 
used more than 20,000 British troops, fully equipped with modern 
military arms, including aircrafts, tanks, and artillery, to quell the 
Revolt. They used severe measures against the civil population who 
cooperated with the guerrillas which included detention, blowing up 
houses, collective fines, and curfews. They also encouraged and helped 
-328-
arm anti Revolt bands and cooperated with the Zionist forces in order to 
crush the Revolt. But it was not before the British forces had occupied 
all the towns and most of the villages in Palestine, cut Palestine off 
from the rest of the Arab countries, and reached an understanding with 
the French Authorities in Syria, to suppress the political and military 
leadership in Damascus, that Britain was able to defeat the Revolt. 
Therefore, it can be said that it was the combined British and Zionist 
material and military superiority which made possible the defeat of the 
Palestinian Revolt and not the lack of will or desire among the 
Palestinians to resist foreign colonization. 
However, the Revolt was not defeated before it had left clear marks in 
the history of the Palestine conflict and indeed was a turning point in 
regard to the British approach to solving it. For example it was during 
that Revolt that the Arab states were brought to playa part in the 
Palestine conflict, a feature which is still in play up to the present 
day. It signalled future geographical as well as ideological segregation 
between Palestinians and Jews to be crystallized in proposals for 
Partition, bi-national state and a federal state. It also drove the 
Palestinians, after their military defeat, to rely more and more on the 
Arab states and less and less on themselves. 
3. Palestinian Responses To Attempts To Solve The Conflict 
During the Mandate period the attempt to solve the conflict can be 
divided into three categories: legislative councils, a bi-national or 
federal state and partition. 
a. Legislative Councils 
During the first two decades of British rule, no serious attempt was 
made to solve the conflict permanently. But on two occasions, 1922 and 
1935, the Mandatory government suggested the establishment of a 
legislative council in Palestine which would give both Arabs and 
Zionists some limited share in the administration of the country without 
questioning the validity of the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate and 
without executive power over the two main issues, which were at the 
heart of the conflict, immigration and land sales to Zionists. 
Although the council in 1922 would have provided the Palestinians with 
t bl ' h recognized body which would represent and an opportunity to es a lS a 
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talk on behalf of the Palestinians - until that time Britain had refused 
to recognize the Palestinian leadership as representing the population _ 
and would give them some say in the day to day administration of their 
country, the acceptance of such a council was seen by Palestinians as an 
effort from the British Government to legalise Jewish immigration and 
the Jewish National Home idea. Therefore, they rejected the idea and 
demanded the establishment of a legislative councilor self-government 
which would truly represent all the inhabitants of the country according 
to their numbers and with executive powers and control over the 
administration of the country including immigration and land sales to 
Jews. 
I would argue that the legislative council idea was in fact not 
intended to solve the conflict but rather it was an attempt by the 
British Government to bring both sides together in sharing with them the 
administration of Palestine in the hope that such a thing would make 
their policy more acceptable and their rule over the country easier. It 
would have meant the execution of the policy of the Balfour Declaration 
with Arab approval and consent. 
The British used the Palestinian rejection of participation in the 
legislative council as an excuse not to develop any form of 
self-government in the country. British propaganda succeeded in giving 
the impression to world public opinion and to the League of Nations that 
the Palestinians had refused to participate in the administration of the 
country and therefore, they were the ones to be blamed. 
In 1935 the British Government suggested a similar scheme - to be 
rejected this time by the Zionists, who hoped to form a majority very 
soon, and by the British Houses of Parliament but not by the 
Palestinians. 
b. A unitary and bi-national state 
After three years of unrest and revolt the British Government realised 
that its Jewish National Home policy was not only not acceptable in 
Palestine alone but also throughout the rest of the Arab countries which 
became officially involved in the problem after 1936. Therefore, during 
London Conferences in 1939 and in 1946-1947 the British Government for 
the first time proposed the establishment of a single government in 
Palestine representing both Arabs and Jews and declared the fulfilment 
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of their obligation to the Jews. During the London Conference of 1939 
the British Government suggested a plan involving the establishment of a 
single Palestinian state after a ten years transitional period in which 
the Zionist settlers would remain a permanent minority. The Arabs, 
including the Palestinians, accepted the Plan in principle but insisted 
that a definite date for independence must be set. 
In contrast, the Zionists rejected the British proposal and even 
boycotted the official sessions of the conference. 
The single item which prevented a complete agreement between the Arabs 
and the British Government was to set a date for the end of the 
transitional period. The British Government wanted to make independence 
dependent on Zionist consent. They feared that if they set a definite 
date for independence then the Arabs would not make serious efforts to 
meet Zionist demands for a fair share and participation in the 
administration of the country. On the other hand, the Palestinians 
feared that the British Government, under Zionist pressure, might change 
or reverse their policy at the end of the proposed transitional period, 
as she had on earlier occasions, and the only guarantee for independence 
would be through setting a fixed date for independence with or without 
Zionist consent. That the Palestinians believed to be also the only way 
to force the Zionists to seek serious negotiations with the 
Palestinians. But if independence was to be dependent on Zionist 
consent, it would never happen because the Zionists announced openly 
that they did not accept such a proposal and they would resist it with 
all means. 
The London Conference ended without agreement with either side and the 
British Government issued a White Paper in 1939 announcing the policy 
which she would follow in Palestine. The statement emphasized that it 
was not the intention of any British Government or even the "framer of 
the Balfour Declaration" to convert Palestine into a Jewish state. The 
British Government "Would indeed regard it as contrary to their 
obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate as well as to the assurances 
which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab 
population of Palestine should be made the subject of a Jewish state 
against their will." (1939 White Paper p.3). 
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The White Paper included the following objectives: 
1. The establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine 
state. 
2. Both Arabs and Jews would participate in the administration and 
government in such a way as to ensure the essential rights of each 
community. 
3. That after the admission of 75,000 Jewish immigrants within a five 
years period, no more immigration would be permitted without Arab 
consent. 
4. Land sales to Zionists were to be prohibited in most of Palestine 
and should be subject to strict control of the High Commission. 
Despite the fact that the Zionists had rejected the White Paper out of 
hand and that the Palestinians accepted almost all its items, except the 
length of the transitional period, they failed to sign an agreement with 
the British Government and therefore, their position was seen as the 
same as the position of the Zionists namely the rejection of the British 
proposals. 
Although some Palestinians may argue that even if the Palestinians had 
accepted the British proposals it was not going to make much difference 
since Britain was deeply committed to Zionism and that the British 
refusal to set a definite date for independence was intended to give 
them the pretext to reverse their policy in the future, in my view it 
was certainly a worthwhile and important opportunity that was wasted. 
The Palestinian people had struggled for more than two decades to gain 
British recognition for their right to establish a government 
representing all the inhabitants of the country and to refuse such a 
recognition because of fear of a reversal of the policy at the end of 
ten years and without any guarantee that independence would be achieved 
at all, was unwise and mistaken. The significance of the British 
proposals lies in the fact that Britain, for the first time, gave a 
clear definition to the meaning of the Jewish National Home and that was 
definitely not to convert Palestine or part of it into a Jewish state. 
It condemned the Zionist settlers to be a permanent minority. More 
importantly, it provided the Palestinians with an opportunity to get a 
written acceptance by the British Government of their sovereignty over 
the whole country. It prohibited land sales to Zionists in most parts of 
-332-
the country and made Jewish immigration after certain numbers dependent 
on Palestinian consent. 
It is hard to tell whether an agreement reached between the Arabs and 
Britain would have been implemented by the British Government or not but 
such an agreement would have made it extremely difficult for a British 
Government simply to abandon unilaterally an agreement and in any case 
it would have given the Palestinians a stronger negotiation position 
when the matter was brought before the United Nations. 
Although the British Government announced that she was going to 
implement the policy of the White Paper regardless of Arab and Zionist 
agreement it was easy for Britain not to implement that policy and they 
faced no problem when the policy was abandoned altogether in 1948. 
Arabs' protests against Britain's reluctance to implement the White 
Paper's policy was not effective because they themselves had refused to 
accept it. 
The Palestinians realized the importance of the British offer only in 
1946-47 when they demanded the implementation of that policy. They were 
then told that the White Paper was no longer on the negotiating table 
and that it was the Arabs rather than British fault that they had not 
accepted it when it was offered. 
Practically, the Palestinian refusal to sign an agreement with Britain 
which could secure almost all their demands played into the hands of the 
Zionists. It facilitated the task of the Zionists in attacking the 
British policy when they accused the British Government of following a 
policy which was not acceptable by the Arabs themselves, and 
consequently the policy was not implemented. 
During the Second London Conference in 1946-1947 the British 
Government suggested a plan involving the establishment of provincial 
autonomy or a bi-national state consisting of Arab and Jewish cantons. 
Both Arabs and Zionists rejected the offer and it was during this time 
that the Zionists announced their desire to establish a Jewish state in 
a viable area of Palestine, which was accepted by the United States of 
America in October 1946. 
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c. Partition 
Partition as a permanent solution to the Palestine conflict was first 
suggested in 1937 by the Royal Commission of Inquiry. According to this 
partition plan Palestine would be divided into: 
1. A Jewish State 
2. British Enclaves, to include Jerusalem and Nazareth. 
3. The attachment of the rest of Palestine to Transjordan to form an 
Arab State. 
The territories allocated to the proposed Jewish state included the 
Coastal plain and Galilee. These territories contained 304,900 Jews and 
294,000 Arabs. The Arabs owned 75 % of the lands in these territories. 
The main aim of this plan was to enable the Zionist settlers to form a 
secure and exclusive Jewish state in a viable area which included almost 
all the irrigated, citrus and cereal lands and the water resources. To 
achieve this aim the Commission suggested a compulsory exchange of land 
and population between the Arab and the Jewish proposed areas. This 
meant actually the transfer of the 294,000 Arabs who owned 75 percent of 
those territories in return for the transfer of less than 10,000 Jews 
who owned insignificant land in the Arab state. 
The Palestinians rejected this proposal on the ground that while it 
suggested the establishment of a Jewish state for one third of the 
population on a territories mainly owned by Arabs it withheld such 
rights from the Palestinians. The Palestinians argued that the Partition 
solution was not based on the recognized principles of justice and 
equality and it was neither acceptable nor fair to suggest the transfer 
of innocent civilians from their homes and lands to make room for 
foreign settlers to establish a foreign state. They charged that the 
Commission in suggesting such a plan considered the interests of the 
Zionist settlers only and completely ignored the Palestinians right for 
freedom and self determination in their own country. 
Indeed the Partition plan did not give much consideration to the 
economic social and psychological impact of such a transfer of peasant 
communities from their homes and environment to new and strange areas. 
The Arab population announced their determination to resist such a 
transfer by all their means. The Zionists also rejected Partition 
because it did not give them all that they wanted especially the Negeb 
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and new Jerusalem. 
A Technical Commission which was sent to Palestine in 1938 to draw up 
a definite scheme of Partition came to the conclusion that the Royal 
Commission Plan was built on the assumption of transferring the Arab 
population. Without such a transfer Partition as suggested by the Royal 
Commission would not be practical. They produced three alternative plans 
and according to plan C, which they recommended, the proposed Jewish 
state was reduced to a small area, 400 square miles, consisting of a 
narrow strip of the Coastal plain along the Mediterranean. 
The Palestinians, however, were not united in rejecting Partition. The 
"moderate" among them actually were prepared to accept Partition since 
such a solution would confine the Zionist danger into a small area and 
consequently protect the Arab areas from Zionist potential expansion. 
Those "moderates" among the Palestinians were also supported by 
Transjordan. But at the end the nationalists won the argument since they 
were supported by the Revolt's leaders and rejection of Partition 
prevailed. 
The Zionists 
give them all 
too rejected Partition on the grounds that it did not 
they wanted and in the hope that they would become a 
majority and establish a Jewish state in the whole country. Against this 
background the British Government announced their abandonment of 
Partition on the ground that it was impracticable. 
The important point which must be noticed here is this: despite the 
fact that Zionist opposition to Partition was no less than Palestinian 
opposition, British and Zionist propaganda succeeded in giving the 
impression that the Arabs were mainly responsible for the failure of the 
scheme. It is the contention of this thesis that Partition was not 
abandoned by the British Government because of Arab objection to it but 
rather and mainly because of Zionist rejection. 
In 1947 the United Nations adopted and recommended a partition scheme 
as a solution to the Palestine conflict. It was similar to the Royal 
Commission scheme with the exception of adding the Negeb to the Jewish 
state and Western Galilee to the Arab state. The United Nations 
Partition scheme with economic union included: 
1. The establishment of an Arab state in the central hill and arid 
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area of Palestine, including Western Galilee, Gaza strip and an enclave 
and corridor to Jaffa. The total area of the Arab state was 4,476 square 
miles or 42,88 percent of the total land of Palestine. It was to contain 
725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. 
2. The establishment of a Jewish state to include Eastern Galilee, 
which contain the water resources, the Coastal plain, which contains, 
most of the Citrus cereal and irrigable lands, and the Negeb with its 
strategic location on the Red Sea and its mineral and oil potential. An 
area of 5,897 square miles or 56 percent of the total. It was going to 
contain 498,000 Jews against a similar number of Arabs 497,000 including 
the nomads. 
3. Jerusalem International Zone. It consisted of 68 square miles or 
0,65 percent and contained 105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews. 
The Palestinians' responses to this plan were almost identical to 
their responses to the previous Partition plan of the Royal Commission. 
They rejected the United Nations Partition plan for the following 
reasons: 
1. The U.N. recommended Partition without consulting the people 
concerned and in doing so the Organization violated the principles 
embodied in its own Charter, namely the right of every people to 
self-determination and the establishment of a national government 
representing the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants. 
2. The U.N. used a double standard in dealing with the rights of the 
Zionist settlers and the rights of the Arab native population. If 
Partition was recommended in order to solve the problem of Jewish 
minority under Arab rule then why did the same principle not apply for 
the large Arab minority which would be subject to Zionist rule? 
3. Partition was not fair or just and discriminated against the 
Palestinians. While it allocated one-third of the population, who owned 
about 7 percent of the land, over half the country including almost all 
the Citrus, Cereal, and irrigable lands and water resources, it offered 
the Arab two-thirds majority who owned 93 percent of the total land less 
than half the lands of their country and which had not sufficient 
resources to establish a viable state. 
4. Partition was not recommended because it was based on justice, 
equality and to solve the conflict but rather it was an endorsement of a 
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Zionist scheme which was supported by the United States of America. Such 
an unfair plan was not possible without the pressure and influence of 
the United States and her allies in the U. N. 
The Palestinians, however, demanded the establishment of a Unitary 
State but at the last moment they were prepared to support a federal 
state. 
The Partition Plan actually was not officially implemented because, 
firstly Britain refused to allow the Palestine Commission to enter 
Palestine and do the preparatory work recommended in the Partition 
resolution, such as demarcating boundaries and establishing local 
government and militias, secondly Arabs' opposition and thirdly the 
refusal of the U.S.A and their Allies to establish an international 
force to supervise the implementation of partition because they did not 
want Russian forces in the Middle East. Consequently, a civil war broke 
out in Palestine during the last six months of the Mandate. During this 
local strife the Zionist forces succeeded in occupying Arab towns and 
territories in excess of the areas allocated to the Jewish state by the 
Partition Plan. The Zionists used every possible means to force the 
Arabs from their homes and lands. This included massacres, mortar 
shelling, time bombs and later actual expulsion. Before the end of the 
Mandate about 200,000 Palestinians had fled or been expelled from their 
homes, forming about one third of the total Palestinian refugees until 
the end of 1948. What aggravated the refugee problem was the refusal of 
"Israel" to withdraw from those areas occupied, in the course of the 
1948 war in excess of the areas allocated to them by the Partition 
resolution and her refusal to allow the Palestinian refugees to return 
or to compensate those of them who opted not to return according to the 
U. N resolution 194 (Ill) of December 1948. 
This "Israeli" attitude on the occupied Arab territories and the 
refugees supports the argument that the expulsion of the refugees was a 
pre-determined policy of the Zionists which was intended to make room 
for more immigrants and make possible the establishment of an 
exclusively Jewish state. It also supports the Arab argument about the 
expansionist nature of the Jewish state which up today has refused to 
withdraw from the Arab territory occupied in 1948 and has annexed other 
Arab territories such as Arab Jerusalem and the Golan Heights after the 
1967 War. 
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If the Zionists succeeded in giving the impression that the Palestine 
conflict was a conflict between two nationalist movements and not a 
conflict between a native population and foreign settlers, "Israel" too 
succeeded in converting the conflict from one between the Zionists and 
the Palestinians over the sovereignty of Palestine into a regional 
conflict between the Arab States and "Israel". 
It is the contention of this thesis that the Palestinians are at the 
heart of the conflict and that there is no hope for any settlement 
without addressing and solving the Palestinians' economic, social, human 
refugee and political problems and this is not possible until the 
Palestinians point of view is properly understood. 
I would argue that the imposition of Partition on Palestine against 
the express wishes of the majority of its inhabitants cannot be 
justified and can in no way be considered as a respect for or compliance 
with the U.N.'s Charter especially Article 73, concerning Mandated 
terri tori es, in wh i ch the U. N. undertakes to promote the "well bei ng" of 
the inhabitants of these territories and to take their "political 
aspirations" into account. Having said that, it seems to me constructive 
to stress the following points: 
1. The Arabs blamed the United States more than Russia for the 
adoption by the U.N. of the Partition Plan but practically, without the 
Russian support for Partition it would not have been possible to pass 
the General Assembly and therefore, both America and Russia bear equal 
responsibility for the Partition of Palestine and the creation of the 
present conflict. 
2. That the Palestinians missed a worthwhile opportunity in 1939 when 
they declined to accept the British White Paper. 
3. That the Palestinians followed on many occasions the wrong tactics 
during their handling of the conflict with the British Government or 
before the U.N. For example, the Arabs knew that the Zionists would not 
accept British proposals which were submitted by the Royal Commission, 
Woodhead Commission or during the London Conference, but they failed to 
capitalize on this Zionist rejection by reaching a deal with Britain. It 
was also known to the Arabs that the Zionists, supported by the United 
States, were determined to get the U.N.'s endorsement for Partition. 
They knew also that any Partition could not pass the General Assembly 
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without support from Russia. The Russians at the beginning of the debate 
were in favour of a federal state. It was the Arabs who refused to 
discuss the federal proposal until it was too late and after the 
Russians had made up their minds and voted in support of Partition. 
3. Arab rejection of Partition, after it was accepted by both East and 
West, without possessing their own military forces to resist Partition 
and without thinking of the consequences, left them not only isolated, 
politically and militarily defeated but also they lost the logic of the 
argument and were left without much sympathy. The Palestine tragedy 
passed almost unnoticed. 
This Arab position on the U.N.'s proposal, gave the Zionists a golden 
opportunity, which they utilized to the maximum, and it made easy their 
task of influencing world public opinion that the Arabs were 
"aggressors" instead of the victims, and were uncompromising extremists 
instead of being unfairly treated and not consulted. 
The Arabs, however, did not recover and were not able to correct this 
image in world public opinion, since after this defeat and humiliation, 
by the Zionists and "Israelis", they tried to keep some kind of dignity 
by refusing to recognize "Israel". Although such a position cost the 
Palestinians most of their lands and dispersed the majority of the 
Palestinian people allover the Middle East's Arab countries, the Arabs 
found it difficult to recognize a state which was established by the use 
of force and still occupied Arab territories just because they were 
defeated. 
4. If the Arabs had accepted Partition, after it became evident that 
it was not possible to reverse the U. N decision or to prevent its 
implementation by their own forces, they would have perhaps made it 
extremely difficult for the British Government to allow the Zionists, as 
she did, to occupy Arab towns and territories and to displace or expel 
about 200,000 Palestinians before the end of the Mandate and while 
Britain was officially responsible for law and order in the whole 
country. 
Palestinians' acceptance of Partition would have made the Zionists 
action against the Palestinians, if it had happened at all, unacceptable 
in the eyes of their own allies. It would have deprived the Zionists of 
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the propaganda advantage which they gained as a result of Arab refusal. 
It would have confined the Jewish state into recognized borders and with 
the Palestinians holding on to their homes and lands and through their 
participation in the administration of the Jewish state, Zionist 
ambitions to establish an exclusive Jewish state, bringing more 
immigrants or expansion, would have been unattainable at least because 
there would always have been a substantial Arab minority and the extra 
lands would have been unavailable since most of the land was in Arab 
hands. 
5. Although the position of the Palestinians is appreciated and 
understandable, since they could not accept solutions based on 
principles other than justice, equality and the right to 
self-determination, they nevertheless failed to realize that time was 
not to their advantage and that every proposal or plan was worse than 
its predecessor. The proposals of the 1939 White Paper were much better 
than those of 1946; the Partition Plan of 1937 was better than that of 
1947 and so on. 
The practical implications of this study are obvious. For the 
Palestinians it has been revealed that although they have a just case 
and that they were the victims of British and Zionist colonialism they 
nevertheless followed unsuitable tactics during their handling of the 
problem during the Mandate both with the British Government and before 
the U.N. As a result of rivalries, divisions and interference from 
different Arab countries they failed to present a uniform and clear 
strategy and to state their goal and the right methods to achieve it. 
Even 
put 
this 
today they 
to the world 
goal. What 
still suffer from these symptoms and appear unable to 
a clearly defined goal and acceptable ways to achieve 
the Palestinians need to do, in my view, and in the 
study is carry out an honest review of their previous 
position and tactics, to learn from them and then to build their 
arguments and strategy on the U. N's resolutions which, although these 
would not give them all they wanted nor compensate them for all their 
losses and sufferings it nevertheless, would put the conflict in the 
right context namely: That they were the victims, they were the party 
who had been denied the right to establish their own state according to 
the U.N. resolution and that "Israel" is the party which refuses to 
1 ight of this to 
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withdraw 
homes or 
according 
from their lands and to allow the refugees to return to their 
compensate those among them who do not want to return, 
to the U.N. resolution 194 (Ill) of December 1948. 
Such a Palestinian position would not only find support from the rest 
of the world but also would expose Israel's ambitions and its true 
nature and consequently would lead to its isolation, something which 
might push her towards accepting a compromise solution. 
For IIIsrael ll it is to their advantage too to show genuine readiness to 
recognize the rights of the Palestinian people for the establishment of 
their state which was recommended by the same U.N. resolution which 
IIIsrael ll claims as the Illegal" bases for its existence. 
Time and events have proved that the Palestinians were a major factor 
in the conflict and that there would be no lasting settlement without 
solving the human and political problems of the Palestinians people. The 
illusion of the Zionist movement and later~Israer that the Jewish 
problem would end once they established an exclusively Jewish state in 
Palestine, 
least be 
and that the Palestinian problem would cease to exist or at 
reduced to a refugee problem which might be solved through 
assimilation in the Arab world, have also proved to be wrong. 
The insistence of "Israel" on its annexation and occupation of Arab 
lands, its refusal to comply with U.N. resolutions in regard to Arab 
territories and Palestinian refugees has led to four major wars up to 
now and undoubtedly could eventually lead to a nuclear arms race and 
perhaps a nuclear war with its disastrous consequences on both sides and 
perhaps on the world. 
The refusal of the Palestinians to recognize or accept a settlement 
based on principles other than justice and equality despite all the 
losses and suffering which have been inflicted upon them, is a 
reflection of their bitter feelings and a clear indication that they 
would not surrender their rights and that they would continue their 
struggle until a satisfactory settlement could be reached. It is in my 
view, the duty of the Palestinians, the Arabs and the Jewish leaders to 
explore all possibilities to find and reach a just solution which is in 
the interest of all people in the Middle East and the World. 
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